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The dynamics of policy change are inevitably complex, and 
can involve inputs at all stages of the policy process. These 
stages are to some extent interdependent, and the expertise 
of the implementer, together with the usually long time-scale 
involved in an implementation process, would suggest that those 
who execute a policy are particularly well placed to influence 
change. At the same time there is also considerable scope for 
discontinuity within the process, with the result that policy 
change can come about from autonomous events at the policy-making 
level, and have little connection with the work of the 
implementer. The aggregative model of implementation, put 
forward by Dunsire, is considered to be a particularly valuable 
tool for gauging these connections and discontinuities. 
The case study examines the creation and implementation of 
legislation affecting the bus industry since the beginning of 
the Twentieth Century. The category of operators chosen for 
study is that of the territorial busmen, who in earlier years 
were subject to the control of the entrepreneurs, but in recent 
times have come under state ownership in the form of the 
National Bus Company (NBC). An organizational analysis of the 
NBC suggests that it retains many of the traditional values of 
the company busmen, despite suffering from declining passenger 
demand. The final part of the case study looks at a number of 
NBC subsidiaries, and traces the inter-organizational dynamics 
of the relationship with the County Councils in which their 
services operate. 
The evidence of the case study suggests that the capacity 
for discontinuity within the policy process was initially 
ABSTRACT (concluded) 
under-estimated, and that although implementers possess great 
power within their own sphere, it is policy-makers who are in 
a more advantageous position to initiate radical change. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND THE NATURE OF 
THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS 
In this chapter we will firstly give a working definition 
of implementation, followed by a model of the policy process, 
and the function of the implementation process within it. The 
nature of the implementation process is examined principally in 
the context of studies by Heclo, Hood, Dunsire, Downs, Pressman 
and Wildavsky and Richardson and Jordan. The theoretical 
writing on implementation is relatively sparse, but these 
particular writers offer a good cross-section of the principal 
theories. At the conclusion of the chapter we attempt to 
indicate the main points concerning the nature of the 
implementation process, and briefly outline the contents of the 
case-study on implementation and the road passenger transport 
industry. 
A. Implementation and the Policy Process 
A Definition of Implementation and Its Function in the 
Policy Process 
If we examine implementation as a phase of the policy 
process, we would usually consider it to be that part which 
immediately follows the completion of the legislative phase. 
In the British context, once a Bill has been given the Royal 
Assent, it becomes an Act ready to be implemented. We might 
assume that in an ideal situation the Act will set out the 
changes it intends to bring about to the real world (i. e., its 
objectives), and also the means which will be adopted to produce 
these changes. By stating the objectives themselves, and the 
means by which they are to be obtained, the Act will attempt to 
give clear guidance to those who are charged with the 
2 
responsibility of implementing its provisions. When the process 
of implementation has been monitored and judged to be completed, 
then a process of evaluation can commence which will enable 
government to assess the exact degree of success which has been 
achieved, and hence learn valuable lessons which may be 
incorporated in any further round of policy-making on this subject. 
This basic model of a seemingly "perfect" policy process 
assumes with a naive optimism that the real world can be altered 
in a specific way. Within the model there is an implicit 
assumption that policy objectives are realistic (e. g., a policy 
objective which rested on the premise that the world is flat 
would not fit this model) and, also, that a chain of authority 
and control will be created (if it does not already exist) in 
order that the desired policy objective can be brought about. 
If, however, the real world refuses to change in the manner 
prescribed by the policy objectives, or the means of achieving 
the objectives does not exist, then implementation will be 
regarded as a failure in this instance. 
As a starting point, this simple model can be used in order 
to give us a working definition of implementation. Implementation 
is that stage of the policy process where the means of obtaining 
a given objective are activated, followed by the period when 
these means are put into practice by those charged with this 
responsibility. The process will continue until the policy 
objectives have been achieved (or maintained) and/or a fresh 
policy process is activated. This definition of implementation 
can be related to the stages of the policy process outlined by 
Lewis Gunn. 
1 
These are: 
1. Problem-Search 
2. Problem-Definition 
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3. Forecasting 
4. Objective-Setting 
5. Identifying and Comparing Relevant Options 
6. Policy Implementation 
7. Policy-Monitoring and Programme Evaluation 
The nature of Gunn's model emphasizes that making, 
implementing and evaluating policy is an interlinking process. 
In fact, in identifying a stage of the policy process known as 
implementation, it is likely that there will be blurring at the 
edges, and even within the process itself, for no stage of the 
policy process stands in isolation. 
Firstly, a number of policy options may be tested at one 
time, meaning that selection of a final option will only take 
place after a process of implementation, or a particular option 
be simply allowed to emerge by a process of natural selection 
during implementation. 
Secondly, when a bureaucracy is itself the target of a 
policy objective within the implementation process (i. e., when 
government changes the bureaucracy's structure or standing 
procedures in order to bring about greater efficiency) then 
implementation and policy impact can be inextricably intertwined. 
Thirdly, policy monitoring is an inherent part of the 
implementation process, while evaluation can take place when 
implementation is still in progress. In some instances a 
time-scale may be of such a length that it is difficult to 
determine when implementation has been completed. For example, 
when a public corporation is set up and its duties and 
obligations are detailed in legislation, then the corporation's 
long-term behaviour represents continuing implementation of 
this original Act. During this period, corporation policy may 
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be externally evaluated many times, but until new legislation is 
passed the corporation can claim to be implementing the Act by 
which it was founded. 
Fourthly, Gunn's classification appears to incorporate 
policy impact into policy implementation. Can a policy's impact 
on its clients be regarded as part of the implementation process ? 
On many occasions the implementers and evaluators may be one and 
the same, e. g., a bus company provides a service to its 
passengers but will usually also evaluate that service and 
adjust it accordingly. In this case it might be said that the 
service itself represents the impact of implementation on the 
public, or alternatively, that the bus running on the road and 
carrying passengers is the final stage of the implementation 
process. There is a blurring between implementation and policy 
impact where the implementer meets his clients which suggests 
that an unambiguous categorization is impractical. 
These examples illustrate that in the real world the 
various parts of the policy process are interlinked and 
interdependent to an extent which would make it unrealistic to 
consider implementation as being divorced from the preceding 
and succeeding stages. We have seen that on a time-scale there 
will usually be considerable overlap between the various 
elements of the process. Nevertheless, there can also be 
considerable discontinuities. If a policy possesses conflicting 
objectives, or is out of touch with reality, then this will 
present enormous implementation problems. Similarly, policy 
evaluators will have difficulty in performing their job if 
implementers are either unwilling to co-operate or unable to 
understand the evaluator's questions and give misleading 
information. Finally, if as a result of these difficulties, or 
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the evaluator's shortcomings, the wrong conclusions are drawn 
about the quality of the policy, then the policy-makers will be 
liable to initiate a faulty policy-making process. 
We can therefore observe that there is ample opportunity 
for failure within the policy process. In fact, within the 
"perfect" model, we can note that the mere presence of an 
evaluator indicates a particular type of policy "failure. " If 
we imagined a single line policy process, then it would cease 
when the policy had been implemented. Monitoring could take 
place in order to ensure satisfactory implementation, but the 
line would be discontinuous. 
2 If the single line is required 
only to achieve a specific objective at a single moment in time, 
then it may suffice, but without evaluation feedback to the 
policy-makers, the line has no other purpose than its own limited 
function. Without any information as to how a policy had 
affected the real world, the policy-makers would be able only 
to base their judgment on instinct and their own values. This 
lack of continuity would apparently mean that the second policy 
process line was not "perfect". Once the link between each 
policy process line is broken, the process would appear to 
break down. 
A more realistic view might be that in the course of time 
the policy-makers will change, either in terms of personnel or 
in attitude and approach. Thus when they receive information 
from an evaluator or the implementer himself, another policy 
line may be initiated (if the policy objectives continue to be 
met policy-makers could decide that no further action is 
required, and wait until further feedback is obtained at a later 
date). In this model the evaluator analyses the policy at a 
particular moment in time, and the policy-maker may act on this 
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information. Alternatively, the policy-makers may have changed 
their views to such an extent (e. g., as a result of a change in 
government) that the new policy is based on different values 
and conceptions of reality rather than a straightforward 
"learning" process. We should also note that even with an 
unchanged policy those individuals or groups who either operate 
or receive the effects of the policy may have changed their 
behaviour after an evaluation has taken place. In this case 
the policy may no longer be appropriate. 
If a policy remains unchanged amidst changes in the real 
world, then an emphasis will be placed on the work of the 
implementer. Rather than carry out a series of specific tasks 
set by the policy-maker, he may interpret his responsibilities 
in a way which is appropriate to the new set of circumstances. 
In this case the initial "straight line" becomes indistinct, 
and is replaced by a more significant series of interactions 
between implementing individuals and groups. Even when a new 
policy line is initiated it will only be a "straight line" if 
the implementers do not use their own experience to modify its 
nature. Implementers may thus be powerful agents of policy 
change, either through reinterpreting an existing policy or by 
giving advice to government on the formation of a new policy. 
The implementer's power can be greater still if he is his own 
monitoring agent and evaluator. We should note, however, that 
governments may still find means of having the last word, and 
also that clients of the policy may also wish to participate in 
the policy-making process. 
The Nature of Change 
Hugh Heclo attempts to analyse the policy process by 
outlining a continuum of change, ranging from the static to the 
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dynamic. 
3 At the static end, we can isolate a particular 
moment in time, and attempt to: ". ... find what goes with 
what. " 
4 Statics can be developed in order to discover how a 
process can maintain equilibrium over time, and also how 
external changes can affect the equilibrium. Dynamics begin 
where the occurrence of one stage is dependent on the occurrence 
of a particular preceding and succeeding stage. This analysis 
proceeds whereby the constant interplay between bureaucracy 
and its environment produces a kind of synthesis ("selective 
reprogramming") which creates the ultimate dynamic process of 
comprehensive reprogramming. The latter indicates general 
changes in attitude and approach brought about by everyday 
interactions. 
The static end of the continuum can be equated with the 
contact between implementation and policy impact (i. e., which 
policy objectives are suitable to achieve a particular impact 
at a particular time). The development of statics could be 
equated with the maintenance of a steady state relationship 
between implementer and client, together with the influence of 
external factors. An examination of dynamic change would 
proceed through analysing how a change in one element of the 
process led to a sequence of changes in the other elements, and 
would continue through an examination of results produced by 
the constant interplay between the elements in the process. 
Finally, comprehensive reprogramming can be equated with the 
general changes emanating from and influencing the constant 
interplay. 
The concept of comprehensive reprogramming is particularly 
important to our study for two reasons. Firstly, it suggests 
that an accumulation of everyday interactions causes each 
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policy element to reinterpret its position, and that an 
accumulation and interaction of these reinterpretations will 
lead to a new form of the system. Secondly, it indicates that 
interaction itself has a synthesizing quality, i. e., general 
change will occur because, through interaction, each element 
in the process accepts the fact that it has occurred. In turn, 
the importance placed on the value of interaction itself as a 
synthesizer, suggests that the trend of political activity 
normally tends towards some form of consensus. 
A practical dilemma, confronting both the policy-maker and 
implementer, is to judge if conflict within the system should 
be accepted at any particular moment in order to bring about a 
general consensus in the long-term. In examining political 
activity, it can often be difficult to place a particular policy 
objective within a general consensus of policy objectives. 
Consensus with regard to one objective can lead to conflict 
over another objective. If we examine the policy process over 
a wide area and a long period of time, we can perhaps identify 
a very general consensus of values, (e. g., the general 
acceptance of Keynesian principles in Britain during the 1950s 
and 1960s) but within that consensus we are likely to find 
internal conflict which in time will produce a further general 
consensus. Although comprehensive reprogramming can permeate 
all elements of the process, it may itself be a function of 
everyday interactions brought about by the attempts of political 
actors to achieve a short-run consensus. The policy process may 
also contain a time overlap, in which yesterday's consensus 
plays an important part in shaping that of tomorrow. 
We have seen that our concept of the "perfect" policy line 
is in fact not perfect in the sense that a straight line can 
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convey its true nature. It is a complex system of overlaps, 
interactions, interdependencies and discontinuities over time 
which, although apparently leading towards consensus, is 
likely at any one time to contain the seeds of conflict. 
Within the process we also have seen that although 
policy-making can be of considerable importance, on a time-scale 
it represents only a small period in comparison with 
implementation. To some extent the position can be confused 
through the difficulty of identifying when monitoring and 
evaluation end, and policy-making begins. To the extent that 
evaluation can contain discussion of future options it could be 
regarded as a form of policy-making, and a policy idea might be 
discussed over a long period of time. While these processes 
are continuing, however, the previous policies are still being 
implemented, and will continue to be so until the next policy 
is officially introduced. Once it has commenced, interaction 
between implementer and clientele continues until it is 
officially altered or changed. As the amount of time which 
governments can give to change in one particular policy area is 
limited, it is likely that implementation will continue for a 
comparatively long period of time. We have already seen that, 
in order to keep track of the policy objective and the changing 
behaviour of his clients, the implementer is likely to use his 
own discretion and initiative. The importance of implementation 
in the policy process, and the behaviour of the implementer, 
brings us to consider the nature of the implementation process. 
B. The Limits of Administration. 
The "Perfect" Implementation Model. 
In our "straight line" model we regarded implementation as 
the means by which a policy objective is to be achieved. 
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Superficially, it might appear that, a policy which set out both 
its objectives and the means of achieving them would be likely 
to achieve satisfactory implementation, but there could of 
course be many other obstacles. The implementer might not 
understand his instructions, or deliberately disobey. The 
client could be, recalcitrant, and go out of his way to resist 
the implementer. Pressures of time might mean that implementation 
is rushed, and the objective not achieved. It might nevertheless 
be hoped that, if only theoretically, conditions of "perfect 
implementation" could be envisaged. 
Christopher Hood defines 'perfect administration' as being: 
a condition in which 'external' elements of resource 
availability and political acceptability combine with 
'administration' to produce perfect policy implementation. " 
5 
Based on the "total surveillance" society devised by J. B. Rule, 
Hood outlines the five major conditions which he considers to 
be necessary. if administration proper is to have no limiting 
effect on policy outcomes. The five conditions are: 
1. A unitary administrative system, like a huge army with 
a single line of authority. Any conflict of authority might 
potentially weaken administrative control, and all information 
should be collated at a single point, in order to avoid 
compartmentalism. 
2. The norms or rules enforced by the system have. to be 
uniform. Objectives must be kept uniform if the unitary 
administrative system is to be fully effective. 
3. Perfect obedience or perfect control. If perfect 
obedience cannot be obtained, perfect control will ensure that 
recalpitrance is nullified. 
4. Perfect information and communication. This includes 
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perfect co-ordination. 
5. The absence of time pressure. Time must be allowed 
for administrative resources to be brought to bear. 
The Conceptual Limits of "Perfect Implementation". 
These five conditions offer a valuable insight into the 
nature of administrative control, but are they the conditions 
necessary to bring about "perfect implementation" ? At the 
core of the five conditions is the assumption that, "total 
surveillance" is necessary if perfect implementation is to be 
achieved. The image is similar to that of the single line 
policy process, where the implementer is given explicit details 
of his task and, carries it out with total obedience, but our 
model of the dynamic policy process suggests that more is 
required of the implementer than pure obedience. If it is 
assumed that better implementation will be achieved if the 
implementer is allowed some discretion, then can the fulfilment 
of Hood's five Qonditions be regarded as "perfect implementation" ? 
There is the further difficulty of identifying "perfect 
implementation" as the successful completion of an internal 
bureaucratic process, and/or the. auccessful achievement of the 
original policy. objective. If the implementer behaved 1, ike an 
automaton, and carries out the wishes of his controller-, even 
if he sees.. that the policy objectives are not being achieved, 
can this be regarded as "perfect implementation" ? In the 
"total -surveillance" model we must therefore assume that 
"perfect implementation" refers to both the means of achieving 
the objective and the -achievement of the objective itself. It 
could nevertheless also be argued that "perfect implementation" 
is the achievement of objectives, regardless of the means of 
achieving them. In a situation where the implementer has more 
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"grass roots" knowledge than his superior, (e. g.,, where the 
implementer interacts with his clients) then the "total 
surveillance" model will break down., for in this case 
recalcitrance could be a definite asset to the achievement of 
"perfect implementation. " 
Hood states that when the five conditions are satisfied, 
administration will have no limiting effect on policy outcomes. 
We must therefore assume that a controller has perfect knowledge 
not only of the implementer or implementers, but also of the 
clients as well, for without thin total knowledge he will be 
unable to control policy outcomes. On the whole, the concept of 
"perfect implementation" is perhaps a relatively unfruitful 
means of examining and analysing the implementation process. 
If we examine the five conditions in turn, we can perhaps 
identify some of the conceptual limits of "perfect administration" 
1. For the pyramid system to be the most effective, it 
would appear that we must assume a purely downward movement of 
information. The single authority at the peak of the pyramid 
will have perfect knowledge of the entire system, which he will 
programme completely before the process commences. In this way, 
the system can be self-administering, without any feedback to 
the peak of the pyramid being required (this system is 
reminiscent of the "single line" policy process, where a single 
linear downward movement is sufficient) and either perfect control 
or perfect obedience must be assumed. If the single peak 
authority has complete knowledge of the programme, but commences 
it by only instructing each element with regard to its initial 
task, then when that task is completed, feedback and new 
instructions will be required in order that the second task may 
commence. In this situation a single peak authority is 
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apparently not the most effective structure, for, given a second 
peak authority of equal capacity and knowledge, the task will be 
completed twice as quickly. It might be argued that an infinite 
number of peak authorities of equal capacity and knowledge is 
still in fact one authority, but this implies fulfilment of the 
fourth condition of perfect co-ordination, which we will examine 
shortly. 
2. Although we can conceive of a single uniform objective 
in the sense of a policy outcome, the means of achieving that 
outcome requires that each sub-unit of the system will have an 
individual objective at a particular time. At that moment, the 
sub-unit will see the world in terms of completing its part of 
the task. In a sense, to envisage the process purely in terms 
of the final objective is tautological, as if the policy-maker 
is saying: "to achieve the objective we must achieve the 
objective". 
3. Perfect control is a state which it is difficult to 
envisage theoretically. Firstly, a subordinate might be immune 
to all threats, but secondly and more significantly, a control 
system requires some form of feedback. During this time, the 
subordinate can devise methods of recalcitrance and hence keep 
ahead of the control system. Although recalcitrance may be 
forestalled, the contemplation of disobedience implies that 
attention is turned away from the task in hand, and is in itself 
a departure from the 'perfect' system. In addition, the process 
of control requires strict surveillance, and as analysis of the 
first condition suggested, the unitary system does not provide 
this in its most efficient form. 
Although the subordinate could behave with perfect obedience, 
his superior can never be sure that he is perfectly obedient 
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unless he operates some form of monitoring system. Once again, 
this will require more than the unitary authority. Our analysis 
therefore suggests that perfect obedience and perfect control 
are in conflict with the concept of a unitary authority as one 
of the conditions necessary for 'perfect implementation'. 
4. Our analysis of perfect co-ordination is based on the 
implementation model of Andrew Dunsire, which we will be 
considering in detail later in this chapter. For perfect 
co-ordination, we must assume that all instructions are perfectly 
understood. We have seen, in our analysis of objectives, that 
each sub-unit will have its own task. If we assume a common 
language amongst and between all the sub-units, then this will 
be a lowest common denominator, and will not satisfy the needs 
of each specialized sub-unit. If we allow each unit to develop 
its own specialized language as ,a means of 
describing aspects 
of its work, then in order to achieve co-ordination between 
units, some form of interpretation at the margin will be required. 
Interpretation is not a finite process. In attempting to define 
a particular specialized activity to those not'involved in it, 
there will always be some form of cognitive gap, based on each 
individualrs unique personal stock of knowledge and experience. 
6 
In this sense, perfect co-ordination cannot be achieved, and 
even if the infinite number of peak authorities in our first 
condition is regarded as one, interpretative difficulties will 
occur. 
5. Some form of time pressure is inherent in the 
implementation process. If we state an objective, then there 
must be an assumption that at some date in the future the 
objective will be achieved, otherwise there would be no point in 
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having an objective at all. In addition, implementation will 
usually require a sequence of activities to be co-ordinated. 
In order for this sequence to take place, it will need to be 
programmed over a certain period of time. 
The limits of Control 
It appears that when we take the "perfect implementation" 
model to its theoretical limits, there are internal weaknesses 
within the system. It represents a particular style of 
implementation based on a chosen set of values. Hood himself 
points out the weakness of this system in stating that: 
"One difficulty which has been identified by many writers is 
that the word 'dysfunctionality' implies a prior judgment about 
what organizations ought to be doing, whereas in practice, people 
in organizations have multiple and conflicting objectives, and 
the objectives of the 'bosses' are open to challenge. " 
7 
A method of implementation based on total surveillance is likely 
to prove itself too naive and simple to be effective in the 
real world. It is based on a judgment which regards uniformity 
and control as being the primary means of effective policy 
implementation. The nature of our policy process model suggests 
that where external conditions are changing, the implementer 
will be required to use his discretion if the policy is to be 
implemented at all. Ironically, cumbersome control devices 
within the bureaucratic system would usually be inappropriate in 
the case where implementers wish to maintain control over their 
objectives. This is a dilemma of control referred to by Hood, 
who gives the following example: It. ... police officers who 
are given no opportunity to 'get their hands dirty' will be 
unable to obtain intelligence from the criminal 'underworld', 
but allowing police officers to pursue secret intelligence 
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activities on their own, inevitably introduces opportunities for 
corruption. " 
8 This classic dilemma indicates that an 
implementation method employed at one level of the process can 
produce its opposite at another level, and vice versa. It is 
not just a matter of examining differing styles of implementation 
between implementation processes, but also styles of 
implementation within one process. 
Hood gives a valuable and exhaustive list of implementation 
problems based on relaxing the five conditions of 'perfect 
implementation'. He classifies these limits within three 
categories. Firstly, external or extra-administrative limits. 
These include cases where there is a shortage of resources or 
where the policy lacks political feasibility. The latter will 
usually occur when certain dominant interests, within either 
the bureaucracy or its clients, refuse to accept the policy as 
it stands. Secondly, administrative limits. These are cases 
where implementation fails because of internal weaknesses or 
dilemmas within the administrative system itself (this category 
could include the control dilemma referred to earlier). 
Thirdly, quasi-administrative limits. This term refers to 
implementation failure caused by weaknesses within the policy 
itself, most frequently found in cases where conflicting 
objectives make the policy administratively unworkable. 
The difficulty with a categorization of this sort is in 
identifying and classifying a particular problem. If a particular 
method of implementation occurs when we relax the conditions of 
'perfect implementation', then there is a danger that we may 
interpret this behaviour as indicating an administrative limit, 
when in fact it represents an alternative administrative style. 
If it is discovered by an official that a policy is most 
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effectively implemented if he allows his subordinate a certain 
degree of discretion, then in this particular case the mix of 
control and discretion employed might be described as the optimal 
means of achieving policy goals. 
It might also be the case that when the implementer and his 
client interact, the quality of the policy will be improved if 
a mutual learning process takes place between them. Hood refers 
to reciprocal learning as being the case whereAearning takes 
place against an environment which is also learning. Where the 
environment is hostile, Hood portrays the relationship as being 
of a 'cat and mouse' type, with both sides continually trying 
to outwit one another. As we have already indicated, there will 
always be some scope for recalcitrance. In the sense referred 
to when we were discussing co-ordination limits, mutual learning 
could also signify a case where the two sides are attempting to 
interact and understand each other's behaviour, and hence 
achieve some kind of consensus. In discussing this process, 
Hood refers to the 'lumpiness' and 'slippage' of language 
('lumpiness' meaning the manner in which language fails to define 
a situation exactly, and 'slippage' being the tendency for people 
to place their own interpretation on a particular word). These 
learning problems can occur because of a genuine failure to 
understand, or because one side deliberately chooses to 
misunderstand. 
Hood places the emphasis on 'deliberate' misunderstanding, 
and considers that: "The degree of hostility in the environment 
is the key factor. To a large extent, recalcitrance is the 
raison d'etre of administration. one 'administers' because 
there is or may be resistance in the system. But recalcitrance 
is also a limiting factor, indeed the limiting factor; in many 
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cases. The more that the authorities try to prohibit or to 
enforce activities that a significant proportion of ordinary 
people do not feel to be wrong or right, respectively, the more 
administrative difficulties they will encounter. " 
9 It 
therefore appears that, although there are limits to control, 
there is no limit to recalcitrance. The implementer faces 
dilemmas and limits to the degree of control he can operate, 
but theoretically and ultimately the client is uncontrollable. 
Hood concludes that: "In a dilemma there can by definition be 
no wholly satisfactory solution: but to know that there is no 
answer is itself an 'answer' of sorts, if only as a discouragement 
to naive hopes. There is no point in trying to 'fine tune' in 
such cases. Finally, 'limits' and 'possibilities' are merely 
the opposite sides of the same coin. " 
10 
Despite these limits, complex administrative processes take 
place each day and policies are implemented with at least 
relative success. Although various forms of control over 
recalcitrance can play a prominent part in the operation of 
implementation processes, recalcitrance itself might not be the 
raison d'etre of administration. In examining Andrew Dunsire's 
implementation model, 
11 
we can analyse an alternative 
exploration of how the implementation process operates in 
practice. 
C. "The aecution Process. " 
The Aggregative Model of Implementation. 
We examined earlier the prominent part played by 
implementation within the policy process, at least"on a 
time-scale, and also the discretion which mill usually be required 
of an implementer if he is to maintain-contact with his clients. 
In the previous section we attempted to indicate the inherent. 
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limitations of the "perfect implementation" model, and also 
discussed the possibility that control might not in fact be the 
central factor in achieving successful implementation. 
In essence, where Hood is discussing what can go wrong 
within the implementation process, Dunsire examines how things 
can go right within that same process. Dunsire's emphasis is 
on continuing administrative processes, where over a long period 
of time an organization will build up specialized knowledge, and 
apply that knowledge in performing a series of functions. 
Perhaps the key element in the model is the hypothesis that on 
the whole implementation is an aggregative rather than a 
developmental process. Dunsire considers that, if we study an 
organization, we will see a series of 'offices'. Within each 
'office', we will find: °. ... a person or persons endowed 
with the necessary skills, equipment, materials and 
authorization. " 
12 
Initially, the 'office' can be seen as a single unit, in 
which a particular range of activity takes place. The 
aggregative model then states that: "An intention is executed, 
an order completed, a plan activated (a decision implemented, 
a product or service produced, an application dealt with, a 
demand met, a stimulus responded to, etc) by linking together 
a chain, train, combination or converging network of such offices 
or work stations, assembling a sufficient number of appropriate 
work operations in a requisite sequence for the cumulated final 
output desired. " 
13 The implementation process is thus 
assembled by combining a number of individual 'offices' rather 
than developed from an original blue-print containing the whole 
process in embryo. 
20 
Dunsire employs the example of a particular case study 
(the almost uncontested closure of a branch railway line in 
Yorkshire) to examine the validity of this hypothesis. He 
concludes that the aggregative model is most applicable at the 
higher and lower ends of the process, but less so in the middle. 
At the higher end, a Cabinet decision on public expenditure 
levels will involve an examination of the National economy as a 
whole, with the future of the railway system one element within 
that total. The Cabinet is an 'office' with the task of making 
decisions on the economy as a whole, and railway finance is but 
a relatively small part of that whole. At the lower end, a 
ballast loader will not consider that the function of his work 
is to form part of a particular implementation process. He will 
perform the task within the context of his 'office' of ballast 
loading. In the middle, we may find civil servants or railway 
board officers whose main task is to develop a particular policy. 
They are not so independent of the process as the ballast loader, 
and must to a large extent base their behaviour of what takes 
place at preceding and succeeding stages of the process. 
14 
Dunsire concludes: "To generalize: the idea that individuals 
in the descending ranks of a hierarchy of authority are 
implementing a ministerial decision or carrying out a policy of 
his (or any one else's) is an-abstract one, one that derives 
from the interest of the observer or the enquirer, and is not 
inherent in, or even manifest in, the internal structure of the 
Ministry. " 15 
Problems of Communication 
The significance of the aggregative model leads Dunsire on 
to distinguish between the position of an office on a 
generality/specificity scale, and the degree of discretion to be 
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found within the office. On a generality/specificity scale, the 
Cabinet and senior civil servants would be placed at the 
generality end, while the ballast loader would appear at the 
specificity end. We could also say that a Minister concerned 
with problems on a National scale will possess a higher degree 
of discretion than the ballast loader. In another sense, 
however, it could be argued that a ballast loader could enjoy 
more discretion as to how he actually performs his job than a 
Minister hemmed in by all manner of external constraints. 
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Arising from this examination of the aggregative model and 
discretion within an 'office', Dunsire identifies particular 
'orders of comprehension'. These are 'clusters of activities', 
with each cluster having a different character from the others 
in the process. Each cluster will have its own individual 
language, in order to communicate information about the nature 
of activity within that cluster. As we outlined when examining 
the inherent limits of 'perfect implementation', a cognitive 
gap will exist between clusters and even within the cluster 
itself. Translation will take place on the margins, but over 
a large number of 'orders of comprehension', a large cognitive 
gap will appear. Dunsire illustrates this gap by employing a 
'Babel House' model, where messages issued at one end of the 
building would be unintelligible at the other end until they 
had been taken through a process of interpretation and 
translation by a series of units. 
This process of interpretation and translation can be seen 
as a series of triadic relationships where the office in the 
middle sees the world in terms of instructions received from 
the 'office' above, and information received from the 'office' 
below. The 'office' in the middle will interpret an instruction 
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in terms of how it can be 'operationalized'. This will involve 
adding a certain amount of information, in addition to 
discounting any part of the instruction which seems irrelevant. 
By specifying the task, the 'office' will be able to undertake 
it more efficiently. When the 'office' in the middle passes 
the instruction on to the 'office' immediately below, it will 
contain certain assumptions about the nature of the instruction 
which the 'office' below will have to take on trust, for it 
cannot posses all the specialized knowledge of another 'office'. 
This process is known as uncertainty absorption, and will also 
occur when messages are passed upwards. Dunsire concludes that 
interpretation and uncertainty absorption should not be regarded 
as distortion of the system, but (given the nature of an 'office' 
and its discretion) as an essential means of performing the 
process. 
The manner in which the sequence of operations takes place 
could be regarded as programmes-within-programmes, whereby each 
unit is an individual 'machine' within the total process. Each 
unit will communicate with the unit above and below it in a 
vertical hierarchy, and also the parallel 'offices' on a 
horizontal plane. Nevertheless, the aggregative model and the 
discretion of the individual unit can give the process the 
appearance of being a network of communication between the units 
rather than a hierarchy of command. 
Dunsire's model focuses attention on the cognitive rather 
than the motivational aspects of the implementation process. 
He emphasizes that motivational elements of behaviour are always 
present in an organization, and that they can only be separated 
from the cognitive elements analytically. The particular 
importance which he places in the cognitive process is 
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nevertheless clear in this comment on the nature of administrative 
feedback: "Now there is no doubt that many men are lazy, 
self-seeking and fearful of what may happen if they tell the 
truth or allow their superior to learn the truth: the distortions 
introduced into the communication system by the use of 
information as a commodity must gravely affect a superior's 
ability to know what is going on. But - at the risk of flogging 
a dead horse - is it not the case that, before we can properly 
take the measure of such distortions, we must acquire some 
appreciation of what difficulties there might still be in knowing 
what is going on, even if all subordinates were keen, assiduous, 
dedicated only to the purposes of a superior and George 
Washingtons to a man ?" 
17 
The concept of administrative difficulties caused by 
communication itself is inherent in Dunsire's model. In a large 
Babel House with many languages the occupants may spend a large 
amount of time trying to understand one another, and as a result 
give relatively minor attention to tactical manoeuvring. 
The Benefits of the Aggregative Model 
Of perhaps even more importance for the nature of the 
implementation process is the concept of the aggregative model. 
The relatively high degree of autonomy and discretion allowed 
to each 'office' by the aggregative model suggests that any 
concept of the implementation process as a straight line, or of 
aiming towards a system of 'perfect control' would be mistaken. 
We saw in our policy process model that a policy-maker would be 
wise to allow the implementer the degree of discretion he 
requires to maintain interaction with his clients, but Dunsire's 
model suggests that 'orders of comprehension' and cognitive gaps 
are features of the process which create a natural discontinuity. 
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The model also indicates that recalcitrance is not necessarily 
the raison d'etre of administration, for even if conditions of 
'perfect obedience' existed, discontinuity would remain. It 
might also be mistaken to regard the nature of this discontinuity 
as an administrative limit. The degree of discretion and expert 
knowledge within an 'office' could be employed to advantage 
within the system. 
A dilemma is that, if these cognitive gaps and 'orders of 
comprehension' exist to the extent made apparent by Dunsire's 
aggregative model, can we examine an implementation process at 
all ? Dunsire analyses the implementation of a railway line 
closure, but nevertheless concludes that the idea of implementing 
a ministerial decision is an abstract one. It is true that a 
large Ministry will be dealing with a great many other things 
at the same time that the administrative process associated with 
closure of a particular railway line is handled, and also that 
to a ballast loader one particular job may represent only a 
small part of his total work, but does this signify that 
"Implementation is in the eye of the beholder. " ? 
18 
In the sense that within an 'office', an individual's 
activity may be influenced by many factors (e. g., past experience, 
organizational traditions, external constraints and internal 
objectives) it could be argued that a single activity is but 
a small insignificant part. 
This is a powerful image, and would appear to have a great 
deal of validity, but a particular implementation process need 
not exist merely in the eye of the outside observer. To the 
railway passenger who loses his local line, the effect of that 
process will be all too apparent, and he will not be inclined to 
think that the line has disappeared purely as the result of a 
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large number of people going about their everyday business. He 
will place the blame on the policy-makers at the Ministry or 
British Rail headquarters. The decision may form only a small 
part of a total strategy, but its implementation does have an 
identifiable impact on the real world. We noted earlier that 
the client may not be regarded as taking part in the 
implementation process, but in many cases (including the operation 
of a railway or a bus network) it is difficult analytically to 
separate the actions of the client from those of the implementer. 
There are many elements which can influence the implementation 
of a particular policy decision, and to someone operating within 
an aggregative process implementation may appear to be something 
else (e. g., running a ballast loading business), but if some 
kind of identifiable interaction takes place between the 
implementer and his clients as a result of that decision, then 
policy implementation would appear to have taken place (whether 
or not the interaction is of the nature originally intended). 
Dunsire's concept of 'orders of comprehension', the 'Babel 
House' model, and the aggregative nature of implementation and 
discretion within an 'office' give us a valuable and distinctive 
way of examining and analysing the implementation process. It 
implies that implementation should only be viewed as part of a 
total administrative and operational process, and that the 
nature of the process makes it inadvisable for one 'office' to 
think that it can fully understand and control the activity 
within any other 'office'. It also suggests that we should pay 
particular attention to the 'viewing point' of a single individual 
or unit within the process (this aspect of the model can be 
linked with the theory of Anthony Downs, which we will be 
considering shortly), for its aggregative nature means that 
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implementation may be profoundly affected by the manner in which 
it is treated by a particular unit. 
The Aggregative Model and Problems of Control. 
The nature of the aggregative model also suggests that 
attempts to impose a high degree of control may not only be 
impractical but also undesirable. Within Dunsire's implementation 
model, it might be thought that control can be at best only 
tenuous, given the apparent autonomy of each 'office' and the 
cognitive gap between 'orders of comprehension'. Dunsire, 
himself, considers that the greater the generality of the task 
(caused by an uncertain environment) and the higher the 
discretion made to a decision maker, then the more will control 
rest on self-regulation: "In routine clerical work, .... 
standards can be almost as 'objective' as in mass-production 
manufacturing industry. Specific skills and attitudes can be 
identified and inculcated; job evaluation and job specification 
can be applied. " 
19 In this case, deviation from a particular 
norm can be quickly detected, but at the other extreme: "Where 
the superior is not familiar with the subject-matter of the 
subordinate's work, the superior will not only lack the equipment 
for 'scanning for oddness', he will be conscious that he lacks 
the authority for it. Hierarchic authority will not do: if 
mutual esteem is to be maintained, sapiential authority is 
requisite. Such authority may be found elsewhere in the 
bureaucracy, but it may not, and in that case the subordinate 
has to be induced to contribute not only his own monitoring, but 
also his own standards of what he ought to measure up to. " 
20 
The subordinate cannot be made subject to duress, while the 
superior's lack of knowledge precludes any form of exchange. 
Duress and exchange are Dunsire's first two modes of 
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superior-subordinate relationship. Duress involves achieving 
compliance by means of sanctions, while exchange entails the 
winning of co-operation by the mutual recognition of contribution 
and obligation. The remaining relationship is one of 
identification, whereby the subordinate adopts (either 
spontaneously or by inculcation) the values, purposes and goals 
of his superior. Supplementary to its importance as a mode of 
achieving compliance within an organization, identification can 
be of considerable importance in building up an 
inter-organizational implementation process, for where no official 
hierarchy of authority exists, duress cannot be imposed. In 
addition, exchange can involve a great deal of complex 
bargaining, although a long and intense period of bargaining may 
lead to identification between the parties. The extent to which 
this process of identification may occur will be one of the 
considerations of this study. 
Dunsire sees an organization as being in a state of dynamic 
stability. It derives its stability not from remaining in a 
steady state, but from each unit within the organization 
continually adjusting its position with regard to other units, 
although still remaining within a given threshold. The concept 
of dynamic stability appears to be close to Heclo's idea of 
selective reprogramming, whereby change comes about through a 
constant interplay between elements in the policy process. Heclo 
takes the process one step further along the dynamic scale and 
identifies a process of comprehensive reprogramming, which is 
change brought about as the result of a synthesis in the elements 
within selective reprogramming. Identification could be seen as 
the manifestation of comprehensive reprogramming, for when 
members of an organization (or a number of organizations) accept 
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certain common values without any obvious self-interest being 
involved, then it might be explained by the constant interaction 
between individuals or units. 
The Importance of Everyday Interaction 
We stressed in our policy model the importance of the 
implementer being able to keep track of his clients. In doing 
so, the implementer will inevitably lose some degree of contact 
with the policy-makers or other members of the administrative 
process. This can be caused by a simple time lag, a cognitive 
gap, or perhaps even the implementer identifying his interest 
with that of the client rather than the policy-maker (this 
latter phenomenon could also be explained by the implementer 
and client occupying the same "order of comprehension"). In 
this case, an apparently natural phase of the implementation 
process can lead to the implementer switching identification 
from the values of the policy process to those of the client. 
In another case, the policy-maker may become affected by 
changes in the general "atmosphere". Having devised and 
implemented a particular policy, he may discover that it is no 
longer in tune with the general values and objectives of his 
government, and therefore has to choose between operating a 
policy which is unpopular with his colleagues, or making clumsy 
changes in a delicately balanced administrative system. Because 
the-world refuses to stand still, seemingly firm alliances can 
drift apart, and apparently sworn enemies find common values 
and goals. 
The unpredictability of these changes is liable to frustrate 
the most determined policy-maker, although it should be noted 
that he himself is part of the process of change, and because 
he identifies himself with new values and goals, may be relatively 
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unaware that change is taking place. It might be said that the 
implementation process is a dependent variable of this change, 
until we note that change itself is not something which appears 
out of thin air. In many cases it may come about through 
everyday interaction, although the nature of the interaction 
will rest on certain values and goals which themselves have 
been brought about by change. 
This interplay between everyday interaction and change is 
of considerable importance in studying implementation. When we 
examine an implementation process, we may quite rightly search 
for a pattern of interests, either of groups or individuals, as 
an explanation of how that process works, but we should also 
understand the nature of the interests themselves. On its own, 
a particular group or individual interest can appear meaningless, 
for it is the political process which gives it shape and 
significance. The degree to which the process creates or moulds 
an interest is perhaps of greater significance than the interest 
itself, for the values and goals of all interests will change to 
a greater or lesser extent over a period of time. 
The limits of Dynamic Stability 
Dunsire's concept of dynamic stability envisages a constant 
interplay between particular incompatible procedural objectives 
within an organization, (e. g., speed versus accuracy), but does 
not consider the general changes which this interplay can bring 
about. It could be argued that ultimately no dynamic system 
can be stable, and that the natural interplay between objectives 
could change the nature of the organization, or affect its place 
within the implementation process. Dunsire considers that the 
flexibility of approach brought about by stressing one objective, 
and then another, leads to a situation of balanced equilibrium. 
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The natural tension between objectives means that no unit within 
an organization can adopt one objective to the total exclusion 
of another. In turn, this tension enables one unit to balance 
with another: "Dispersed control of this kind (it is not really 
self-control) relieves the centre of an impossible burden of 
monitoring and enforcing priorities - which would be 
counter-productive in any case, since the priority among 
procedural objectives has to fit the circumstances of each 
decision. " 
21 Because the units are already in a state of 
balanced tension, a superior can exercise control by merely 
stressing the importance of one objective rather than another. 
In this way, the merest touch can enable the superior to bring 
about large-scale changes within subordinate units: "Control 
energy can be minute when large forces are in balance. " 
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With regard to implementation, we should perhaps also study 
how it comes about that one value is stressed rather than 
another, and its implications for change. In addition, we might 
question the nature of the movement, of the large forces which 
are set in motion by the minute energy of the superior. If the 
effect of the touch cannot be predicted, then the balance might 
be shifted uncontrollably, causing the organization to lose its 
stability. Given a high level of discretion within each. 'office', 
the degree of 'fine tuning' available to a superior might be 
limited, particularly in an organization where a degree of 
recalcitrance is present. 
In this section we have attempted to indicate the value of 
Dunsire's model in analysing the implementation process. Dunsire, 
himself, stresses that he has deliberately avoided all reference 
to motivational aspects of behaviour in order to study 
organizational processes as such, although he does not make clear 
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the extent to which he considers apparently motivational aspects 
can in fact be satisfactorily explained by the cognitive 
elements. He does at least implicitly suggest that everyday 
interaction within an implementation process can be more readily 
explained by the aggregative model, the cognitive gap etc. than 
by individual psychology and motivation. The model appears to 
become more strained when we consider the concept of control and 
dynamic stability. Dunsire's model rests heavily on an analogy 
with the physiology of, the human body, but unlike the body, the 
structure of the implementation process may be constantly 
changing. The nature of organizational (or inter-organizational) 
change defies enclosure within the analogy of a single structure, 
for the aggregative model itself suggests that parts can be used 
and then discarded. Once we introduce motivational elements and 
recalcitrance the analogy becomes impossible to sustain, for one 
part of the body does not totally rebel against another. 
We indicated earlier that the relationship between everyday 
interaction, producing consensus, conflict and ultimately 
general change is of considerable importance in analysing the 
implementation process. When an Act is implemented the nature 
of the various interests and the relationship between them (be 
they implementers or clients) can have profound effects in 
influencing the 'atmosphere' which surrounds the whole policy 
process including succeeding implementation processes. Even if 
we accept the validity of the aggregative implementation model, 
we cannot ignore the manner in which self-interest can influence 
the implementation process. Also, if Dunsire's model of dynamic 
stability fails to fully describe how change comes about within 
the implementation process, we need to examine how organizational 
or inter-organizational dyzLamics can bring about these changes. 
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In these two respects, the work of Anthony Downs offers useful 
guidance. 
D. "Inside. Bureaucracy" 
The Nature of Self-Interest 
The hypotheses put forward by Anthony Downs 
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stress the 
motivational aspects or organizational behaviour. If we 
over-simplify somewhat,, it could be said that while Dunsire 
emphasizes the co-operative nature of the implementation process, 
Downs emphasizes its competitive nature. Nevertheless, Dunsire 
makes a considerable number of references to Downs, and to some 
extent the two works do complement each other, for both are 
concerned with the nature of communication and control within an 
organization. Downs sets out his three central hypotheses as 
being: 
1. Bureaucratic officials seek to attain their goals 
rationally. 
2. Officials have a complex set of goals, but all will be 
influenced by a certain degree of self-interest. 
3. An organization's social functions (its interactions 
with the outside world) will strongly influence its internal 
structure, and vice versa. 
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The first hypothesis might be regarded as a dependent variable 
of the second, for where goals. conflict, there will need to be 
some degree of compromise between them. This might be particularly 
true where official interests conflict with self-interest. In 
this case, if an official seeks maximum rationality for his 
official goal, he might be sacrificing his own interest, and 
vice versa. 
A further complication is the degree to which official 
interests can be disentangled from self-interest. This difficulty 
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is similar in kind to considering uniform objectives as a 
condition of "perfect implementation". We argued that a division 
of labour required an individual to have a particular objective 
at a particular time, even when the ultimate o, ljective of the 
organization is held in common. That particular objective of 
the individual might be regarded as either an official or 
personal objective. In Dunsire's terms, the objective could be 
defined as an individual exercising his discretion within an 
'office'. In Downs' terms, the objective could be regarded 
(at least partly) as reflecting the individual character and 
personal ambitions of the individual. In reality, when an 
official is seen to be carrying out his allotted task, we can 
assume that he is operating in an official capacity. It is only 
when the official task comes into conflict with strictly personal 
objectives that the motivational aspects come into consideration. 
Each official will of course bring his own personal approach to 
a job, but where his efforts can be perceived as furthering the 
overall objectives of the organization (or an inter-organizational 
implementation process), the question of self-interest is of 
minor importance. 
As an illustration of how the separation between official 
and self-interest can work in practice, we can examine Downs' 
categories of individual character. Downs classifies officials 
by five "ideal types" - (similar terms might be applied to 
organizations) climbers, zealots, conservers, advocates and 
statesmen. Although a . 
few officials might be classified under 
one type exclusively, Downs suggests that the natural behaviour 
of an individual official will tend towards one of these types, 
although experience within the organization can cause him to 
switch types. Thus, a climber who realizes that he can go no 
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higher is likely to become a conserver, while a natural zealot 
at the top of an grganization will have-to behave as a statesman 
when questions concerning the "National interest" are to be 
considered. 
In thesQ cases, it would appear that individual behaviour 
is being shaped by organizational characteristics. The 
apparently "natural" climber becomes a "natural" conserver, 
while the enthusiastic zealot bepomes the objective statesman. 
If this behaviour is congruent with the_needs*of the organization, 
then the element of self-interest which may be involved is not 
significant. If, however, - the climber becomes a conserver when 
the organization requires him to remain a climber, or the zealot 
causes the organization to fail because he wishes to promote a 
new image. as a statssman,. then the self-interest of the 
individual become: significant, 
We should perhaps-also note that the short-term gains made 
by self-interest, might be offset by the damage to the individual 
which organizational failure, can bring. It might even be argued 
that while an individual remains a member of an organization, 
official interest and 
self-interest will invariably coincide in 
the long-term. We must-also avoid the trap of regarding the 
performance of official interest as being totally congruent with 
perfect obedience. In. a dynamic implementation process, the 
instinct of the individual that radical change is needed may be 
more beneficial for the interests of the policy than merely 
furthering the interests of an organization which has outlived 
its useful pur, )oße. 
Downs himself appears uncertain as to whether personal or 
official goals are of primary importance as the , causal elements 
of individual behaviour. In a hierarchy of goals, Downs regards 
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the personal goals as having a more profound effect on an 
individual's behaviour than the bureau-oriented goals. 
Nevertheless, he amplifies this hypothesis by stating that: 
"If society has created the proper institutional arrangements, 
their (the officials) motives will lead them to act in what they 
believe to be the public interest, even though these motives, 
like everyone else's, are partly rooted in their own 
self-interest. Therefore, whether or not the public interest 
will in fact be served depends upon how efficiently social 
institutions are designed to achieve that purpose. Society 
cannot insure that it will be served merely by assigning someone 
to serve it. " 
25 This statement, although somewhat enigmatic, 
appears to support the hypothesis that "institutional 
arrangements" will guide private motives in the direction of 
the public interest (despite the previously outlined hierarchy 
of goals). 
If, however, self-interest and official interest conflict, 
then the organization must find ways of imposing its will on 
the individual. We have already argued that "perfect control" 
is impossible, and so the organization is incapable of totally 
banishing self-interest from individual behaviour. In this 
case, the organization must endeavour, by means of coercive 
control or exchange, to ensure that official interests and 
self-interest coincide in the work of the individual, or 
alternatively that the individual (despite Downs' hierarchy of 
goals) can come to identify his interest with that of the 
organization. 
One of the insights we have gained from Dunsire is that of 
the aggregative implementation model, whereby a natural cognitive 
gap will exist between 'offices'. Dunsire is critical of Downs 
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for his failure to distinguish between cognitive and motivational 
elements in his analysis. In analysing communication within an 
organization, Downs describes changes in information during its 
transmission as distortion, and concludes that the particular 
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objectives of individuals within an organization will cause 
authority leakage. 
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Following Dunsire, we can argue that 
when an individual is perceived to be "doing his job", even if 
his behaviour contains a degree of self-interest, then it is 
more suitable to regard that behaviour as forming a part of the 
cognitive process. Analytically, it can more often than not be 
almost impossible to indisputably identify the behaviour of an 
individual as representing the performance of official interest 
or the defence of self-interest. Even then, the identification 
of self-interest becomes less important when it is placed in the 
context of an evolving interaction process. In this sense the 
concept of self-interest is of less analytical importance than 
the observation of an official's actual activity and its effect 
on implementation and policy impact. 
Further Characteristics of the Implementation Process 
Despite Downs' failure to distinguish between cognitive 
and motivational elements in the implementation process, he adds 
to Dunsire's analysis in three particular ways. Firstly, and 
arising from the motivational elements, there is the question of 
control. Given that officials do not always behave in the 
manner intended by their superiors, some kind of control system 
will usually be enforced within an organization (or sometimes 
between organizations). The emphasis which Downs places on the 
competitive nature of elements within an organization is 
particularly illustrated by his Law of Counter Control, which 
states that: "the greater the effort made by a sovereign or 
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top-level official to control the behaviour of subordinate 
officials, the greater the efforts made by those subordinates 
to evade or counteract such control. " 
28 This Law is closely 
linked to the concepts of distortion and authority leakage, and 
suggests the imperfect nature of any control system. Some type 
of monitoring system within an organization is usually necessary 
as a control device, but also as a means of feedback, performing 
a service as part of the cognitive process. 
Given the high cost of setting up elaborate control 
systems, it might be considered more suitable to engender a 
process of identification, but Downs considers that some degree 
of goal diversity (i. e., individual discretion) is required if 
the organization is to respond satisfactorily to environmental 
change. His Law of Countervailing Goal Pressures states that: 
"The need for variety and innovation creates a strain toward 
greater goal diversity in every organization, but the need for 
control and co-ordination creates a strain toward greater goal 
consensus. " 
29 This Law emphasizes the manner in which change 
takes place during an implementation process, for the strain 
towards variety and innovation (sometimes apparently manifested 
in self-interest) will take place both when an individual 
exercises his discretion within the organization, and also when 
implementers come into contact with their clients. The strain 
towards goal consensus represents the general recognition that 
to make the process work at all, a higher degree of co-operation 
is required. This activity does not necessarily represent a 
distortion of the policy process; it is in fact an integral 
part of it. 
Distortion can take place if implementers misrepresent the 
reality of what they are doing to the policy-makers. We can 
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illustrate this difference by examining the nature of an 
organizational ideology. In the cognitive sense, an ideology 
is a form of feedback, whereby an organization can explain to 
the outside world what it is doing in terms of information which 
can be easily assimilated by policy-makers. In the purely 
self-interested sense, however, an ideology can be used to 
exaggerate the importance and quality of the work which is being 
undertaken. Although this behaviour may have short-run benefits, 
in the long-run it may distort the whole process and lead to the 
organization spending more time on creating a false image than 
on doing its official job. In this case, official and 
self-interest clearly come into conflict, although eventually 
even self-interest will be damaged if the organization collapses 
under the strain of maintaining this misrepresentation. The 
dilemma for the policy-maker is that he needs to ensure that the 
implementer is doing his job, but that if he imposes too strict 
a degree of control, the essential flexibility of the implementer 
will be lost. (This is the dilemma referred to by Hood with 
regard to the work of a police force). 
The discretion of the implementer brings us to the dynamic 
nature of the implementation process, this being the second way 
in which Downs adds to Dunsire's analysis. The most obvious 
example of this dynamic quality given by Downs is his outline 
of the rigidity cycle, whereby an organization changes in 
character as it grows older. 
30 The larger an organization 
becomes, and the higher degree of control which is exercised over 
its members, the more rigid it becomes. When a task is set 
requiring a high degree of innovation, a new organization may be 
set up, but this organization will in turn find its. energy being 
dissipated. Organizational change is mirrored in the behaviour 
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of individuals, whereby climbers become conservers etc. The 
concept of the rigidity cycle suggests that eventually nearly 
all policy initiatives will run out of steam, and will need 
recharging periodically. 
We noted earlier that one of the principal considerations 
in examining an implementation process is to understand how 
change comes about, and the rigidity cycle can be an important 
factor in considering this problem. We should nevertheless 
note that an organization can exist for many years, and while 
experiencing many fluctuations in its fortunes, can maintain a 
high degree of success in achieving its goals (in a successful 
organization the goals might change over time). It might even 
be the case that an organization could commence in a rigid state, 
and become more innovative over time. 
A key to an organization remaining innovative could be its 
ability to remain flexible in responding to its environment 
(e. g., an implementer maintaining contact with his clients. ) The 
final way in which Downs adds to Dunsire concerns his third 
central hypothesis, that of an organization's social functions 
strongly influencing its internal structure and behaviour, and 
vice versa. Thus Downs' Law of Free Goods states that: 
"Requests for free services always rise to meet the capacity of 
the producing agency. " 31 and the Law of Inter-organizational 
Conflict states that: "Every large organization is in partial 
conflict with every other social agent it deals with. " 
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Paradoxically, this inter-organizational conflict, which may 
appear dysfunctional for the implementation process, can lead 
to innovation and progress. It is the paradox considered earlier, 
and which appears to be at the centre of the implementation 
process, whereby everyday interaction contains the seeds of 
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both consensus and conflict. Because implementation occupies 
such a large part of the policy process time-scale, it can 
influence or even come to dominate the whole process, epitomized 
in the manner by which a general "atmosphere" of common values 
and perceptions builds up and infiltrates the political world. 
Counteracting this force is the tendency for the cognitive gaps 
caused by 'orders of comprehension' to enclose information and 
values in pockets, thus causing discontinuities within the 
policy process. 
E. Multi-Organizational Implementation 
The Relevance of the Aggregative Model. 
If an inherent tension and conflict exists within and 
between organizations (and both Dunsire and Downs suggest that 
this is true), then actually setting up an implementation process 
is liable to present considerable difficulties. Apart from any 
motivational aspects, the aggregative model of implementation 
suggests that when someone considers that he is "just doing his 
job", he may not even understand that he has been designated to 
play an integral part in implementing a policy-maker's "grand 
vision". By employing the example of a particularly disastrous 
implementation process, Pressman and Wildavsky offer an insight 
into the nature of these inter-organizational tensions. 
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Their study also illustrates that a process of identification 
can be difficult to achieve when there is little or no pressure 
on the organizations to achieve a consensus. 
The lack of a hierarchical relationship between organizations 
presents both problems and potentialities. The problems stem 
from the inability to construct a formal control system, while 
the potential of a network rather than a hierarchy is the 
greater flexibility and individual discretion which may be 
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allowed. Pressman and Wildavsky's study tends to confirm the 
inherent problems of the aggregative implementation model, with 
its cognitive gaps and 'orders of comprehension', although its 
multi-organizational character also highlights the dynamic 
nature of the process and the interests which influence it over 
the passage of time. 
Lessons of the Oakland Case-Study 
Pressman and Wildavsky's study concerns the Economic 
Development Administration in the United States, which was set 
up in 1965 in order to provide assistance to areas where 
persistently high unemployment rates were prevalent. It was 
envisaged that the IDA would provide assistance to rural areas 
and small towns, but the leadership of the organization was 
anxious that they should move in to a large urban area, 
particularly one where social tensions were high. Eventually 
they chose Oakland in California, and quickly committed 
23,000,000 Dollars of IDA funds in the form of grants and loans 
to various projects in the city. The majority of the money was 
to go to the port of Oakland, and would be used to finance an 
airport hangar (leased to World Airways) and a marine terminal. 
The remainder of the money was to finance an industrial estate 
and a short section of road. 
The original leadership of the IDA departed soon after 
setting up the projects, in the mistaken belief that their main 
work was completed. In the event, the naive optimism with which 
the IDA entered into these projects was soon dissipated by a 
number of unforseen happenings. The Port facilities were not 
specifically IDA projects. They had already been envisaged by 
the Port, who saw the IDA as providing a useful means of finance. 
Similarly, World Airways wished to improve their facilities, and 
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were not particularly interested in providing employment for the 
under-privileged. In the aggregative sense, the IDA was 
switching-in to a project which already existed, but lacked the 
control to impose its goals on other organizations. 
With regard to the marine terminal, a basic dispute arose 
over finance. The EDA wished to maintain control over the 
project by only paying out money when it had been completed, 
while the Port argued that work would not commence without the 
necessary funds. This basic control dilemma is caused by 
mistrust between organizations. The IDA suspected that if the 
money was paid immediately it might be wasted by the Port, while 
the Port suspected that a change in political control might 
result in the IDA redirecting its funds. It was not so much 
that one side suspected the other of plotting deliberate 
recalcitrance, but both feared that the passage of time and the 
intervention of circumstance would frustrate their original 
agreement. In effect this is what happened, for over a period 
the IDA leadership became less favourably disposed towards the 
Oakland project, while the Port realized that the original 
financial commitment by the IDA would be insufficient. Progress 
was also impaired by the intervention of the Navy, who objected 
to the project on the grounds that it was a danger to both 
navigation and airplane safety. In the aggregative sense, the 
Navy had its own 'order of comprehension', and was switched-in 
to the implementation process in an attempt to protect its own 
interests. The Navy was indifferent to the IDA objectives, but 
its objections further delayed the project. 
The hangar project experienced similar difficulties to the 
terminal project, with considerable disputes over funds, and a 
reluctance by World Airways to commit itself to employing poor 
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and underprivileged workers. In addition, an IDA plan for 
World Airways to operate a training programme was vetoed by 
other federal agencies who feared that their own training 
centres would suffer. In this case, implementers in a 
neighbouring 'order of comprehension' assisted the Airline in 
losing contact with the implementation process. Pressman and 
Wildavsky point out that attempts to by-pass an existing 
bureaucracy (which the IDA to some extent represented) will 
usually cause resentment. 
34 This can be partly caused by the 
creation of a gap in communication. Officials who feel that they 
are being by-passed will almost inevitably build up a feeling of 
resentment, even if they have no objection in principle to the 
work of the new organization. In the motivational sense, it 
could of course also be possible that an existing organization 
had genuine fears that its functions were to be usurped. 
The IDA also initiated a number of loans to small 
businessmen, but nearly all of the businesses were already in a 
poor financial state, and little new employment was created. 
The EDA's one major success was the building of a health centre. 
Like the terminal and the hangar, this was a project which had 
been planned prior to the IDA intervention, but the IDA was 
able to commit funds when the project was in danger. Delay was 
minimized by the IDA paying the contractor direct, and by 1970 
the centre had created 150 jobs for minorities. 
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Pressman and Wildavsky's principal analytical point concerns 
the high number of agreements which need to be made during an 
implementation process, even when only a relatively small number 
of individuals and organizations are involved, together with a 
high level of agreement between them on policy goals. In a 
multi-organizational implementation process there will be many 
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decision points, at each of which clearance will be required 
from several different organizations if the process is to 
continue its progress. Using the concept of decision and 
clearance points, Pressman and Wildavsky calculate (slightly 
tongue in cheek) that even given 99% concurrence between the 
parties involved, after 68 agreements the possibility of project 
completion drops below 50%. When given this perspective, the 
relative failure of the Oakland project becomes more explicable. 
Change-, Exchange and the Importance of Identification 
Given the apparently high probability of project failure, 
why is it that any project is ever completed ? In relation to 
programmes that have succeeded, Pressman and Wildavsky comment 
that: "It is easy to forget (perhaps because we never knew) 
about their initial difficulties. The years of trial and error 
that led to the present state of operation are. lost from 
view .... No genius is required to make programmes operative 
if we don't care how long they take, how much money they require, 
how often the objectives are altered or the means for obtaining 
them are changed.,, 
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Pressman and Wildavsky suggest that programmes survive 
because they adapt themselves to their environment over a long 
period of time. We could add that the implementation process 
will itself play a part in shaping the environment (e. g., the 
failure of such projects as those undertaken at Oakland can 
lead to a general consensus that this type of activity has an 
unacceptably high marginal cost), but perhaps the main point is 
that when (within the context of the aggregative model) a 
number of people or organizations are "doing their job", change 
is never likely to be easily or inexpensively brought about. 
As we noted earlier, within almost any implementation process, 
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there is a natural tendency towards both consensus and conflict. 
In the Oakland project, the IDA, the Port and World Airways all 
needed each other to attain certain objectives, but the bonds 
which drew them together were not firm enough to prevent 
conflict over objectives within the overall objective. 
It might be that interaction could cause an exchange of 
values and alter perceptions. Thus, the Port and World Airways 
might become more aware of obligations towards minorities, while 
the IDA could understand more about the nature of major capital 
development projects and the needs of business. This altered 
perception could lead to a greater consensus, but it would also 
represent a change in the political "atmosphere". In Dunsire's 
terms, the organizations would be within a similar 'order of 
comprehension'. The new consensus can be strong, and resistant 
to outside intervention. In effect, the power of everyday 
interaction will be stronger than that exerted by new policy 
initiatives. In the case of Oakland, the IDA had to fight 
desperately to make any impression on the "business is business" 
attitude of the Port and World Airways. Nevertheless, change 
was in the air (brought about by minorities refusing to accept 
the status quo), and the work of the IDA reflected the new 
attitudes. Even within the consensus of everyday interaction, 
tensions can be detected which will eventually lead to general 
change. 
In most multi-organizational implementation processes, the 
lack of any hierarchic structure will minimize the chances of 
implementation by means. of coercion. The process will usually 
be based on exchange followed by some kind of identjficat. i. on, 
although in some cases interaction itself might lead to 
identification (e. g., by listening to the arguments of the EDA, 
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World Airways executives could become more aware of their 
responsibilities to minorities, regardless of the commercial 
benefits to the organization). The exchange could be one of 
material benefits, but could also be one of values. In this 
case, communication itself can be a powerful agent in bringing 
about a consensus. In the latter stages of our case-study we 
will be examining the extent to which communication and 
interaction may lead towards the formation of a consensus within 
a multi-organizational implementation process. 
F. Group Activity and the Policy Process 
The Problem of Policy 
The failure of such over-ambitious programmes as the one 
attempted in Oakland raises serious doubts over the ability of 
well-intentioned planners to devise policies which can be 
implemented satisfactorily. Wildavsky himself has sought to 
discover how the policy analyst can learn from such an 
experience: "Much of the scholarship of the Seventies, my own 
included, has been an effort to discover what went wrong and to 
learn how things might be made to work better, or whether 
government should take some actions at all.,, 
38 On the whole, 
Wildavsky concludes that social interaction is likely to be a more 
reliable and valuable policy dynamic than the opposing image of 
what he terms (drawing from Lindblom) intellectual cogitation. 
Social interaction occurs where people pursue their own interests 
and decisions are made: ". ... without anyone necessarily 
controlling the sequences of individual actions or intending an 
outcome. " 
39 In contrast, cogitation: ". ... orders social 
relations through mental processes as if they were taking place 
in one mind. " 
40 Wildavsky considers that cogitation can act 
as a corrective to a process of interaction which produces 
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selfishness and chaos, but that interaction should on nearly all 
occasions take precedence over cogitation. 
Arising from this conclusion comes a related view that: 
"Problems are not so much solved as superseded. " 
41 Thus a 
policy will generate its own problems to which a succeeding 
policy will offer a solution, but the new policy will itself 
cause problems requiring a-further policy change, and so nn. 
In this model, policy implementation can becpme something of a 
"cuckoo in the nest" which pushes out. other activity and itself 
assumes a position of predominance in the policy , area: 
if. ... the environment in each major policy sector is more 
internal than external, it reacts more_to internal needs than 
to external events. That is, each sector creates the environment 
to which, in turn, it best responds.,, 
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In order to control its environment, Wildavsky consider 
that each policy sector will attempt to maximize its size. 
Ironically, this increasing size will cause big solutions 
leading to big problems which will have an impact on neighbouring 
policy sectors. Wildav ky sees sectorization as a major policy 
trend during the 1960s and 1970s, in which government-has 
become a federation of sectors. This arrangement is the key to 
a paradox in which -central government appears to be acquiring 
more power, while at the same time the centre itself is seen to 
be disintegrating. Wildavsky perceives that sectorization is a 
decentralization of power, but that the central authority of 
each sector will wish to maintain maximum control over the 
activities within its policy area. As bureaucracy encounters 
difficulties in controlling its clientele, then objectives will 
be orientated towards inputs and instruments rather than people 
(a similar conclusion to that of Downs). The dilemma for a 
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growing policy sector is that control over its environment will 
become increasingly difficult, for the various individuals and 
groups within the sector are so diverse that uniformity is 
impractical. 
Monolithic policy sectors threaten the quality of the 
policy process, but Wildavsky softens the image by emphasizing 
the degree to which each participant in the process should 
constantly bear in mind the need for correction of error. 
Correct solutions are not the prerogative of any one individual, 
but by interaction and consequent exchange the process can move 
along in the best available manner. Wildavsky is obviously 
concerned that such a means of ordering affairs will result in 
interest overwhelming intellect, but considers that this is 
preferable to absolute control by a Great Planner. The policy 
analyst should give aid to interaction and thereby fulfil the 
function of: ". ... speaking truth to power. " 
43 It is 
nevertheless interaction which produces change, the criterion 
for which is: ". ... altering the pattern of relationships 
between participants which leads to outcomes that are 
different. " 
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Values and the Policy-Maker 
Wildavsky's emphasis on interaction highlights its power as 
an agent of change (usually of an incremental type), but his 
analysis also suggests the associated implicit assumption that 
implementation is likely to be of a higher quality when there is 
a strong bottom-up element present within the process. In other 
words, better policies will result when those at the centre have 
a good understanding of the problems involved in delivering the 
policy to the clientele. Wildavsky discusses the implementation 
process in terms of correction of error rather than Downs' 
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image of distortion. In essence, where Downs would see the 
implementer distorting the planner's intentions through 
self-interest or lack of knowledge, Wildavsky has the view that 
it is the planner's false hopes and dreams which require 
correction by those given the onerous task of implementing 
these policies. Correction of error implies that each 
implementer is adjusting a false view of reality held by his 
superiors, but in the terms of Dunsire the error may be no more 
than a cognitive gap. If policy is being changed during 
implementation then it may not be correction of error but 
reinterpretation which is taking place. 
Wldavsky's somewhat jaundiced view of the value of the 
policy-maker probably reflects his own disillusionment with the 
radical social programmes introduced in the United States during 
the 1960s, but we should note that the Minister and the ballast 
loader are required at various times to both cogitate and 
interact. Nevertheless it is the Minister who is in the better 
position to cogitate on the general state of the railway system, 
and his thoughts on this subject are likely to be of more 
political importance than those of the ballast loader. This 
top-down image of the policy process is based on the Minister's 
official position, his particular type of expertise, and his 
control over resources. The policy-maker's power to control the 
policy values is something of an antidote to the importance 
placed on interaction as an agent of change, for at times 
interaction may be dependent on cogitation i. e., a change in the 
pattern of relationships may bring about a change in outcomes, 
but the change in the pattern may be brought about by new 
policies promulgated by the policy-maker. 
Interaction during implementation may not necessarily be the 
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principal dynamic of policy change, for as Rhodes points out 
discontinuities in the behaviour of officials can sometimes 
only be explained by major (and perhaps autonomous) changes in 
government policy: .... the political and organizational 
models tend to ignore the discontinuities for the routine and 
to this extent at least they can be considered descriptively 
inadequate. " 45 Wildavsky's view could be considered part of 
a cycle described by Kaufman in which the weaknesses of a policy 
centrally controlled will lead to greater decentralization 
followed by centralization once more when the disadvantages of 
decentralization are discovered. Thus: "Decentralization will 
soon be followed by disparities in practice among the numerous 
small units, brought on by differences in human and financial 
resources, that will engender demands for central intervention 
to restore equality and balance and concerted action. . oil 
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In this cycle, implementation is transformed from a complex 
decentralized network of relationships into a more straight line 
process, only to once again fragment with the passage of time. 
The dynamics of this process do not entail correction of error 
so much as responses to endemic implementation phenomena. 
In this case the policy-maker will assume greater importance 
when a centralized policy is being devised, for his decisions 
will have a direct effect over the manner in which a policy is 
implemented. In contrast, a decentralized policy will mean that 
greater discretion is allowed at the local level. Our analysis 
suggests total control from the centre will not lead to 
"perfect implementation" but it could also be said that a policy 
initiative entailing a change in general values is likely to 
have more effect when it comes from the top e. g., if a Minister 
decides that a smaller railway network is required in the 
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national interest then his decision is likely to have more 
impact in the real world than if a ballast loader comes to the 
same conclusion. Although there may be a multitude 'of cognitive 
and motivational obstacles obstructing a centrally initiated and 
controlled implementation process, the power of that original 
initiative can still carry more force than policy initiatives 
instigated lower down the chain of authority. In this sense, 
central government is often the chief repository of values 
underpinning a particular policy, i. e., an implementation 
process totally controlled from the centre may be impossible, 
but the ability of the centre to control the nature of the 
policy process and the behaviour of implementers is potentially 
considerable. Even a policy which allows for a high degree of 
discretion at the operational level may imply values which will 
have a significant effect on the manner of implementation. 
Governments can hold certain values for a variety of 
reasons. In some cases it might be that the Party in power has 
certain views on how the world should operate, e. g., a Labour 
Government may consider that a certain industry will operate 
most efficiently when it is state-owned, whereas a Conservative 
Government would wish to see private enterprise take charge of 
that same industry. In other cases general political 
circumstances may force a government into a particular position 
e. g., electoral considerations or the need to retain a majority 
in Parliament. 
An analysis of the relationship between groups and 
government can be an extremely complex affair, and is epitomized 
by the long-standing discussion on the true meaning of 
corporatism and pluralism. This unresolved debate nevertheless 
provides an important means of examining the relative power of 
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groups and their consequent impact on government and the policy 
process. For our purposes, we will employ the definitions of 
corporatism and pluralism set out by Schmitter. These give a 
good indication of how corporatism is associated with a 
structured relationship between groups and government in which 
some kind of exchange process is vital, while pluralism is 
generally identified with a more informed relationship in which 
government may at the same time have potentially both more and 
less power than in a corporatist relationship. 
Schmitter defines corporatism as: 11.9 9. a system of 
interest representation in which the constituent units are 
organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, 
non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally 
differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not 
created) by the State and granted a deliberate representational 
monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for 
observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and 
articulation of demands and supports. " 47 In contrast, he 
defines pluralism as being: It. .., a system of interest 
representation in which the constituent units are organized into 
an unspecified number of multiple, voluntary, competitive, 
non-hierarchically ordered and self-determined (as to type or 
scope of interest) categories not specially licensed, subsidized, 
created or otherwise controlled by the State and not exercising 
a monopoly of representational activity within their respective 
categories. " 
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Thus in a pluralistic relationship government 
may make a decision with or without consulting a particular 
group, but at the same time the fragmented nature of the group 
structure and the lack of government control over implementation 
reduces State power. 
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The existence of corporatism has important implications for 
policy implementation, as it implies a top-down process in which 
groups and government at the centre will together seek to impose 
a policy on the implementers. Policy-making in a pluralistic 
system can also be top-down where consultation is minimized, but 
more usually the concept of pluralism is identified with many 
groups contributing to the policy-making debate. Thus in a 
pluralistic system we might expect the policy process to be more 
of the bottom-up type, with implementers being allowed a higher 
degree of discretion than might be found in a corporatist system. 
Kaufman's analysis suggests that the attitudes of groups 
themselves are dependent on the natural cycle of the policy 
process. This conclusion could be equated with Wildavsky's 
view that policy is its own cause. Kaufman states that: 
"Discontent on the part of various groups is thus the dynamic 
force that motivates the quest for new forms. ', 
49 Although 
this could often be the case, change can also come abtut when 
the government itself, or even a single official, has strong 
views on a particular policy. In their study of the origins of 
the 1973 Water Act, Jordan, Richardson and Kimber lay particular 
emphasis on the part played by the Under Secretary responsible 
for the policy area. This official favoured reorganization of 
the water authorities on the basis of efficiency and rationality 
rather than politics and participation. The authors consider 
that the new organizational structure which resulted from the 
50 1973 Act owed a great deal to the views of this one individual. 
This observation on the role of the individual highlights 
the point that the policy process is capable of producing radical 
as well as incremental change. The potential for change may be 
latent, only to burst through when a forceful individual 
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(possibly a zealot or advocate in Downs' terms) comes upon the 
scene and pushes through a radical measure. From the point of 
view of interaction, formerly disparate groups can form a 
powerful alliance to initiate change, or powerful interests may 
collectively adopt a previously dormant policy idea. We should 
also note that a seemingly incremental policy change may become 
radical in nature during implementation, and vice versa. Major 
policy change may take place at various levels of the process, 
sometimes unofficially and with little indication of its 
occurrence. Despite the power of the implementer to initiate 
change, we might nevertheless hypothesize that significant 
policy changes will eventually be given the status of the 
official stamp of government. 
Corporatism, Pluralism and the Policy Cycle 
If a policy is corporatist in nature, the chief interests 
will take an active part in policy-making, and undertake to seek 
compliance in implementation from their members. In this case 
the leaders of a group can take on some of the officiality of 
government. Lundquist sees the decision-maker's attempts to 
keep in touch with the implementer in terms of steering: "The 
steering consciousness of the decision-maker presumes that he 
has goals for his activity and that the steered implementation 
will result in outcomes. The difference between goals and 
outcomes can be said to be a measure of the rationality of the 
decision, and the difference between decision and implementation 
a measure of the reliability of the steering. " 
51 Lundquist 
adds that the feedback process will enable the decision-maker 
to: ". ... get information about the rationality of his 
decision and the reliability of the steering. This activity, 
which follows the implementation process, is called review. " 
52 
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Lundquist adopts Simon's concept of bounded rationality in 
order to assume that in general a gap will appear between goals 
and outcomes. We have seen earlier in this chapter that review 
might well take place during the implementation process and 
that steering and review may be applied alternately before a 
policy outcome is known, but Lundquist's analysis does indicate 
the problems of implementing a corporatist policy. If the 
leaders of a group assure government that they can guarantee 
implementation of a particular policy, then a large gap between 
goal and outcome can place the group in a vulnerable position in 
its future relationship with government. In order to prevent 
this gap, the group leaders may well seek to ensure that the 
policy is centrally administered in the belief that the 
goal-outcome gap may be unacceptably wide if a high degree of 
discretion is allowed at the local level. There is thus likely 
to be a strong link between corporatist policy-making and a 
centrally administered policy in cases where compliance cannot 
be guaranteed. If as a result of a top-down policy implementation 
process the level of feedback and review is low, then the centre 
may become out of touch with the outside world. Ironically, 
the very policy which results from corporatism at the centre may 
result in fragmentation between interests and alienation between 
government and groups when it is discovered that the policy lacks 
the flexibility to be workable. 
Wildavsky considers that policy is its own cause, and from 
the above example we could also conclude that policy style can 
carry within itself the seeds of a different approach. As a 
reaction against corporatism a government may decide to develop 
a looser relationship with the interests, and consult a wider 
range of groups. Alternatively, government can decide to "go it 
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alone" in finding a policy solution, or else present a 
superficial appearance of wide consultation when in reality the 
decisions have already been made. 
At the operational level there is often more emphasis on 
performance of a task. Consultation processes can take place, 
but non-operational interests may find difficulty in gaining 
power. The aggregative implementation model and the concept of 
'orders of comprehension' both stress the limitations of central 
control and the need for individual discretion to be exercised 
if a task is to be performed satisfactorily. Gustafsson and 
Richardson note that co-ordination of policies at the local 
level has often proved more successful than at the national 
level, 53 and it could be argued that this success for 
decentralization is at least partly explained by the differing 
priorities at the two levels (Gustafsson and Richardson also 
consider that responsibility for problems is likely to bounce 
up and down between local and national levels, although it 
could be said that on the whole the impetus for the bounce will 
come from the top, and that national political circumstances 
are more likely to determine its velocity rather than events 
at the local level). 
In performing his task the local official as implementer is 
likely to give priority to obtaining co-operation from those 
whose help he needs most. If he is to obtain order from his 
environment he will wish to deal with the minimum number of 
groups and individuals necessary in order to 'get the job done. ' 
This priority gives him a higher incentive than the central 
policy-maker (or even the local politician) to exclude from his 
considerations 'fringe' groups, although he may also be more 
likely to consult groups from another sector whose help he 
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particularly needs (we should note that at both central and local 
levels there may be a tension between a pluralist-minded 
Minister or councillor who wishes for particular political 
reasons to consult as many interests as possible, and his 
corporatist-minded officials ever mindful of the need to 
implement a manageable policy). 
Pressman and Wildavsky's study illustrated the local 
problems when a new agency attempts to disrupt the established 
order. The IDA wished to bring together many local groups which 
formerly had known very few inter-connections, and lacked the 
power to compel compliance, The basic weaknesses of such a 
vague and ill-defined programme are highlighted by Peter 
Drucker's analysis of "the sins of public administration. " 
These include having over-lofty objectives, a lack of priorities, 
overstaffing, dogmatism, an inability to learn, and an adherence 
to programmes which are no longer of use. 
54 From the point of 
view of the Oakland project, Drucker's key statement is perhaps: 
work is always specific, always mundane, always focused. 
55 Yet without work there is non-performance. " This observation 
ties in closely with the aggregative implementation model and 
the image of the implementer "doing his job. " In addition, 
Drucker's recommendation that the job should be done with the 
fewest number of people can be equated with the corporatist 
tendencies of implementers at the operational level. 
Gustaisson and Richardson consider that: ". ... the most 
difficult task in modern democratic societies is to combine a 
high level of rationality (in the sense of designing policies 
which succeed in the objective of solving "real" problems) with 
high levels of group, and citizen participation. " 
56 This 
observation reflects a concern that too many groups within a 
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policy sector will prevent any significant activity from taking 
place. Group theory emphasizes the importance to the policy 
process of organizations other than government, even to the 
extent that the groups may take on some of the functions of 
government. Corporatism implies that government is prepared to 
sacrifice a part of its sovereignty in return for co-operation 
from powerful interests, while even pluralism suggests a need 
for government to achieve a working relationship with the most 
important groups as an essential prerequisite of policy-making 
and implementation. In order to achieve some sort of order, 
it is understandable that government should normally favour 
policy sectorization. Richardson and Jordan see the distinctions 
between groups and government in many countries becoming more 
blurred over time, with the result that: ". ... we see 
policies being made (and administered) between a myriad of 
interconnecting, interpenetrating organizations. It is the 
relationships involved in committees, the policycýommunity of 
departments and groups, the practices of co-option and the 
consensual style, that perhaps better account for policy 
outcomes than do examinations of party stances, of manifestoes 
or of parliamentary influence. " 57 
The policy community suggests an image of continual 
interaction between groups and government departments, and 
Richardson and Jordan employ the key terms of negotiated order, 
negotiated environment and accommodation to describe how orderly 
change is brought about. By means of negotiated order, and 
within a negotiated environment, government arranges a stable 
pattern of relationships with the groups, while accommodation 
allows for agreement even when the basis for consensus is 
minimal. 
58 Although a government seeks stability within the 
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policy community, the relative importance of the groups over 
time is likely to change, while new groups may attempt to join 
the community. Gustafsson and Richardson point out that in 
many Countries an increasing number of groups have sought and. 
gained admittance to policy communities, with the result that 
overcrowding has taken place. It is this overcrowding which 
restricts the manoeuvrability of policy-makers and causes 
stagnation within the policy process. 
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This analysis suggests that beyond a certain point, 
interaction becomes dysfunctional, and that certain channels of 
communication should be cut, i. e., certain groups should be 
excluded from the community. In reality overcrowding may not 
be such a serious problem as it appears, for despite the size 
of the community only a few of the groups may possess real 
power. It is significant to note that these powerful groups 
are likely to be the ones most concerned with implementation, 
for without their co-operation the policy cannot function. It 
is thus not only important for a group to gain admittance to the 
policy community, it should also seek to become an integral part 
of the projected implementation process. If a group becomes 
indispensable to government in the administration of a policy, 
then its power is indeed real, i. e., it has a good chance of 
being included in corporatist policy-making. 
A group can nevertheless also gain power by enlisting wide 
popular support for its policies. If a government fears that it 
may suffer electorally by excluding a group whose values have a 
wide following, then it is likely to incorporate some of the 
group's values into a policy. In this case, a non-operational 
group's values can infiltrate government and hence a policy 
community. The boundaries of the community can be extremely 
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blurred where transference of ideas and values is concerned, 
for the network of relationships may spread over a wider area 
than the groups immediately involved with policy in that sector. 
Issue Networks 
Hugh Heclo has observed that in the United States the 
familiar "iron triangles" linking executive bureaus, 
congressional committees, and interest group clienteles have been 
replaced by a large number of issue networks: "Looking for the 
closed triangles of control, we tend to miss the fairly open 
networks of people that increasingly impinge upon government.,, 
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Heclo sees these networks creating strains in political 
administration caused by: ". ... a dissolving of organized 
Politics and a politicizing of organizational life throughout 
the nation. " 
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Thus the increasing amount of government 
activity in recent years has led to the political activation of 
more and more groups, but at the same time the specialized and 
technical knowledge required to operate within a particular 
policy area effectively insulates it from both the traditional 
party politicians and the public in general. It is significant 
that Heclo places great emphasis on how a multitude of interests 
wish to be represented in Washington. Thus nearly all the 
States and Cities have their own offices in the Capital, and it 
is here that the issue network predominantly operates: 
". ... everyone has accepted the idea that the national 
government in Washington is the decisive arena and will continue 
to be so indefinitely. ', 
62 
The tendency of so many groups to 
concentrate their attention on Washington suggests not only 
that they consider this is where true power lies, but also 
reflects the expectation that their efforts are likely to 
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obtain some kind of reward. Heclo's identification and analysis 
of the Washington issue network gives an image of a central 
policy community or 'order of comprehension, ' where the 
specialists who understand a particular policy network, and the 
manner in which it operates, can wield considerable power: 
.... it is the issue network that ties together what would 
otherwise be the contradictory tendencies of, on the one hand, 
more widespread organizational participation in public policy 
and, on the other, more narrow technocratic specialization in 
complex modern policies. " 
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Heclo does not make clear the extent to which the issue 
network phenomenon is evident at a more local level, but the 
apparent emphasis which so many groups place on a presence in 
Washington suggests that the degree of activity may be less 
intense elsewhere. If this is so, then the corporatist 
"iron triangle" may be more significant at the local level than 
the complex issue network. Where groups place such emphasis on 
the policy-making process then implementation and policy 
delivery can be left in the hands of the principal operational 
interests who wish to "get the job done. " We should note that 
it is they who will execute the policy delivery. Paradoxically, 
it might be that overcrowding at the centre will lead to 
policies based on a wide consensus of interests and which 
decentralize authority for implementation. In this case, the 
multitude of groups seeking power at the centre may find that 
their very actions cause power to be devolved to a lower level. 
Thus in the policy process it may be wise for a group to stay 
away from an overcrowded centre and devote its energies to 
becoming a key part of the (in all likelihood corporatist) 
implementation process at the operational level. 
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G. The Nature of the Implementation Process 
In examining implementation theory, we have attempted to 
indicate the importance of the following points: 
1. The interdependence of the various elements within the 
policy process, but also the capacity for discontinuities. 
2. The importance of the implementation process within 
the policy model, at least on a time-scale. 
3. Models of "perfect implementation" are unrealistic and 
even conceptually impractical. 
4. Control need not be the chief motivating force behind 
an administrative system. 
5. The aggregative model appears to be the most satisfactory 
explanation of how an implementation process actually works in 
practice. 
6. Self-interest (of an official or organization) is only 
of limited analytical importance, for it is difficult to 
identify definitively, and in any case must be placed in the 
context of interaction. 
7. An organization is likely to be best able to avoid the 
trap of the rigidity cycle if it can remain flexible in response 
to its environment. 
8. Within an implementation process, there is usually a 
natural tendency towards consensus, but the consensus will 
contain the seeds of conflict and future change. 
9o Everyday interaction and change are interrelated and 
interdependent. 
10. Within the implementation process, an exchange of 
material benefits or values will often lead to some kind of 
identification between the parties involved. In some cases, 
however, communication and interaction may of themselves lead to 
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identification. 
11. The officiality of government places it in a 
position to inculcate its own values into a policy process. 
12. Policy values can be adopted by government as the 
result of a-bottom-up process, but policy discontinuities caused 
by autonomous change at the top cannot be discounted. 
13. Policy change at any level is likely to eventually 
seek the status of the official stamp of government. 
14. Radical policy change can be brought about by a 
powerful individual, as well as being activated by a change in 
the pattern of interaction. 
15. Both policy-makers and implementers are likely to 
discourage trends towards pluralism at their level, although a 
non-operational policy-maker may be more susceptible to pressures 
from a variety of interests. 
H. Implementation and the Road Passenger Transport Industry. 
In our case study we will attempt to analyse and develop 
the above points. The bus industry (a term which refers to the 
provision of bus services rather than the manufacture of buses 
themselves) and its attendant legislation offers us the 
interesting opportunity of examining the implementation process 
in several different forms. Firstly, we can study the 
interaction between a series of policies and their implementation 
over a long period of time. Secondly, the development and 
characteristics of a particular organization (the National Bus 
Company) can be studied. Thirdly, we can trace how a number of 
separate inter-organizational implementation processes 
(involving County Councils and NBC subsidiaries) come to adopt 
varying goals and values during implementation. 
In Chapter Two we will examine the early development of the 
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road passenger transport industry and its legislative framework. 
The inter-relationship between policy-making and implementation 
will be emphasized, but we will also note the degree to which 
implementation has a life of its own. 
In Chapter Three we will briefly analyse the philosophy 
and activity of the bus operator, with particular reference to 
the aggregative implementation model. 
In Chapter Four the 1962 and 1968 Transport Acts will be 
examined in the context of political reactions to environmental 
change. 
Chapter Five will trace the development of the National 
Bus Company. Despite operating in a hostile operational 
environment, the NBC still survives, and offers an interesting 
example of organizational dynamics. 
Chapter Six will examine the legislation concerning road 
passenger transport during the 1970s. This legislation has led 
to increased financial support for the bus industry, and has 
also brought the local authorities into much closer contact with 
the busmen. With the decline in demand for bus services, a 
rising level of criticism from Conservative politicians and some 
local authorities has been directed towards the existing 
administrative system. 
Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine will be more detailed case 
studies, concerning four NBC subsidiaries (Midland Red, Potteries 
Motor Traction, Crosville and City of Oxford Motor Services) and 
their relationships with a variety of Shire Counties. In these 
chapters we can examine more closely the manner in which 
interaction may lead to an exchange of values and eventual 
identification. 
In Chapter Ten we can summarize our conclusions and attempt 
65 
to develop our analysis of the relationship between implementation 
and change. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BUS INDUSTRY AND ITS 
LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK 
A. Introduction 
In this chapter we will be studying the general 
development of the bus industry, and its relationship with 
government up to the implementation of the 1947 Transport Act. 
Although the implications were not fully realized at the time, 
the middle 1950s marked the dividing line in the fortunes of 
the bus industry. Prior to that time, legislation such as the 
1930 Road Transport Act and the 1947 Transport Act sought to 
give a rational administrative and regulatory system to an 
expanding and prosperous industry. It will be seen in Chapter 
Four that the 1968 Transport Act to a considerable extent 
represented a continuance of this attitude. Nevertheless, the 
increasing financial pressures on the industry inevitably meant 
that after 1968 a higher degree of political attention has been 
paid to the question of how to run an industry which declining 
demand has made largely unviable as a commercial proposition. 
An examination of the relationship between Government and 
the bus industry enables us to analyse the inter-connection 
between policy-making and implementation. The manner in which 
the 1903 Motor Car Act, the 1930 Road Traffic Act and the 1947 
Transport Act were implemented leads us to some general 
conclusions with regard to the relationship between a policy 
and its implementation. In each of the three pieces of 
legislation, we shall see that the method of implementation 
produced effects which were not anticipated at the initial 
policy-making stage. As we stated in Chapter One, the nature of 
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this apparently natural discontinuity between policy-making and 
implementation, and the manner in which the gap may be bridged, 
is a central theme of this study. 
When we examine the British bus industry, a feature which 
quickly becomes apparent is the gap between central government's 
deliberations on transport policy and the operator running a bus 
between a village and a neighbouring town on market day. At 
this local level, the operator is providing a personal service 
to the consumer which possesses a high degree of flexibility 
and variety. Throughout the history of the industry, bus 
operation has been taken up by men who wished to escape from 
the enclosed world of an office or factory, and who enjoyed the 
relative independence given to them by running their own 
services, or even when working for a larger company. The 
traditional independent spirit of the busman is still in 
evidence today, and sometimes appears to run independently of 
company or government ownership. 
Politically, this independence is important in that there 
is a sphere of activity relating to the day-to-day operation 
of bus services which appears to be almost immune to outside 
influence. In studying the activity of government and senior 
bus company officials, we should always bear in mind the 
activity of the local traffic manager and engineer, both of 
them more likely to be influenced by custom and tradition 
rather than advice from politicians, civil servants or company 
chairmen. In this respect, some bus routes and services might 
appear little changed over the last fifty years. 
Existing side-by-side with the independent nature of the 
busman, however, we find a tendency throughout the industry's 
71 
history towards rationalization and increasing government 
involvement with the problems of bus operation. Although the 
degree to which economies of scale operate in the bus industry 
is an argument which continues to this day, the trend within 
the industry during the 1930s and 1940s was towards the 
takeover of smaller operators by the large companies. In the 
case of government, after initial suspicion of a new means of 
transport, the anxiety to provide a regulatory framework for 
bus operation manifested itself in the system of Traffic 
Commissioners set up by the 1930 Road Traffic Act, which 
complemented the process of operator rationalization. 
Subsequently, the 1947 Transport Act reflected the government's 
objective of providing an integrated transport system. 
Consequently, a new rationalization process commenced which 
by 1968 had led to nearly all the major bus companies becoming 
state owned. 
In examining the development and legislative framework of 
the bus industry we can therefore identify the interests and 
values of (a) the operator (b) the entrepreneur (c) the 
Department of Transport and (d) the government of the day. If 
we are to understand the behaviour of the NBC, government and 
County Councils since 1968, it is necessary to appreciate the 
strong influence of former times on more recent events. 
Indeed, in an industry which is innately conservative, the 
circumstances surrounding such a major piece of legislation as 
the 1930 Road Traffic Act can offer key indicators in 
identifying values which continue to shape current events. 
From the policy process aspect, this persistence of values 
gives a cyclical appearance to policy-making and implementation. 
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The common threads to be found within the 1930 Road Traffic 
Act and the 1947 Transport Act belie the long time scale 
involved, and can give the impression that each new policy 
owes more to the contents of its predecessor than the lessons 
learned from implementation. The continuity could be partly 
explained in that both Acts were passed by a Labour Government, 
and the activity of successive Conservative Governments did 
little to alter the general trend. Only at the present time 
is a Conservative Government beginning to question the fifty 
year old system of Traffic Commissioners and their powers over 
route licensing. 
It will be seen in Chapter Five that, despite the bus 
industry's declining commercial viability, the NBC has 
experienced little direct government intervention when compared 
to other public corporations. In earlier and more prosperous 
days the system of Traffic Commissioners allowed the large 
companies to become virtually area monopolies, with considerable 
discretion as to the degree of cross-subsidization to be 
operated. In contrast to the railways, therefore, the 
political debate on the amount of subsidy to be given to the 
bus industry has only commenced in recent years. Previously, 
government was more concerned with giving the industry a tidy 
and rational administrative system. These circumstances have 
had the effect of frequently relegating the bus to a position 
of apparently minor political significance. For most of its 
history, apart from one or two relatively brief periods, the 
bus has faced stiff competition from interests representing 
other means of transport, and has often found it difficult to 
obtain a sympathetic hearing from government. 
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B. The Early Days. 
Even from its birth in Britain, the bus appeared to lack 
the popular romance which was attached to the stage coach and 
the railways. The original scepticism was based on a natural 
British mistrust of foreign ideas. The principle of running a 
public service vehicle which anyone could board without prior 
booking was established in Paris in 1819, and the name of 
"omnibus" was given to it shortly afterwards. 
George Shillibeer, who had previously built coaches and 
buses in Paris, introduced the horse bus into London in 1829. 
In the manner which foreshadowed many battles to come, 
Shillibeer encountered strong opposition from the short-stage 
coach operators, and was forced to run his buses over an 
unpaved route not operated by the coachmen. The speed and cost 
of these services nevertheless won them considerable public 
support, with the result that some competitors brought actions 
for illegality. They received little sympathy from magistrates, 
and the bus was given official blessing by the 1832 Road 
Traffic Act. 
1 
By this time Shillibeer had been joined by numerous other 
bus operators, to the extent that one service had 90 buses 
running. Anticipating the situation which came to a head in 
1930, it was decided that some form of service regulation was 
required, although unlike the latter period there was no official 
system. Inspectors worked for the companies, and companies 
were allocated particular times on the route. 
2 Within three 
years of being introduced into Britain, therefore, the bus 
industry had faced severe competition, been subject to 
over-capacity, introduced a system of route licensing, and 
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battled to. achieve official recognition from government - 
a microcosm of what was to come during the following one 
hundred and fifty years. 
The Nineteenth Century was essentially the age of the 
railways, and railway interests came to dominate the attention 
of both the government and the public in general. Hibbs makes 
the point that steam vehicles were being developed at the same 
time as the earliest railway engines, but while the railways 
prospered, the steam vehicles almost disappeared until the 
final years of the century. 
3 The antagonism of government 
towards steam vehicles was reflected in the Locomotive Act of 
1865 (the "Red Flag" Act), which imposed conditions of such 
severity that the running of a steam vehicle became an almost 
prohibitive occupation. Even today a bias towards the 
railways is still evident, for the problems of British Rail 
continue to occupy a greater degree of political and public 
attention than those of the National This Company. 
The 1870 Tramways Act allowed a greater degree of 
competition to the horse bus by making it easier to develop 
tramway systems. In London, the trams did not penetrate the 
centre of the City, but in many provincial cities it became 
the most popular means of public transport. Klapper highlights 
the irony that large-scale bus undertakings outside London 
often developed as a result of the introduction of capital 
provision by tramway companies, a point which emphasizes that 
the horse bus operator, left to himself, had little inclination 
to become associated with big business. 
Even in London, it was the tram which transported the 
working class, while the bus became identified with middle and 
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upper class transportation within the central area of the City. 
The London General Omnibus Company, founded in 1855 with a 
capital of £1 million, took over many small operators, but was 
generally conservative in its policy towards expanding services. 
C. The Motor Bus and the Growth of the Companies. 
The Establishment of the Motor Bus. 
The Twentieth Century began with no motor buses on 
Britain's roads. In successfully persuading the government to 
place prohibitive regulations on the use of motor vehicles in 
general, the railway interests had demonstrated their power, 
while the owners of horse buses were not inclined to become 
mechanised. 
The 1896 Highways Act removed many of the restrictions on 
motor vehicles and lifted the-speed limit to 12 m. p. h., but it 
was the Motor Car Act of 1903 which heralded the dawn of the 
motor age by raising the speed limit to 20 m. p. h. and 
introducing the registration of vehicles. As its name implies, 
the Act resulted from pressure by motoring interests. It 
seems doubtful that the government even considered the Act's 
implications for public transport, and represents a good 
example of how a piece of legislation may activate hitherto 
latent interests. It is also interesting to note that the 
1903 Act set a precedent in the sense that legislation has 
rarely dealt solely with the bus industry. Usually, it has 
been included either incidentally, or as a part of a "total" 
plan for transport. 
Smith states that: "The hierarchy of policies develops as 
rules have to be formulated to govern the various activities 
which contribute to the implementation of policy. " 5 
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Superficially, it may have appeared that the 1903 Act 
represented no more than a middle ranking policy, by which 
some kind of regulation could be given to an activity indulged 
in by a tiny minority. In fact it represented a policy 
watershed, in that the motor vehicle was given official 
respectability and legitimacy. 
We should therefore note that the place of a policy in 
an implementation hierarchy cannot always be ascertained from 
the value placed on it by policy-makers. An apparently middle 
or lower ranking policy may, in the effects of its 
implementation, be seen to express general values. Equally, 
a policy which appears to be of the highest rank, by expressing 
a far-reaching set of values, may in its implementation prove 
to have less momentous effects. Later in this chapter we shall 
see that the implementation of the 1947 Transport Act, which set 
out a comprehensive plan for the organization of transport, 
had little effect on the day-to-day operation-of bus services. 
Although the Act was primarily concerned with the nationalization 
of the railways, it did set out a framework for a radical 
restructuring of the bus industry] but lack of government 
involvement and the opposition of the principal interest 
frustrated its implementation. 
The first municipal motorbus service ran in Eastbourne 
in 1903. Despite the 1903 Act, however, the motorbus gained 
favour only slowly. As Booth states: "The drivers and 
mechanics were dealing with unfamiliar machinery, and the 
buses themselves were still very crude and prone to 
breakdown. " 
6 These early buses were mainly Daimlers, built 
under licence in Britain, and -continued -the tradition of a 
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strong continental influence on the British bus industry. In 
London, one of the earliest motorbus operators was the Thomas 
Tilling Company, which was later to own many of Britain's bus 
companies. 
After many difficulties with regard to. design and 
operation, the turning point for the motorbus came in 1910. 
The London General Omnibus Company was slow in developing 
motorbuses, and when i=n 1909 the Metropolitan Police laid 
down very strict regulations for bus design it appeared that 
the age of the horse-bus would continue for many years. These 
new regulations concentrated the minds of the General's 
engineers wonderfully, however, and in 1910 the introduction 
of their B type was an immediate success with the public. 
The London General's reaction to the regulations was another 
example of how implementation may have unexpected effects. 
The Metropolitan Police were clearly suspicious of motorbuses, 
but in attempting to suppress their use, they provoked the 
General into action. Hood describes this phenomenon as the 
"negative demonstration effect. " This refers to.. .. "the 
case where the activities of the authorities directly trigger 
off antagonistic or perverse responses. " 
7 The General's 
reaction also indicates the ability of the bus industry to 
adapt to a hostile environment, a quality which in more recent 
times the NBC has required in abundance. 
In 1912, the London General Company was taken over by the 
Underground Electric Railways Group, a business deal which 
years later made it easier for government to implement the 
policy of nationalizing London's transport. In the years that 
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followed the take over, the General spread its activities into 
London's suburbs, and obtained operating agreements with many 
smaller companies. The agreement with Thomas Tilling was to 
have far-reaching effects, for the reduction in their London 
services encouraged the Tilling board to seek provincial 
expansion. So successful were they that, together with the 
British Electric Traction Company (BET), they came to dominate 
the bus industry outside London. Eventually, it was the 
nationalization of the BET bus companies in 1968, following 
those of Tilling in 1948, which produced the formation of the 
NBC. 
Despite their eventual common ownership, the development 
of such companies as Midland Red, City of Oxford Motor 
Services, Potteries Motor Traction and Crosville, has given to 
each a distinctive character which is still visible today. In 
Chapters Seven to Nine we shall be dealing with each of these 
companies in turn, and seeing how in modern times they have 
developed a particular relationship with the county councils, 
and. therefore represent good examples of contrasting 
implementation styles. IS we are to understand the nature of 
these companies, it is important that we examine their origins 
and development. 
Midland Red. 
As its name implies, British Electric Traction was 
founded in order to develop tramway undertakings. It was 
noted earlier that many local bus undertakings were begun by 
tramway interests, and BET was to the forefront of this process. 
BET developed many tramways around Birmingham, and 
eventually acquired a joint controlling interest in the 
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Birmingham and Midland Motor Omnibus Company limited in 1905. 
The initial operation of motorbuses was not a success, however, 
and all of these were withdrawn in 1907, leaving only the 
horse-buses and trams for the following five years. 
Nevertheless, the colour of the horse-buses had already given 
the company its colloquial name of Midland Red (a title which 
perhaps belatedly became official only in 1974). The 
motorbus successfully returned to BMMO services in 1912, but 
operation was restricted by Birmingham corporation's 
insistence that motorbuses could not compete with the tramways. 
Eventually, an agreement was reached whereby the company was 
not to compete with the corporation inside the city, but was 
permitted to run-through services of motorbuses between the 
centre of Birmingham and places outside the city. In a modified 
form, a similar agreement still exists today. From this time, 
the BMMO company took over the services of many private 
operators in the surrounding counties. This process was 
unwittingly assisted by goverrment, which requisitioned many 
vehicles for use in the First World War, but did not favour the 
type of buses used by BMMO. As a result, the company was 
able to fill in the gaps let by these losses. 
Throughout the 1920s the company continued to be 
aggressively expansionist, and from 1923 became almost unique 
amongst bus operators by manufacturing its own buses. In the 
days before route licensing, in preference to taking over 
smaller operators, BMMO often preferred to put on alternative 
services and gradually run its competitors into the ground. 
Using these methods, by 1930 BNMO dominated the bus industry 
within a wide radius of Birmingham. 8 
80 
Perhaps the most remarkable feature of BMMO during these 
years was its organizational structure. There was no General 
Manager and the company was run jointly by O. C. Power, the 
Traffic Manager, and L. G. Wyndham Shire, the Chief Engineer. 
A deep enmity existed between these two men, to the extent 
that each jealously guarded his own sphere of responsibility, 
and resented any intrusion from the other. Klapper describes 
how a green-baize-covered door separated the traffic and 
engineering departments at BMMO, with the staff forbidden to. 
essay any liaison between the departments. 
9 Yet throughout 
this period (1912-1940) Power's ruthless expansionist policy, 
and Shire's audacious and imaginative designs for the company's 
own buses, allowed BMMO to grow rapidly. 
The Power-Shire relationship is particularly interesting 
to the extent that it indicates how the rivalry which soured 
relationships within the company, was translated to assist the 
external success of the company. With regard to implementation, 
it suggests that apparent failure at one level may be 
instrumental in bringing about success at another level. 
Bardach observes that personality clashes can be ". .. a 
deterrent to better co-ordination, " 10 but in such cases as 
the Power-Shire relationship it might be preferable for 
everyday interaction to be kept to a minimum 
When Shire resigned in 1940 BMMO acquired a General 
Manager and took on a more orthodox organizational appearance. 
The company ceased manufacturing its own buses in 1970, but 
it remains the largest of the NBC's subsidiaries, and in many 
respects is still the flagship of the NBC. 
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Potteries Motor Traction. 
A neighbouring BET company, but with a different 
tradition, is the Potteries Motor Traction Company. Prior to 
1933, the company was known as Potteries Electric Traction, a 
title which reflected its function as a tramway company. 
Founded in 1898, the company quickly set about the task of 
providing an electric tramway system along the "main line" 
linking the towns which comprise the City of Stoke-on-Trent. 
Even by the early 1920s, the PET operated only a handful of 
buses, which were used mainly as feeders for the trams. The 
financial position of the PET deteriorated rapidly when 
Stoke-on-Trent City Council obtained powers to control the 
licensing of all routes, vehicles, drivers and conductors. 
The City Council granted licences to nearly all those who 
applied, which led to fierce competition on the most lucrative 
routes. 
11 Twenty-five different companies ran on the main 
Potteries route, producing a situation graphically described 
by the West Midland Traffic Commissioners: "No time-table 
existed, and the vehicles shuttled up and down in a continuous 
game of leap-frog, with an average frequency of less than a 
minute at peak times. .... Competition between individual 
omnibuses accordingly became general, and convictions of both 
drivers and conductors for dangerous driving or obstruction 
were frequent. " 
12 
The PET ceased to operate trams in 1928, and after the 
introduction of the Traffic Commissioners and a stricter 
system of route licensing, a process of rationalization began. 
Nevertheless, a residue of the old system remains today in 
the form of several private operators running buses over urban 
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routes. The presence of these private operators requires the 
PMT to liaise with them in settling routes and fares. A 
further link with the past is the manner in which the PMT 
services are still dominated by the "main line" routes. 
Unlike the BMMO, the PMT was content with its role of 
providing services for Stoke-on-Trent and its environs, a 
policy no doubt influenced by the lack of any competition 
from corporation-run buses. The PMT is rare among the NBC 
subsidiaries in restricting its sphere of operation to one 
densely populated area, and in being the dominant operator 
within that area. The individual character of the PMT means 
that its policy has not always followed the mainstream of the NBC 
thinking, particularly with regard to such developments as 
one-man operation. 
City of Oxford Motor Services 
A bus company which developed at an early date as a 
result of investment by a tramway company, was City of Oxford 
Motor Services. It was founded in 1906 by its holding company 
National Electric Construction Company Limited (a company 
similar in character to BET and which was eventually taken 
over by the latter in 1931), in order to develop an electric 
tramway system, but it was soon discovered that: "Overhead 
wires were unthinkable in a city of the calibre of Oxford. " 
13 
As a result of this local opposition, motor buses replaced the 
horse-trams from 1914. In a similar manner to the PMT, COMS 
did not adopt an expansionist policy, and in fact did not 
trust its buses to run more than a radius of 25 miles beyond 
the Oxford headquarters. This conservative policy caused it 
to forfeit revenue on lucrative express routes, such as 
Oxford - London. Later in this study we shall see that in 
83 
recent years COMS has become a much more commercially minded 
company, in contrast to the still conservative PMT. 
Crosville. 
One of the largest and most distinctive of the NBC 
companies, but previously controlled by Thomas Tilling, is 
Crosville. Unlike BMMO, PMT, and COMS, Crosville's roots are 
firmly those of a family concern. The Chester-based company 
was founded by George Crosland-Taylor and Thomas Ville in 
1904 in order to manufacture cars, but when this venture 
failed the two men turned to motorbus operation, and began 
running a service from Chester to Ellesmere Port in 1910. 
After 1919 Crosville steadily expanded its territory in 
Cheshire and North Wales, controlled by archetypal busmen in 
the persons of the Crosland-Taylor family. Nevertheless, in 
1929 Crosville became involved in a take over which typified 
the arrangements made between the business interests largely 
controlling the bus industry at that time. 
Although the railway companies were anxious to obtain 
some control of the expanding bus industry, they were 
reluctant to undertake bus operation themselves. In fact, 
until the Railway (Road Transport) Act in 1928 it was officially 
illegal for railway companies to run their own services, 
although the Great Western Railway had operated its own bus 
services for several years. It would appear that the railway 
companies had decided that bus operation was an activity best 
left to the professional busman, for even after 1928 they 
concentrated their attentions on taking over existing 
companies. From 1st May 1929, the Crosville company was 
owned by the London, Midland and Scottish Railway, while on 
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1st November 1929 the I, MSR sold half its Crosville shares to 
the Tilling and British Company. 
Tilling and British represented a merger of interests 
between Thomas Tilling and the BET subsidiary British 
Automobile Development Company limited. As Tilling and BAT 
both held considerable shareholdings it was decided to form 
a joint company in 1928, and it was this new company which 
acquired a 50% shareholding in Crosville. The BET companies 
which did not have a Tilling shareholding remained entirely 
under BET control, and these included both BMMO and PMT 
(although the railway companies obtained a 50% shareholding 
in BMMO). 
These complex financial arrangements represented the 
activity of entrepreneurs who were anxious to obtain a stake 
in what was an expanding industry. Despite the tendency 
towards co-operation between these business interests, the 
relationship between Tilling and BET was not harmonious. 
Klapper emphasises the contrasting philosophies of the two 
companies when he states that .... "the Tilling group set 
out specific lines of management which Heaton (the Tilling 
Chairman) wanted followed, whereas the BET style of management 
left much more to the discretion of the individual general 
manager. Some of the companies managed direct by Tilling 
were fortunate in having managers bold enough to confess that 
they threw away what they considered unreasonable directives 
from Tilling headquarters and admitted to objecting to the 
spying on staff or management that the Tilling methods 
induced. " 14 These differences, reflected particularly in 
the personality of the Tilling Chairman Sir Frederick Heaton, 
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led to the failure of Tilling and British, and the two 
companies went their separate ways once more in 1942. 
The machinations of the entrepreneurs, however, should 
not hide the essential work of the busman. In the next 
chapter we shall examine the activity of James Crosland-Taylor, 
a general manager of Crosville, with particular reference to 
the manner in which it reflects Dunsire's implementation 
model. The arrival of big business in the bus industry 
nevertheless paved the way for the 1930 Road Traffic Act, a 
piece of legislation which gave the industry an administrative 
system which exists, almost unchanged, to the present day. 
D. The 1930 Road Traffic Act. 
A Community and Confluence of Interests. 
The investment of BET, Tilling and the railways in the 
largest bus companies created a very powerful vested interest 
within the industry. The result of the cross-investment was 
that the companies agreed not to invade each other's territory, 
as there was little to be gained for the entrepreneur in 
pitting one company against another. Instead, the territorial 
companies could expand within their own areas. We noted 
earlier, in connection with BMMO, that there was little 
incentive for the expanding companies to buy out their smaller 
rivals when fresh competition on the same routes could be 
encountered immediately. A system of route licensing, however, 
would allow- the territorial companies the opportunity to take 
over competitors and achieve a monoply. It was therefore in 
the interests of the large companies that a system of 
regulation for the industry be introduced, for without it they 
could never obtain security of operation which the entrepreneurs 
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required if a satisfactory return on capital was to be obtained. 
The representatives of these investment interests were to have 
a considerable influence over the system of licensing 
introduced by the 1930 Road Traffic Act. Richardson and 
Jordan refer to a community of interests between powerful 
groups and government, and state that .... "it is worth 
noting that there is a preferred relationship that Whitehall 
attempts to establish - and that very much suits the interests 
involved. " 15 The 1930 Road Traffic Act is a good example of 
this community of interests, for the Omnibus Owners' Federation 
exerted considerable influence over its introduction. 
In addition to representing a community of interests, the 
contents of the Act also signified a confluence of interests. 
Although a close relationship can exist between interests, 
some bargaining may be required in order to achieve an 
equilibrium, but in 1929 the policy content objectives of three 
powerful interests (The Ministry of Transport, the territorial 
companies and the Labour Government) coincided, although each 
differed in its motivation for wishing to see legislation 
implemented. 
Although the territorial companies were powerful 
supporters of the Act, the youthful Ministry of Transport was 
the chief motivating force behind its passage. -The Ministry 
was founded in 1919, and its first Minister, Sir Eric Geddes, 
was determined that his new charge should have a positive role 
to play in relation to transport planning. Plowden quotes 
Geddes as stating: "The country now expects from the government, 
not only regulation and restriction, but initiation and 
inspiration -a positive, not merely a negative policy .... 
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Among the matters to be dealt with on new lines, transportation 
holds a prominent placer and the hopes raised will have to be 
satisfied ... ." 
16 From the outset, the Ministry was 
concerned to take the initiative in an attempt to obtain a 
co-ordinated and rational policy on transport. The associated 
tendency of the Ministry to regard co-ordination as a beneficial 
development in itself is a quality which is still evident today. 
As early as October 1919 the MoT began to examine 
proposals for the reform of road traffic law, and set up a 
departmental committee which included a representative of the 
bus operators. Delays in preparing a policy were aggravated 
by governmental doubts on the future of the Ministry, but a 
draft bill on changes in the law with regard to the motor car 
was produced in 1922, to which provisions for bus licensing 
were added in 1924. 
The Ministry's attitude to bus licensing was influenced 
by experience in London. Increasing traffic congestion led to 
the 1924 London Traffic Act, which gave the Minister of 
Transport power to regulate or prohibit motorbus traffic on 
certain restricted streets. In addition, the licensing 
authority for the area, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, 
could prescribe approved routes for operation of buses. 
17 
This Act had the effect of controlling the number of buses on 
London's streets and severely restricted the introduction of 
new operators. The proposals in the draft bill were based on 
the new system of bus licences in London, but owing to disputes 
concerning provisions with regard to the motor car, the bill 
was not officially made public until 1927. At this time it 
was circulated to the various interests for comment. 
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Even after this had taken place, the Government could not find 
time to introduce the legislation, and fell back on the 
expedient step of creating a Royal Commission to examine the 
whole question of the growth in road traffic, including bus 
licensing. 
The Ministry submitted the draft bill to the Commission, 
which also took evidence from R. J. Howley on behalf of the 
Omnibus Owners' Federation. Howley stated that he would 
accept a "controlled monopoly", with the protection of the 
"established operator" from new competition. 
18 In contrast 
to the strong impression made on the Commission by Howley, no 
evidence was taken from any of the smaller independent operators. 
The strong views of both the Ministry and the large 
territorial companies in favour of bus licensing, not 
surprisingly led the Commission to make recommendations almost 
identical to those contained in the draft bill. By the time 
the Commission reported, however, there had been a change of 
government. 
The new Labour Government of 1929 represented the third, 
and final, interest whose influence brought about the new 
licensing system. The new Minister of Transport, Herbert 
Morrison, at that time a young and ambitious minister, was 
anxious to see introduced on a national scale a system of bus 
licensing similar to the one which he had observed in his 
native City of London. It was perhaps ironical that a 
licensing system which favoured large private interests 
should also be regarded with admiration by a labour minister, 
but this community of interests was finally decisive in 
bringing the new system to fruition. Morrison's attitude 
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towards transport planning is indicated by the nature of his 
own brainchild, the London Passenger Transport Board, which 
was eventually set up in 1933, and took over all existing 
transport undertakings in the Metropolis with the aim of 
providing a unified and rational pattern of services. In 
fact, as the Underground group also already had control of 
most of the bus services, the Government in effect had only 
one organization with which to bargain. The degree of 
continuity and the link with the private sector which was 
achieved is indicated by the fact that the Chairman of the 
Underground group, Lord Ashfield, became the first Chairman of 
the IPTB, and continued the policy of greater co-ordination to 
which he was personally dedicated. Outside London, a similar 
scheme would have involved obtaining the agreement of Tilling, 
BET, the railway companies, municipal bus operators and many 
private operators, a task which at that time the Government 
considered was too politically daunting to undertake. On the 
other hand, the proposed system of bus licensing had the 
advantage of being supported by the most powerful interests, 
and could also be presented as a means of ensuring that the 
industry served the public interest. 
An important implication for the Bill's implementation 
was that, because all the strongest interests were agreed on 
the need for the new system, there was little public debate 
on how the system would actually work in practice. With 
reference to the 1903 Motor Car Act, we noted that a 
middle-ranking policy could prove to be of the highest rank 
(in creating and shaping interests, or even changing general 
values) in its implementation. In the case of the bus 
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licensing aspects of the 1930 Act we could look at the 
argument from another side, and state that because no 
difficulties were forseen in implementing the content of 
the Bill, there was little debate with regard to the underlying 
motives of the interests concerned. The territorial companies, 
the Ministry of Transport and the Labour Government had 
differing motives for wishing to see the Bill implemented, but 
all were agreed that it should be implemented. For the 
territorial companies, the primary policy objective was to 
obtain security and extend their services; for the Ministry of 
Transport, the primary policy objective was to achieve a more 
co-ordinated and rational set of services together with a 
higher degree of central control; and for the Labour Government 
the primary policy objective was to devise a system which would 
introduce a degree of public control over the bus industry. 
These differing objectives did not prove a serious barrier to 
implementation because the substance of the Act was agreed by 
all. The difficulties occurred during implementation and the 
next round of policy-making, when the interests discovered 
that they had been operating the system with different 
objectives in mind, and failed to achieve agreement with regard 
to the next step along the road. In 1930 the Labour Government 
could therefore envisage the licensing system as a move 
towards full nationalization, the Ministry of Transport could 
hope that the system would make the industry more centrally 
manageable, while the territorial companies would aim to 
ensure that the system operated in their favour. In later 
years, these conflicting objectives were to become more 
apparent. 
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Parliament and Implementation. 
A further factor which limited debate on the bus 
licensing aspects of the Bill was the degree of interest shown 
in the sections which concerned the motor car. The abolition 
of the speed limit, although of relevance to the bus industry, 
was discussed almost entirely in terms of the private motorist. 
The licensing of drivers, the introduction of third-party 
insurance and the refusal to introduce driving tests were 
generally considered by the political world to be topics of 
far greater importance than bus licensing, although the 
private motorist still represented only a small percentage of 
the total population and the bus had taken over from the tram 
as the primary means of urban public transport. The Draft 
Bill became generally known as the "Motor Bill", reflecting 
the ability of such organizations as the Automobile Association 
and the Royal Automobile Club to arouse the interest of those 
with political influence. Yet Plowden makes it clear that for 
Morrison, bus licensing was the most important aspect of the 
Bill. He quotes Morrison as stating in a broadcast: 
"Establishment of an ordered system of public vehicles: a 
matter of less general interest to the public at large, but 
in many ways the most important part of the Act. " 
19 
The low political salience of the public transport aspects 
of the Bill diverted public attention away from them, and 
restricted comment to the interests concerned. Once again the 
principal interests were assisted, for if any general public 
opposition to bus licensing had grown up on the grounds that 
it was protectionist, then the system might have been more 
difficult to set up. Public debate was also kept to a minimum 
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by the fact that the Road Traffic Bill was introduced into the 
House of Lords only four months after the Royal Commission 
reported. Part IV of the Bill dealt with the regulation of 
public service vehicles, and detailed the new licensing 
system. England and Wales were to be divided into eleven 
Traffic Areas, with two Areas for Scotland. Each Area was 
to have three Traffic Commissioners, one full-time chairman 
appointed by the Minister, and two part-time members appointed 
from a panel submitted by the county councils and county 
borough and urban district councils respectively. The local 
authorities therefore gained considerable influence over the 
system, although as the one full-time professional, the role 
of the chairman was clearly crucial. 
The Commissioners were given the authority to grant five 
different types of licence, each of which would be required 
by an operator wishing to run express coaches, fare stage 
services or excursions. The five types were: 
(1) A driver's licence. 
(2) A conductor's licence. 
(3) A certificate of fitness for the vehicle. This 
licence is issued by a suitably qualified certifying officer. 
(4) A public service vehicle licence for the operator, 
which may be revoked if the holder is not considered to be a 
"fit and proper person" to operate buses. 
(5) A road service licence. This is the most contentious 
and politically significant licence, which establishes the 
operator's right to run services over a particular route. It 
was this licence which the territorial companies were seeking 
to introduce in order to establish area monopolies. In 
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awarding this licence, the Traffic Commissioners were directed 
by the Act to give consideration to the suitability of the 
route, the service needs of the route, the extent to which 
the service was necessary or desirable in the public interest 
and the needs of the area as a whole (in particular the need 
for co-ordination of services and the provision of 
unremunerative services). The Commissioners were also to 
ensure that fares were not unreasonable and prevented wasteful 
competition with alternative forms of transport along the 
route. In order to consider applications for road service 
licences the Commissioners were empowered to hold public 
sittings, popularly known as traffic courts. Any unsuccessful 
applicant was permitted to lodge an appeal with the Minister. 
The Act in theory offered wide discretionary powers to 
the Commissioners in granting road service licences, but the 
nature of the system itself inevitably favoured the territorial 
companies. It was noted earlier that there was little 
incentive for large companies to take over smaller competitors, 
for new competition could spring up at any time. In contrast, 
the new road service licence guaranteed protection to its 
owner, and was therefore- a valuable commodity to be bought 
and sold. The Traffic Commissioners could grant a licence to 
an existing operator-, - but they could not prevent that operator 
selling out to a larger competitor. 
Although the implications for the future structure of the 
industry were the most important implications of the Bill, they 
were not touched upon during Parliamentary debates. Morrison, 
in fact, did not even mention the Labour Party philosophy of 
increasing public control over the industry, but-instead 
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concentrated on the MOT concept that the administrative 
system required greater rationalization and co-ordination. 
Even such a powerful political personality as Morrison 
apparently found it difficult to escape from being strongly 
influenced by the philosophy of his officials. 
During the Second Reading of the Bill, Morrison prefaced 
his remarks on the new system of Commissioners by referring to 
the then current chaotic system whereby licensing was in the 
hands of 1,298 local authorities, few of whom imposed any 
effective system of control. He went on to say that: "This is 
an impossible state of affairs, which must be cleared up if we 
are to have a national policy .... I decided to take the true 
path of revolutionary conduct and to reduce the whole of the 
1,298 to twelve authorities at one blow, and I hope that I 
shall have the support of the House in coming to that decision, 
because I an sure that it is the only way in which we can get 
a national and co-ordinated system of transport. " 
20 
After 
outlining the new system he emphasized that the duties of the 
Commissioners would be: ". ... mainly administrative. Their 
main task will be to co-ordinate and to organize transport. " 
21 
Morrison concluded his remarks on the Commissioners by once 
again emphasizing the benefits of administrative co-ordination: 
"I think that as time goes on we shall find that we have set up 
machinery not merely for licensing, but a great aid towards 
co-ordination, and machinery that can be used with advantage in 
any further alteration of the law that may come along. " 
22 
The emphasis which Morrison placed on the words "national" 
and "co-ordination" illustrated the influence of the MoT over 
the contents of the Bill. The Commissioners, although 
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including local authority representatives, were to be led by 
a Chairman who was appointed by, and responsible to, the 
Minister of Transport. Morrison had admitted during the 
Second Reading that he was initially inclined to leave 
licensing in the hands of the local authorities, but had 
eventually been persuaded to introduce a national system. 
Given the propensity of Morrison to be influenced by his 
officials, it was a system which would apparently increase the 
power of the Ministry of Transport as a whole. 
Morrison referred several times to the manner in which 
the system would be an aid towards co-ordination, and this 
could be taken to mean that the needs of the public would 
benefit, but during the debate the Minister made no reference 
to the public as such. In this case, co-ordination appeared 
to be conceived as providing a tidier and more centrally 
controlled administrative system. Amidst this triumph of a 
Departmental interest, little attention was paid to the 
effect of the new system on bus operation itself. 
The power of the MoT over successive Ministers was 
confirmed by the attitude of the Opposition spokesman, and the 
previous Minister of Transport, Colonel Wilfred Ashley. Ashley 
is quoted by Plowden as being: ". ... "a thorough-paced old 
English gentleman, " and also that: It. ... he relied heavily 
on the advice of officials.,, 23 His reply to Morrison during 
the Second Reading confirms these observations. From the 
outset, he stressed the Oppositions support for the principles 
of the Bill by declaring: n. ... On behalf of those who sit 
on the Conservative benches I can assure him (Morrison) that, 
though we shall feel it our duty to examine fairly minutely 
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the various proposals of the Bill, we shall do so in no party 
spirit. This is not a party Bill: it is a Bill which affects 
us all, whatever part of the House we may sit in; and we want 
to make it a national Bill and a useful Bill. 
24 
Colonel Ashley emphasized that the Draft Bill he had 
circulated in 1927 had been prepared by two Departmental 
Committees, and that no significant opposition had been 
expressed by affected interests. He considered that the Bill 
was long overdue, and regretted that only shortage of time had 
prevented him from introducing it himself. The views of 
Colonel Ashley confirmed that a real policy community had 
been created, and that implementation of the Bill was unlikely 
to arouse any significant degree of political interest. It 
should be noted that both Morrison and Ashley devoted only a 
small section of their speeches to road passenger transport. 
The motoring aspects of the Bill were given far more attention, 
while the MPs who followed the front bench spokesmen made 
scarcely a single reference to the new regulatory system for 
public transport. 
The Effects of Implementation. 
The paucity of public debate on the implications of the 
new system for the future structure of the bus industry, and 
the lack of precedent with regard to bus and route licensing, 
ostensibly allowed the Traffic Commissioners a high degree of 
potential discretion in exercising their authority. With regard 
to the certificate of fitness, the new inspectorate clearly 
possessed considerable direct power. An operator could no 
longer afford to neglect the condition of his vehicles, for if 
he did his whole business could collapse. Dyos and Aldcroft 
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state that during the 1930s: "In nearly every case the Traffic 
Commissioners were able to report that there had been a 
remarkable improvement in the standard of equipment and in the 
comfort and cleanliness of public service vehicles. They were 
no longer worked to a standstill before repair, .... while 
the safety of the public was increased by constant supervision 
of the maintenance of steering, brake gear, and general 
improvement. " 
25 
The certificate of fitness offered a means of improving 
vehicle quality which could be relatively easily implemented 
and the consequent benefits measured. The benefits of route 
licensing were more difficult to measure, while the Road Traffic 
Act did not offer the Traffic Commissioners an easy guide to 
implementation. Such questions as the suitability and needs of 
a route, the desirability of a service, the needs of the area 
as a whole, the provision of both efficient and unremunerative 
services (a clear case of conflicting policy objectives), and 
the co-ordination of all forms of passenger transport, left the 
Traffic Commissioners with a considerable degree of individual 
discretion. In fact, Thomson and Hunter quote Chester as 
considering that the Traffic Commissioners acted on the 
principles of priority, protection and public need. 
26 Thomson 
and Hunter also consider that the principal objectives of 
route licensing were: ". ... to eliminate wasteful competition 
within the road industry and between road and rail, and to 
facilitate the provision of unremunerative services. " 27 
Although Parliamentary debate was much concerned with 
rationalizing the system, no reference was made to the provision 
of unremunerative services, despite its inclusion as one of the 
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matters which the Traffic Commissioners should bear in mind 
when considering a licence application. In fact, the provision 
of unremunerative services depended to a large extent on the 
elimination of competition, wasteful or otherwise. The 
territorial companies, in having most to gain from the 
implementation of the new system, were in a vulnerable position 
with regard to providing these loss-making services. If a 
large company was given the monopoly of a profitable route, 
then it could charge a particular fare without the fear that 
new competition would spring up. This would only happen if 
the Traffic Commissioners allowed these newcomers to operate. 
On the other hand, there could also be routes where profits 
were small, or where even losses were likely to be made, but 
which were considered by the Commissioners to be (in the words 
of the Act): ". ... necessary or desirable in the public 
interest. " On these routes, the large companies might be 
persuaded to operate in return for the continuing privilege of 
being able to operate a monopoly on more profitable routes. 
Rather than charge a higher fare on the unprofitable route, 
the operator could average out his total costs and revenues 
and charge the same rate of fares on all his routes. The 
operation of this principle is known as cross-subsidization, 
and the method of calculating fares as standard charging. 
The principle of cross-subsidization, although not referred to 
in the Road Traffic Act, became the main feature of its 
implementation (we shall see in Chapter Three that 
cross-subsidization already existed prior to implementation of 
the 1930 Act). Operation of the principle depended on the 
mutual recognition by the companies and the Commissioners that 
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their interests would be best served by a tacit acknowledgment 
of the need to co-operate with each other. 
Operation and preservation of the route licensing system 
therefore depended on an equilibrium and interdependency of 
interests being achieved between the Commissioners and the 
large companies. The Commissioners could fulfil their 
statutory obligations, while the companies could obtain 
guaranteed route monopolies in return for fulfilling certain 
social functions. When placed in this context, the 
Commissioners' principles of priority, protection and public 
need become clearer. 
The Commissioners established the principle of priority 
from the start by giving the established operator preference 
over the new applicant: "In fact to facilitate their 
proceedings in the transitional period the Commissioners were 
empowered during the first four years to grant public service 
licences to all vehicles operating prior to 1931, without a 
certificate of fitness having been granted. " 
28 Although 
obtaining a public service licence did not automatically mean 
that a road service licence would also be issued, it did mean 
that the established operators' services could not easily be 
taken off the road. 
The principle of priority led naturally to the principle 
of protection: "As a rule, whenever more than one operator 
performed a service in the same area or on the same route, the 
Commissioners allocated services on a non-competitive basis. " 
29 
We noted earlier, however, that by merely issuing a licence the 
Commissioners facilitated the development of the territorial 
companies. In return for this privilege of protection, the 
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operator could assist the Commissioners by fulfilling the 
principle of public need. 
The merit of cross-subsidization in the bus industry is a 
contentious issue. Its supporters argue that it allows for 
the most comprehensive set of services, while its critics 
contend that it destroys competition and hence provides the 
public with an inefficient service. The significant point 
with regard to implementation of the 1930 Road Traffic Act, 
however, was that cross-subsidization served the interests of 
both the regulators (the Commissioners) and the regulated 
(the large companies). The Road Traffic Act was a piece of 
legislation which expressed the interests and philosophy of 
the territorial companies, the Ministry of Transport and the 
Labour Party, but in its implementation it was moulded by the 
Traffic Commissioners into a shape which none of its 
progenitors appeared to have envisaged. The discretion given 
to the Commissioners allowed them the opportunity to apply the 
principles which could achieve the most convenient equilibrium 
of interests between themselves and the operators. The Road 
Traffic Act was therefore an effective piece of legislation to 
the extent that its implementation allowed for any potential 
conflict between the Commissioners and the operators to be 
defused. A more rigid system, which set out precisely how the 
Commissioners were to operate, could have led to confrontation 
and non-implementation of the Act. 
It is also important to examine the dual nature of the 
Traffic Commissioners' interests. On the one hand, their 
interest lies in implementing the provisions of the Act. In 
this respect they are the delegates of those who framed the Act, 
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and charged with the responsibility of ensuring that the real 
world changes in the manner stated in the contents of the Act. 
On the other hand, and in a more personal sense, they are 
officials doing a job, and unlikely to deliberately provoke 
a conflict where it can be avoided. The Commissioners' 
solution to the problem of satisfying these dual interests was 
the principle of cross-subsidization. 
This dual interest corresponds to Downs' hypothesis that 
a member of a bureau will attempt to satisfy his own interests 
in addition to those of the organization. 
30 When an official 
discovers a means of satisfying these dual interests, then ease 
of implementation is. Considerably assisted. It should. 
nevertheless also be noted that the personal interests of the 
implementer are dependent on the contents of the Act. If these 
official interests are ignored in favour of satisfying personal 
interests, then the implementer is likely to be checked by his 
superiors, unless they acknowledge the impracticability of the 
Act's contents, (or themselves have a vested interest in 
frustrating Official policy objectives) and hence turn a blind 
eye to the implementer's behaviour. Difficulties could also 
occur as a result of cognitive. gaps within the Babel House 
model outlined by Dunsire (e. g., the Minister of Transport 
could be seen as occupying a different "order of comprehension" 
from the Traffic Commissioners). In certain circumstances it 
could even be argued that satisfaction of personal interests 
is merely a by-product and result of satisfying official 
interests. Hence in applying the principle of 
cross-subsidization the Traffic Commissioners could be 
perceived as fulfilling the provisions of the Act, and as a 
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result gaining personal fulfilment from satisfying these 
official interests. This argument in turn raises questions 
about the nature of individual motivation and discretion. 
The individual's role within the implementation process is of 
key importance, and one to which we shall return during this 
study. 
Regardless of the way in which we interpret the nature of 
the Traffic Commissioners' motivation, competition within the 
bus industry was undoubtedly reduced during the 1930s. Dyos 
and Aldcroft state that between 1931 and 1938 the number of 
operators fell from 6,434, to 4,798, with the average number 
of vehicles owned by each operator rising from 7.1 to 10.4. 
By the beginning of 1938 over 60 per cent of the buses and 
coaches were owned by firms possessing 100 vehicles or more 
compared with around 47 per cent in 1931, whilst the percentage 
owned by smaller operators (less than ten vehicles) fell from 
31 29 to 22 per cent over the same period. In addition to 
the take over of smaller concerns by the territorial companies, 
the existence of the Commissioners considerably checked the 
entry of new operators into the bus industry. As the onus was 
on the operator to prove that his proposed service was 
necessary or desirable in the public interest, would-be 
operators were discouraged from even applying for a licence, 
which strengthened still more the power of the territorial 
companies. 
The Act did nevertheless bring a greater degree of order 
to the industry. The co-ordination of fare and time-tables 
provided a much more reliable service to the public, while 
there was also a limited degree of co-ordination between bus 
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and rail services. 
In analysing implementation of the Act, however, we 
should also consider the degree of autonomous change which 
took place. We noted earlier that throughout the history of 
the industry, there has been a natural trend towards operator 
rationalization. During the 1920s, the bus industry 
experienced a type of "gold rush". Many operators were 
attracted to the industry in the hope of making a quick and 
easy profit, producing a chaotic pattern of services and 
cut-throat competition. The powerful financial support given 
to the territorial companies gave them a strong foothold in 
the industry, and as we saw with BMMO few private operators 
were able to resist for long once such a large company had 
made up its mind to dominate a particular route at all costs. 
In this context rationalization during the 1930s, although 
greatly assisted by the provisions of the 1930 Act, would still 
have taken place without legislation. 
Dunsire's aggregative model would appear to be of 
particular significance with regard to the development of the 
bus industry during the 1930s. One of the main pillars of 
Dunsirets implementation model, which we described in Chapter 
One, is the premise that: "Implementation is a construct that 
takes its life and force from the interest of an observer. 
Implementation is in the eye of the beholder. " 32 We have 
already seen how the Traffic Commissioners moulded the Act 
into a form which suited their purpose. Dunsire holds that 
when we are examining bureaucratic structures and processes, 
we are looking at the matters which concern particular stages 
of the bureaucracy, rather than at a continuous thread of 
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policy implementation. Implementation of the 1930 Act worked 
because interdependency of interests existed between the 
Commissioners and the operators. In one sense the Commissioners 
were implementing the terms of the Act, but in another sense 
they were ensuring that their place within the structure of 
the bus industry was secure. Equally, without the consent of 
the principal operators, the Act would not have been capable 
of implementation. For the territorial companies, 
implementation of the Act was just one element of their plans 
for future expansion. If we examine the implementation process 
in this manner, then Dunsire's concept of an aggregative 
implementation process can be linked to Downs' hypothesis that 
self interest is a primary element in motivating the individual 
within a bureau. The difficulties which arise when interests 
rebel against a piece of legislation are illustrated when we 
examine the 1947 Transport Act. 
E. The 1947 Transport Act. 
During the Second World War, the bus companies were 
compelled by the Government to run services where they were 
most needed, and a rationalization of routes resulted. There 
was inevitably little new investment in buses, and by 1945 
many fleets consisted of ageing vehicles. The most notable 
single event for the bus industry during the war years was the 
dissolution of Tilling and British. As we noted earlier, the 
relationship between the two companies had always been uneasy, 
and it was finally decided that they should once more go their 
separate ways. 
They continued to operate their area agreements, but 
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significant differences over major issues were reflected in 
the nature and membership of groups representing bus interests. 
The largest of these groups was the Public Road Transport- 
Association, which was formed in 1943 as the result of a 
merger between the Omnibus Owners' Federation and the Public 
Service Transport Association. 33 The PTA contained both 
Tilling's and the BET, as well as many municipal operators and 
the largest private operators. Richardson states that the 
PTA's wide constituency made it an influential client of the 
34 MoT, but there were several other operators' groups. The 
Municipal Passenger Transport Association was founded in 1905, 
and contained nearly all the local authorities who ran their 
own transport services. The Passenger Vehicle Operators 
Association represented many of the smaller operators, and BET 
were also members, but Tilling's did not join. 
35 Tilling's 
were also absent from the British Omnibus Companies Public 
Relations Committee. This group was founded in 1942 in order 
"to convey to the public how the companies are serving them and 
assisting the war effort. " Fifty companies joined, including 
BET and Scottish Motor Traction. In reality, the BOCPRC was 
formed to fight any proposed nationalization plans for the 
bus industry, and after the war the Omnibus Passengers' 
Protection Association (largely a front organization for the 
BET and other large operators) campaigned against the plans 
put forward by the Labour Government. 36 
The Labour Government which took office in 1945 was 
committed to the nationalization of the railways, road haulage 
and civil aviation, but not the bus industry. Finer indicates 
that the Government considered a bus service to be a matter of 
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local concern, and that a centralized organization owned by 
the national authority would be politically inept as well as 
clumsy to operate. He reveals that the Government's decision 
was largely influenced by the views of Sir Frederick Heaton, 
the Chairman of Tilling's. Heaton suggested: ". ... a number 
of purely local passenger transport boards for the purpose of 
co-ordinating as public utility undertakings the existing 
local passenger services municipal and private. 
() 37 This 
statement confirmed that Sir Frederick was not inclined to be 
anti-nationalization to the same extent as his counterparts at 
BET, and explained why Tilling's was disinclined to join 
groups other than the PTA. 
The 1946 Transport Bill proposed that a policy-making 
British Transport Commission would supervise five Executives, 
dealing respectively with railways, road haulage, hotels and 
catering, docks and inland waterways, and road transport. A 
further Executive was set up to take over from the London 
Passenger Transport Board. 
In a similar fashion to the 1903 Motor Car Act and the 
1930 Road Traffic Act, the bus industry found itself in a 
position of low political salience, with the majority of 
attention being given to nationalization of the railways. 
With regard to road passenger transport, the BTC was given 
power, but was not required, to: "secure the provision" of 
road passenger transport services. It was to be allowed to 
prepare and submit to the Minister "area schemes" which would 
provide for the acquisition of operators within such areas, and 
for the organization of suitable bodies to run the services 
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thus obtained. 
38 
The Labour Government clearly considered that the 1930 
Act did not provide for sufficient public control of the 
industry, but had only a vague idea as to how any new system 
should operate. The lack of precision concerning the nature 
of the area schemes was in fact reminiscent of the Ministry 
of Transport's faith in the benefits of co-ordination itself. 
The BTC's connection with the MoT was strengthened by the 
appointment of C. W. Hurcomb as its first Chairman, for 
Hurcomb had previously been Permanent Secretary at the MoT 
from 1927-37, and had been closely connected with the creation 
of the 1930 Road Traffic Act. In the event, the BTC 
experienced scant success in implementing the road passenger 
transport provisions of the 1947 Transport Act, with the 
result that the new legislation had little direct impact on 
the bus industry. In contrast with the 1903 Motor Car Act, 
general values expressed by road passenger transport aspects 
of the 1947 Act occupied a high position in the policy-making 
hierarchy, but a low position in the implementation hierarchy. 
The failure to implement the Act could be attributed to lack 
of interest and attention at the top, and resistance at the 
operational level. 
The Minister of Transport, Alfred Barnes, exemplified the 
lack of thought which the Government had given to implementing 
the area schemes. He stated that: "The procedure to be 
adopted is for the policy Commissioners to promote area 
schemes, after consultation with the local authorities in 
their areas .... It is the intention that ultimately they 
shall be brought completely into an integrated national 
transport service .... The Commission will promote schemes 
108 
after consultation with the local authorities for the 
co-ordination of the passenger transport services serving the 
area. " 
39 The Minister did not mention the delicate subject 
of consultations with the private companies, a process which 
would be essential if the schemes were to work, nor did he 
refer to the future of the Traffic Commissioners in the event 
of the new system being implemented. 
In contrast to the Minister, several backbench labour 
MPs were prepared to be more outspoken in their criticism of 
the relationship between the companies and the Traffic 
Commissioners. The Labour Government of 1930 could envisage 
that the Road Traffic Act represented a step in the move 
towards full public control, but by 19.46 many Labour MPs had 
become disillusioned with the system. A particularly vehement 
critic was Robert Mellish (making his maiden speech). 
Mr. Mellish accused the road passenger transport industry of 
being a monopoly and claimed that: ". ... the people who 
work in the industry know the methods adopted by the monopolies 
in order to gain this measure of control. We know the 
instances that have occurred again and again in order to stamp 
out the "small man" .... They knocked him out years ago, 
and they gave him very small compensation in doing so ... 
The issue before us is whether private monopoly is better 
qualified to run transport than is State control. " 
40 
It was ironic that the system which Mr. Mellish criticised 
so strongly had been brought about through legislation 
introduced by a previous Labour Government. The terms of the 
1930 Act had resulted in a particular relationship between the 
Traffic Commissioners and the territorial companies, and the 
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nature of this relationship was explicitly set out by 
Mr. Glossop, a Conservative MP and also a director of a BET 
subsidiary. Mr. Glossop claimed that there was no real 
monopoly in the way that Mr. Mellish would like to suggest. 
He defended the system of traffic courts with regard to route 
licensing, and considered that the Traffic Commissioners had 
no difficulty in securing all the services which they 
considered to be necessary. 
Mr. Glossop continued his defence of the status quo by 
emphasizing that a large number of operators ran a substantial 
proportion of their services at a loss, and continued to do 
this because if they did not, the Traffic Commissioners would 
say: "If you will not operate from A to B- we know it is not 
an economic route - we shall take away from your existing 
licence a section of your economic route. " 
41 In supporting 
this statement, Mr. Glossop revealed that 48% of BIVINO services 
and 64% of Southern National services were run at a loss. 
These figures indicated the extent to which the operators were 
prepared to accommodate the needs of the Commissioners, and 
also the extent to which the companies were allowed by the 
Commissioners to operate the more lucrative routes at a high 
level of profit. The strength of the interrelationship, 
manifested in the form of cross-subsidization, indicated that 
implementation of the 1930 Road Traffic Act had produced a 
system which would not easily be changed by the policy-makers. 
The difficulties which would be encountered by the BTC in 
attempting to implement the area schemes were further emphasized 
by Mr. Glossop's comment on the activities of the Public 
Transport Association. He emphasized that this body, supported 
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by both private operators and municipalities, had decided that 
the Bill's proposals were ill-considered and unfair. 
42 On 
this occasion there was to be no question of the bus industry 
adapting legislation to suit its own needs. 
Yet implementation of the 1947 Act began with a notable 
victory for the BTC, when they acquired all the transport 
interests of Thomas Tilling for the sum of £24.8 million. As 
we indicated earlier, Sir Frederick Heaton had first suggested 
the concept of the area schemes, and he shocked the bus 
industry to the core in 1946 when he announced himself to be 
in favour of the nationalization of inland transport. The PTA 
had been relatively non-committal over the Government's plans, 
as had the MPTA, but the PVOA and the BOCPRC (with BET to the 
fore in both groups) had come out strongly against the area 
schemes proposal. Sir Frederick outraged the BET and other 
operators by stating that neither railways, road hauliers nor 
bus operators could be said to be engaged in the ordinarily 
accepted meaning of free enterprise, and that the Government 
quite distinctly had a mandate for what it proposed to do. 
43 
Heaton was severely criticized by the PVOA, but he replied 
that the PTA represented the widest cross-section of the 
industry, and they had expressed no opinion on the Government's 
plans (thereby throwing doubt on Glossop's assertion). 
44 
Tilling's sale came as a great shock to other operators, 
for bus travel was then approaching what was to prove its peak 
level, but Hibbs points out that compared to BET many of the 
Tilling bus companies operated in the relatively unremunerative 
rural areas. 
45 In addition, Sir Frederick Heaton had by 
that time considerably diversified the interests of the 
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company, and buses 
company's holdings. 
Heaton, who ran the 
was ill at the time 
later. 
Tilling's were 
were no longer so important a part of the 
It was also perhaps significant that 
company in an extremely autocratic manner, 
of the sale, and died only a few months 
quickly followed into state ownership by 
Scottish Motor Traction and many in the bus industry assumed 
that, with these two major companies having gone into public 
ownership, it would be only a matter of time before BET 
followed. The directors of BET were extremely angry about 
Tilling's action, however, and refused to contemplate any sale 
to the BTC. Nevertheless the BTC did acquire considerable 
interest in the BET companies, in the form of shares which had 
previously been owned by the railway companies. 
Despite this direct involvement by the state in bus 
operation, the structure of the industry showed little change. 
The BTC was content to remain within the existing regulatory 
system, and the area agreements with BET were unaltered. The 
degree to which the BTC wished to remain true to the spirit of 
the relationship which had been constructed between the Traffic 
Commissioners and the territorial companies was illustrated in 
a 1951 court case. When it was ruled in the High Court that a 
BTC company could not be made subject to the provisions for 
route licensing laid down in the 1930 Road Traffic Act, the 
BTC immediately appealed against this decision, and won its 
case . 
46 The BTC evidently did not share the low opinion of 
the licensing system expressed by labour MPs such as Bob 
Mellish, and was not prepared to introduce revolutionary 
changes. The attitude of the BTO could be explained by the 
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nature of the leadership given to the Road Passenger Executive, 
which was set up in June 1949 with the particular object of 
introducing the area schemes. The Chairman of the RPE was 
George Cardwell, a genuine busman who had built up the North 
Western Road Car Company, based in Macclesfield. 
Prior to Tilling's sale to the BTO, Cardwell had worked 
at the company's headquarters in London. Significantly, the 
RPE eventually moved its headquarters to the building occupied 
by the Tilling Group Management Board (the management structure 
of the Tilling bus companies was little changed despite its 
sale to the BTC). The RPE was therefore dominated by the 
philosophy of the territorial companies, which was embodied in 
the twin principles of area agreements and cross-subsidization. 
In the light of the close relationship between the RPE and 
Tilling's, we could relate the managerial philosophy of the 
RPE to Downs' observation that: ". ... any new department in 
an existing bureau will usually be under superiors whose 
functions continue to be dominated by the tasks previously 
assigned to them. Hence these top officials cannot develop 
the same single-minded concentration upon their new functions 
as the leaders of a wholly new bureau formed solely to carry 
out those functions". 
47 The RPE was a new bureau, created as 
part of the BTC but it was another "new" BTC bureau, the 
Tilling organization, which had taken it over. In this case it 
could be argued that the BTC itself was the new bureau, 
attempting to control a "department" (Tilling's) which had been 
established for many years, and contained a high degree of 
professional expertise. The Ministry of Transport philosophy 
epitomized by Hurcomb, together with the philosophy of the 
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labour Government, had little hope of influencing "Uncle" 
George Cardwell (as he was known in the bus industry) and the 
firmly entrenched Tilling approach to road passenger transport 
planning. 
In introducing the 1930 Road Traffic Bill, Morrison had 
laid great stress on the MoT concept which emphasized the 
scheme's national and co-ordinated character. In practice, the 
MoT had little opportunity to influence the development of the 
territorial companies, or control the Traffic Commissioners, 
while co-ordination was based on an equilibrium of mutual 
interests between the Commissioners and the companies. The 
area schemes proposed by the BTC could be interpreted as a 
further attempt by the MoT to strengthen central control, a 
plan which, as in 1930, could also fit the labour Government's 
wish to increase public control over the bus industry. The 
stumbling block was that on this occasion the industry itself 
was determined that the schemes should not be implemented. 
It was decided that the first area schemes should be 
introduced in North-East England, but progress was extremely 
slow. The area was to be controlled by a Northern Passenger 
Road Transport Board, and divided into three districts. The 
main company in the area, United Automobile Services, was 
owned by the BTC, and it was no doubt hoped by the Government 
that the many Labour-controlled councils in the area would be 
sympathetic towards the scheme. In the event, the councils 
were reluctant to surrender their authority to one co-ordinating 
Board, and strongly resisted attempts to win them over to the 
new concept. In addition, the BET-owned company within the 
area, Northern General, remained firmly in private hands. 
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Resistance to the area schemes was also assisted by the 
lengthy and complicated consultative process adopted by the 
BTC. This consisted of the following stages: 
1. The Commission was obliged to consider representations 
made by the local authorities in the area concerned, while they 
were still in the process of formulating a scheme to be 
presented to the Minister. When they had provisionally decided 
on a scheme they were bound to consult every local authority 
and every private provider of transport who was likely to be 
affected by the scheme (i. e., local authorities had to be 
consulted twice). 
2. The scheme was then submitted to the MoT. 
3. Providing he approved of the scheme, the Minister 
then had to prepare a Draft Order, which was to be published 
so that objections could be made against it. 
4. If any objections were not eventually withdrawn, the 
Minister was forced to hold a public enquiry. 
5. After holding a public enquiry the Minister could 
then make the Order, which then had to lie on the table of the 
Commons for fourteen days. If, even after this period, 
objections still had not been withdrawn then the final stage 
came into operation. 
6. The scheme had to be examined by-a Select Committee 
of both Houses after which it became law. 
48 
After two years of wrangling, the BTC submitted a scheme to 
the Minister in 1951, but the change of Government in that 
year effectively rendered the plan null and void. Within the 
MoT the area scheme concept lived on, however, and resurfaced 
in the form of the Passenger Transport Areas set up by the 
1968 Transport Act. 
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The Conservative Government disbanded the RPE in 1952, 
and in the 1953 Transport Act took away the BTC's power to 
acquire bus companies together with its scheme-making powers. 
The PVOA campaigned strongly for complete denationalization of 
the bus industry, but this issue was not considered by the 
Conservative Government to be as important as denationalization 
of the road haulage industry. 
49 It was thought at the time 
that some of the BTC companies might be sold back to the 
private sector, but only a handful of small sales took place. 
Despite the non-implementation of the area schemes, the BTC 
was now firmly established in its ownership of the former 
Tilling companies. In maintaining the company management 
structure within the now traditional licensing system, the 
BTC was not inclined to lose its interest in the bus industry. 
Assistance in maintaining the status quo was also given 
by the Thesiger Committee, which was set up-to enquire into 
the working of the licensing system. 
50 The Committee's 
report amounted to a total defence of the existing system, and 
its judgment was supported by the Government. 
The year 1953 proved to be a significant one for the bus 
industry (although it could hardly have suspected it at the time), 
for in that year the volume of passengers carried by bus reached 
its peak. In the early post-war years, the demand for travel 
exploded at a time when the bus, was asserting its final 
supremacy over the tram. Bus fares had remained almost 
unchanged since 1930, but the real incomes of the population 
were slowly increasing. At the same time few people could 
afford a car, and in any case the supply of vehicles was 
restricted. From the mid-1950a onwards, car ownership began to 
1.16 
increase rapidly, and the golden age of buses was over. 
F. Conclusion. 
In this chapter we have studied the development of the 
bus industry, and the legislative framework which grew up 
around it. We have attempted to analyse and compare the 
effects of three pieces of legislation in particular - the 
1903 Motor Car Act, the 1930 Road Traffic Act and the 1947 
Transport Act. We saw that the 1903 and the 1930 Acts had 
a far greater impact on the bus industry than the 1947 Act, 
and concluded that the initial place of a policy in a hierarchy 
of importance may not correspond to its importance in the 
implementation hierarchy. Nevertheless, with regard to the 
1930 Act in particular, we attempted to illustrate the 
interrelationship between policy-making and implementation. 
In this case, the circumstances and manner in which the policy 
was presented considerably influenced the success of its 
implementation. At the same time, we also recognised that a 
gap existed between the policy concept and its implementation. 
The success of implementation depended on achieving a 
delicately balanced interrelationship between the two principal 
interests involved. 
During the following round of policy-making, the Ministry 
of Transport and the Labour Government discovered that their 
exclusion from the implementation process had frustrated the 
achievement of their objectives. Subsequently, in the 
implementation of the 1947 Act, they again learned that an 
expression of general policy objectives is no substitute for 
power at the operational level. We also noted that when one 
of the operational interests (Tilling's) became a part of the 
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official structure, it quickly invaded and took over 
departments set up to initiate radical change. 
The apparent power which implementing interests have over 
policy-making interests in determining the actual effects of 
a policy might suggest that a similar phenomenon might be 
detected at each operational stage of the implementation 
process. In this chapter, we have examined the territorial 
bus companies mainly in terms of the interest of the 
entrepreneur, particularly in studying how he gained from 
implementation of the 1930 Road Traffic Act. In the following 
chapter, we will briefly examine the philosophy of the busman, 
and his place within the implementation process. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE BUSMAN 
A. Introduction 
At the core of the bus industry is the busman, i. e., the 
man who operates, services or manages the actual bus service. 
In the context of the aggregative model, he must be switched-in 
to any implementation process which concerns road passenger 
transport. In fact within our policy process model, the work 
of the busman will predominate on the time-scale. Nevertheless, 
the bus industry undoubtedly has become more subject to 
official regulation over the years, while in recent times it 
has been compelled to seek a greater degree of co-operation 
with local authorities in order to maintain economic viability. 
The reaction of the bus industry to change in later 
years will be seen when we study the National Bus Company, but 
the attitudes and values which have shaped the NBC are 
themselves derived from the busman's basic attitude to his 
business. 
We noted in the previous chapter how both the 1930 Road 
Traffic Act and the 1947 Transport Act were moulded to suit 
the interests of the bus industry, and in particular those of 
the territorial companies. The 1930 Act was of major 
importance because of the administrative restructuring which 
it brought to the industry. In contrast the 1947 Act, despite 
expressing high level general objectives, and leading directly 
to the state ownership of major bus companies, had little real 
impact on the industry as a whole. 
In briefly examining the reactions of a particular 
busman to these pieces of legislation, we can analyse how 
implementation may work at the "grass roots" level, and also 
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identify some of the attitudes of a typical busman. James 
Crosland-Taylor (son of the founder of Crosville Motor Services) 
spent forty years in the bus industry, and was General Manager 
of Crosville from 1935 to 1959. His account of how he did his 
job is a unique instance of a busman writing about his work. 
The views which he expresses are still much in evidence today, 
and have shaped to a considerable extent the policy of the 
National Bus Company. 
B. Crosville and the 1930 Road Traffic Act. 
From its earliest days, the Crosville Company operated 
its services over a very wide area. With its headquarters in 
Chester, it quickly developed a system of routes into both the 
thickly populated industrial areas of North Cheshire and 
Merseyside and the sparsely inhabited territory of North and 
Central Wales. In this respect, Crosville offers a good 
example of how a bus company can contain a large amount of 
in-built cross-subsidization. In the previous chapter we 
emphasised that cross-subsidization became the key element in 
the Traffic Commissioners' approach to implementing the 1930 
Road Traffic Act, but Crosland-Taylor makes it clear that 
loss-making routes were a feature of the company's operations 
almost from the outset. 
Until 1923 Crosville concentrated its services on 
lucrative industrial areas such as Chester, Warrington, the 
Wirral and Crewe, but in 1923: "Fresh capital was easy to come 
by, and so we were tempted by the almost untouched area of 
North Wales and fell. One often wonders what would have 
happened if we had sat tight in our own very compact and rich 
piece of country, relying on Merseyside with its million 
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population, and let other people have North Wales - as they 
would have done, because even then small operators were 
beginning. " 
2 Crosville did not of course commence these 
services in the expectation that they would make a loss, but 
even before 1930 it had become clear that many of the Welsh 
routes would never make a profit. Yet the company did not move 
out of Wales: "By 1929 we had this large area in square miles, 
but small in population, for which we had paid nothing and 
which barely paid its way. What was the best thing to do ? 
It might have been better if it had been sold, and the profit 
used to buy something better, but we decided to adopt a policy 
of keeping it, and buying certain other businesses where the 
goodwill paid for would be at least partially balanced by the 
economies that could be made by amalgamation. " 
3 
Even prior to the 1930 Road Traffic Act, therefore, 
Crosville had made the decision to purchase rivals in the 
rural areas. The 1930 Act nevertheless made it possible for 
Crosville to take over these businesses without the fear that 
new competition would spring up. The extent of the change is 
illustrated by the fact that between 1922 and 1930 Crosville 
bought twenty-six businesses, but between 1931 and 1939 a 
further sixty-seven companies were acquired. Although many 
of these purchases might have taken place irrespective of the 
Road Traffic Act, the security which it offered to Crosville 
must have been an incentive to proceed with this policy. The 
Act therefore had the effect of encouraging rationalization 
within the bus industry, but in Crosville's case it also 
appeared to have the effect of encouraging the company to 
widen its territory despite the business instinct that it was 
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an unwise policy. Even without the presence of the Traffic 
Commissioners, the company wished to expand in the hope that 
by some means or other a satisfactory return on capital could 
be obtained. 
The principal impact of the Traffic Commissioners on 
the company was the insistence of the former that services 
should be maintained even in the deepest rural areas. As a result 
of the Commissioners' policy, ". . .,. by 1939 it was obvious 
that the Welsh part of the company was becoming a drag, and 
would have to be supported by the English portion, which by 
that time was thoroughly established and doing extremely well. " 
4 
It is possible to illustrate the actual effects of the 
Commissioners' policy, for at the commencement of World War 
Two, and in the light of petrol rationing, the bus companies 
were asked to cut services. Crosland-Taylor observed that: 
"This was a golden opportunity to get things sorted out, since 
we had a lot of superfluous mileage that had to be kept going 
in normal times but that was really not required. " 
5 In 
1939 bus miles run for Crosville were 33,465,636, but in 1940 
this had been reduced to 30,418,510. Nevertheless, passengers 
carried increased by more than six million, and profits rose 
from £261,689 to £320,063. There is therefore no doubt that 
the Traffic Commissioners were able to exercise genuine control 
over the bus industry during the 1930s, and that the principle 
of cross-subsidization was enforced.. 
The limits of the Commissioners' powers are illustrated 
by Crosland-Taylor's observations on events in Wales, where 
"pirate" operators continued to exist: "Evidence of law 
breaking was extremely difficult to obtain because a stranger 
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was immediately spotted, and local people would naturally 
refuse to help. Even when we did get a case, the Court would 
fine the offender half a crown, and that was that. The money 
spent in obtaining a prosecution was 
6 
g just not worth it. " 
This activity in Wales illustrates an absolute and a relative 
limit of control. In the absolute sense, some forms of 
recalcitrance cannot be controlled, while in the relative 
sense, the marginal cost of enforcing a control system may be 
unattractively high. 
We could nevertheless note that the work of the "pirates" 
indicated a weakness in the aggregative nature of the 1930 
Act. If the "pirates" could have been somehow "switched-in" 
to the implementation process, the question of recalcitrance 
would not have arisen. It must be assumed that the "pirates" 
were taking revenue away from the territorial companies, for 
it was unlikely that they would risk breaking the law in order 
to provide a social service ! By being excluded from the 
system, the "pirates" became the outcasts of implementation. 
In this case, when the implementers were unable to maintain 
control with a particular target, then the process proceeded 
as if the target did not exist. 
For Crosland-Taylor himself, the principal effect of 
the Road Traffic Act was the extra paper work that was 
required. When the Act first came into effect: ".... the 
first thing we did was to get a van load of forms to fill up. 
I say a van load - perhaps it was two - in any case there was 
a prodigious number of them ..... Every route, including 
shorts, had to have a licence .... When "the appointed day" 
arrived we sent them all to Manchester in a lorry and had an 
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evening off. For three weeks we had worked till 8p. m. every 
night. " 
7 The age of bus regulation had arrived with a 
vengeance, and it is worth noting that the procedural effects 
of implementation are themselves of significance. In the 
present age of multi-organizational implementation, many 
NBC senior managers complain that most of their time is taken 
up with obtaining agreements with Government, local authorities, 
unions etc. rather than actually running the buses. In 
having less time to give to their own companies, more weight of 
authority and discretion can be thrown on to those occupying a 
lower position in the hierarchic chain. In this sense, 
implementation of the 1930 Road Traffic Act introduced a new 
"order of comprehension" in which the senior management of a 
bus company were compelled to become more acquainted with the 
political and bureaucratic world. In doing so, there was an 
obvious danger that a cognitive gap could appear between 
themselves and the people who actually operated the bus 
services. Ironically, an implementation process designed to 
increase official control over an industry can lead to a 
breakdown in communication and control within the existing 
organization. 
With regard to the Traffic Commissioners themselves, 
Crosland-Taylor indicated his preference for 
same "order of comprehension". In the North 
was appointed to be the first Traffic Commis 
that he could be a good man for the job, and 
we were right. Always fair to everybody -a 
guide for the other part-time Commissioners 
balance in a difficult and complicated area. 
someone from the 
West, Mr. Chamberlain 
sioner: "We thought 
events proved that 
firm and kindly 
- he held the 
.9.. He had been 
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an operator, and that made a lot of difference. " 
8 
Crosland-Taylor clearly felt more at home with someone who 
spoke the same language, although (as we noted above) the new 
system was a world of its own. The quasi-judicial nature of 
the traffic courts has tended to attract members of the legal 
profession, and few Traffic Commissioners have come from the 
bus industry itself. It could be argued that by their very 
nature, the traffic courts favour the large operator. The 
small operator applying for a licence might well feel lost 
amongst the specialised world of the regulatory system, unless 
(like the large companies) he can afford the best legal advice 
to speak for him. 
It was also inevitable that, because of their frequent 
contact with each other, Traffic Commissioners and company 
managers would often build up a relationship outside the 
courts. Crosland-Taylor describes how he and his solicitor 
would often speak to the Commissioner for South Wales 
(A. T. James) on the night before a sitting while they were all 
staying in the same hotel. Although James was very deaf: 
"He used to speak very quickly and size up a situation like 
lightning .... He would say: "Are you people coming before 
me tomorrow ? Well, I see the case like this. " And he would 
immediately outline the whole thing and tell us what he was 
going to do before we could get a word in. "Don't tell 
anyone you have seen me, " he would say, and then we would have 
an interesting talk about all sorts of other things, for A. T. 
was a great talker. " As we noted in the previous chapter, 
the territorial companies and the Traffic Commissioners needed 
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each other, and against this type of interaction outsiders 
such as the Ministry of Transport or small private operators 
were unlikely to have much influence. The community at the 
policy delivery point was different to that at the formulation 
stage, and the regulators and the regulated developed a 
relationship which suited the interests of them both. It must 
nevertheless also be noted that the general climate of the time 
was in favour of the bus industry becoming more regulated and 
rationalized, and the relationship between the operators and 
the Traffic Commissioners did enable this objective to be 
achieved. 
One further effect of the 1930 Road Traffic Act was the 
manner in which it compelled the territorial companies to 
consider quality of service. Once it was realized that 
expansion in terms of mileage had reached its optimal level, 
and that the Commissioners would not allow further expansion of 
territory, the companies turned their attention to new 
investment, advertising and improved social facilities for 
employees. At Crosville it was decided that: "We were to 
attack the revenue side of the business at last. Any 
reasonable cost of doing it would be allowed. There would be 
the maximum of new vehicles and the standard of maintenance 
of all assets would be improved. Publicity was to be 
completely overhauled, and on top of that all services were to 
be reviewed twice a year - after winter and summer working - 
so that we could become more elastic and open up the good 
traffic and clamp down on the bad. " 10 It is interesting to 
note the degree to which Crosland-Taylor's scheme for increasing 
revenue corresponds with the objectives of the current Market 
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Analysis Projects, which the NBC has undertaken in an attempt 
to maximize its revenue. Later in the study we will be 
attempting to assess the degree to which MAP represents a 
novel approach by the NBC to maximizing revenue, but the work 
of Crosville during the 1930s suggests that bus companies 
require a periodic "quasi-revolution" in order to accelerate 
change. 
We have seen that the new regulatory system itself and 
the effects of that system had a tangible effect on the bus 
industry, but we should also note that to some extent the 
1930 Road Traffic Act represented just one element in running 
a bus business. We have seen that Crosville accepted the 
principle of cross-subsidization even during the 1920s, and 
that the company made its decision to retain its Welsh services 
even before implementation of the 1930 Road Traffic Act. In a 
sense, Crosville appeared to make maximizing of territory an 
even greater objective than maximizing of profit, and was 
prepared to pay the cost of adopting this policy. Dealing with 
the Traffic Commissioners was just one part of the company's 
total approach to running a bus business. In the manner of the 
aggregative model, this section could alternatively have been 
entitled, "Crosville and Cross-Subsidization, " in which an 
account of the effects of the 1930 Road, Traffic Act would form 
an integral part. 
Yet the Traffic Commissioners did have a measurable 
effect on Crosville's policy, i. e. -, in this case the implementer 
remained successfully in contact with his target. The 
Commissioners possessed a potentially strong sanction over 
130 
Crosville, for if the company had declined to run various 
loss-making routes, then it might have found that some of its 
lucrative Merseyside routes would have been transferred to 
other operators. The nature of the cross-subsidization system 
therefore enabled the Commissioners to gain a strong position 
within the administration of the industry, although the nature 
of their control rested heavily on the understandable 
reluctance of the territorial companies to attempt any 
recalcitrance of the traffic courts' decisions. 
C. Crosville- and the 1947 Transport Act. 
Nationalization came to Crosville in January 1949, when 
all the Tilling bus companies were taken over by the British 
Transport Commission. From 1930 to 1942 the company had been 
owned jointly by. IMS and Tilling and British. In reality, the 
company was largely controlled by BET, whose Chairman was also 
Chairman of Crosville. The decentralized style of management 
adopted by BET is indicated by the obvious freedom in running 
the company enjoyed by Crosland-Taylor during the 1930s. In 
1942, however, when Tilling and British broke up, Crosville 
came under the control of Tilling and its Chairman, Sir 
Frederick Heaton. The new Chairman, (representing the classic 
entrepreneur)was more interventionist in approach, and 
immediately instructed Crosland-Taylor to place all the 
company's employees on a single wage scale, for up till that 
time lower rates had been paid in Wales (a practice which 
reduced the effects of cross-subsidization). The attitude of 
the entrepreneur was also reflected in Heaton's instruction 
that Property should be bought as an investment in order to 
compensate for the inability to expand the company's territory 
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or purchase new buses during wartime. The entrepreneurial 
approach was also evident in Heaton's willingness to sell up 
when an attractive offer for Tilling's buses was made by the 
BTC. 
The Tilling sale marked the beginning of the end of 
the entrepreneur's interest in the bus industry. Although 
passenger demand. was at its peak, and BET was to retain its 
buses for another twenty years, the busman was now coming 
into his own in controlling his industry. As the title of his 
book, State Owned Without Tears suggests, Crosland-Taylor was 
extremely gratified to discover that state ownership enabled 
him to carry on with his work in much the same manner as 
before. Crosland-Taylor took no direct part in negotiations 
between Tilling's and the BTC, but was pleased to note that: 
"The management was to go on in the meantime exactly as it 
had always done, and all we really cared about was the old 
problem of receipts and expenses per mile. " 
11 
In fact, things were not quite as they always had been, 
for the BTC had decreed that the General Managers of all its 
new bus companies should join the board, and so Crosland-Taylor 
became a director of Crosville. It was perhaps symbolic that 
on thZQ same day that Crosland-Taylor joined the board 
(17th January 1949), Sir Frederick Heaton tendered his 
resignation, together with five other directors who in the 
main had represented the interests of the railway companies. 
The board of ten was now reduced to a board of four. The 
Chairman and one other director basically represented the 
Tilling interest, one director came from the railways, while 
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the presence of Crosland-Taylor himself indicated the new 
importance given to the actual operator. Behind the general 
ideals expressed by the 1947 Transport Act, its main effect 
was to officially ratify the structure of the industry which 
had grown up since 1930, and to*increase the busman's control 
of his own affairs. 
In the previous chapter we noted that the appointment of 
"Uncle" George Cardwell to be Chairman of the Road Passenger 
Executive represented a considerable triumph for the busmen. 
In effect, the new Executive was captured by former employees 
of the Tilling organization, who had little sympathy for the 
Labour Government's plans to introduce area schemes. 
Crosland-Taylor makes a brief but cryptic comment on the failure 
of these area schemes: "This (failure) was. not Mr. Cardwell's 
fault. He did his work well, but I never once heard him 
12 
express his personal opinion as to these. schemes. " it 
might be said that the Conservative Government's abandoxment 
in 1953 of the obviously failed area schemes concept spoke 
volumes for "Uncle? ' George's attitude -o implementing the 
vague policy ideas put forward by a Labour Government six 
years previously ! At least the Labour Government (and 
perhaps more importantly the Ministry of Transport) learned 
from that experience that the implementation of such schemes 
could not be entrusted to the busmen. In the next chapter we 
will see how the 1968 Transport Act made direct provision for 
the introduction of Passenger Transport Areas (in many ways the 
modern equivalent of the area schemes).. 
In the years which fallowed Nationalization, Crosville's 
main activities centred around purchasing of new vehicles, 
133 
minimizing costs, developing depots, gaining approval for the 
now more frequent. fare increases (fares had remained almost 
unchanged from 1930 to 1948), and attempting to maintain good 
labour relations, in other words, the traditional concerns of 
the busman, which so often appear to transcend the 
significance of a particular piece of legislation. 
In addition, despite the Nationalization of both the 
railways and the Tilling bus companies, there was little real 
co-ordination between the two. The separate organizations 
were maintained, together with their basic rivalry. To a 
busman such as Crosland-Taylor, this relationship represented 
the natural state of affairs, and epitomises an attitude which 
is still widespread today. 
The attitude of Crosland-Taylor towards the BTC's 
attempts at achieving greater co-ordination clearly indicates 
the suspicion of the busman that political. intervention can 
only do harm to the industry: "The BTC's first reaction to its 
newly-constituted powers was to reorganize everything within 
sight, to centralize as much. as possible. But they did not 
provide enough oil for their machine at first, and there, soon 
appeared a slowing down of the wheels - clogged up with the 
requirements of "permission from headquarters" - and Qf course 
the old bogey of "Policy", which-is so necessary, and yet so 
deadly if used unintelligently by man whose grasp of theory may 
be unimpeachable, but whose practical knowledge is either 
entirely lagking, or else sadly antiquated. " 
13 
It is significant to note that Crosland T. aylor's 
objections to the work. of the, BTC, were of two kinds. Firstly, 
that the policy-makers and those at the top of the 
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implementation hierarchy lacked practical knowledge, and 
secondly that a centrally controlled bus industry reduces its 
efficiency. In terms of our policy model, Crosland-Taylor 
considered that there was a discontinuity in feedback, a chain 
of authority in which one "order of comprehension" spoke a 
different language from another, and a degree of contr. Ql which 
acted as a hindrance to the efforts of the implementer 
(Cro. sville) in his-attempts to maintain contact with his 
objective (the well-being of the company). 
As far as Crosland-Taylor was concerned, his job was to 
look after the welfare of the company, while co-ordinating with 
the railways, or even other bus companies., was not the prime 
company objective. In this view he was supported by the RPE, 
and so by 1953 was able to note that: "As far as bus companies 
were concerned, we. had been fortunate from the beginning of the 
new regime. The Tilling way of running the group was 
recognised as being perfectly sound, so let it continue. It 
made profits in the past, so let it go on doing so in the future. 
And we did. From the Crosville point of view, with 
our deep-seated optimism, it was a case of "State-owned 
without tears. " 
14 
D. Conclusion. 
In later chapters we will see how the National Bus 
Company is confronted, with an inherent conflict between 
centralization and decentralization. We will also observe the 
degree to which the busman's determination to maintain the 
viability of his company (either the NBC itself or a particular 
subsidiary) is still evident, and also the natural suspicion 
which he maintains of a political world with which he is 
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obliged to co-operate. The extent to which Crosland-Taylor's 
attitudes mirror these behavioural characteristics and 
dilemmas indicates the continuity of the busman's philosophy. 
The philosophy is perhaps most evident in the attitude 
towards cross-subsidizat-ion. Crosland-Taylor was quite happy 
to accept the principle of cross-subsidization, and recognised 
that in certain circumstances a route should be operated as a 
social service. It might be thought that he would have been 
looking towards outside support for this service, but in fact 
he was quite prepared to accept that Crosville should carry 
this obligation itself. Crosland-Taylor's approach is 
indicative ofadistinctive dichotomy in the mind of the busman. 
Implementation of the 1930 Road Traffic Act has given him an 
ingrained respect for the principles of cross-subsidization, 
yet he is anxious that at all costs his company should retain its 
profitability. Even in an age when passenger demand was at, 
at its peak, those opposing forces placed a strain on the 
company, but when that demand-began to flag, the burden became 
almost unbearable. Crosland-Taylor was reluctant to surrender 
any of Crosville's territory, and in fact was prepared to 
undertake an expansionist policy even when the commercial 
prospects-for such activity were inauspicious. To the 
territorial company, the size of its territory is clearly a 
matter of importance, and it is reluctant to hand over services 
to the small private operator. Regardless of the arguments. 
with regard to the merits of cross-subsidization, the large 
companies take some pride in their size, and do not wish to see 
it diminished. Downs considers that a bureau will wish to 
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establish a large enough territory of policy space to 
guarantee its own survival. 
15 In Crosville's case, the 
territory is geographical, although the motive for moving into 
North Wales could be ascribed to empire-building as well as 
self-preservation. The decision could not be justified on 
rational economic grounds, but it represented the company's 
ambition to expand, and its anxiety to secure the "frontiers" 
of lucrative urban routes. 
The anxiety of Crosland-Taylor to remain on good terms 
with the Traffic Commissioners is a further typical 
characteristic of the territorial company. He was pleased to 
emphasize that: "For years, since 1931 in fact', we had built 
up a state of mutual confidence with the licensing authority. 
We had never let them down, and never tried any sharp practice 
which might have brought us a monetary advantage. If we said 
a thing was so - assuredly it was as we said - at any rate to 
the best of our belief. " 
16 Crosland-Taylor was anxious that 
no cognitive gap, neither accidental nor deliberate, should 
appear between Crosville and the Commissioners. If it did, 
then the company's most lucrative routes could be in danger, 
although it also could be argued that if the Commissioners 
deliberately broke up the system of cross-subsidization, their 
job would become a great deal more difficult. To this extent 
there were limits to the control which the Traffic 
Commissioners could exercise over the territorial companies. 
The behaviour of the RPE, and Crosland-Taylor's obvious 
pleasure in becoming "State Owned Without Tears" illustrates 
the anxiety of the busman to retain his independence of the 
political world. As we will see in Chapter Five it is a 
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quality which is still evident today, for the NBC has 
experienced much less government intervention' than many of the 
other public corporations.. Crosland-Taylor believed that, 
with the assistance of the Traffic Commissioners, he could 
operate cross-subsidization better than any politician or 
bureaucrat, while he also considered that liaison with railways 
could have an unhealthy effect on the quality of services. 
Suspicion of political motives was perhaps also encouraged 
by Crosville's relationship with municipal bus undertakings. 
The territorial companies considered that they faced unfair 
competition from the municipalities, who could subsidize their 
services from the rates. 
The absence of any reference to subsidies by 
Crosland-Taylor could be indicative of a natural tendency 
towards independence, although it also could be attributed to 
the general set of values existing at that time. In an age 
when nearly everyone travelled by bus, companies such as 
Crosville had an important place and status within the community. 
The company would no doubt have considered it most humiliating 
to receive a subsidy, while neither the government nor the 
local authorities was prepared to hand over money to 
apparently lucrative businesses. 
By the early 1950s, many of the busmen had moved from 
being climbers to conservers, and were anxious to be seen by 
the public as successful businessmen who also possessed a 
social conscience. It was to be another twenty years before 
the "comprehensive reprogramming" caused by the massive growth 
in car ownership brought about a change in values, and caused 
the busmen and the local politicians to make the first 
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tentative steps towards each other in order to forge some 
sort of alliance. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Legislation and the Bus Industry in the 1960s 
In this chapter we will be examining how Tilling and BET 
became reunited in the form of the National Bus Company. We 
will initially analyse how Government perceived the problems 
of the bus industry when demand began to fall during the late 
1950s and early 1960s. The 1962 Transport Act set up a 
Transport Holding Company (THC) which had a statutory obligation 
to act commercially. Within this organization the Tilling 
companies retained their identity, but when it appeared that 
the Labour Government's transport policy might sweep away the 
existing structure the THC took the judicious step of purchasing 
all the BET bus companies. Although this nationalization of 
nearly all the territorial companies appeared at the time to 
assist the Government in its aim of creating a Nationwide 
network of the New Passenger Transport Areas, the creation of 
the National Bus Company in the 1968 Transport Act was in fact 
a triumph for the THC, and enabled the company busmen to retain 
their independence. 
A. Government Response to Change in the Economic 
Conditions of the Bus Industry. 
The Fragmentation of Problems. 
By the end of the 1950s, it had become clear that the demand 
for bus travel had passed its peak, and that the industry would 
never again know the days of prosperity it had experienced 
during the 1940s and early 1950s. Nevertheless, the decline was 
not so great or so sudden that anyone seriously considered a 
change in the administrative system was required immediately. 
We saw in the previous chapter that many rural routes had been 
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unprofitable since the 1930s, but the system of cross-subsidization 
(and the territorial companies reluctance to surrender 
territory) had virtually guaranteed their continued survival. 
As implementers, the territorial bus companies were 
determined to maintain a system of licensing which gave them 
security, and the Conservative Government of 1951-64 supported 
them in this particular point of view. We noted in Chapter Two 
that the Thesiger Committee came out strongly in support of the 
status quo (although it should also be noted that the Committee 
reported in 1953, the year of peak demand for bus travel) . 
The Thesiger Committee acted in an evaluative capacity for the 
Government by providing confirmation of the view that the 
operators and the Commissioners were the people best suited to 
organizing the bus industry. 
The first evidence of strain in the system was the 
accelerating rate of fare increases from the early 1950s onwards. 
From 1930 to 1950, fares had remained virtually unchanged, but 
as the decade progressed the time of the traffic courts was 
increasingly taken up by hearing applications for fare increases. 
At first, these increases could be attributed to general 
inflation, but as passenger levels decreased, bus companies 
were forced to seek rises which moved ahead of inflation rates. 
It is interesting to note the form in which the fall in 
passenger demand manifested itself in the political sense. In 
reacting to the properties of the policy process it is likely 
that information received by the policy-makers will define 
reality in a way which reflects their sense of what can be 
comprehended and acted upon. Lindblom highlights the difficulty 
of defining a policy problem when he observes that: "Even 
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familiar problems require formulation. A problem like 
inequality in income distribution can be formulated as one big 
problem or as many relatively independent smaller problems... " 
2 
Moreover, both Lindblom and Wildavsky make the point that a 
problem cannot exist unless some kind of solution is possible. 
Lindblom states that: "Landing a man on the moon never used to 
be a problem for the US. We made it a problem when we began to 
develop a technology for space exploration that made such a 
problem possible. " 
3 Similarly, Wildavsky holds that: 
"Policy Analysis is about the realm of rationality and 
responsibility where resources are related to objectives. 
Rationality resides in connecting what you want with what you 
can do, and responsibility in being accountable for making 
that connection. " 
4 
As Hood notes, implementation of a particular policy may 
be impractical in the absolute sense through lack of material 
resources, but in many cases it may be a lack of political 
resources which will cause implementation to fail. 
5 In a 
world where absolute control is impossible, successful 
implementation will invariably require either voluntary 
compliance or consensus by those involved. We noted in Chapter 
One that compliance is notoriously difficult to achieve 
(particularly in Britain) and that a consensus will usually be 
required if implementation is to be at all successful. Finding 
a solution to a problem will therefore involve the policy-maker 
in ensuring that he has both material and political resources. 
In the case of the bus industry, the "problem" of falling 
demand is one which policy-makers lack either the material or 
political resources to solve. In fact, it is doubtful if 
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policy-makers would truly wish to solve this problem. In the 
modern age, car ownership is so universally sought after that 
politicians would be unlikely to take radical steps in actively 
discouraging it. It could be argued that theoretically the 
material resources would be made available for such a course of 
action, but the political costs are generally regarded as 
prohibitive. 
The predominant problem in urban areas therefore manifests 
itself in the form of managing the car rather than encouraging 
the use of public transport as such. This in turn has the 
effect of fragmenting the policy problems into several 
categories. If policy-makers can identify certain areas where 
the use of the car should be restricted, and the development of 
public transport encouraged, or perhaps an area where public 
transport requires particular help, then a solution can be 
found to match a problem. The problem which occurs in 
developing these fragmented and incremental policies, rather 
than having an overall plan, is that co-ordination difficulties 
will usually occur. For example, it is of little use banning 
cars from a city centre unless a proper public transport system 
is developed to take its place. 
Wildavsky claims that: "Policies don't succeed so much as 
they are succeeded. It is not resolution of policies but 
evolution that should interest us.,, 
6 Similarly, in Chapter 
One we observed that the nature of change is such that any 
implementation process will contain the seeds of both short-term 
consensus and long-term conflict, and/or vice versa. In these 
circumstances, it is perhaps inevitable that a wise politician 
will never allow solutions and problems to stray far from one 
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another. Thus, there is a natural tendency for policies to be 
placed in fragmented (even if unco-ordinated) bundles. 
The trend towards fragmentation of problems Is. also 
encouraged by the nature of the principal sources of support 
for the two main Parties. The rural areas are traditionally 
strongholds of the Conservative Party, while the majority of 
Labour MPs represent urban areas. On the whole, this pattern 
of representation leads to Conservative Governments placing 
emphasis on rural problems, while labour Governments are more 
susceptible to the problems of urban areas. As a result of 
these Party political activities, together with resource limits, 
Governments have divided policy into the "rural transport 
problem" and the "urban transport problem. " The rural, transport 
problem centres around the need to provide adequate services for 
those who lack their own transport, in areas where bus operation 
is usually unprofitable. The urban transport problem (although 
it also includes making provision for those witliaat their own 
cars) centres mainly around the need to prevent traffic 
congestion and pollution, caused by the lack of satisfactory 
transport planning which results in destroying the pattern of 
urban life and its environment. 
From the bus operator's point of view, the rural transport 
problem could be largely solved by the system-of 
cross-subsidization (i. e., the well-used urban services 
subsidizing the unprofitable rural routes). However, this 
apparently neat solution presents a difficulty to the 
policy-maker. If he wishes to discourage cars from using city 
centres, and simultaneously develop an efficient low fare publ- c 
transport system, he would ideally need to isolate the urban 
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from the rural services, and abandon the system of 
cross-subsidization between the two. In doing so, the rural 
transport problem would be aggravated. Unless large-scale 
subsidies are available (a solution requiring both material and 
political resources) then the services in rural areas will 
rapidly deteriorate. Rather than confront such a massive 
problem, the policy-maker might alternatively decide that it is 
better to preserve the less publicly obvious system of 
cross-subsidization, while attempting to treat the most urgent 
cases in both the urban and rural areas. In this case, if the 
rural and urban problems can remain separate for the purposes 
of policy-making, unmanageable problems may be avoided. In the 
long-term, the policy-maker may hope that change will cause a 
particular problem to disappear, e. g., if rural services 
deteriorate, people who lack their own transport in these areas 
will either purchase cars or move nearer to towns, thus solving 
the "rural transport problem. " The succeeding problem would be 
the even greater need to relieve the pressure on city. centres. 
The solution to this problem could involve a greater dispersal 
of industrial and commercial activity, thus causing a different 
type of "rural. transport problem" 
The Nature of the "Rural. Transport Problem". 
The Conservative Government of the early 1960s maintained. 
cross-subsidization, while at the same time directing its 
attention towards the transport problems of the rural areas. 
The isolation of a "rural transport problem" was epitomized by 
the creation of the Jack Committee. By the late 1950s the 
Government was under increasing pressure from Conservative MPs 
representing rural constituencies to take action on the serious 
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decline in rural transport services. The GQ-vernment was not 
prepared to take direct action, but in 1959 appQinted D. T. Jack, 
Professor of Economics at Durham University, to chair a 
Committee investigating the problems of public transport in 
rural areas. The Jack Committee took two years to produce its 
Report, a length of time which reflected the lack of unanimity 
7 
among its members. 
Eventually nine members of the Committee agreed to all the 
conclusions and recommendations of the-Report, but there were 
three dissenting voices. The chief conclusion of the main 
Report was that rural services were inadequate, and that the 
existing licensing system was not sufficiently powerful to deal 
with the situation. Doubts concerning the... value of 
cross-subsidization. were indicated by the recommendation that 
operators should increase fares on unremunerative services 
before.. taking a decision to withdraw them. It was nevertheless 
acknowledged that many rural services would not continue 
without Government subsidies. A remission of fuel tax was 
rejected on the grounds that it would be imprecise and 
indiscriminate, and would also present the larger companies with 
a considerable increase in profits (an indication that running 
a bus company was still generally considered to be a lucrative 
line of business). Instead it was recommended that direct 
financial, aid should be given to the rural services, administered 
through the County Councils and financed partly by the Exchequer 
and partly by the Counties. In addition it was suggested that 
, more 
flexibility should be introduced into the system, in 
particular a greater use of school contract services and an 
investigation into the possibility of carrying fare-paying 
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passengers in Post Office vans. 
The majority of the Jack Committee had thus concluded that 
stage carriage services might not be suitable in all cases, and 
that subsidies would be required indefinitely for loss-making 
services in an environment where the bus industry faced an 
apparently inevitable decline in passenger demand. It is 
significant that the three dissenting voices represented 
interests which would have been particularly affected if the 
Committee's recommendations had been implemented. Firstly, 
W. T. James, a former Chairman of the PTA, was worried about the 
effects direct subsidies would have on cross-subsidization. 
The operation of cross-subsidization allowed the bus companies 
to largely control their own affairs (with the co-operation of 
the Traffic Commissioners), but the provision of subsidies 
would suggest intervention by the County Councils. In the 
early 1960s the bus industry was still to experience the full 
impact of financial decline, and preferred to operate on its own 
terms. We will see in Chapter Six that ten years later the 
financial plight of the industry made it more amenable towards 
the prospect of receiving subsidies. 
As this study is primarily concerned with the territorial 
bus companies, which were conceived (and to a large extent are 
still run), as organizations designed to make a profit, the 
question of whether or not to accept subsidies is an extremely 
sensitive matter. It should be noted that for municipal bus 
services there is a far stronger tradition of subsidizing 
loss-making routes. Even in the 194Ds, it was a sore point 
with the territorial companies that the unions would first make 
their wage demands to the national council dealing with wages 
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in the municipal bus undertakings, as it was considered that 
they would be more pliable than the National Council for the 
Omnibus Industry, which represented the companies. (The role 
of the trade unions in the bus industry will be dealt with in 
the following chapter). 
We noted in the previous chapter that until the 1940s 
Crosville paid its employees in Wales less than those in 
England, a practice which emphasized the problems faced by a 
company in running rural services. The territorial companies 
therefore have been compelled to compete with the municipalities 
on wage scales, while running a higher percentage of loss-making 
rural services and having (at least until recently) far less 
recourse to subsidy. As the municipal bus undertakings can in 
many areas cream off the most profitable urban routes for 
themselves, there is often a natural rivalry with the territorial 
companies, who would obviously profit from a higher degree of 
cross-subsidization. 
These arguments throw into relief the conflict between the 
interests of the urban bus passenger and those of his rural 
counterpart. As the principal provider of rural bus services, 
the territorial companies have always been particularly concerned 
with the "rural transport problem", and it is a theme which will 
frequently recur throughout this study. As a policy problem, 
however, it cannot stand in isolation while cross-subsidization 
is accepted as the central pillar of the bus industry's 
administrative system. 
The second member of the Jack Committee to dissent from the 
majority was H. R. Nicholas, the Assistant General Secretary of 
the Transport and General Workers Union. Nicholas was 
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principally concerned about the organization of the bus 
industry, and considered that a greater degree of integration 
was required. Since 1945 there has been a consistent strand of 
thought within the Labour Party and the trade unions which 
held the opinion that integration of the transport industries 
in general would encourage rational policy-making and overall 
efficiency. The ETC was an example of this concept, but by 
1961 the limitations of this organization had become evident 
and its demise was imminent. Nevertheless the TGWU hoped that 
all the bus companies might be publicly owned with a higher 
degree of central control of their affairs than was current at 
that time. Although the Jack Committee outlined the limits of 
the existing administrative system it did not describe how a 
new system would work, but restricted itself to the 
recommendations for greater flexibility and subsidies. The 
Union offered a more radical alternative, although it was one 
which was unlikely to appeal to a Conservative Government. 
The third dissenting voice came from E. B. Powley, a Deputy 
Traffic Commissioner for the Eastern Traffic Area and a 
spokesman for the County Councils. Powley favoured fuel tax 
remission on unremunerative rural routes and considered that the 
Association of County Councils would be against the provision 
of local authority subsidies. Powley's point of view illustrated 
that the County Councils were not prepared to accept the 
administrative and political costs of becoming involved in the 
bus industry, and wished the busmen to retain responsibility 
for the delicate task of cutting back unremunerative rural 
services. 
The Government was placed under great pressure by its own 
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MPs to implement the recommendations of the Jack Committee, but 
the range of interests set against the majority Report was 
formidable. The opposition of both the bus companies and the 
County Councils to the prospect of direct revenue support 
indicated the problems of implementation which the Government 
would face, for the administration of any subsidy scheme would 
depend heavily on the goodwill and co-operation of these two 
interests. In the event the recommendations of the Jack 
Committee were virtually ignored by the Government. The bus 
companies were allowed to keep their independence and the 
County Councils were given no opportunity to deal with the 
question of subsidy. More than a decade was to pass before 
these two interests were compelled to build up a relationship 
with one another. The Government's lack of action was a 
triumph for the principal interests, but it could also be 
attributed to the potential cost of the subsidies and the 
Government's preoccupation with reorganization of the transport 
system (the latter will be discussed shortly). In addition, 
the bus companies were still thought of at that time as being 
financially strong enough to continue the widespread use of 
cross-subsidization. 
The only positive moves by the Government arising from 
the Jack Committee were to set up an enquiry into the transport 
problems of six rural areas in 1963, and subsequently to 
introduce experimental services in four rural areas. 
8 
As with 
subsidies, the enthusiasm for experimental services did not 
gather momentum until the 1970s. As events transpired the 
Report of the Jack Committee anticipated much of the later 
legislation affecting the bus industry. The economic and 
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political climate for the implementation of its main 
recommendations was not propitious in the early 1960s, but we 
should not ignore its possible influence on the thinking of 
later Governments. 
B. The 1962 Transport Act and the Nature of the THG. 
The Creation of the THC. 
Despite the Conservative Government's perception that a 
modification in its policy with regard to the bus industry was 
required, it continued to accept that the established 
administrative system represented the most efficient means of 
controlling both the quality and quantity of services. The 
Government's view was confirmed by the 1960 Road Traffic Act, 
which basically restated the provisions of the 1930 Road 
Traffic Act. Nevertheless, structural change was in the air, 
for the days of the British Transport Commission were numbered. 
During the 1950s, the financial condition of the railways 
had deteriorated considerably, and it was thought by the 
Government that the BTC was no longer in proper control of its 
affairs. The Government judged that the massive BTC, with its 
commitment to achieving an integrated transport system, had 
failed in its task and instead had become unwieldy and 
inefficient. The 1962 Transport Act hence disbanded the BTC and 
in its place set up five autonomous boards. These were the 
British Railways Board, the British Waterways Board, the 
British Transport Docks Board, London Transport and the Transport 
Holding Company. 
The aims of the new policy were to decentralize the 
nationalized transport industries, and to make each sector more 
individually accountable for its own efficiency. Together with 
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the state owned section of the road haulage industry, the 
Tilling bus companies found themselves placed within the 
Transport Holding Company, which was perhaps the most novel and 
interesting of the new organizations. The chief feature of the 
THC was its statutory requirement to act in a commercial manner. 
The Act stated that the object of the THC should be to (a) hold 
and manage the securities vested in them by virtue of the Act, 
(b) exercise the rights attached to the securities as if the 
Holding Company were a company engaged in a commercial 
enterprise. The THC was also given the power to buy and sell 
company securities. 
9 As Ponsonby notes, this was the first 
time in the history of transport nationalization in Britain 
that a specific directive had been given to "act commercially". 
10 
We saw in the previous chapter that to a busman such as 
Crosland-Taylor, a directive to act commercially was almost 
superfluous. In this case, legislation was confirming the 
firmly established practice. A Tilling busman could not have 
accepted any other way of running his business. From the point 
of view of the companies, their commercial viability required a 
continuation of the existing licensing system, for without the 
protection given to a territorial company it might find making 
a profit a much more difficult task. 
The Structure of the THC, 
To a Tilling bus company, the THC was an organization after 
its own heart. The THO rested on the organizational principle 
that a high degree of decentralization would lead to maximum 
commercial efficiency. The THC in fact consisted of 140 
companies, each with a managing director accountable to the THC 
for the profitability of his company. The THC itself controlled 
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the form of the organization which each company took, appointed 
the boards of its subsidiaries, evaluated capital expenditure, 
operated all loans to subsidiaries, and annually examined each 
company's progress. 
11 
The structure of the THC is worthy of note for we shall see 
later that in many respects it was the direct antecedent and 
organizational model for the NBC. The structure of a 
decentralized holding company was one which appealed to the bus 
companies, and continues to give the NBC a distinctive character. 
A further significant feature of the THC was the retention of 
the Tilling name itself. The Tilling companies had been state 
owned for nearly fourteen years, but the company busmen had 
succeeded in retaining their identity. 
In addition to the companies wholly owned by the THC, there 
were also companies in which it held considerable shareholdings. 
These included the shares in BET bus companies which the BTC had 
inherited from the railway companies at the time of 
nationalization. The THC's large-scale involvement in the 
privately owned bus companies thus indicated that a National 
Bus Company already existed in embryonic form. The THC's 
companies were divided up into appropriate regional groups, 
with the managers of each company and the Managing Director of 
the THC itself forming the group board. This group structure 
enabled a direct link to be made between each company and the 
central management of the THC. 
12 We shall see later that a 
roughly similar structure exists for the NBC, where the companies 
are also divided up into regional groups. The THC groups were 
additionally formed into three associations. Thus the Tilling 
groups, by forming an association, strengthened still further 
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the corporate image of the bus group. 
While the licensing system remained unchanged, and the BET 
bus companies were privately owned, it was inevitable that the 
Tilling companies would be left almost undisturbed. For radical 
structural change to have been brought about, the agreement of 
the BET companies would have been required, while a change in 
the licensing system would have altered the role of the Traffic 
Commissioners, which the Conservative Government had previously 
indicated it was unwilling to do. The Tilling companies were 
therefore locked into a well established administrative system, 
which was perpetuated and strengthened by the nature of the THC. 
To the Tilling busmen, the THC represented an opportunity to 
continue their work undisturbed. 
The Work of the THC. 
As events transpired, the THO was to have only a relatively 
brief organizational life (it was founded on 1st January 1963 
and disbanded on 31st December 1968). Throughout its history 
it consistently made good profits, with the Tilling companies 
well to the forefront. As examples, the THC's road passenger 
transport subsidiaries made a profit of over £6.7 million in 
1963, and almost £7 million in 1967. To some extent the 
maintenance of profits could have been accounted for by the 
acquisition of other companies. Richardson notes that the THC 
adopted a more expansionist policy after a Labour Government 
came to power in 1964.13 Ironically, the THC was able to act 
even more commercially under a Labour Government than it had 
under its Conservative predecessor 
Despite the significance of acquisitions, the Tilling 
companies were clearly successful in operating profitably. 
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Ponsonby considered that the passenger journeys' loss from 
2,090 miles in 1963 to 1,756 miles in 1967 was also a 
satisfactory result 
14 (although it represented a loss of 
over 6% per annum, car ownership increased during this period 
at approximately 10% per annum). Nevertheless, to accommodate 
passenger losses and yet still make a profit, it was inevitable 
that the real cost of bus fares would rise. Although a bus 
company can rationalize its vehicle fleet when demand falls, it 
can hardly ever keep pace with the decrease, for a service must 
often be maintained, and a vehicle retained, even when fewer 
passengers are being carried (the nature of the route licensing 
system also requires that loss-making services should be 
retained). 
Behind their successful financial results the Tilling bus 
companies were already having to cope with the economics of 
decline. Yet the traditional independence of the busman was 
still much in evidence, and created a suspicious attitude 
towards government intervention. In its Final Report, the THC 
was highly critical of government activity, which it considered 
created uncertainty and reduced organizational efficiency. It 
was considered that: "The moral of the last twenty-one years 
as a whole is that political intervention shall be kept within 
bounds that are not only reasonable, but also clearly and 
precisely defined, and above all that a consensus of view must 
be arrived at, or a political settlement, as a result of which 
the transport industry will be freed from the consequences of 
reversible Acts of Parliament every few years, and will at last 
be granted a due amount of stability. " 
15 
This statement is perhaps difficult to understand in view 
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of how little change the Tilling companies had undergone in the 
post-war period. A considerable amount of government activity 
had taken place (e. g., the 1947 Transport Act, the Report of 
the Thesiger Committee, the Jack Report, the 1960 Road Traffic 
Act and the 1962 Transport Act), but the sum effect of this 
legislation was that the bus companies were still run very much 
on the same principles which operated during the 1930s. The 
significance of this activity to the bus companies was that they 
had fought to retain their independence, which to some extent 
must have diverted time and resources away from the actual 
operation of the bus industry. For the Tilling companies it 
had been not so much a matter of implementing legislation, but 
of battling to maintain "business as usual. " 
In the remainder of this chapter we will be examining the 
1968 Transport Act, perhaps the most significant piece of 
legislation for the bus industry since the 1930 Road Traffic 
Act. Nevertheless, we shall also see that the bus companies 
came through even this period relatively unscathed, with the 
structure of the newly formed NBC largely maintaining the by now 
traditional world of the busman. 
C. The 1968 Transport Act. 
Barbara Castle and a New Policy. 
We shall see that although the 1968 Transport Act was 
presented by the Government as being a radical step forward in 
bus passenger transport planning, its roots could be found 
quite firmly planted in previous post-war legislation. 
Nevertheless, such a major piece of legislation did attract a 
considerable amount of public attention. Interest was also 
heightened by the forthright personality of the Minister of 
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Transport, Barbara Castle, who characteristically identified 
herself completely with the concept of the new policy, and 
fought with single-minded zeal to bring about its implementation 
(to some extent a parallel could be drawn with Herbert Morrison 
and the 1930 Road Traffic Act of an ambitious Minister 
determined to make a major political impact). 
As in 1930 and 1947, a Labour Government was determined to 
implement a radical transport policy. Sir Harold Wilson, Prime 
Minister during the 1964-70 Labour Government, considered that: 
"A 'priority' ministry may become less important as old 
16 
explanation problems and challenges give way to new. " His exp 
for upgrading transport provides a direct (if slightly bizarre) 
link with the previous Labour Government. Wilson reveals that: 
"Shortly before he died, I invited Clement Attlee to Chequers 
where he had spent the happiest days of his life. ..... 
Following his stroke, he found speaking difficult, so I put 
questions to him. 'If you were in this chair, ' I asked him, 
'what subject would you put higher in the system of priorities 
than it appears to occupy today ?' Immediately he answered, 
'Transport. ' I moved Barbara Castle there from Overseas 
Development within a very short period. " 
17 
The appointment of Barbara Castle as Minister of Transport 
in December 1965 effectively committed a Labour Government to 
another attempt at achieving an integrated transport policy. 
The implementation of the 1947 Transport Act proved to be a 
relative failure, and had been succeeded by the Conservative 
Government's more decentralized and competitive 1962 Transport 
Act. Richard Grossman acknowledged the problems facing 
Mrs. Castle when on her appointment he observed that: "I have 
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heard .... that she 
(Mrs. Castle) realizes how much a 
graveyard of all political reputations Transport has become. 
But if there is anybody who will get us a fully integrated 
transport policy it is her and that makes it a good move. " 
18 
Mainly due to Mrs. Castle's forceful approach, transport policy 
had forced itself almost to the top of the political agenda, 
where it was to stay for the next two and a half years. 
19 
The appointment of Mrs. Castle also focused attention on 
the structure of the MoT. During the 1950s and 1960s bus 
transport had become something of a "Cinderella" aspect of 
transport planning within the Ministry, particularly when 
compared to the massive road building programme. Martin Painter 
describes how a self-sufficient roads wing developed within the 
MoT which generated its own logic and programme momentum. He 
sees this as a development of sectoral politics, where 
policy-makers and implementers attempted to control their 
environment. In becoming self-contained, the justifications 
for the policy were rarely challenged, and the road builders 
commandeered massive resources from governments which were in 
any case disinclined to deter the public from greater use of 
cars 
20 (a Conservative Government could regard such action 
as an infringement on personal freedom while a Socialist such 
as Mrs. Castle would find it politically difficult to deny the 
right of all classes to own a car). Politically, public 
transport was at a considerable disadvantage, and the well 
organized road builders took full advantage of their position. 
Richard Marsh, Mrs. Castle's successor as Transport 
Minister (who confesses that he had little knowledge of 
Transport policy when he became Minister) considered that 
159 
co-ordination within the MoT was poor, and was also struck by 
the power of the road builders: "There was a strong pro-roads 
policy lobby, partly because we are a nation of car owners, 
partly because the Press tends to highlight anything affecting 
the motorist out of all proportion to its real importance, but 
also because of the peculiar situation where, although British 
Railways has its own separate board like any other nationalized 
industry, all matters concerning road construction are dealt 
with by a section of the Ministry itself. The Director-General, 
Highways (a professional road engineer) who was to all intents 
and purposes Chairman of British Roads Limited, was a Deputy 
Secretary in the Ministry of Transport. " 
21 
One of Mrs. Castle's key appointments was that of C. D. Foster 
in the newly created post of Director General of Economic 
Planning. An economist who had already written extensively on 
the need for a more balanced appraisal of economic and social 
costs and benefits in British transport planning, Foster hoped 
that he could assist in redressing the balance within the 
Ministry away from the road builders and towards a more 
sympathetic consideration of public transport problems. Foster 
himself was shocked to discover the extent to which road 
building appeared to exist as a self-contained policy sector, 
and both he and Mrs. Castle were determined that the Government's 
new policy initiative would devote a major part of its attention 
to public transport reorganization. 22 For political reasons 
previously stated, the Government could not afford to turn its 
back on the car owner, or potential car owner, but it was 
considered that action needed to be taken on the problems of 
congestion in urban areas and the depressed state of public 
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transport generally. Again for political reasons previously 
outlined, the labour Government placed the emphasis on urban 
transport problems, although we will see that the policy did 
contain significant changes in rural transport policy. The 
Government's relative preoccupation with urban transport was 
particularly significant for the bus companies, who were able 
to perpetuate their existence by instigating the creation of a 
National Bus Company while the Minister's principal focus of 
attention was elsewhere. 
The quest for independence by the company busmen might be 
regarded as one of the factors leading to the supremacy of the 
roads lobby. As we have seen, the Tilling sections of the BTC 
and later the THC were a self-contained unit. In this case, 
the bus companies could also be seen as a case of sectoral 
politics, for the busmen were disinclined to become over-dependent 
on the will of the politicians. In the following chapter we will 
see how the NBC has gone to great lengths to maintain its 
viability and hence avoid becoming entirely dependent on 
government aid. 
The 1966 White Paper. 
The outlines of the new policy were first revealed in a 
White Paper published in July 1966.23 The White Paper made 
clear the Government's emphasis on transport planning. It was 
stressed that transport systems would need to be integrated 
with the needs of industry, while urban planning required that 
public transport be placed within the context of traffic 
management as a whole. 
24 
The publication of the Buchanan 
Report on "Traffic in Towns" 25 in 1963 had highlighted the 
problem of reconciling the growth in car ownership with the 
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creation or preservation of a congenial urban environment. 
Buchanan emphasized the importance of road building to cope 
with urban congestion, and the White Paper confirmed that a 
massive programme of road construction was still required. 
26 
The document nevertheless set out the advantages of traffic 
management schemes, and stated that: "Public transport has a 
key part to play in dealing with the urban transport problem, 
both for the mass carriage of passengers at peak hours and for 
the transport needs of people without cars. Yet public 
transport is in decline. " 27 
The causes of the decline were attributed to rising costs, 
the effects of congestion and the loss of passengers to private 
cars. It could be argued that the mass carriage of passengers 
and the transport needs of people without cars, can amount to 
the same thing, unless cars are discouraged from entering urban 
centres. In the latter case the car owner and the non-car owner 
are indistinguishable, and their needs inseparable. The 
statement therefore symbolizes the political choice which must 
be made between actively discouraging car use in urban areas, 
or providing public transport only for those who lack a vehicle 
of their own. In the event the Government did not wish to make 
a decision on this politically sensitive value judgment, but 
chose to place the burden at the local level. 
The most significant recommendation made by the White 
Paper was that public transport required reorganizing so that 
it could become integrated with urban planning as a whole. It 
was considered that: "This fragmentation and lack of central 
control militates against the rational co-ordination of transport 
policies. " 
28 The Government therefore believed that: 
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as a first step conurbation transport authorities 
should be created under broad local authority control, or 
suitably linked with local authorities, with the duty of 
securing an efficient, convenient and integrated system of 
public transport for the urban region. The Minister of 
Transport proposes to take powers to create such authorities. " 
29 
As in 1947, the Government had come down in favour of area 
transport planning, but this time implementation was not to be 
left so much to chance. It could also be said that new 
transport planning authorities would require resources from 
central government, which would in turn increase the power of 
the Ministry of Transport. We saw the significant part which 
the interests of the Ministry played in the creation of the 
1930 Road Traffic Act and the 1947 Transport Act, and once 
again a policy proposal for an apparently more rational system 
was put forward which in one respect (allocation of resources) 
could have the effect of increasing central control. 
C. D. Foster considered that the new transport authorities 
were primarily proposed in the belief that greater co-ordination 
was a good thing in itself. He believed that the actual 
creation of the new authorities would mean that local government 
could not ignore the need for urban transport planning, and that 
public transport would have a better chance of maintaining its 
position within the total system. 
30 The implications of this 
plan for the territorial bus companies were serious, for if 
urban transport was to be considered as a separate entity, with 
a transport authority controlling all these routes, then the 
companies would be left with only the less profitable rural 
services. It is significant that Poster considered the 
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subsidization of the rural. bus passenger by his urban 
counterpart to be unjustifiable, 
31 for the proposed system 
emphasized the interests of urban public transport. The 
implication for the bus companies was that their whole existence 
was threatened, a threat which was to have considerable power 
in persuading BET to sell its bus companies to the state. 
In the 1966 White Paper, the proposal for conurbation 
transport authorities was not elaborated on, but it was 
explained that the Regional Economic Planning Councils (set up 
by the Government in 1965) were already investigating the 
possibilities for the new system. A complication for the 
Government was that the Royal Commission on local Government, 
chaired by Lord Redcliffe Maud, was still sitting, and that the 
transport authorities would need to fit in with the new system 
of local government likely to be implemented as a result of the 
Maud Commission's recommendations. We shall see that this 
uncertainty assisted in the creation of the National Bus Company, 
and aided the bus companies in their battle for survival. 
In examining the proposal for transport authorities it is 
not difficult to detect a link between the new initiative and 
the old Area Schemes. C. D. Foster appeared to infer that the 
idea came from the officials-, and no doubt plans of this type 
had been lying on the Ministry shelf for several years (the 
potential which the new authorities offered for greater central 
control cannot be ignored). Many opponents of the new authorities 
assumed that the idea had come from the United States, where 
comprehensive urban transport authorities were already fairly 
common. Mrs. Castle herself visited the United States to study 
these authorities at work, but Foster denied that the policy 
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concept had come from this source. Perhaps the most significant 
factor was that the concept of comprehensive planning in general 
was becoming more politically fashionable during the 1960s, and 
this trend combined with the Ministry's ready-made scheme and 
the objectives of the labour Government shaped the form of the 
new policy. 
In addition to the new transport authorities, the Government 
also proposed that it would assist in financing major improvements 
in public transport facilities. During the 1960s, considerable 
interest was engendered in the development of urban rapid transit 
systems, several of which had already been built in the United 
States. Research into a similar type of system was already 
taking place in Manchester, and indeed one of the chief 
justifications for the new authorities was that they would more 
ea, sily facilitate the development of new rapid transit systems. 
The high cost of these systems and the need for Government 
finance inevitably implied a higher degree of central control: 
"The Government proposes to mount a large and centrally 
co-ordinated programme of research and development with the aim 
of securing a much needed improvement in . services and 
productivity.,, 
32 The MoT already exercised a considerable 
degree of control over the road building programme, and could 
now hope that major development in public transport would 
increase its power in this sector. 
In reality the degree of central control implied in the 
building of these systems proved to be a disincentive to their 
development. In the majority of cases local authorities preferred 
to retain the existing system in order to maintain their autonomy, 
and concluded that the costs involved in terms of power forfeited 
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outweighed the benefits to be gained. In this case, the tension 
between central and local authorities can discourage major new 
capital projects. In addition, by being nearer to the 
operational problems, and envisaging the time and trouble that 
could be involved in implementation, local authorities were 
also discouraged from undertaking the task. (One of the few 
exceptions was the development of the Metro system in 
Newcastle upon Tyne). 
The central-local relationship may therefore be a powerful 
force in preserving the status quo with regard to major projects 
which require a considerable amount of initiative and discretion 
at the local level. As Bardach observes: "The object of 
Funding is to secure not only money but flexibility in regard 
to its use. The recipient bureau seeks to maximize the size of 
its grant while minimizing the constraints on how it must spend 
its monies. " 
33 (In later chapters we will see the tensions 
which develop over subsidies between county councils and NBC 
subsidiaries). We should also note that the proposed 
development of rapid transit systems, which utilize existing or 
new railway lines, offered a threat to the bus services. In 
this case, if the bus operation within the area of the transport 
authority could achieve maximum co-ordination and efficiency, 
then the interests of the municipal busman could be maintained 
(probably at the expense of company territory). 
In contrast to the urban transport problem, the White Paper 
devoted little space to rural transport. In referring to the 
decline in rural bus services, the Government considered that: 
"These adverse pressures cannot be allowed to lead to a widescale 
withdrawal of rural bus services. For the people who would 
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suffer from a decline in such services include a disproportionately 
high percentage of the economically weak - in particular the old, 
the young, the poor and the infirm. " 
34 In fact, the creation 
of urban transport authorities was likely to threaten the user 
of public transport in rural areas still more, but the Government 
avoided mention of this policy dilemma. Nevertheless, it was 
recognized that the bus companies could not maintain these rural 
services unaided, and for the first time local authorities 
(with a contribution from the Government) were to be empowered: 
11. ... to give, at their discretion, financial assistance, 
for 
providing or improving road passenger transport for the benefit 
of rural areas and the people living in them. 
), 35 This propo sal 
indicated that a new set of values had permeated through to the 
-official level. Henceforth, the rural transport problem would 
be as much concerned with the question of official subsidies as 
with cross-subsidization. 
The sheer size of the White Paper and its comprehensive 
approach to transport planning apparently precluded detailed 
Cabinet debate on its contents, and once again the bus industry 
was swept along by a legislative tide in which its concerns 
formed just one part. In resigned fashion, Crossman realized 
that Mrs. Castle had won political priority for her new transport 
policy: "There was very little discussion of its substance. 
What people (the Cabinet) were mostly concerned about was 
whether the publication of the White Paper would ensure that she 
(Mrs. Castle) got parliamentary time in the next session for-a 
Transport Bill .... However, we were given a solemn 
assurance that the publication of the White Paper didn't commit- 
the Cabinet to a Transport Bill in the next Session. That 
167 
assurance means nothing. Barbara has got her way and her big 
Bill will be the major measure of the second Session of this 
Parliament.. 
36 
A New Battle for the Busmen. 
The 1966 White Paper did not go into great detail with 
regard to the future structure of the bus industry, but the 
proposed urban transport authorities indicated that change was 
at hand. - Nevertheless the detailed plans, for new legislation 
could not be prepared at the speed Mrs. Castle had hoped for, 
and-it was- tobe October 1967 before the Bill was introduced. 
Over the following twelve months the Government evolved its 
plans for the industry, while the reaction of the bus industry 
itself could be split into two parts. Firstly, the public 
campaign by the privately owned companies and the municipalities 
against the urban transport authority concept, and secondly, the 
unofficial, relatively unobserved (but crucial) battle by the 
THC to retain its identity. 
As in 1947, the campaign centred around the Passenger 
Transport Association, the British Omnibus Companies Public 
Relations Committee, the Public Vehicle Operators Association, 
and the Municipal Passenger Transport Association. Opposition 
to the new policy faced two particular difficulties. Firstly, 
obtaining information on the new urban transport authorities. 
By the Summer of 1967 it had been decided that the initial 
Passenger Transport Authorities (as they were now to be called) 
would be set up in Tyneside, Merseyside, Manchester and 
Birmingham, but the detailed structure and role of these PTAs 
had still to be announced. There were unofficial hints from 
Mrs. Castle that she intended to create more PTAs, but no 
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public announcement was made. 
The second difficulty concerned Mrs. Castle's personal 
disinclination to negotiate with the principal interests 
involved. One of the participants in Ministerial consultations 
on the proposed formation of a West Midlands PTA stated that 
Mrs. Castle, at the commencement of the meeting, immediately 
announced that she had only a limited amount of time available. 
After giving a speech on her proposals, she was called out of 
the room by one of her assistants. When a few minutes had 
elapsed, the meeting was told that the Minister had been called 
away on urgent business 
37 It was clear that Mrs. Castle 
was determined to implement her proposals, despite opposition 
from all sides of the bus industry. 
The public opposition to the policy could be divided into 
two categories, those of the privately owned bus companies and 
the municipalities. (We will see later in the chapter that 
the MPTA had little or no effect on Mrs. Castle's plans for the 
creation of the PTAs). With regard to the private companies, 
in July 1967 the British Omnibus Companies Public Relations 
Committee and the Passenger Vehicle Operators Association 
jointly launched the Passenger Transport Vehicle Operators 
Independence Committee (VOICE) with the aim of preventing the 
formation of the PTAs. The companies feared that it was only 
a matter of time before a nationwide PTA network was introduced, 
and that Mrs. Castle's objective was to remove the privately 
owned sector altogether. The principal support for VOICE 
inevitably came from the BET companies, for they operated the 
majority of privately owned services. VOICE asked operators to 
contribute £2 per vehicle in order to form a fighting fund with 
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a national maximum of 9100 per operator. 
38 Regional 
committees were set up and superficially it appeared that the 
independent busmen were about to launch a strong, united 
campaign against Mrs. Castle's policy. 
The nature of VOICE's campaign was of the category termed 
by Finer as the "fire brigade" type. Its objective was to 
douse the flames of the Government's enthusiasm for the PTA 
concept, and not to function as a long-term interest group. 
39 
The formation of VOICE also indicated the lack of consensus on 
the Government's policy. Mrs. Castle had set her mind on 
implementing the new policy and was not to be denied by even 
the most powerful interests. Her eventual success, despite the 
lack of a policy community at that time, suggests that the 
personal power of Ministers is often more formidable than even 
they themselves suppose. In the case of the PTAs, the policy 
process was definitely of a top-down nature 
VOICE had come on the scene rather late, for it was clear 
that the Transport Bill would come before Parliament later that 
year, and there was not any sign of Mrs. Castle even considering 
a change in her policy. The rather frenzied and desperate 
nature of VOICE's campaign was reflected in a report of a 
meeting in October 1967 at which Denis Quin, Secretary of both 
the PVOA and VOICE, expressed the hope that a mass rally could 
be held at Wembley Stadium to coincide with publication of the 
White Paper on public transport. At the same time he announced 
that VOICE had so far collected only 97,000, when the target was 
£25,000, and that if matters did not improve, members would have 
40 to be approached for a second time. 
In addition to Mrs. Castle's determined approach, and the 
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relative lack of information on the number of PTAs envisaged, 
it could be argued that the lack of support for VOICE reflected 
a loss of self-confidence on the part of the busmen. In 1947, 
the bus industry was at its peak and confident of its future 
profitability and stability. By 1967, the growth in car 
ownership was taking its toll on many bus services, and even 
the most sanguine of operators would. have realized that the 
days of plenty were numbered. The busmen also lacked what Finer 
terms "advance intelligence" on the Government's intentions. 
Mrs. Castle had not been inclined to enter into a period of 
'extensive consultation with representatives from the bus 
companies, who had not been alive to the Government's intentions. 
41 
A further burden for the industry was the Government's pay 
and prices "standstill" of that period. Many companies had 
found their applications for fare increases being rejected or 
deferred by the Commissioners. The Government was also 
encouraging the Commissioners to use fare increases as levers 
towards increasing one-man operation (omo). Improvements in omo 
were regarded by the Government as being essential if ca8ts 
were to be reduced and productivity improved, and in 1967 they 
asked the Prices and Incomes Board to examine productivity in 
the bus industry, with special reference to increased pay for 
one-man operation. 
42 By making fare increases conditional on 
cost reductions the industry was placed under great pressure, 
particularly in view of the continuing fall in demand for bus 
services. At the same time, pressure from the Government could 
assist the companies in their negotiations with the unions, for 
it could be claimed by the bus operators that they were not 
free agents. 
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The general state of the industry at the time when VOICE 
was canvassing support is indicated by a report that: "The 
large companies are not money-spinners, and the government 
standstill has not helped them. Red and White (a THC subsidiary) 
have delayed orders for new buses for 1968 and decided not to 
buy any for 1969. Western Welsh (another THC subsidiary) have 
made their position clear on a number of occasions .... 
they too were caught out by the freeze. Their application for a 
fares increase was rejected, as was their subsequent appeal, 
although the appeal inspector said the company needed the 
increase 'to maintain efficiency and undertake necessary 
investments. ' Midland Red (a BET company) had become so short 
of cash it had to borrow £400,000 from the BET Federation joint 
deposits and advance scheme. " 
43 Both the THC and BET were 
discovering that operating bus services was not an enviable 
task, with future prospects even bleaker. Secretly, away from 
the vociferous anti-nationalization campaign waged by VOICE, 
the two companies were negotiating the sale of BET bus interests 
to the THC. This time-bomb under the independent bus operators 
indicated that the entrepreneurs were about to sever their 
connections with the busmen. 
The VOICE regional committees consisted of representatives 
from BET companies and smaller private operators. It should be 
noted that their campaign was not directed against the THC and 
the Tilling buses, but against Mrs. Castle and the PTA concept. 
To a BET busman, the area agreements with his Tilling neighbours, 
all authorized and sanctioned by the Traffic Commissioners, 
acted as a symbol of reassurance and stability within a changing 
world. (It should be remembered that the companies were already 
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closely linked through the THC's part ownership of many BET bus 
companies). In contrast, the spectre of the PTAs, with their 
threat of external control, haunted the minds of the company 
busmen. 
This fear was reflected in VOICE's suggestion that the 
PTAs should act only in an advisory capacity. Denis Quin 
attacked a statement made by John Locke, an Under Secretary at 
the MoT who was responsible for the bus passenger transport 
aspects of the forthcoming Transport Bill, by claiming that: 
"Mr. Locke has had, and missed, a golden opportunity to attempt 
to justify the Transport Minister's proposals to nationalize 
the entire bus and coach industry under the guise of operating 
PTAs .... Our view, that these PTAs would carry out a. 
valuable function in a purely advisory capacity, has only been 
strengthened by what Mr. Locke said - moreover they could do 
this without the extra cost to the community. " 
44 (It is 
significant to note the extent to which John Locke was playing 
a highly political role in speaking for the Government, and 
suggests that the officials identified themselves closely with 
implementation of the policy). The independent busmen took it 
for granted that it was only a matter of time before a nationwide 
PTA network was set up, sweeping away the old order with a 
totally untried system. 
Mr. Locke had confirmed the busmen's fears when he stated 
that: "The creation of PTA's in the main conurbations, it has 
been alleged, will seriously damage the company bus undertakings 
operating partly within a major city and partly outside it. 
This clearly is not a long-term problem. The Minister envisages 
that in time the whole country will be divided into PTA areas, 
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each centred on a large city or town and including the country 
areas around it.,, 
45 We outlined earlier the Government's 
reluctance to introduce a large PTA network before the 
anticipated reorganization of local government, but it was clear 
that the Government envisaged the eventual demise of the bus 
companies. 
One of VOICE's few politically significant actions was to 
arrange for a visit to Britain by an American Consultant in 
Transport; Thomas Lenthall. The object of Lenthall's visit was 
to publicize what he considered to be the chronic weaknesses of 
the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Ap. thority. We described 
earlier how the United States Transport Authorities were 
considered by many to be models for the PTAs, and VOICE was 
anxious to show that this policy concept was a potential disaster. 
Lenthall described the heavy financial losses of the MBTA, and 
alleged that the Authority was a breeding ground for inefficiency. 
He wrote several articles while in Britain and addressed meetings 
in different parts of the country, but his visit took place in 
the early months of 1968-, and by this time the Transport Bill 
was before Parliament. Lenthall's visit thus epitomized VOICE's 
inability to mount a campaign in sufficient time to make it 
politically effective. 
The THC as an Interest Gröup. 
In this case, when we refer to the bus companies, we must 
include the Tilling companies with the BET. We saw earlier how 
the THC, in its short life, had built up the distinctive identity 
of ,a decentralized organization whose subsidiaries behaved in a 
highly commercial manner. In effect, the Government's proposals 
were as much a threat to the THC as they were to the independent 
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operators. A nationwide network of PTAs would in all likelihood 
see the dismantling of the Tilling company structure, while each 
PTA could purchase its local BET bus company. If, however, a 
return could be made to the days of "Tilling and British" 
(now that awkward characters such as Sir Frederick Heaton had 
disappeared from the scene) then the united strength of the 
companies might still somehow preserve the world they both knew 
so well. 
As a state owned undertaking, the THC and companies were in 
an advantageous position compared to VOICE. The. 
anti-nationalization campaign fought by VOICE was unlikely to 
cut much ice with a Minister as determined as Mrs. Castle, but a 
proposal for further nationalization put forward by a successful 
state owned company might be a different matter. 
Prior to publication of the Transport Bill, Richardson 
emphasized that: "The main question, so far as the THC is 
concerned, must be whether or not it can survive in anything 
like its present form. It is clearly going to be exceedingly 
difficult to preserve the degree of flexibility and autonomy 
within the THC that has been its main characteristic to date.,, 46 
It was not only the bus services which were liable to undergo 
change, for it had been proposed that. the freight interests of 
the THC and British Rail should be combined in a new National 
Freight Corporation. With regard to the future of the THC as a 
whole, Richardson considered that: "Almost certainly a great 
deal of 'horse-trading' is'taking place over the type of 
organizational structure to be adopted. In this situation it is 
interesting to note that--a nationalized body, like the THC, 
emerges as an interest group attempting to influence decision 
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making, in a very similar way to the more commonly accepted 
private groups. " 
47 
There was no doubt that the senior management of the THC 
were keen supporters of their organization's structure. Sir 
Reginald Wilson, Deputy Chairman and Managing Director of the 
THC, set out this organizational philosophy in a paper given 
to the. Chartered Institute of Transport in October 1966.48 
Although Sir Reginald was care-ful not -to direct his criticism 
at a particular individual or organization, it was clearly 
meant as a defence of the "organic" THC and an attack on the 
"rational" plan for transport set out in the 1966 White Paper. 
His suspicion of the planners was made clear in the remark: 
"And speaking for myself, I don't want the formulation of these 
policies to be too much influenced by the purveyors of dogmas, 
fashionable systems, or expertise generally .... Thereafter 
the prime necessity is to see that the 'pale cast of thought' 
does not inhibit action, that the will-power exists to set 
action in motion, and that the mechanics essential to successful 
action are provided. " 
49 Although direct references were 
avoided, this statement must be interpreted as an attack on the 
planners who had devised the PTA concept. 
Like a true company busman, however, Sir Reginald was a 
strong supporter of the existing administrative system: "The 
need for close regulation of the services and fares of the 
stage and express carriage services for passengers is generally 
admitted, except by the lunatic fringe .... So there has to 
be regulation in any case, and anyone who believes in 
decentralization and the rule of law will agree that road 
transport is fortunate in its machinery of regulation, namely 
176 
the Traffic Commissioners, who are both local and quasi-judicial 
as well as being specially experienced. " 
50 
It could be said that "decentralization and the rule of law" 
defined the company busman's approach to his industry, whether 
he be a THC or BET employee. Sir Reginald also spoke for these 
busmen when he concluded that: ". ... we in road transport 
must be careful not to sacrifice the special simplicities and 
virtues of our form of life and effectiveness, and our 
non-technological advantages, in exchange for some of the 
complicated messes of pottage, gimmickry and pseudo-science that 
are now being hawked around. We must combine a great deal of 
optimism with a certain amount of healthy scepticism, .... 
I am saying, in fact, that we must at all costs - --continue to 
rely in full measure on the ancient prescriptions of initiative 
and flexibility, hard work and toughness, discipline and 
individuality and adaptability - and common sense. There are 
no substitutes for these things in ordinary road transport, 
whichever way the rest of the world may go.. " 
51 As time went 
by, Sir Reginald decided that "the rest of the world" was not 
going in the right direction, and was determined that the "pale 
cast of thought" (i. e., the work of Mrs. Castle and her planners) 
would not triumph over the values of the working busman. 
A further defence of the THC structure was given by its 
Chief Executive, G. H. Quick Smith (a company busman of 
long-standing) in a paper also given to the Chartered Institute 
of Transport in November 1966.52 Quick Smith conceded that 
a case could be made out in theory for monolithic transport 
systems and: "Perhaps it could work in a Utopian society. ' But 
imperfect and irrational human beings would have to work the 
177 
system - and imperfect and sometimes irrational human beings 
would have to use it. Freedom of choice and personal decision 
would necessarily be curtailed, and even if we accepted these 
curtailments as compatible with a Utopian society, it would be 
unrealistic to base plans today on the assumption that Utopia 
will be attained in the forseeable future. " 
53 Quick Smith 
confessed that at one time he supported the idea of a 
hierarchical structure, but he now realized that the company 
structure offered maximum flexibility and adaptability. 
These two papers exemplify the suspicion which THC 
executives had of the PTA concept, and their desire to retain 
the identity and values of their own organization. As a 
state-owned body, the THC could not be associated with the 
anti-PTA campaign undertaken by VOICE (although the THC owned 
shares in many BET companies). Instead, it instigated a plan 
for more state ownership by making the BET an offer to purchase 
all the latter's bus companies. It was ironic that BET, which 
had so severely criticized Tilling's for selling out to the BTC 
in the 1940s, should itself be engaged in secret discussions 
for a similar sale nearly twenty years later. The secret 
negotiations would also explain the difficulties of VOICE in 
raising funds for its campaign. To most BET busmen at the time, 
the sale came as a terrible shock, but the BET management 
regarded it as a good business deal. The large loan to Midland 
Red, referred to above, was an indication of how the bus 
companies were becoming a liability to BET, for it was clear to 
all that the days of easy profits in the bus industry had 
disappeared for ever. 
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The BET Sale. 
In November 1967 it was announced that BET was to sell to 
the THC its interests in 24 regional bus companies and their 
subsidiaries, together with the coach operating companies. 
BET was to receive £35 million for its holdings of Ordinary 
shares. (The THC already owned 50% of the shares in many of 
the companies, although BET had retained control). The THC was 
also to offer to buy all the minority shareholdings. 
54 The 
benefit of the deal to the vendor is indicated by BET's 
statement: H .... that the book value of the BET group's 
equity investment in the associated bus companies and the book 
value of the net assets of the subsidiary bus companies 
comprised in the offer, as included in BET's consolidated 
balance sheet at March 31st last (1967), amounted to 
£20,174,000. " 55 Withk35 million in its pocket from the'sale, 
BET could indeed say goodbye to the bus industry with a smile 
on its face 
The Chairman of BET, Sir John Spencer Wills was a 
dyed in the wool busman, " 
56 
who had played a 
prominent part in maintaining the independence of BET bus 
services during the 1940s. Nevertheless, as Sir John put it in 
BET's Annual Report for 1968: ". ... the percentage of our 
Group net profit derived from our UK bus interests had, by 1967, 
declined to 22.2%. Or, to put it rather more flatteringly to 
your Directors, we had been sufficiently diligent on your 
behalf as to invest more of your funds in other profitable 
activities. " 
57 Perhaps the final ironic (and somewhat symbolic) 
twist in BET's long association with the bus industry was that 
much of the money obtained from the THC was used to assist the 
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development of Rediffusion, a television rental company owned 
by BET. Thus a form of entertainment which had contributed to 
the decline in demand for buses, by keeping people at home in 
the evenings, benefited directly from the private sector 
relinquishing its interests in large-scale bus operation. 
The BET sale could be seen as a triumph for Mrs. Castle 
and the Government, and to some extent it did represent a 
considerable step forward towards the Minister's fulfilment of 
her plans, but in reality it was the THC which had gained most 
benefit. Shortly after the sale the part-time Chairman of the 
THC, Sir Philip Warter, decided to retire, and he was replaced 
by Sir Reginald Wilson, who was to be a full-time Chairman. 
Sir Reginald was a former MoT official who, like Quick Smith, 
had been involved in the operation of the bus companies for 
many years. This experience gave these men a high degree of 
expertise in dealing with the Government and in understanding 
how to significantly influence the policy-making process. It 
was thus reported that: "A power struggle at the top, in 
which the THO under its new Chairman, Sir Reginald Wilson 
(described by politicians as the "Old Man of the Sea, " who 
always turns up), will struggle to be the national purveyor of 
bus services to the future public transport authorities, and so 
continue to have a place in Mrs. Castle's set-up, is one forseen 
result of the THC purchase of BET's 24 bus companies. There is 
some wonder, even with the THC's State Board status, how ¬35 
million expenditure is to get official approval in these hard 
times. " 58 This financial obstacle was not to prove a serious 
one. Of more significance for the future structure of the bus 
industry was the following information: "The Minister appears 
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to reckon that she can handle the THC when the time comes, but 
it is not seen how her (Transport) Bill can now abolish it 
within any stated time. From the time of unofficial conversations 
about the big bus deal, it had been assumed that the THC was 
taking the initiative, having got the Ministerial OK from 
Mrs. Castle, rather than it was the Minister's original idea. " 
59 
To some extent the development of events was reminiscent of 
circumstances which surrounded the bus route licensing 
provisions of the 1930 Road Traffic Act. At that time, a 
confluence of interests was found between the Labour Government, 
the MoT and the bus companies. In 1967, a confluence existed 
between the Government, the THO and BET. A further similarity 
was that behind the immediate agreement lay basic differences in 
philosophy. We saw earlier how many Labour MPs had decided by 
the 1940s that the route licensing system was operating against 
the public interest. Similarly, the motives of the THC and the 
Government in acquiring the BET companies were very different. 
Mrs. Castle considered that once the sale had gone through she 
could "handle" the THC, but the latter had a strong instinct for 
"survival of the species", i. e., creating offspring organizations 
which could perpetuate the organizational philosophy of their 
progenitor. In Downs' terms, the THC was engaging in the 
dynamics of territorial relations. He considers that an agency 
will: ". ... attempt to increase its influence over decisions 
of other social agents that affect its own operations, thereby 
pushing many of its zone boundaries outward. " 60 The dynamic 
quality of the THC's approach to survival ironically involved 
its own death and the birth of two new organizations. 
The White Paper on the future of freight transport, published 
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just prior to the BET sale, had already announced that the THC 
freight interests were to be integrated with British Rail's 
freight holdings in order to form a National Freight 
Corporation. 
61 In December 1967, less than three weeks after 
the announcement of the BET sale, a White Paper on public 
transport was published which set out the future structure of 
the bus industry. 
62 In addition to describing how the PTAs 
would operate (which we shall briefly outline in the following 
section) the White Paper also announced that the THC. and former 
BET bus companies would be joined in order to form the National 
Bus Company. It was explicitly stated that the NBC was to be 
the "successor body" 
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of the THC, and that: Like the THC 
the NBC will be run on commercial lines. " 
64 We will be 
examining in detail the structure and development of the NBC in 
the next chapter, but at the end of 1967 the factor of prime 
importance for the company busmen was that their world was not 
to be disturbed (at least for the immediate future) by the 
development of a PTA network. 
A further irony of the BET sale was that their executives 
continued to serve on the executive committee of VOICE. A 
typical reaction to the sale by a BET busman was that of 
Mr. J. W. Womar, General Manager of the Midland Red, who refused 
to have anti-nationalization posters removed from his buses. 
He defiantly stated that: "I will decide when they will be 
taken off our vehicles and no amount of pressure will have the 
slightest effect upon me. " 
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Neither the Government nor the 
THC in fact had any power to prevent this type of activity, for 
the THC could not complete the BET purchase until its borrowing 
limit had been raised from a30 million to 1100 million by. Act of 
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Parliament. 
Despite' the continued existence of VOICE, opposition to the 
THC takeover was muted. As we described earlier, most of VOICE's 
activity was directed against the PTA concept, but now that 
nearly all the area companies were to become nationalized in any 
case, the heart went out of the campaign. In addition, the 
Conservative Party was unlikely to vociferously champion the 
cause of an industry whose principal private operator voluntarily 
sold out to the state. Immediately after the sale Motor 
Transport noted: "Tory politicians feel that the rug has been 
pulled from under their defence of private enterprise against 
the PTA's take-over, and are not at all pleased with the move. 
It will prejudice to some extent the full-bloodedness of their 
attack on the Bill next month and later. In consequence they 
are turning their main attention to the haulage and licensing 
proposals contained in the White Paper (on freight transport) 
published last week. " 
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Although the Conservatives continued 
to oppose both the THC purchase and the PTA concept (largely on 
the grounds of the likely cost to the tax-payer), the sheer size 
of the Transport Bill meant that only limited attention could 
be given to its public transport provisions. 
Amidst all the clamour and attention given to the Transport 
Bill, the Transport Holding Company Bill passed quietly through 
Parliament during the early months of 1968. Richard Grossman, 
who at the time was Leader of the House of Commons, revealed 
the Government's attitude to the Bill on the day of its Second 
Reading: "After the business statement we started a highly 
contentious little Transport Holding Company Bill which we want 
to get through with the minimum of attention. " 67 In this 
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case, the Government succeeded in its aim, and by March 1968 
the THC borrowing limit had been raised from £30 million to 
£100 million. 
The BET purchase was one of the final acts of the THC, for 
it ceased to exist from 31st December 1968. Nevertheless, its 
spirit lived on in the structure and personnel of its successor 
organizations. Sir Reginald Wilson, the final Chairman of the 
THC, became the first Chairman of the National Freight 
Corporation, while the NBC perpetuated the independence and 
philosophy of the company busmen. As with Crosland-Taylor and 
Tilling's sale to the BTC, the BET sale represented a case of 
"State Owned Without Tears. " The strategy of the THC could be 
seen as the one instance with regard to Mrs. Castle's Transport 
Bill in which she was out-manoeuvred. Mrs. Castle left the 
MoT in April 1968 to become First Secretary of State and 
Secretary of State for Employment and Productivity, but by then 
she had ensured that four PTAs were to be set up. Unlike the 
1940s and the Area Schemes, there was to be no escape for these 
particular municipalities on this occasion. Mrs. Castle's 
successor as Minister of Transport, Richard Marsh, was given the 
task of steering the Bill through its remaining stages. 
Mr. Marsh was generally regarded as being a more pragmatic and 
moderate Minister than Mrs. Castle, but in reality the die was 
already cast and the future structure of the bus industry decided. 
It is significant that in discussing the activity of the 
THC we have moved away from the "main line" policy contained in 
the Transport Bill, which after a tortuously long progress 
through Parliament eventually became law in October 1968. The 
triumph of the THC was to side-track Mrs. Castle from her vision 
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of a Nationwide PTA network, while leaving her with the 
impression that the fulfilment of her objectives were only just 
over the horizon, when the restructuring of local government 
took place. It is of course true that the THC could not forsee 
the future, but it could at least hope that a union of Tilling 
and BET would give a better chance of survival. 
Despite vehement opposition from the Conservatives, (over 
2,000 amendments were put down) and considerable obstruction in 
the Lords, the aspects of the Bill which affected the bus 
industry survived almost unscathed. Apart from the proposed 
formation of a National Bus Company, the 1968 Transport Act 
contained several provisions which were to have a considerable 
effect on the work of the NBC. 
The Bus Industry and the 1968 Transport Act. 
In briefly examining the bus passenger transport sections 
of the 1968 Transport Act, we should note that it contained 
166 Sections and also dealt with the setting up of the National 
Freight Corporation, the regulation of road haulage operators, 
drivers' hours, inland waterways, bridges and traffic regulation. 
Such a large piece of legislation was in effect several Acts in 
one. Only two of the ten parts were concerned with the bus 
industry, one on the setting up of the PTAs, and the other on 
the establishment of the NBC. 
To the NBC, the PTAs were important in two particular 
respects. Firstly, they presented themselves as a rival form 
of organization. Barbara Castle made it clear that she 
eventually envisaged a nationwide PTA network, and despite the 
unification of Tilling and BET, there was no guarantee that this 
would not happen. Secondly, the NBC would have to learn to live 
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with the PTAs. From the early days, the bus companies had 
negotiated with the municipalities, but the concept of the PTAs 
suggested that they might adopt a more aggressive and expansionist 
approach. It is therefore important that we briefly examine the 
structure and function of the PTAs. 
As with the Area Schemes of the 1940s, the local authorities 
were on the whole antagonistic towards the PTAs. The Municipal 
Passenger Transport Association was highly critical of the 
Government's plans, and several labour controlled councils 
within the designated areas for the first four PTAs sent 
deputations to Mrs. Castle, but the Minister was not to be 
moved. In contrast to the long consultation process required 
prior to implementation of the Area Schemes the PTAs became 
operational only six months after passage of the Act (in April 
1969), while on this occasion there was no "Uncle" George 
Cardwell in charge of implementation 
The first PTAs were set up in the West Midlands, Manchester, 
Merseyside and Tyneside. Each PTA was to consist of members 
appointed by the local councils concerned (although not every 
council had a member on the PTA, which caused some antagonism 
locally). In addition, the Minister was given the power to 
appoint a number of members not exceeding one-sixth of the 
aggregate number appointed by the local councils. The Minister's 
appointees would be from: It. ... among persons appearing to 
him to have special knowledge or experience which would be of 
value to the Authority in the exercise of their functions.,, 
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The Minister was also required to approve the appointment of 
each PTA Chairman. It could therefore be possible for a Minister 
to exercise some degree of central control of the PTA. 
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The day to day management was to be left in the hands of a 
Passenger Transport Executive, which would prepare a plan: 
". ... setting out proposals for the development of a system 
of public transport capable of serving the needs of the 
Area. " 
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It was for the PTA to decide whether public transport 
within the Area would be subsidized by the local authorities, 
but the Executive was to have the task of planning the public 
transport system of the Area. (In addition to the buses, each 
PTE was to take over the train services running wholly within 
its area). The Executive was expected to split its services 
into several subsidiaries, with the wide range of 500-1,000 
buses being recommended as the ideal size for a subsidiary. 
Working agreements with the NBC subsidiaries would also have to 
be sought, and details of these agreements would be sent to the 
Minister (although his approval was not required). 
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Most controversially, full control of the services in the 
Area would be exercised by the Executive, in place of the 
Traffic Commissioners, although the Minister had to be satisfied 
that a fair agreement had been made with the NBC. This position 
clearly offered a considerable threat to the NBC, but in reality 
the PTEs have never exercised this authority, and the Traffic 
Commissioners have retained their place. The Commissioners 
have survived principally for the intermediary role they play 
between the PTE and the public. If the Commissioners sanction 
a fares increase it can be claimed by the PTE and the local 
authority that the case has been subjected to independent 
scrutiny. The PTEs have therefore declined to wield absolute 
power, although the Traffic Commissioners would be unlikely to 
significantly change detailed agreements worked out between the 
PTEs and NBC subsidiaries. The Executives were also given 
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powers of compulsory purchase of other bus companies, but again 
this is a right which has never been exercised (although we 
shall see in the next chapter that the West Midlands PTE was 
to complete a highly contentious purchase of Midland Red 
services within its area). 
Financially, the Executives were to perform in such a way 
to ensure that: ". ... as far as practicable the cumulative 
net balance of the consolidated revenue account of the Executive 
and any subsidiaries of theirs does not show a deficit at the 
end of any accounting period .... ". 
71 The PTEs were 
therefore given the responsibility of breaking even, although 
both their finances and level of services would obviously be 
dependent on the amount of subsidy they received from the local 
authorities. 
In addition to their role as bus operators, the PTEs were 
seen by the Government as organizations which would have a 
dynamic planning function. To the company busmen, they 
represented an unknown quantity, which might either be pacified 
and neutralized, or could spring out and gobble up a bus company 
before the latter realized what was happening. 
Although the creation of the PTAs and the NBC dominated 
the bus transport aspects of the 1968 Transport Act, it also 
contained several other provisions of considerable importance 
to the future of the NBC. Firstly, a grant of 25% was to be 
paid towards the cost of each new bus. The Government was 
anxious for bus operators to re-equip their fleets, and also 
that one-man operation should be introduced more quickly in 
order to improve productivity. The aim of the new scheme was to: 
". ... encourage the purchase of standardized buses of high 
quality. " 72 It was intended that the grant would only be 
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paid on buses which conformed with specifications laid down by 
the Ministry. As we shall see in the next chapter, this new 
grant was to have a considerable effect on NBC's vehicle 
purchasing policy. The grant had the political merit for the 
Government of assisting both the bus industry and the motor 
industry. Thus the problems of two policy sectors could be 
treated by one policy The scheme was originally intended to 
run for a period of seven years, at a cost to the Government 
of more than £5 million a year. 
Secondly, the grant on bus fuel was to be increased from 
ten pence (4.2p) to one shilling and seven pence (7.9p) per 
gallon, at a cost of about F, 7 million per annum. The Government 
refused to exempt the bus industry from fuel tax altogether, 
(despite pressure from the operators) as it was considered that 
operators had access to track which had been provided at public 
expense. 
Thirdly, capital expenditure on projects such as new bus 
depots or stations were to be entitled to a grant of 75% of 
approved cost. This grant was primarily intended to bring 
public transport in line with road construction grants. In fact, 
it was unlikely to have any great effect on the bus industry 
itself, and was intended as a contribution towards the cost of 
new rapid transit systems, which it was thought at that time 
would become widespread in the urban areas. To the bus 
operators, a 75% grant for new vehicles would have been of 
greater value. 
Fourthly, the Government. proposed: ". ... to give powers 
to local authorities to make grants to operators of bus services 
in rural areas where the essential services could not be provided 
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on a commercial basis. Provided that the terms laid down by 
the Minister or the Secretary of-State concerned are complied 
with, they will pay the local authorities 50% of the grant paid 
to the bus operator. " 
73 This scheme was seen by the 
Government as a step towards implementing the Jack Report of 
1961. Seven years was no doubt considered a long enough period 
for evaluation of the Report's recommendations. Significantly, 
it was also considered. that: "In many cases services to 
outlying villages could best be provided by private operators, 
who may well run a bus service in conjunction with other 
activities-, and the service may be best provided with a 
relatively small vehicle. ', 
74 We described earlier how the 
experimental services of the 1960s had made heavy losses. It 
now appeared that. the Government was reviewing the possibility 
that the private operator might be more suitable for the deep 
rural areas than the territorial companies, (a possibility 
considered by Crosland-Taylor when Crosville was expanding into 
rural Wales during the 1920s). If it were to be found that the 
small private operator required less subsidy than the territorial 
company (or even no subsidy at all) for particular rural routes, 
then the degree of cross-subsJ, dy could be. reduced and resources 
possibly diverted from rural to urban areas. 
A precedent was set by the provision of the new rural grant, 
for the local authorities had been given the responsibility of 
providing subsidies to. the bus companies. Although t, 4is new 
grant formed only a tiny part of the 1968 Transport Act, and in 
the event was only implemented in a small way, it, did foreshadow 
what was to become a major preoccupation of the NBC during the 
1970s. We shall see in Chapter Six that the-legislation of the 
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1970s placed considerably greater responsibility on County 
Councilp to co-ordinate with NBC subsidiaries, and in later 
chapters we will be examining several of these relationships in 
more detail. The grant also set a precedent in making it clear 
that local authorities rather than central government were to 
take responsibility for decisions on Subsidizing NBC services. 
This was an important step for the NBC who would have to 
negotiate with local councils individually rather than receive 
a block grant which could be spent as the Company saw fit,. In 
addition, this grant signified how the Government, in its own 
mind, had separated urban and rural transport. The PTAs were 
to provide for the main conurbations, while the Counties would 
look after the NBC services in rural areas. In reality, the 
definition of urban and rural areas could be. much more blurred, 
but as we. discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the 
Government could make the problem more manageable by 
fragmentation. The small-scale nature of the new grant is 
illustrated by the Government's expe. etation that the cost was 
not expected to rise above £4 million per annum. In reality the 
cost proved to be even less than this figure, and it was only in 
the second half of the 1970s that the cost escalated. 
Fifthly, Section 30 of the Act stated that school bus 
operators wishing to carry fare stage passengers would henceforth 
require only a permit rather than a full route licence on the 
condition that no other servicQa existed in the area. The 
introduction of Section 30 Permits (as they have become 
generally known) represented a small liberalisation of the 
licensing laws, and commenced a movement which was to gather 
momentum in-legislation during the 1970s. 
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Finally, drivers' hours regulations were tightened up. This 
provision within the Act was intended mainly to apply to the 
road haulage industry, but it did-have implications for the 
busman. Maximum working hours were reduced from 14 to 11 hours, 
with a maximum of 10 hours at the wheel. Drivers were 
restricted to a maximum of 60 hours per week, and were required 
75 The bus to take at least one rest day during that time. 
industry is labour intensive, with approximately 70% of cost 
being attributable to wages and salaries. There were complaints 
from both the road haulage and bus industries that these 
provisions would put up costs, but on this occasi. Qn the 
Government would not relent. 
D. Conclusion.. 
In this Chapter we have been principally examining how the 
company busmen maintained the structure of their industry during 
a time when demand was falling, and bus operation was ceasing to 
be regarded as a. lucrative businesq. It was also a time when 
governments were assuming more responsibility for the welfare of 
the bus industry, and ßought. to seek solutions by separating 
urban and -rural transport. In doing so, the principle of 
cross-subsidization was being questioned, although not 
confronted directly. It was pointed out by Munby that if the 
NBC was to remain. viable then it would have to retain many urban 
routes in order to pay for unprofitable rural services, yet if 
they retained these routes the authority of the PTEs would be 
undermined. 
76 Rivalry between the companies and the 
municipalities was nothing new, but at the time when the 1968 
Transport Act was passed it was thought that an individual PTE 
would wish to control its own territory. 
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The NBC therefore began its life with considerable doubt 
surrounding its future, but it could take heart from the events 
of the immediate past. We saw how Tilling's retained its 
identity by the creation of the THC, and then how the THC itself, 
by means of the BET purchase, brought about unification of the 
companies and the creation of the NBC. Mrs. Castle was a 
strong Transport Minister, who vas determined that the 
fulfilment of her policy objectives would not be undermined. 
Yet she was in a cleft stick with regard to the PTAs, for she 
could not set up a nationwide network. prior to local government 
reorganization, but if implementation was delayed altogether 
then the whole concept might collapse in the manner of the Area 
Schemes. By setting up four PTAs in the larger conurbations, 
then the implementation process was set in motion. In this 
context, to have all the bus companieg state owned made good 
sense. In any case, the THC had been encouraged in its 
purchasing policy by the Labour Government since the mid 1960s, 
and the purchase could be regarded as no more than a. natural 
progression. 
The behaviour of the THC is a good example of policy 
overlap, for in implementing the provisions. of the 1962 Transport 
Act the THC had a considerable effect, on the nature of the, 1968 
Transport Act (an example of Wildavsky's hypothesis that policy 
becomes its own cause). The NBC owed its existence to the work 
Qf the THC, and has proved to be a more durable organization 
than might have been envisaged when it came into being on 
1st. January 1969. When Munby criticized the retention of the 
Traffic Commissioners his words could also have been applied to 
the creation of the NBC: "It is almost an axiom of British. 
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practice that when a new organization is created all the older 
ones which formerly performed its functions should be continued 
alongside .... it 
77 The NBC has now continued alongside the 
PTEs for over eleven years, with no signs that this arrangement 
will cease in the immediate future. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The NBC and Implementation of the 1968 Transport Act 
In this chapter we will be examining how the National 
Bus Company has implemented the provisions of the 1968 Transport 
Act. In later chapters we will study the legislation relating 
to bus passenger transport during the 1970s and the manner of 
its implementation. The principal feature of this later 
legislation has been an increase in the role of the local 
authorities in public transport planning, and in our case 
studies we will describe and analyse several of the NBC 
subsidiary-county council relationships. These relationships 
are of increasing importance, but it is nevertheless important 
to understand that in many respects the NBC continues to 
exercise considerable autonomy over its affairs. The counties 
only provided 8% of total NBC revenue in 1979, while the 
attempts made by various counties to take a more direct part 
in NBC planning have frequently met with only limited success. 
With regard to capital expenditure, wages and the important 
principle of cross-subsidization, the NBC makes its decisions 
with little help or interference from local authorities. 
We will initially briefly outline the sections of the 
1968 Transport Act which concerned the creation of the NBC, 
and the thinking behind them. We will then examine the 
corporate finances of the NBC and analyse the manner in which 
the relationship with government has developed over the years. 
The debt which the NBC owes to the holding company concept 
gives it a distinctive character among the public corporations. 
We will therefore also look at several aspects of central-local 
relationships within the NBC. 
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A. The Creation of the NBC 
Only two weeks after the proposed sale of the BET bus 
companies to the THC was announced, the Government's White 
Paper on passenger transport set out the structure and function 
for the NBC. 1 The White Paper made it clear that the THC 
rather than the Government had taken the initiative in setting 
up the BET sale, although the Government fully supported the 
deal. We saw in the previous chapter how the THC and the 
Government had differing motives for supporting the BET purchase; 
the THC wishing to maintain its organizational philosophy, and 
the Government hoping that integration of the companies would 
assist in the establishment of the PTAs. The creation of a 
nationwide PTA network was a long-term objective, pending the 
reorganization of local government, and for the moment the 
Government was content that it had managed to instigate a new 
organizational concept. 
Outside the five main conurbations the company busman 
retained his authority. In any case, all the new PTAs were 
primarily served by municipal services, with the companies 
operating services into and within these areas by agreement. 
From the company busman's point of view,. the immediate threat 
offered by the PTAs was that they might attempt to take over 
all services within their own areas completely. In his 
categorization of how bureaus are created, Downs suggests that: 
"In a vast majority of cases a bureau starts as the result of 
aggressive agitation and action by a small group of zealots 
who have a specific idea they want to put into practice on a 
large scale. " 
2 In one sense, the officials of the THC' were 
zealots for their organization's character, but the company 
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busmen were also conservers, i. e., they wished to preserve the 
existing regulatory system. On this occasion, the zeal of 
Mrs. Castle and her officials led to countervailing action by 
the "zealous conservers" of the THC. 
Downs also states that: ". ... the self-interest of 
climbers, zealots and advocates causes them to seek more 
influence in the surrounding policy space than they would if they 
were perfectly altruistic. " 
3 We discussed in Chapter One the 
difficulties in distinguishing between self-interest and 
official interest, but whatever the motivation of the PTAs. 
Government policy made it clear that the ultimate rational 
policy objective was for the PTAs to occupy the entire policy 
space. The NBC was therefore likely to come under pressure from 
any PTA which chose to indulge in empire-building, as well as 
from any of the PTAs which considered that a take over of all 
NBC services in their areas was the most rational policy 
solution. In addition, the NBC also faced the possibility of 
its own destruction once local government reorganization was 
implemented. "In much of the rest of the country (outside the 
first four PTAs) the problems are somewhat less acute and the 
question of establishing PTAs can perhaps wait until the future 
shape of local government is clearer. " 
4 
Despite these potential threats to its viability and very 
existence, the NBC was portrayed by the Government as an 
organization which would fulfil an important function within 
the public transport system. The Government's attitude 
towards the NBC indicates a blurring of objectives. Although 
it was hoped that the PTA concept would spread, the Government 
obviously wished the NBC to be a successful and efficient 
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organization. It is significant that despite the evidence in 
the White Paper'both C. D. Foster and Mr. Gailey (the NBC's 
first Chief Executive) did not consider the NBC at its 
foundation was regarded as a "stop gap" organization. Both 
considered that the THC had successfully persuaded the 
Government of the NBC's viability as a policy concept. 
5 
In reality it was likely to be municipal operators who would be 
most affected by the creation of new PTAs, although in some 
cases NBC subsidiaries were the principal operators in large 
urban areas. The NBC was no doubt seen by the Government as 
being the principal rural operator, and thus falling outside 
the PTAs. The uncertainty was the degree to which local 
government reorganization would require the creation of 
regional transport authorities encompassing both rural and 
urban areas. 
With regard to finance, the White Paper stated that: 
"like the THC, the NBC will be run-on commercial lines ... 
It will be expected to pay its way, providing out of revenue 
for the interest on its capital loaned by the Exchequer and 
for the renewal of its assets. The financial duty of the NBC 
will therefore be basically the same as that of the Passenger 
Transport Executives. " 6 Unlike the THC, the NBC was not 
given the specific statutory obligation to "act commercially", 
but it was obviously expected to operate in a commercial 
manner. Although superficially its financial duties might be 
similar to those of the PTAs, the organizational nature of the 
NBC required it to operate in an environment where it would be 
left more to its own devices. 
The whole concept of the PTAs was based on the premise 
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that they should form an integral part of large-scale 
comprehensive planning. As nearly all PTA members were also 
likely to be local councillors, it was anticipated that the 
Passenger Transport Executive would operate its services in 
accordance with the objectives of local authority planning as 
a whole, and that the level of fares and services would 
largely be dependent on the position of public transport within 
the local scale of priorities. In contrast, the NBC was 
expected to use its own judgment in deciding the best way of 
remaining viable. Outside the PTAs, it had no obligation to 
liaise with local authorities, while the only aid from local 
government it could receive was the small-scale rural bus 
grant. The concept behind the NBC was still that of a 
commercial company, which would be expected to make profits 
and generate funds mainly from its own resources. 
The NBC was also given the power to acquire voluntarily 
other bus undertakings, although it was stressed that the small 
private operators would still have an important part to play, 
particularly in rural areas. 
7 Only two major fare-stage 
operators remained in private ownership after the creation of 
the NBC (Lancashire United and Barton Transport in 
Nottinghamshire) and NBC purchases were likely to consist of 
small local operators. In many deeply rural areas the NBC, like 
its predecessors, would not consider it worthwhile to purchase 
companies whose services were unlikely to make a profit. The 
more attractive targets were likely to be those operators who 
continued to run in urban and suburban areas. In Chapter Seven 
we will see how Midland Red (an NBC subsidiary) lost many of 
its urban services to the West Midlands PTA, and in its turn 
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reacted by purchasing a group of smaller operators within its 
own area. 
The prospective relationship between the NBC and the PTAs 
was the most delicate of the policy implications to be 
considered by the Government. It was stated that: "The NBC 
will have a specific duty to co-operate with each PTE, in 
carrying through the necessary reorganization of public 
transport in the areas concerned", 
8 
and that ". .. 
working agreements will be needed to avoid creating problems 
of severance or irritating restrictions (which often occur at 
present) on the way in which people inside and outside the Area 
can use the various bus services. " 
9 
We noted in the previous 
chapter that the PTAs were to be given powers of compulsory 
purchase, yet crucially the Government was also anxious to 
emphasize that: "The agreements between the Executives and the 
NBC companies must not destroy the basis on which the NBC 
companies can operate profitably. The NBC companies will be 
maintaining a wide range of services outside the main towns: 
, On many of these the level of profits is inevitably low, and 
they will need a proportion of more profitable urban routes if 
the 'mix' of their services is to enable them to be viable 
undertakings. If these companies were deprived entirely of 
their right to provide urban services, then the people living 
in county towns and villages served by the NBC would suffer. " 
10 
This statement highlights the question of policy fragmentation 
referred to at the beginning of Chapter Four. The Government 
wished to maximize the power and independence of the PTAs, yet 
at the same time was anxious that cross-subsidization between 
urban and rural areas should continue. In this dilemma the 
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Government could not offer any solutions, but merely hope that 
the parties involved would find some kind of compromise. 
The NBC was also given the responsibility of arranging 
for the provision of bus services required as a condition of 
the Minister agreeing to the withdrawal of rail passenger 
services. 
11 Previously this responsibility had been given 
to British Rail. We referred in Chapter Two to the lack of 
co-ordination between bus and rail services, and by taking this 
responsibility for negotiating contracts away from BR, the 
Government was acknowledging the difficulties of the 
relationship. 
In general, the Government envisaged the NBC as 
perpetuating the holding company concept, but the union of 
Tilling and BET would: ". ... make easier the reorganization 
of bus services to meet the needs of each area. " 
12 The 
policy dilemma was nevertheless evident once more in the 
statement that: "Although it will act commercially, its 
financial responsibilities will not be such as to inhibit it 
from taking a broad view of proposals whether in a PTA or with 
a municipal bus undertaking. In short, the establishment of 
the NBC will provide a sound basis for developing on a rational 
basis the provision of bus services throughout England and 
Wales. " 
13 
In setting up the NBC, the Government stressed the 
importance of the holding company structure, the possibilities 
for rationalizing the company structure and the relationship 
with the PTAs. There was nevertheless one particular aspect of 
the NBC which was not touched on, and yet carried considerable 
implications for the dynamics of the organization. 
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When privately owned, the Tilling and BET companies had been a 
part of organizations with investments in other industries. 
Similarly, after nationalization the Tilling companies had 
formed part of the BTC and then the THC. For the first time 
the companies were on their own, and just as important, the 
new organization was to be named the National Bus Company. 
(It is interesting to note that the THC originally envisaged 
a British Bus Company. The title was adopted in order to avoid 
the idea of nationalization. In the event "British" became 
"National" when it was considered that the title would cause 
confusion with the British Broadcasting Corporation). 
14 
Although central control had been exerted by Tilling and 
BET management (most obviously by Sir Frederick Heaton) and the 
Tilling Group had formed a large part of the THC, the creation 
of the NBC put the central-local relationship into a new 
perspective. Although the holding company concept was to 
continue, for the first time the companies would have to 
present an Annual Report to Parliament, based entirely on their 
own performance. In the final analysis what was to be publicly 
visible would not be the viability of an individual subsidiary 
or group of subsidiaries, but the NBC as a whole. In a period 
when demand for bus services was suffering an apparently 
inevitable decline, the NBC would need to produce a corporate 
result which justified its existence as an organization. In 
addition, the very word National = was likely to evoke in senior 
management the thought that the organization must live up to 
its name (the word "British" would have had the same effect). 
Thus a natural tension was likely to result between the company's 
two images, firstly as that of a holding company with relatively 
20 6 
autonomous operating units, and secondly as 
answerable to a Minister and to Parliament. 
chapter we will study how the central-local 
the associated tensions within the NBC have 
B. The Initial Structure. 
When the first NBC appointments were m 
a public corporation 
later in this 
relationships and 
evolved. 
ade, it was not 
surprising that nearly all the senior management of the new 
organization were well-established company busmen. Initially, 
A. F. R. Carling was appointed in February 1968 as liaison man 
between the THO and the BET bus companies. 
15 As Mr. Carling 
had previously been a member of the BET board, the appointment 
represented the first step in uniting the two sets of companies. 
In August 1968 it was announced that Mr. Norman Todd was 
to be the first Chairman of the NBC. The appointment was 
part-time, and reflected the Government's judgment that the 
decentralized nature of the NBC did not warrant a full-time 
Chairman. It might also be said that the appointment signified 
the relatively low political importance which the Government 
attached to the NBC. Mr. Todd was a full-time member of the 
Central Electricity Generating Board, and he considered that 
the NBC would require only a very small headquarters staff, 
with a Chief Executive doing the day-to-day work. He saw the 
NBC as a policy body only, controlling completely decentralized 
(sic) bus companies. 
16 
In October 1968 Mr. T. W. Gailey was chosen to be Chief 
Executive of the NBC. A Ministry of Transport statement said 
that Mr. Gailey would control and co-ordinate the activities of 
all the company subsidiaries, including both bus operating and 
manufacturing. Mr. Gailey had previously been Director of 
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Passenger Planning in the THC and Chairman of Tilling 
Association Limited. 
17 
He was a confirmed company busman, 
who had worked for Tilling's since 1932, and in 1968 was also 
Chairman of the Passenger Transport Association. Further NBC 
appointments reflected the need to draw on personnel from both 
BET and Tilling's. The Secretary, Mr. Sandall, had previously 
been Secretary of the BET Federation Limited, while the Chief 
Planning and Development Officer, Mr. D. Glassborow, was 
formerly head of economic research for the THC. It was also 
significant that the NBC's Press and Public Relations Officer 
was to be Mr. Glass, who had held the same post with the 
British Omnibus Public Relations Committee. 18 The BOPRC had 
been one of the chief opponents of Mrs. Castle's bill, but the 
actual establishment of the NBC indicated that the company 
busmen had won a significant battle. The background of the 
people who were to form the nucleus of NBC senior management 
suggested that, as with Tilling's and the BTC, the organization 
had already been captured by the "establishment" of the bus 
industry, - 
The first part-time members of the NBC, apart from Mr. Todd, 
consisted of a past President of the MPTA, an industrialist 
(perhaps surprisingly also Vice-Chairman of the British Roads 
Federation a retired local government officer, a retired 
trade unionist and the Chairman of the Scottish Bus Group. 
Mr. Gailey was appointed as the only full-time NBC member. 19 
The initial organization of the NBC followed closely the 
Tilling system within the THC. Central research and supplies 
departments took over the functions of similar Tilling and BET 
sections, while the subsidiary companies were split into ten 
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regional areas: North East, North West, Yorkshire, East Midland, 
West Midland, Eastern, South Wales, South West, South and 
South East. In addition to the Tilling and BET buses, London 
Transport's Country Bus and Green Line services were transferred 
to the NBC, and became known as London Country Bus Services. 
All the existing companies retained their identity at the 
inception of the NBC, although it was envisaged that the 
Tilling-BET integration would facilitate some degree of 
rationalization. 
20 Some of the rationalization was arranged 
even before the NBC was instituted. For example, in November 
1968 it was announced that from Ist January 1969 bus operations 
of the small Carlisle based company United Automobile services 
would be integrated with those of the much larger Ribble Motor 
Services. 21 Again, in December 1968, it was revealed that 
the Brighton, Hove and District Company, with its fleet of 
150 buses, and the Southdown Company, with nearly 900 buses, 
would come under the same management. 22 
The NBC was launched by its management in the spirit that 
although some economies of scale might be achieved, the basic 
company structure (with the busman firmly in charge) offered the 
most efficient means of running the bus industry. Although the 
days of real affluence for the industry had already disappearea, 
there was no desire for the NBC to receive large subsidies, and 
thus forfeit its independence to local authorities or central 
government. In the following section we will examine how this 
attitude, amongst other factoxs., has affected the corporate 
finances of the NBC and the associated relationship with central 
government. The central-local tension which we referred to 
earlier in the chapter is perhaps the prime organizational 
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characteristic of the NBC. In the fourth section of the 
chapter we will study aspects of NBC policy implementation from 
the point of view of these intra-organizational relationships. 
C, NBC Corporate Finances and the Relationship with Central 
Government. 
At the time of the NBC's creation, there was considerable 
debate concerning the need to set financial targets for the 
nationalized industries. The 1961 White Paper on the 
nationalized industries 
23 
recommended that surpluses should 
cover deficits over a five year period. Each industry was to 
be set a target, with a review each year. As Tivey comments, 
long-term targets of this type are contingent on many factors: 
'The targets are determined by administrators, after negotiation 
with the boards, and determined in advance. They are, therefore, 
in a sense predictions - not predictions of what will happen, 
but predictions that the objectives will be reasonable. As 
things turn out, the targets may be very difficult or very 
easy to achieve. A great deal depends on the economic 
circumstances of the time, and on the Government's policies in 
response to-the circumstances. The provision for annual review 
seems to recognize this. " 
24 
In the case of the NBC, its declining market could only be 
met by increasing fares and cutting back services if its 
statutory obligation to break even was to be achieved without 
recourse to subsidies. If a five year plan was to be 
successfully implemented, then the decentralized nature of the 
NBC could be a considerable handicap in evaluating and 
monitoring the performance of its subsidiaries. 
In 1967, the Labour Government produced its own White Paper 25 
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on the nationalized industries, which proposed that discounted 
cash-flow techniques be adopted for the majority of investment 
projects. It was intended by the Government that the adoption 
of DCF would enable comparisons to be made between a wide range 
of investment projects, and a test discount rate of 8% was 
considered to be: ". ... broadly consistent, having regard to 
differing circumstances in relation to tax, investment grants, 
etc., with the average rate of return in real terms looked for 
on low-risk projects in the private sector in recent years. " 
26 
On pricing, the White Paper recommended marginal costing, 
and made a strong criticism of cross-subsidization: "In a few 
cases, cross-subsidization may be justified by statutory 
requirements or by wider economic or'social considerations. 
But - these cases apart - to cross-subsidize loss-making 
services amounts to taxing remunerative services provided by 
the same undertaking and is as objectionable as subsidizing 
from general taxation services which have no social 
justification. " 27 In the case of the NBC, wider economic 
and social considerations were considered to outweigh the 
arguments against cross-subsidization, although the concept 
behind the creation of the PTAs also (as we described in the 
previous chapter) implied a criticism of cross-subsidization. 
One of the prime objectives of both the 1961 and 1967 White 
Papers was to make the nationalized industries more commercially 
minded, and to place them on a comparable basis to the private 
sector. As our study has shown, the NBC was likely to welcome 
the independence to act in a commercial manner, but the general 
conditions for doing this were not favourable. 
The commercial success of the THC possibly deceived the 
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Government and the NBC into thinking that similar returns could 
be maintained. Thomson and Hunter consider that the THC's 
average rate of return on new investment: 11. ... was 
considerably higher than the 8% quoted, since the figure for 
the net assets has included over 930 million of goodwill mostly 
inherited at the time of nationalization, which has nothing to 
do with the current value of the physical assets involved. " 
28 
The NBC commenced operations with over 20,000 vehicles, 
and more than 80,000 staff employed. The company was given a 
Commencing Capital Debt of £97,625,000 repayable at a fixed 
interest rate of 4.92% per annum. The borrowing limit was set 
at £130 million. We shall see that the size of the opening 
debt, and the continuing burden which it has placed on the 
NBC, has become an extremely sore point with the company. In 
1969, when London Transport came under the control of Greater 
London Council, its capital debt of 9270 million was written 
Off, while both British Rail and the National Freight 
Corporation have each had their capital debt sonsiderably 
reduced during the 1970s. The failure of the NBC to obtain 
similar reductions reflects a serious dilemma for the company. 
The NBC's financial position could be improved by abolition of 
the capital debt, but this might indicate to Government that 
the company was not efficient and required a higher degree of 
external monitoring or even basic structural change. On the 
whole, the NBC preferred to pay its debt. e and maintain the 
status quo. 
The financial burden on the NBC was increased by the lack 
of reserves. The THC's reserves of £23 million were not 
transferred to the NBC, but were reduced from the size of the 
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opening capital debt. As Thomson and Hunter comment, this 
reduction was no substitute for lack of liquidity. 
29 
Shortly after the NBC was founded, transport suffered a 
loss of status within the governmental structure. When 
Richard Marsh resigned in October 1969 his successor, Fred 
Mulley, did not have a seat in the Cabinet. No doubt the 
Government considered that once the 1968 Transport Act was on 
the statute book, transport policy could be safely placed in 
the political background. In contrast to the 1947 Transport 
Act, the Government had taken direct action in order to 
implement legislation, and the creation of the PTAs, the NFC 
and the NBC signified (at least to the Government) that the 
main task was completed. 
In the event, the Labour Government did not have much time 
to assess the impact of the 1968 Act, for a Conservative 
Government took office in June 1970 and in the following 
November introduced a major departmental reorganization. The 
Ministries of Housing and Local Government, Transport, and 
Public Buildings and Works were joined together to form a new 
Department of the Environment. As Martin Painter states: 
"The central idea behind DoE was better policy co-ordination 
through departmgntal integration of closely related functional 
responsibilities .... A Secretary of State for the 
Environment was app. Qinted, -and he took on the statutory duties 
and powers formerly residing in the three ministers. Under him 
three ministers of equivalent status to a non-cabinet minister 
in charge of a department were appointed, each exereißing 
delegated functions over a specified area of DoE work. " 30 
It was intended that a high degree of policy co-ordination 
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and integration should be achieved within the DoE, but Painter 
cons. ider, s that the DoE could not: ". ... work like a team 
except in a very limited sense. " 
31 The DoE was so huge that 
the Secretary of State could not give attention to all its 
aspects, and this-meant that. certain policy areas would hardly 
ever reach the attention. ßf the Cabinet. The Minister of 
Transport Industries could immerse himself in the work of his 
own department, but politically, transport had suffered a 
severe diminution in status, unless. the Secretary of State for 
the Environment could be persuaded to focus his main attention 
on this particular policy sector. 
From the NBC's point of view, the departmental 
restructuring did offer certain organizational advantages. If 
transport policy was given less political attention, then it 
was likely that no major restructuring of the administrative 
system would take place in the immediate future. In addition, 
the NBC was likely to remain a less politically obtrusive 
organization if its Minister was not in the Cabinet. The 
company busmen could also hope that their quest for independence 
would be aided by the return of a Conservative Government, which 
would recall the success of the THC, and leave the NBC to 
"act commercially". 
In reality, although the NBC remained relatively free from 
direct Government intervention (as it has continued to do up to 
the present time), the organization's fortunes during the early 
1970s reflected the increasing strains on the ability of the 
bus industry to remain viable. Thomson and Hunter note that: 
"In 1969 and 1970, owing to numerous changes in the basis of 
the accounts, the financial results are not directly comparable 
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with earlier years (i. e., with the THC accounts), but there is 
no doubt of a disastrous deterioration ." 
32 In 1969 
NBC had an operating surplus of £7.5 million (reduced to 
£0.8 million after taxation and interest) and the Minister set 
the company a target of an £8 million surplus in 1970 and 1971.33 
In the event, the NBC had an operating deficit of £4.8 
million in 1970 and a surplus of £4.5 million in 1971. The 
NBC was pleased with the improvement in 1971, but noted that: 
.... the £4.5 million falls short by £0.5 million of the 
interest charge payable to the Secretary of State for the 
Environment for the capital debt. " 
34 The company attributed 
the financial improvement in 1971 to better relations with 
staff (we will be examining the NBC-Union relationship later 
in this chapter) but the disappointing financial results in 
1970 led to the NBC management putting intense pressure on the 
Government in order to obtain concessions which would relieve 
the position. 
The Government was not inclined to co-operate at first, 
but by October 1971 a package of measures had been prepared. 
Firstly, the bus grant was increased from 25% to 50% of cost. 35 
(Again, we will be examining the implications of the bus grant 
later in this chapter). Secondly, the company received a grant 
of £350,000 towards the cost of replacing withdrawn railway 
facilities with unremunerative bus services. 36 Thirdly, 
there was a slight relaxation in the drivers' hours regulations 
imposed by the 1968 Transport Act. 37 1971 also saw the NBC 
receive its first loan from the Government - £2 million at the 
then current rate of 9%. 
38 
The Government's target of an 
98 million surplus had been hopelessly over-optimistic of the 
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NBC's viability, but the company itself regarded 1970 as a 
freak year, and considered that the need to borrow money was 
only a temporary inconvenience. 
The optimism of the NBC appeared to be justified in 1972, 
when the company had a consolidated surplus of £14.5 million. 
This figure included a direct grant of £7 million from the 
Government. This money was given as a result of the voluntary 
initiative by the CBI to keep price rises in 1972 below 5%. 
As the NBC wages rose by 7%, the money was intended to bridge the 
gap. The money was given as. a result of the Transport (Grants) 
Act of 1972. In addition to the money for the NBC, British Rail 
received the much larger sum of £27 million. As so often with 
affairs concerning the bus industry the debate in Parliament 
almost ignored the NBC, with nearly all the attention being 
given to the problems of BR. Although the £7 million was no 
doubt welcome to the NBC, this grant should be seen in the 
context of the. Government's overall economic strategy of 
seeking to control inflation by means of limiting price 
increases in the public sector. The Times was critical of the 
decision concerning the NBC and BR in that it appeared: ". .. to 
mark the abandonment of the Government's hardline policy towards 
lame-duck industries, and to drive a coach and horses through 
the 1968 Transport Act. " 39 The NBC could claim that the 
£7 million represented not so much a crutch to a lame-duck as a 
prop for the Government's prices and incomes policy. Ironically, 
as events turned out, better than expected revenue returns enabled 
the NBC to keep the 97 million in reserve. 
40 
The financial position of the NBC in 1972 was improved by 
a severe rationalization in staff , e, nd service miles. The 
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number of staff employed was reduced from 76,526 in 1971 to 
70,973 and service miles went down from 783 million in 1971 to 
746 million (both sets of figures still the largest annual 
reductions in the history of the NBC). The NBC had threatened 
in 1970 that it would have to introduce severe service cuts 
unless it received more local authority financial support. 
As that support was not forthcoming the company carried out 
its threat during 1972. 
1972 was a year of particular significance to the NBC, 
for the Local Government Act confirmed that the company was to 
stay in existence. The principal feature of the new legislation 
for the NBC was the extra responsibility for co-ordinating 
public transport which it placed on the county councils. The 
reorganization of local government was finally implemented in 
1974, and while two new PTAs were created, the NBC was now an 
established part of the public transport system. (We will be 
discussing this legislation in detail in the next chapter). 
The Government's prices and incomes policy made 1973 a 
relatively stable year for the NBC, although the consolidated 
profit was down to x; 2.1 million. This decline prefaced a 
disastrous year in 1974, when the NBC had a consolidated loss 
of almost £12.3 million. In addition, the subsidiaries were 
forced to draw heavily on reserves. The NBC blamed these 
losses on: 
(a) the three day week during the early months of 1974 
(resulting from the national miners' strike), 
(b) shortage of manpower leading to heavy overtime costs, 
(c) a shortage of supplies which caused many buses to 
stay off the road. 
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(d) the rising cost of new vehicles, 
(e) "threshold" payments (part of the Government's 
prices and incomes policy, and based on the Retail Price 
Index, which in the event rose much more steeply than expected), 
(f) The Price Code, established under the Counter 
Inflation Act of 1973, which constrained subsidiaries from 
increasing fares quickly enough to keep pace with the 
"threshold" payments, 
(g) The NBC's decision to keep unprofitable services in 
operation pending the decisions on grants by local authorities, 
(h) Agreements with PTAs and municipalities (who could 
levy from the rates) to keep down fares. 41 
Although the NBC did not criticize the Government directly, 
the effects of the "threshold" payments, and the restrictions 
on fare increases were seen as prime causes of the company's 
troubles. The company welcomed a relaxation in the Price Code 
in November 1974, but noted that: "As applied to NBC 
subsidiaries, it does not allow sufficient surpluses to cover 
the total net cost of essential asset replacement and 
modernization of properties and the growing sums payable by 
NBC to defray increased interest charges on the capital debt 
and loans. " 
42 Although the NBC did not increase its 
borrowings in 1974, it was obviously concerned that the 
financial situation was unlikely to become stabilized in the 
immediate future. 
The worst fears of the NBC were confirmed in 1975, when the 
company suffered a consolidated loss of over £19 million. In 
his foreword to the 1975 Annual Report and Accounts, the NBC 
Chairman, Sir Frederick Wood (who had taken over from Mr. Todd 
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in 1971) made the heartfelt comment that: "For more than two 
decades, bus services have been subject to constant erosion 
from the powerful competitor, the motor-car. Last year I had 
to point out how seriously galloping inflation was further 
reducing our capacity to give a good service on a financially 
viable basis. " 
43 Costs rose so quickly during the year that 
many subsidiaries were forced to raise their fares two or even 
three times in the year. The enormous rise in fares during 
this period is indicated by the NBC's statement that: ".... 
overall average receipts (excluding revenue support grants) per 
passenger journey increased by 39.5%" 
44 Although inflation 
generally was running above 20% during 1975 (the increase in 
the price of oil being a major factor) the NBC increase 
represented a considerable rise in the real cost of bus fares. 
Between 1974 and 1976 the real cost of fares rose by 20%, 
and this increase was not surprisingly reflected in the steep 
decline in passenger journeys for this period from 2,177 million 
to 1,856 million. 
45 In an era when the demand for car 
ownership had an apparently autonomous quality (even allowing 
for the steep rise in petrol prices during this period, the 
number of private cars and vans rose from over 13.9 million in 
1974 to 14.3 million in 1976) 46 the extent to which real 
increases in fares can be equated with loss of passengers is 
impossible to calculate, but the increases during this period 
indicated that, as a commercial undertaking, the NBC was 
approaching breaking point. 
The financial problems of the NBC were still further 
aggravated by two financial burdens which were placed on the 
company by the Government in 1975. Firstly, in September 1972 
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(the year that the NBC had received a grant of £7 million) the 
Conservative Government had directed the NBC to commence 
payment of the principal on its capital debt from ist January 
1975. In 1972 the Government had no doubt hoped that by the 
mid 1970s the NBC would be in a stable financial state (most 
governments appear to possess a naive optimism that the problems 
of a public corporation will miraculously all be solved in two 
or three years time 1), but in reality the position was worse 
than ever. Nevertheless, the Labour Government insisted that 
the NBC be held to its commitment. The capital was due to be 
paid in ten annual instalments, with the interest remaining at 
4.92%, but the NBC was at that time in no position to pay up. 
Consequently, it was forced to immediately reborrow the initial 
payment of £9.9 million (naturally from the Treasury) at the 
then current interest rate of 16.25%. As the NBC plainly put 
it: "The simple effect of this transaction was to increase the 
annual NBC interest obligation by over El million a year. " 
47 
The NBC was unhappy that its capital debt did not take the 
form of public dividend capital, which could be paid back 
according to the financial state of the company. Several of the 
public corporations had a capital structure of this type, but 
the Government remained adamant that the NBC should retain its 
fixed interest capital debt. 
Secondly, the Minister for Transport requested the NBC to 
suspend action on major service cuts while county councils 
reviewed the levels of support proposed in 1976-1977. In order 
to comply with this request, the NBC borrowed a total of 
£22 million during 1975. This sum lifted the NBC's borrowings 
above its statutory limit, and consequently the limit was 
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raised from £130 million to £200 million. The NBC did not 
receive any subsequent compensation from the Government for 
the new borrowings, and is a point of contention which continues 
to aggravate the company. 
In 1976, the NBC fares rose by an average of 26%, while 
passenger journeys fell by 9%, 
48 but in contrast to the 
previous years there was a consolidated profit of £4.4 million. 
This improved result reflected a continuing real increase in 
fare levels and a large cut in miles run from 724 million to 
697 million. In addition, the NBC borrowed £7 million from 
the Treasury in March 1976, while in January 1976 it was forced 
to reborrow the £10 million annual instalment on its capital 
debt. At 31st December 1976 the total liability stood at 
£128.6 million. The NBC was thus remaining viable at the 
expense of heavy fare increases, drastic service cutbacks and 
large borrowings from the Government at high interest rates. 
The company could nevertheless claim that it was fulfilling 
its statutory objective to break even and operate in a 
commercial manner. In reality, the world had moved on since 
the 1968 Transport Act, and the philosophy which had made the 
THC a successful commercial undertaking was placing great 
strains on the NBC (it might also be argued that the large 
debts left by the THC, which continued to place a heavy burden 
on the NBC, were an example of the earlier organization 
achieving short-term success by postponing the evil day). 
After the traumas of the three previous years, 1977 saw 
the NBC sailing into slightly calmer waters. A general fall in 
inflation rates enabled fares to rise by 11.3%, (a real fall in 
fare levels) and the decline in passengers fell from 9% in the 
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previous year to only 3%. 
49 (It is significant to note that 
for the NBC a declining market is generally regarded as being 
inevitable -a difficult fact to reconcile with the commercial 
objectives). The NBC was assisted in keeping costs down by the 
Government's pay policy, which recommended increases within a 
10% limit, and a consolidated profit of £9.5 million was 
reported. Nevertheless, the capital debt instalment was once 
more reborrowed, and a further loan of £4.4 million was made 
in March 1977, bringing the NBC's liability up to £133 million. 
1976 also saw a significant political change when transport 
was separated from the DoE in order to form its own Department, 
with a Secretary of State in the Cabinet. This reorganization 
coincided with a wide-ranging review of transport policy by the 
Labour Government, which we will be discussing in the next 
chapter. The review culminated in the 1978 Transport Act, 
which had significant implications for the NBC-county council 
relationship, but the statutory responsibilities of the NBC 
under the 1968 Transport Act remained intact. 
At the end of 1978, the NBC completed its tenth year of 
operation, and the company was pleased to report a consolidated 
profit for that year of 917.7 million. The number of passenger 
journeys fell by only 0.72%. Revenue rose 11.7% from 1977, 
while expenditure rose only 10.2%. 
50 Once again, the NBC was 
assisted by the Government's pay policy, which applied a 10% 
earnings limit. Nevertheless, the company did once more take 
its by now almost traditional step of reborrowing the £10 million 
instalment on the capital debt, although no further borrowings 
were made. 
1979 commenced on a depressing note with a particularly 
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severe winter, which the NBC estimated cost £12 million in 
lost revenue. 
51 Nevertheless, the number of passengers 
declined by only 1.3% from 1978.52 Passenger revenue rose 
by 13.7%, while wages increased by an average of 9.99%. This 
latter figure did not include an award totalling £5 million to 
non-manual, supervisory and managerial staff, brought about 
by the Labour Government's pay policy which had eroded 
differentials. The consolidated profit for 1979 totalled over 
£6.2 million, although the capital debt instalment was once 
more reborrowed, together with an additional £5 million loan. 
At 31st December 1979, the NBC's liability to the Government 
stood at £138,025,000. The company was also allowed temporary 
borrowing facilities up to £12 million (a figure which had 
risen steadily from an original £3.4 million), although only 
£7 million of this was borrowed in December 1979. With an 
upper borrowing limit of £200 million, the NBC had unexercised 
borrowing powers of £49,975,000. 
In its Annual Report, the NBC presents a corporate face to 
government, and to the world in general. The decentralized 
aspects of the organization's character are subordinated to the 
NBC's need for demonstrating its collective unity and viability. 
The relationship with government has been based on the original 
premise that the NBC should operate in a commercial manner, 
despite the steady decline in demand for the company's services. 
The circumstances surrounding the borrowings from successive 
governments upset the NBC, who set out their grievances in 
evidence given to the Select Committee on Nationalized 
Industries inquiry on Innovations in Rural Bus Services. 
1. Unlike other public sector operators, NBC subsidiaries 
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have to secure substantial income from fares and public 
services to defray interest on NBC commencing capital debt of 
£100 million, none of which has been written off. It is 
currently being repaid and reborrowed in annual tranches of 
£10 million, at significantly increased rates. 
2. Secondly, they have to defray interest at very high 
rates on subsequent NBC borrowing from the National Loans Fund 
amounting to over £35 million. The need for this new borrowing 
at very high interest was the direct consequence of three 
aspects of Government policy, viz: 
(a) the implementation of counter-inflation policies without 
compensation; 
(b) deferment of service cuts in 1974-75 and 1975-76 to allow 
the councils of reorganLzed counties time to develop transport 
policies under the Local Government Acts 1972 and 1974; 
(c) transfer of London green buses and Green Line coaches to 
NBC under the Transport (London) Act without financial 
provision for investment in essential fleet replacement, 
central-works and head office. 
3. Thirdly, NBC. and all subsidiaries are accountable for 
corporation tax purposes in respect of their income from all 
sources, including local authority grants and payments. 
53 
The Select Committe Report itself made a particular point 
of the NBC's capital debt and borrowings, and recommended that 
the Government should write off entirely those debts of NBC 
attributable to the additional mileage run at the request of 
the Secretary of State during 1975. The SCNI also recommended 
that interest charges on commencing capital debt should be met 
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directly by the Government in the form of a direct grant to the 
NBC. 54 
The case put forward by both the NBC and the SCNI was 
never likely to bear fruit, for successive governments had 
adamantly refused to consider releasing the NBC from some of its 
financial burdens. The official view was typified by the 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, John Horam, when he 
gave oral evidence to the SONI in 1978. When a question was 
put to him that the decision whether or not to write off the 
capital debt of a nationalized industry was fairly arbitrary, 
Mr. Horam replied: "I do not think in that sense that it is 
arbitrary. Those organizations which have performed well 
commercially and have been able to service their original 
capital debt have retained it. They have thereby retained 
larger burdens, if you put it like that, of commencing capital 
debt, but, on the other hand, they have been able to bear those 
burdens; and the industries which have been in trouble have been 
the ones whjeh have had the write-offs.,, 
55 The Government 
considered that the NBC-should remain a commercially viable 
organization, although it was suffering from a declining 
market, and was forced to immediately reborrow each annual 
instalment on its capital debt. If only the NBC could have 
arranged its affairs so that the financial position became.., 
hopeless, then it could expect help from Government 
Mr. Horam's viewpoint was later confirmed by the Conservative 
Government which took office in 1979, when it rejected the 
recommendations put forward by the SCNI. 56 
It might be said that the determination of government to 
regard the NBC as a commercial organization betrayed a certain 
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degree of trepidation for the consequences, as a cancellation 
of the capital debt could be construed as signifying that the 
company had become instead a branch of the social services, 
with an open-ended financial commitment required from the 
government in order to keep services in operation. It might 
also be argued that NBC's failure to persuade government to 
change its policy indicates the political weakness of the 
organization. Although the NBC has had an executive 
permanently seconded to the Department of Transport for several 
years, it has not achieved-the same degree of success as, either 
the roads lobby or British Rail. 
To some extent, the failure of NBC lobbying could be 
attributed to the lack of government interest in the bus 
industry, particularly in comparison to the motor-car. At the 
same time, the organizational position of the NBC also places 
it in a vulnerable situation. The NBC's greatest triumph is 
that it remains in existence, or the 1968 Transport Act 
envisaged an-eventual nationwide PTA network. By paying its 
debts and retaining a relative degree of independence, the NBC 
could claim to be. a successful commercial organization. If too 
strong a plea to have its capital debt cancelled were to be put 
for-ward, it might appear to government that the NBC was no 
longer in proper control of its affairs and should therefore be 
dissolved. The NBC is a busman's organization, and we saw in 
previous chapters that he enjoys being in control of his own 
industry. Although the busman has an important and influential 
part to play within a PTE, from an NBC standpoint he may appear 
too dependent on the whims of local councillors. 
For both the NBC and government (but for different motives) 
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the prime policy objective has remained the one set in 1968 of 
maintaining. the company's commercial viability. The company's 
busmen have retained the discretion to run the industry in their 
own manner, in return for minimizing their claims on public 
expenditure. The control which government exercises over the 
NBC is based on possessing the ultimate sanction of disbanding 
the organization, combined with the more routine process of 
regulating borrowings (although the NBC is still well below 
its borrowing limit). For the NBC's part, they have a 
necessity to present themselves to government as a corporate 
entity. Whatever degree of decentralization is allowed within 
the NBC, in the final analysis the company must co-ordinate 
activity to the extent that a corporate balance sheet can be 
presented to government at the end of each year. If satisfactory 
financial results are to be obtained (and the survival of the 
organization secured), then some form of co-ordinated control 
must be exercised over subsidiaries which possess varying 
commercial potentialities. This natural tension between 
central control and decentralization within the NBC is a key 
element of the organization, and gives it a distinctive 
character among the public corporations. 
In this section we have seen how the government-NBC 
relationship has maintained the primacy of commercial objectives 
for the company, despite the constant decline in passenger 
demand. While operating in such a hostile environment, the 
NBC has been forced to borrow from government, while cutting 
back services and increasing fares in real terms. In the 
following section we will examine several aspects of 
central-local relationships within the NBC, giving particular 
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regard to the role of identification within the control process. 
. D, NBC Headquarters. 
The Identification Process Within the NBC. - 
We have seen that in its relationship with government the 
NBC must present a corporate identity for the purposes of 
accounts and generally justifying its existence. In terms of 
organizational structure, there can be no doubt that the NBC 
is relatively decentralized, but the nature and the degree of 
central control can be more subtle and more substantial than 
outward appearances may suggest. Several factors, including 
the NBC's own insecurity concerning its future, the nature of 
cross-subsidization, the delicate question of local authority 
subsidies, public reaction to fare levels and cutbacks in 
services, and trade union response to rationalization, 
frequently make the NBC management sensitive to divulging 
information on their activities. Nevertheless, overriding all 
other factors is the consideration that, in a declining market, 
the NBC must justify its own existence by remaining 
commercially viable. This requirement imposes limitations on 
the behaviour of all the NBC's employees, and creates a kind 
of unity in adversity. A wish to be independent of outside 
interference and control remains a primary characteristic of 
the company busman, and this quality, combined with the adverse 
environment in which he now finds himself, largely shapes the 
behaviour of the organization as a whole. 
The achievement of viability in a declining market will 
inevitably place great strain on any organization. In order 
to achieve the objective, it is important that the members 
identify themselves with it and act accordingly. In examining 
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the structure of the NBC, we will bear in mind the following 
hypotheses on identification put forward by March and Simon: 
1. The greater the perceived prestige of the group, the 
stronger the propensity of an individual to identify with it; 
and vice versa. 
2. The greater the extent to which goals are perceived 
as shared among members of a group, the stronger the propensity 
of the individual to identify with the group; and vice versa. 
3. The more frequent the interaction between an individual 
and the members of a group, the stronger the propensity of the 
individual to identify with the group; and vice versa. 
4. The greater the number of individual needs satisfied 
in the group, the stronger the propensity of the individual to 
identify with the group; and vice versa. 
5. The less the amount of competition between the members 
of a group and an individual, the stronger the propensity of the 
individual to identify with the group; and vice versa. 
57 
Identification can play an important part in the achievement 
of a decentralized organization's goals. Coercion can be 
difficult in a dispersed organization (bearing in mind the 
barriers to perfect control which we outlined in Chapter one), 
while methods of control such as bargaining and persuasion, 
although important, can absorb a great deal of time and effort. 
The NBC Board and Regional Control. 
Earlier in this chapter we referred to the Chairmanship of 
the NBC being a part-time appointment, and also described how 
the Chief Executive was the only full-time member of the NBC. 
This remained the case until 1979, when the Deputy Chief 
Executive, the Secretary and the Personnel Director were all 
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appointed members. The members of the NBC are charged by the 
Secretary of State with the responsibility for setting out the 
general policy guidelines of the company, and with monitoring 
their progress. In this way it is hoped that they can form a 
link between the Minister and the actual work of the NBC. When 
Sir Freddie Wood resigned as Chairman, his place was taken from 
1st January 1979 by Lord Shepherd. The part-time nature of the 
appointment meant that the Chairman (as with all the part-time 
members) has a high degree of discretion with regard to the 
amount of attention which he gives to the job. Sir Freddie is 
an industrialist (the Chairman of Croda International) while 
Lord Shepherd is a Labour peer and former leader of the House 
of Lords. Within the NBC, it is regarded that Lord Shepherd is 
a more active Chairman than his predecessor, but the amount of 
time which any NBC Chairman or part-time member can devote to 
the organization is necessarily limited. 
All the Members (ten in 1979) also belong to the NBC's 
main board, National Bus Management Limited. In addition to 
the ten Members, there were ten Executive Directors in 1979. 
It is the responsibility of the board to see that general 
policy is implemented. We will be examining the central 
services of the NBC later in this section, but the principal 
intermediaries between headquarters and the subsidiaries are 
Regional Directors. We described earlier in this chapter how 
the NBC was originally split into ten regions, along similar 
lines to the Tilling group within the THC. In 1971 the number 
of regions was reduced to six, and in 1972 this was further 
reduced to only three: Eastern, Southern and Western. Each 
Regional Director was assisted by a Regional Executive, while 
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a number of General Managers from subsidiaries within the 
Region became Chief General Managers for various groups of 
subsidiaries within the Region. London Country Bus Services 
remained a separate entity within the Southern Region. 
58 
The Annual Report for 1972 stated that: "This new 
regional organization has the dual advantage of retaining at 
subsidiary company level the control and decision-making for 
local matters, whilst at the same time providing a simplified 
line of vertical communication through the Chief General 
Managers to whom have been delegated many of the responsibilities 
for their sub-divisions which were previously discharged by 
Regional Chairmen. " 59 In order to compensate for rationalizing 
the regional structure, the NBC created an extra administrative 
layer in the form of the Chief General Managers. As events have 
turned out, the CGM concept has not proved to be a great success, 
and it was abandoned during 1979. A General Manager must 
necessarily be chiefly concerned with the affairs of his own 
company, while other subsidiaries within the group might suspect 
that the CGM would favour his own company at their expense. In 
addition, the Regional Director might, at a particular time, 
wish to take a direct interest in a subsidiary, and would by-pass 
the CGM. 
In 1977 there was a further reorganization when the number 
of Regions was increased to four. Wales and the Marches became 
a Region on its own, with a Regional Director based in Cardiff. 
By creating a separate Welsh Region the NBC hoped to achieve a 
better liaison with the Welsh Office. We will see in Chapter 
Eight that some of the Welsh Counties resented what they 
considered to be a lack of interest in their affairs on the part 
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of the Chester-based Crosville company. The creation of a 
Welsh Division did at least indicate to these counties that the 
NBC was not oblivious to their needs. The other three Regions 
were now Northern, Midlands and West, and South East. 
The role of the Regional Director within the NBC is of 
particular importance, for he is the chief intermediary between 
headquarters and an individual subsidiary. He is the Chairman 
of each subsidiary within his Region, and is responsible for 
seeing that the subsidiary fulfils its corporate plan, prepared 
on a five year rolling basis. As with the NBC as a whole, a 
subsidiary is required to meet its statutory obligations, but 
it is allowed the flexibility of breaking even over the five 
year period. In this case, a subsidiary might be for ever 
making losses in the present, while promising viability in an 
eternally elusive five years time. In reality, if a subsidiary 
perpetually fell below its target, the Regional Director would 
instruct it to rationalize services or put up fares. 
The question of cross-subsidization between subsidiaries 
is an extremely sensitive one for the NBC. When he was 
interviewed, a Regional Director denied that any activity of 
this sort took place, 
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although other NBC officials 
considered that on occasions the Regional. Director would 
co-ordinate subsidiaries' corporate plans. Even if 
unco-ordinated, some degree of cross-subsidization must take 
place, for any surplus made by a subsidiary is paid into the 
corporate NBC account. The NBC can then re-distribute the money 
as it sees fit (although a proportion of it will go to the 
government in interest payments). 
The NBC is, sensitive about the financial results of 
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individual subsidiaries, and these were only published for the 
first time in the Annual Report of 1978. In the relatively 
prosperous year of 1978 only one of the bus operating companies 
made a loss (there were also two loss-making coach operating 
companies). These calculations were made on the basis of 
historical cost accounting, but when current cost accounting 
methods were employed eleven bus companies were in deficit. 
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There can be no doubt that by employing historical cost 
accounting the NBC is able to portray a rosier financial picture 
than exists in reality. 
Although the depreciation on a vehicle can be calculated 
on the basis of its original cost, when the time comes for it 
to be replaced money must be found to pay for the new vehicle. 
As some buses may have a life of over fifteen years, the effects 
of inflation on the replacement cost can be considerable. The 
effects of current cost accounting were even more marked in 
1979, when only nine bus companies made a loss on the basis of 
historical cost, but twenty-one (out of twenty-nine) were 
loss-making when current cost methods were employed. 
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These 
results help to explain why the NBC has been forced to borrow 
more than 940 million from government (apart from the money 
re-borrowed in order to pay for the capital debt), and also 
emphasize the extent to which a Regional Director might be 
under pressure to ensure that the more prosperous subsidiaries 
within his Region should maximize their revenue. 
In outlining a model of cyclical administrative 
decentralization, Kaufman considers that when the executive 
leadership fear that departments and bureaus are becoming too 
independent, then organization by area, rather than by function, 
233 
will become fashionable: "The justification for it will be 
couched in terms of efficiency - the need to speed decisions 
in the field without referral to headquarters and without loss 
of co-ordination among field personnel in different bureaus. 
The consequences will extend further, however, because areal 
officers in the field would give top executives lines of 
communication and control alternative to existing functional 
channels, thus actually strengthening central authority. " 
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Kaufman points out the manner in which organization by 
area, although apparently a move towards decentralization, may 
actually strengthen central control. In the case of the NBC, 
the chief changes in the regional structure have been the 
reduction in the number of regions, and the subsequent 
disappearance of the Chief General Managers. The extent to 
which these developments represent an increase in central 
control depends on the degree of control exercised by the 
Regional Directors. The rationalization of the regional 
structure could represent a move towards greater decentralization, 
with each subsidiary being allowed a higher degree of discretion. 
On the other hand, fewer Regional Directors and the abolition 
of the Chief General Managers, could allow for the implementation 
of a more co-ordinated NBC policy. 
When the Traffic Commissioners examine an application for 
a fares increase, they may find it virtually impossible to 
discover the extent to which the increased revenue is required 
by the subsidiary to meet its own financial targets. If a 
particular subsidiary intends to cut back on capital expenditure, 
or accelerate the development of one-man operation, then it will 
find itself with a larger surplus than a subsidiary which 
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introduces the same percentage fares increase, but maintains 
its costs at a higher level. Without detailed knowledge of a 
subsidiary's planning process, the Traffic Commissioners do 
not possess the knowledge to expertly challenge the NBC's figures. 
This lack of expert knowledge (which could also be applied 
to local authorities in their relationship with the NBC) is a 
typical problem of control. It is summed up by C. D. Foster, 
who in analysing the relationship between civil servants and 
the senior management of a public corporation comments that: 
"To some extent, what a ports man thinks about ports or a 
railwayman about railways is something he has absorbed on the 
job and never learned explicitly. Thus, he is less likely to 
be impressed by logic, or dismayed when the illogicality or 
incompleteness of what he has said is pointed out to him. He 
is more impressed by someone who, he believes, shares some of 
the craft mysteries that he does. Also, quite apart from this, 
he knows that, though he may not feel as agile intellectually 
as the civil servant who is questioning him, in the end - he 
may have to play it long - he must win, because of the final 
lack of self-confidence the administrator has in his ability, 
or his right, to say No. n 
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In Chapter Three we discussed how the relationship between 
the company busmen and the Traffic Commissioners had evolved a 
particular 'order of comprehension'. By means of 
cross-subsidization the Commissioners can maintain some degree 
of control, but they do not have access to NBC corporate plans, 
and lack the knowledge to truly challenge the claims put forward 
by the busmen. At the core of the whole matter is the NBC's 
statutory requirement to maintain corporate viability and hence 
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preserve its existence. As one NBC official put it: 
"Preservation of the organization is an unofficial, but 
vitally important, corporate objective. " 
Although a Regional Director may possess the authority to 
direct a subsidiary in a certain manner, his job will be much 
easier if all the staff appreciate this objective and identify 
with it. In this respect, March and Simon's hypothesis on 
identification that: "The greater the extent to which goals are 
perceived as shared among members of a group, the stronger the 
propensity of the individual to identify with the group" 
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would appear to be the most apposite with regard to the NBC. 
March and Simon also hypothesize that: ". ... the greater the 
homogeneity of background, the greater the extent of perceived 
goal-sharing. " 
66 We have seen that the busman requires a 
great deal of specialized knowledge, and that many of the 
senior executives have been in the industry all their working 
lives. The NBC itself has a Senior Management Training Scheme: 
11. ... which recruits and trains candidates who are potentially 
suitable for senior appointments in subsidiary companies, " 
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and many of the younger executives have attained senior positions 
by means of this scheme. 
Downs considers that: ". ... strong goal consensus is 
a vital part of any true decentralization of authority" 
68 
and the degree of identification within the NBC can be a 
powerful force in granting discretionary powers to the local 
level. Nevertheless, Downs also hypothesizes that: "The need 
for variety and innovation creates a strain toward greater goal 
diversity in every organization, but the need for control and 
co-ordination creates a strain toward greater goal consensus. " 
69 
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We shall see in later chapters that introduction of the 
innovatory Market Analysis Projects has placed internal strains 
on the NBC, but that the corporate goal of survival remains 
paramount. 
Although identification can allow a higher degree of 
discretion at the local level, the limits of this discretion 
are bounded by the NBC's hostile environment. If the bus 
companies were operating in the climate of the 1930s and 1940s, 
then profits would be assured and the actual level of financial 
results achieved by a subsidiary might appear almost academic. 
In the modern age, however, decline has become a way of life 
for the NBC. This environment can generate a collective will 
to survive and breed ingenuity in adversity, but it necessarily 
requires more co-ordinated activity. A company may experiment 
with services and fares in order to test the market and improve 
demand, but the NBC cannot afford to take too many chances. 
When the Annual Report is presented to the Minister, the 
subject of viability must be to the forefront in its contents. 
The great danger for the future of the NBC would be if the 
continued decline in passenger demand undermined staff morale 
to the point where it was generally perceived that viability 
could not be maintained. 
The degree to which the staff identify with the NBC as an 
organizational concept is of crucial importance to the company's 
survival. Throughout this study we have noted the busman's 
quest for independence, and this clearly is a powerful force in 
binding the staff of the NBC together, the shared aim of 
preserving independence outweighs any wish to allow greater 
direct political control of the industry. Maintaining 
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independence is thus the shared goal which most influences 
staff identification with the group. Nevertheless, March and 
Simon list four other hypotheses with regard to factors affecting 
identification. These concern the perceived prestige of the 
group, the frequency of interaction, the number of individual 
needs satisfied in the group, and the amount of competition 
within the group. 
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With regard to the NBC9 perceived prestige might be thought 
a weak factor influencing identification. The decline in bus 
travel has had the effect of lessening the prestige of the bus 
industry generally. Within the industry itself, the relative 
independence of the NBC, in comparison to the PTEs and 
municipalities might enhance the NBC image somewhat, although 
in many cases a senior executive within a PTE might consider 
himself to be in a job which possesses its own prestige. When 
interviewed, the Director General of the West Midlands PTE, 
who was formerly the Midland Red Traffic Manager, stated that 
he had left the NBC because of excessive central control with 
regard to capital expenditure and financial targets. He 
considered that the local control exercised over the PTE 
allowed for greater discretion and flexibility. 
71 These 
views reflect the competition between the NBC and PTE as 
organizational concepts. Many NBC busmen will perceive prestige 
in their organization's independence and relative freedom from 
external control. To an outsider, the prestige of the NBC 
might be perceived as weak, but to those inside the organization 
its prestige level might be considered high. Provided that this 
internal perception of prestige remains high, then it can play 
an important part in maintaining identification. 
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With regard to frequency of interaction, March and Simon 
refer to homogeneity in background. 
72 This factor would 
appear to be strong within the NBC, for many of the senior 
executives are lifelong company busmen, while the Senior 
Management Trainee Scheme ensures that the supply is maintained. 
(Richardson notes a similar phenomenon with regard to the 
National Environment Protection Board in Sweden where: "The 
rapid growth in the size of the NEPB has seen an influx of 
young graduate scientists, all fairly committed to the 
'environmentalist cause' ") 
73 The extent to which interaction 
is a causal factor with regard to identification can be of 
crucial importance in the implementation process. If 
policy-makers could be confident that intra and inter-group 
interaction would lead spontaneously to a predicted 
identification of goals then they could hope for greater success 
in implementing policy, but in reality the eventual shared 
goals might not be the ones predicted by the policy-makers. In 
Chapter One we stressed the importance of everyday interaction 
in determing change. Within the NBC, interaction and 
homogeneity of background have maintained the shared goal of 
retaining independence, but interaction can instigate change 
by means of its role as the provider of feedback on the nature 
of the outside world. In later chapters we will be examining 
the effects on NBC policy of interaction between subsidiaries 
and county councils. 
March and Simon link the satisfaction of needs and the 
amount of competition by putting forward the variable of 
permissiveness towards individual goal achievement. 
74 We 
have previously discussed the difficulty of discovering the 
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extent to which the NBC Regional Directors exercise control 
over subsidiaries, but the nature of bus operation ensures 
that the local level must retain some degree of discretion. 
Each town, district or street has an individual identity, and 
the needs of passengers cannot be of a homogeneous character. 
In scheduling services, a depot superintendent can possess 
detailed local knowledge which must be employed if the NBC 
wishes to maintain viability. On Dunsire's generality/specificity 
scale, the local busman can exercise a high degree of discretion, 
and might have more room to manoeuvre than a Regional Director 
attempting to maintain a satisfactory amount of cross-subsidization 
between subsidiaries. 
Of March and Simon's five hypotheses on factors influencing 
identification, each would appear to be of significance in 
strengthening identification within the NBC. It could therefore 
be said that the NBC possesses qualities which draw the 
individual towards organizational identification. We must 
nevertheless also note that interaction has the capacity to 
alter perceptions and change shared goals. The shared goal of 
independence underpins much of the NBC's behaviour, but if a 
consensus of opinion developed on the lines that the effort 
required in achieving viability was too high a price to pay for 
retaining independence, then the company's survival might be 
in danger. 
Rationalization of Companies. 
One of the principal objectives in creating the NBC was that 
the union of Tilling and BET would allow economies of scale to 
be attained by means of company rationalization. In the event, 
although some amalgamations have taken place, nearly all the 
2 40 
major companies have retained their identity. We noted earlier 
in this study that the ideal size for a bus fleet remains a 
contentious issue, and the NBC has been reluctant to make 
major changes. In addition, a local fleet name becomes a 
familiar part of the community, and passengers can resent 
change. A bus carrying a standard "National" livery could 
destroy goodwill and wreck the NBC's image as a decentralized 
organization. 
One of the few major companies to disappear was the North 
Western Road Car Company. North Western (formerly a BET company) 
served a wide area of Cheshire, Lancashire and Derbyshire, from 
Chester in the West to Sheffield in the East. With the 
creation of the South East Lancashire-North East Cheshire 
(SELNEC) PTA (centred on the Manchester area), 60% of the 
North Western stage mileage came within the PTA. As with most 
of the companies, North Western had operating agreements with 
many of the municipalities, but the creation of the PTA 
brought new pressures. In January 1972 all the North Western 
services within its area were taken over by SELNEC. As it was 
considered by the NBC that North Western's remaining territory 
was too fragmented, it was divided between Crosville and the 
Trent Company 75 (Crosville now controlled nearly the whole 
of Cheshire as against only the Western half in the days of 
Crosland-Taylor). North Western was thus one of the few 
examples of a PTA having a fundamental effect on an NBC 
subsidiary (later in this chapter we will be examining the 
effects of the West Midlands PTA on Midland Red). 
Another example of reorganization was the amalgamation in 
1972 of Thames Valley and Aldershot and District to form the 
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Alder Valley Company. Other amalgamations usually involved a 
small company becoming part of a larger one. In the early 1970s 
there appeared to be a trend towards this type of rationalization, 
epitomized by the disappearance of the Stratford Blue Company. 
Midland Red had owned Stratford Blue since the 1930s, but in 
1971 it was decided that the latter should disappear. In later 
years, Midland Red came to have second thoughts about the value 
of local identity. We shall see in Chapter Seven that the first 
Market Analysis Project took place in Stratford, and the name 
"Avonbus" was given to the revised network in that area. The 
question of retaining local fleet names epitomizes central-local 
tensions within the NBC, where corporate identity must be 
reconciled with the local needs of a community. 
This tension is also evident in the development and work 
of the NBC's central services. The NBC's term "central services" 
itself suggests headquarters staff at the service of 
subsidiaries. Although in some respects this is true, we have 
already seen in the case of the Regional Directors that some 
degree of central control does exist. 
The Role of Central Services. 
1. Purchasing and Technical Services. 
The most obvious example of central control concerns the 
purchase of vehicles. We described in Chapter Four how the 
1968 Transport Act provided for a grant of 25% on the cost of 
a new fare-stage bus (raised to 50% in 1971). A new bus is 
eligible for the grant, provided: 
(a) it is suitable for one-man operation on stage carriage 
services; 
(b) It is a type approved by the Secretary of State; 
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(c) It is new and not second-hand or converted; 
(d) The Secretary of State is satisfied that it will be 
used "wholly or mainly" as a stage carriage in Great Britain. 
76 
In 1968 the Government had considered that the grant would 
accelerate the adoption of one-man operation, and also improve 
the design and comfort of new vehicles. Detailed specifications 
were laid down with regard to the "approved type" of vehicle, 
including such items as noise, heating and ventilation. Over 
the years it had become normal practice within the bus industry 
for vehicles to be manufactured in two parts, with the body 
being added to a previously manufactured chassis. Perhaps the 
most striking example of this custom is the alliance between a 
chassis manufacturer - Bristol - and a bodybuilder - Eastern 
Coach Works. The two companies had originally been Tilling 
owned, and eventually came under the joint control of the NBC 
and British Leyland. The chassis are manufactured in Bristol 
and then driven to Lowestoft where the bodies are fitted. 
The Bristol/ECW partnership produces mainly double-decker buses, 
which are sold to the NBC and many other urban operators. 
77 
The double-decker was for many years regarded as the most 
suitable for urban operation, but in the 1960s it came to be 
thought that the single-decker was the only vehicle appropriate 
for one-man operation. One-man double-deckers had only been- 
legalised in 1966, and by the late 1960s even large conurbations 
such as Liverpool, ' Newcastle and Glasgow were favouring 
single-deckers. 
78 
In response to this trend, and the introduction of the bias 
grant, the NBC joined forces with Leyland to manufacture a 
rear-engined (necessary for one-man operation) integral, 
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single-decker bus. It was intended that the bus would be 
suitable for urban and inter-urban use, and that by employing 
the most modern engineering techniques and integrating the 
manufacture of bodies and chassis, a new concept in vehicle 
manufacture would result. A "greenfield" works was constructed 
at Workington at a cost of 98.2 million, and the first Leyland 
National (as the bus was known) was delivered to customers in 
1972.79 
Having been largely instrumental in the creation of the 
British Leyland Company in 1968 as a result of a merger between 
British Motor Holdings and Leyland Vehicles, the Government was 
also a strong supporter of the Leyland National project. The 
project had the advantage of helping both the NBC and the 
vehicle manufacturer, at the same time, thus assisting in the 
co-ordination of policies for both transport and industrial 
development. The political importance of the project is 
indicated by Mr. Gailey's opinion that it represented a 
particular and personal interest of the Prime Minister 
80 (Harold Wilson) at the time. 
With the NBC's heavy financial commitment to the venture, 
it was inevitable that subsidiaries would henceforth have little 
choice with regard to vehicle purchasing policy As an 
example, Midland Red (which had manufactured its own buses until 
1970 and operated in many areas where high capacity double-deckers 
had previously been considered the most suitable vehicle) 
purchased 97 double-deckers in 1969 and 1970, but only 14 
between 1971 and 1978. Between 1972 and 1978 the company 
purchased 388 Leyland Nationals, and ----> 20 Ford single-deckers 
were also purchased . The Leyland National has now-become the 
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most common sight within the majority of the NBC fleets, and 
although some variations have been developed, the mass produced 
vehicle (more than 7000 had been produced by the end of 1979, 
over 4,000 of which had been purchased by the NBC) is 
inevitably highly standardized. 
As with so many "great leaps forward" many of the early 
Nationals developed faults, and it was later admitted that the 
vehicle had been insufficiently tested prior to being placed in 
service. 
81 Operation has improved with time, and a National 
2 came into production in 1979. In addition to technical 
troubles for the National, double-deckers made something of a 
come-back during the 1970s. Manufacturers such as Leyland, 
Metro-Cammell Weymann, Volvo, Bristol, Dennis and Foden have 
all produced new (rear-engined) vehicles, and the change in 
thinking can be gauged by Midland Red's decision to begin 
purchase of double-deckers once more in 1979. 
The NBC has central Technical Services and Purchasing 
departments, with a Chief Engineer and Technical Officer for 
each Region. A shortage of maintenance engineers has been a 
frequent worry for the NBC, as has the late delivery of 
vehicles. Difficulties over vehicle purchase nevertheless have 
been considerably eased by the existence of the bus grant, 
which rose from £2.5 million in 1969-70 to 921 million in 
1977-78.82 The grant was originally set to terminate in 
1980, but after strong representations from both operators and 
manufacturers it was announced in the White Paper of 1977 that 
the grant would remain until 1985, although it would be 
gradually phased out from 1980-81.83 The Government intends 
to phase out the bus grant by means of imposing tighter cash 
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limits, thereby placing a still heavier financial burden on the 
NBC. In recent years several subsidiaries have taken to 
operating vehicles by means of leasing and renting agreements, 
and the phasing out of the bus grant could bring about an 
increase in this practice. 
2. Personnel. 
All NBC pay bargaining is negotiated centrally by means 
of several committees. The chief of these committees is the 
National Council for the Omnibus Industry, which covers the 
rates of pay and conditions for platform and maintenance staff 
employed by the NBC and some of the large private operators. 
The NCOI was instituted in 1940, at a time when the Government 
was seeking to exert greater control of the bus industry in 
order to co-ordinate the War effort. In commenting on the 
first meeting of the NCOI, Crosland-Taylor considered that 
personally he: n. ... felt glad that wage negotiations were 
going to take place on that level and not locally. Up to now 
the practice had been to play one company off against another. 
We would be told that Ribble do this, or Lancashire United do 
that. Those companies in turn would be asked for something 
'because Crosville have given it to us. º ºº 
84 
Inter-company rivalry may have evaporated, but competition 
with the municipalities continued. We described earlier in 
this study how unions usually made their initial wage claims 
to the municipalities, in the expectation that bargaining with 
the subsidized operator was likely to prove more fruitful than 
bargaining with the commercial companies. The municipalities 
negotiate through the National Joint Industrial Council for 
the Road Passenger Transport Industry, while London Transport 
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and each PTE have their own bargaining machinery. Wage rates 
still tend to be higher in the PTEs and municipalities, which 
does not help the NBC in the recruitment of staff. 
The NCOI, one of three NBC negotiating committees, is 
dominated on the union side by representatives from the 
Transport and General Workers' Union, although the National 
Union of Railwaymen is also represented: ". ... the 
last-named being a historical curiosity from the period when 
pre-war railway companies had large holdings in the industry. " 
85 
In 1980 the TGWU had 39,000 members employed by the NBC, 
and the NUR 6,000. Other unions represented in the NCOI are 
the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (5000 members 
working on the maintenance side), and the General and Municipal 
Workers' Union (1,000 members). 
The second committee is the National Joint Council for 
Non-Manual Staffs, which contains representatives from the 
clerical unions. The NUR is also represented on this Committee, 
while the other unions are the National Association of Local 
Government Officers (5,500 members) and the Association of 
Cinematograph, Television and Technical Staffs (5,500 members). 
The third body is the Senior Officers' Association, a 
group exclusive to NBC employees, containing 1,000 executive. a 
from assistant officer level upwards. Together, the three 
committees negotiate for the whole NBC workforce of 63,000. 
The size of the NBC's workforce has fallen from a level of 
84,000 in 1970. Given that 70% of the NBC's costs are taken up 
by wages and salaries, the size and productivity of its staff 
is of considerable importance in determining its viability. 
Ironically, at many times since its inception the NBC has 
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suffered from a shortage of staff. In relation to commerce 
and manufacturing industry, the bus industry does not offer an 
attractive form of employment. A bus driver in an urban area 
must cope with heavy traffic congestion while being responsible 
for the safety of his passengers. He must be prepared to 
undertake such jobs as bus cleaning in off-peak periods, work 
"unsocial" hours, and also be ready at short notice to operate 
a service which would otherwise not run owing to absenteeism or 
shortage of staff. Even allowing for overtime-, the wage rates 
of most bus drivers are below those for lorry drivers and 
industry generally. 
Unlike the railway engine driver, the bus driver has also 
suffered a loss of social status. As bus fares are nowadays 
looked on by government as a cost which is largely incurred by 
the poorer sections of the community (there are no first class 
seats on the buses) it is unlikely that bus workers would 
receive much official support in a campaign for relatively 
higher wages. If the busmen's wages are to even keep pace 
with inflation, then the continuing fall in passenger demand 
dictates a real rise in the cost of fares, unless a drastic 
reduction in staff and services can be implemented. We saw 
earlier in the chapter that NBC fares have risen considerably 
in real terms, for services cannot be indiscriminately chopped 
off when demand falls. 
Almost since its inception, one of the chief NBC policy 
objectives has been the implementation of 100% one-man operation. 
Although pay is negotiated centrally, a subsidiary's 
productivity. is its own responsibility. By 1979,81.5% of NBC- 
stage carriage mileage was one-man operated, but inevitably 
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there were variations between subsidiaries. The statutory and 
corporate plan requirement places great pressure on a subsidiary 
to break even, while one of the chief features of the Leyland 
National is its suitability for one-man operation. Nevertheless, 
the cost savings gained by one-man operation can be partly 
offset by slower average speeds (particularly in urban areas) 
and higher pay for the driver. In addition, the irritation 
caused by long delays at a bus stop while fares are collected 
can act as a powerful disincentive for the prospective bus 
passenger. A striking example of the difference in percentages 
of one-man operation between two subsidiaries is given by 
Midland Red and Potteries Motor Traction. By February 1979 MR 
one-man operation had risen to 98.6% of the total mileage, 
while for PMT the figure stood at 65.1%. 
86 The PMT operates 
mainly within the urban area of Stoke-on-Trent, while the large 
MR has many rural services. These differences in the nature of 
the operating area are reflected in the financial results for 
1979, when the PMT made a profit of £191,000, while MR had a 
loss of £2 million. 
87 The PMT has not experienced the same 
financial pressures as MR, and hence one-man operation has 
remained at a lower level. 
The unions are in accord with the NBC's ultimate objeptive 
of 100% one-man operation, and it is anticipated that this aim 
will be achieved within the next few years. With wages fixed 
at the national level, subsidiaries have no scope for paying 
differential wage rates, and cost cutting will become more 
difficult when 100% one-man operation is achieved. Larry Smith, 
National Secretary for the Passenger Services Group within the 
TGWU, stressed this point when he gave oral evidence to the 
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SCNI: "So we do not see any reason for interfering with the 
level that is paid to bus drivers and conductors - and it will 
only be bus drivers in future, with the commitment to 100% 
single-manning. I believe we have come to the essence of 
productivity in single-manning and so there is not any more we 
can give in terms of productivity, in order to hold down costs 
and produce the best services. " 
88 
Industrial relations within the NBC have on the whole 
been satisfactory, with no national stoppage. The major 
problem for the NBC has been the recruitment of drivers and 
maintenance engineers, rather than redundancies, although the 
unions have in certain areas resisted the proposed rate of 
change to one-man operation. One example of the relatively 
rare major stoppages within the NBC subsidiaries occurred in 
1977, when the TGWU staff at the PMT went on strike for four 
weeks. The strike was called over the company's proposed new 
schedules, and was only settled after a long series of 
discussions on revised and one-man operation. 
In an attempt to avoid the type of confrontation which 
occurred at the PMT, the NBC has in recent years been anxious 
to involve the unions more directly in policy-making. In 1977 
a Central Policy Committee was formed at Midland Red in which 
staff at all levels discussed with management'the future content 
of the company's corporate plan. The Committee was considered 
to be a success, and in 1978 all subsidiaries were directed to 
form similar committees. In addition, a Central Consultative 
Committee of NBC executives, trade union national officers and 
staff representatives was also set up: "It enables views to be 
exchanged on Group policies with the Deputy Chairman and 
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executive directors. " 
89 The Policy Committees, both central 
and local, could have the effect of increasing the unions' 
sense of identification with the aims of the NBC, although 
differences are always likely to remain with regard to the 
pace of change. 
3. National Travel. 
Although the majority of the NBC revenue is gained from 
stage carriage operation (86% in 1979), the company also 
operates a sizeable number of express services. Almost from 
the outset, the NBC perceived that advantages could be gained 
by developing a more co-ordinated express network. Nearly all 
subsidiaries operated their own express coach services, which 
were licensed by the Traffic Commissioners in a similar 
manner to the stage carriage services. The first step in 
reorganization was taken in 1972, when a Central Activities 
Group was set up to facilitate the devehopment of express 
services, tours and other coach operations. The Group was 
placed under the control of an Executive Director with two 
divisions controlling express services and tours respectively. 
The 1972 Annual Report commented that: "Under the Central 
Activities organization they (the express services) will be 
brought together, under a common name and livery, to form a 
comprehensive network of facilities to be marketed on a 
national scale. " 
90 The adoption of the term "Central 
Activities" suggested that the NBC considered express services 
to be a proper concern of headquarters staff. 
The Central Activities Group immediately took control of 
all the subsidiary companies exclusively engaged in coach 
operation, and in 1973 all the remaining express services were 
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absorbed. A common livery of white with the NBC insignia was 
introduced, and a national advertising campaign was launched 
which emphasized the national nature of the express network. 
On October 1st 1973, National Travel (NBC) was launched as the 
subsidiary through which the Central Activities Group was to 
discharge its responsibilities for express services and tours. 
National Travel was divided into five regional areas: 
South-East, South-West, Midlands, North-East and North-West. 
In a similar manner to the stage carriage 
services, National Travel has experienced fluctuating fortunes. 
Inter-urban coach travel is often in direct competition with 
rail services and the private car, while National Travel must 
also compete with other NBC subsidiaries for scarce resources. 
A further difficulty for National Travel is in the definition 
of "express services". Prior to 1980, express services were 
differentiated from stage carriage services by a particular 
minimum fare which an express service could charge. In 
describing the transfer of services to National Travel North 
West, Deegan states that: "Both North Western and Ribble had 
successfully promoted a limited stop range of routes, which 
linked many major points by informal 'pay-on-the-bus' services, 
and thus did. not fit into the strict format of the new National 
Express concept. " 
91 
As local urban and rural routes decline, 
NBC subsidiaries are becoming more aware of the potential in 
limited stop inter-urban services. To the passenger, the 
convenience of a "pay-as-you-enter" service can be preferable 
to a service which requires prior booking. A particularly 
notable example of the "express limited stop" type is the 
Oxford-London service run by City of Oxford Motor Services. 
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By operating a regular half-hourly service, at a competitive 
price, the route has provided good profits. With regard to 
express services, it could be said that National Travel and 
NBC subsidiaries are to some degree in competition, as NBC 
subsidiaries are reluctant to relinquish routes which may be 
profitable (it should also be noted that subsidiaries have 
control of profitable private hire and contract work). 
A further complication is provided by the 1980 Transport 
Act (which we will discuss in Chapter Nine). The Act has the 
effect of de licensing express services in the hope that 
competition will provide a better service to the public, (an 
express service is now defined as one on which the minimum 
distance travelled is thirty miles). The implementation of 
this provision will inevitably place greater strain on National 
Travel and could lead to the NBC directing more attention 
towards the "express limited stop" services, which will still 
be licensed by the Traffic Commissioners. Hood refers to 
language 'slippage' with regard to limits of categorisation, 
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and the definition of what constitutes an express service is 
likely to be of considerable importance to the future of 
National Travel and the NBC generally. 
National Travel's regional groups have not found it easy 
to make a profit, and an attempt was made to reduce administration 
costs in 1977 when the Midlands and North West groups were 
merged to form National Travel (West). A more radical 
reorganization took place at the end of 1978, when National 
Travel (South-East) ceased to exist. This group had lost more 
than £1 million in its final year of operation. 
93 Control 
of the express services in this region was distributed amongst 
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the various subsidiaries, thus largely restoring the status quo. 
The NBC's concern about the financial condition of National 
Travel was further exemplified in 1979, when the NBC's Chief 
Executive became Chairman of the Group. In 1979, express 
services provided 5.8% of NBC revenue, as compared to 8% in 
1976, while the de-licensing provisions of the 1980 Transport 
Act threatened a further decline in this figure (although 
recent evidence suggests that the opposite may be the case). 
4. Other Central Services. 
When the NBC commenced operations, a small central 
Planning and Development section was created. This was 
largely a continuation of the work undertaken by the THC, and 
we noted earlier in this chapter that the NBC's first Planning 
and Development Officer, (Mr. Glassborow) had previously held 
a similar position within the THC. The Planning and Development 
Department was concerned with developing policies which could 
improve the quality of services, and also for: ". ... the 
co-ordination of group plans for future development, particularly 
in regard to the NBC policies relating to the public transport 
responsibilities of central and local government. " 
94 
One of Mr. Glassborow's first tasks concerned: ". .. 
formulating a policy for dealing with the specific provisions 
of the 1968 Transport Act in relation to rural bus services .. 
. ." 
95 The provision of Rural Bus Grant by the County 
Councils as a result of the 1968 Transport Act was relatively 
slight, but the 1972 Local Government Act was to place much 
greater responsibility on the local authorities for co-ordinating 
public transport. In addition to this prospective co-ordination 
with the County Councils, it had also become clear to the NBC 
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during the early 1970s that the declining market would place 
great strain on the company's finances and test its ingenuity 
to the limit. 
As a response to this changing environment, the NBG 
founded a Marketing and Operational Research Department in 1973. 
Based in Peterborough, this Department has a staff of five who 
work: ". ... in partnership with the operating companies 
co-ordinating research done within the group, developing 
techniques, and instigating new projects of general value to 
the group. " 
96 The Department has initiated projects on 
aspects of bus operation such as rural transport experiments, 
crew scheduling, traffic management and the effects of fare 
changes. It has also undertaken joint projects with the 
Transport and Road Research Laboratory. The nature of these 
projects necessarily means that the Department must work 
closely with subsidiaries, and. -, 11, ... much of the research 
carried out by the Peterborough team has been designed to help 
companies with the pressing problems of a very difficult 
economic situation. " 
97 In this respect, the Marketing and 
Operational Research Department can more truly be described as 
a central service than some of the other headquarters 
departments. In addition to the Research Group, the Operational 
Development Department continues the work of the original 
Planning and Development Department. Operational Development 
has its own Executive Director (currently the NBC's Chief 
Executive), and assists subsidiaries with regard to improving 
the quality of services. 
The Director of Research and Strategic Planning 
(Mr. Glassborow) is responsible for the Marketing and Operational 
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Research and Planning Departments. The NBC Planning Department 
was founded in 1974, officially as a response to a SONI Report's 
recommendation that the Nationalized Industries should adopt a 
long-term planning strategy, 
98 
although the increasing need 
for subsidiaries to keep close control of their finances and the 
requirement to liaise with County Councils were also likely to 
be contributory factors. The new Department was set up in 
Oxford (the first Planning Executive had previously been General 
Manager of City of Oxford Motor Services), with the task of 
developing corporate planning techniques within the NBC. It 
was intended that the Planning Group would: ". ... co-operate 
with management at all levels in up-dating and developing the 
Corporate Plan in future years, taking into account local 
transport policies of County Councils as they are evolved, in 
consultation with subsidiary companies. " 
99 
The Planning Department consists of a team of six, who 
offer advice to subsidiaries on making: ". ... conventional 
textbook methods more suitable for road transport undertakings 
operating within an environment where central and local 
government have a large influence on financial results and on 
the freedom to plan and operate services. The department also 
advises the Group on County structure plans, economic and 
other questions. " 
100 An important part of the Planning 
Department's work is its responsibility for preparing the 
NBC's Corporate Plan. The central and local Corporate Plans 
have a strong influence on each other's contents, for 
borrowing, purchasing and pay bargaining are centrally 
controlled activities, while on the other hand the NBC's 
aggregate revenue will depend on the results from each 
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individual subsidiary. The preparation of each Corporate Plan 
involves projections on passenger demand, wage costs and 
revenue support. 
The Corporate Plan itself commences with a narrative 
section describing how the company has fared in the previous 
year and outlining any local characteristics. It continues by 
projecting future results if no action was to be taken, and 
concludes by outlining the measures which the management 
intends to take, and the likely effects of these actions. We 
saw earlier in this chapter that inflation rates can be highly 
unpredictable, while revenue support is also far from being 
stable, but the preparation of a Corporate Plan does compel a 
subsidiary to think about its future, and also enables the 
NBC to co-ordinate activity (particularly with regard to 
cross-subsidization). 
As with Operational Research, the Planning Department has 
no direct control over subsidiaries. Each member of the team 
is given responsibility for a particular area, and during the 
course of a year visits each subsidiary within it, in order to 
discuss the progress of the Corporate Plan, and hopefully to 
persuade the senior management to adopt new ideas put forward 
by the Planning team's representative. There are also 
Regional Committees, and a Research Steering Committee, which 
contains representatives from subsidiaries, the Engineering 
Department, Operational Research, Planning and the Management 
Services Group. 101 (The Director of Research and Strategic 
Planning also controls a Market Analysis Project Direction Team. 
We will examine MAP in Chapter Seven). 
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The Management Services Department provides a large amount 
of technical knowledge to subsidiaries on such matters as 
internal audit facilities, organization and methods studies, 
and the efficiency of various ticket issuing machines. 
102 
It is closely linked to the NBC Computer Services limited, 
based at Midland Red headquarters in Birmingham. There are 
now four computer centres, and the NBC sees considerable 
possibilities in developing a "computer-based management 
103 information system. " The use of computers can help to 
co-ordinate NBC activity, but the pooling and rapid processing 
of information could give scope for greater central control. 
Other central services include Administration and Finance 
(NBC finances were dealt with earlier in this chapter), Public 
Relations and Advertising (the NBC produces a monthly newsletter 
for its staff) and a Quantity Surveyors Department. The 
Property Department is responsible for: ". ... co-ordinating 
and advising on the operational and commercial development of 
properties owned or leased by subsidiary companies .., . n' 
104 
and the NBC has its own property company, Omnibus Estates 
Limited, (which had a rental income of £300,000 in 1978) 105 
together with Regional Architects. Finally, in 1975 a 
Consultancy Division was created, and the NBC has since provided 
management training, operational and technical advice to many 
countries. 
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E. Conclusion. 
In this chapter we have studied the organizational 
development of the NBC, both in terms of its financial results 
and internal structure. We have seen that within a hostile 
environment the company has retained its independence and 
258 
viability, although only at the cost of heavy fare increases, 
service reductions and borrowing from government. We have 
described how, despite its basically decentralized structure, 
the NBC has over the years progressively increased the number 
and range of its central services. The need for co-ordination 
tends towards greater central control, but the essentially 
local nature of a bus service necessarily requires the exercise 
of discretion at the local level. 
Government has the ultimate sanction over the NBC of 
threatening its existence (although no government has as yet 
gone to this extreme) while also controlling its borrowing and 
setting cash limits. This degree of control is mitigated by 
the reluctance of government to disband an organization which 
remains eager to maintain its viability, and hence keep its 
claims on public expenditure to a minimum. Within the NBC, the 
most direct control over subsidiaries is held by a Regional 
Director. The extent to which he co-ordinates activity is 
difficult to ascertain, but as Chairman of each subsidiary 
within his Region he is ultimately responsible for its welfare. 
Purchasing and pay bargaining are centrally controlled activities, 
which leave little discretion to a local subsidiary, while 
headquarters has a strong hold over the NBC finances generally. 
All the above activities suggest the name National Bus Company 
is not a misnomer, and that in certain respects the subsidiaries 
are subject to a high degree of control. In certain cases the 
control could be coercive in nature, although bargaining is 
also likely to take place in instances such as a subsidiary 
discussing the contents of a Corporate Plan with its Regional 
Director. 
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Departments such as Operational Research and Planning 
possess a more advisory character. The degree of their control 
depends on powers of persuasion. 
Coercion, bargaining and persuasion can all play a part 
in the NBC control process, but we have stressed the primary 
importance of identification. A large number of recalcitrant 
subsidiaries could lead to the downfall of the NBC, and the 
identification of shared goals is of paramount importance if 
the viability and morale of the organization is to be sustained. 
We concluded that all five of March and Simon's hypotheses on 
factors affecting the strength of identification were present 
within the NBC. One of these five hypotheses depended on job 
satisfaction at the local level, and the nature of planning 
and operating a bus service allows individual discretion to be 
exercised. In the Conclusion we will be further examining how 
the nature of the control process within the NBC can be 
related to the implementation process analysis put forward in 
Chapter One. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Legislation and the Bus Industry in the 1970s 
A. Introduction 
The years between 1970 and 1978 were notable for an 
intense period of activity with regard to legislation affecting 
the bus industry. This consisted of the 1972 local Government 
Act, the 1973 Road Traffic Bill, -the 1974 Local Government Act, 
the 1977 Passenger Vehicles (Experimental Areas) Act, the 1977 
Minibus Act and the 1978 Transport Act. A large proportion of 
the legislation was concerned with developing public transport 
policy within the context of major local government 
reorganization, and the increasing involvement of local 
authorities in the affairs of the bus industry was undoubtedly 
the principal organizational effect of policy change during 
this period. 
The continuing decline in demand for bus services during 
the 1970s inevitably placed more pressure on both national and 
local government to increase financial assistance to the 
industry, and revenue support increased quickly in the latter 
part of the decade. Politically, it could be said that the 
topic of bus passenger transport became marginally more 
fashionable during this period. Increasing energy costs and 
a growth in the number. of groups concerned with the quality of 
the environment led to more public debate on the merits of 
public transport and its potential. In addition, local 
government reorganization placed great emphasis on the value 
of comprehensive planning, and local authorities were 
encouraged to evaluate planning problems in terms of achieving 
optimal land use. 
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The 1972 local Government Act led to the appointment of 
public transport co-ordinators in all the shire counties, and 
this new dimension of local authority activity created a fresh 
set of relationships for NBC subsidiaries. In the following 
three chapters we will be examining in some detail how these 
relationships evolved with regard to several NBC subsidiaries, 
but the general implication for the companies was that a 
powerful new element had been introduced into a system which 
for more than forty years had rested chiefly on the duopoly 
consisting of themselves and the Traffic Commissioners. 
The road service licensing system was not radically 
altered during the 1970s, although it was increasingly 
recognized by government that the problems of providing public 
transport in deep rural areas required a more flexible approach. 
The Conservatives hoped to introduce some relaxation of the 
licensing system by means of the 1973 Road Traffic Bill, but 
the elements of this Bill concerned with delicensing 
disappeared when a Labour Government returned to power after 
the General Election of February 1974. The Labour Government's 
initial hostility to delicensing in time relented somewhat and 
the Experimental Areas and Minibus Acts (the latter a Private 
Member's Bill supported by the Government) indicated that 
Labour was searching for suitable forms of public transport as 
an alternative to orthodox stage carriage services. When a 
Conservative Government returned to office in 1979, a more 
radical move towards delicensing was introduced as a result of 
the 1980 Transport Act. We will examine this last piece of 
legislation in Chapter Nine as part of our study of public 
transport policy and the market model. 
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The 1978 Transport Act represented the culmination of the 
third major transport review by a Labour Government. By this 
time, the process was taking on a cyclical appearance with 
Labour producing a Transport Act in 1947,1968 and 1978 (the 
Conservatives were in power in the late 1950s). Labour still 
appeared to be searching for the "philosopher's stone" which 
would produce an integrated transport system, but no attempt 
was made to revive a BTC type of organization. Although the 
Conservative and Labour Parties had differing opinions with 
regard to the structure of local government reorganization, 
they shared the adherence to principles of comprehensive 
planning. Nevertheless, the Conservative Government of 1970-74 
did maintain faith in the holding company concept and thus the 
NBC remained in existence after reorganization. The new County 
Councils were instructed to co-ordinate public transport services, 
but they had no official control over NBC subsidiaries. 
In this chapter we will be studying the legislation in 
terms of the principal values and interests which shaped it. 
Surprisingly little of this legislation was directly concerned 
with the NBC or the general structure of the bus industry, and 
the organizational framework set up by the 1968 Transport Act 
remained largely unchanged. The chief political attention 
moved away from the operators themselves and was directed more 
towards the local authorities. The policies adopted reflected 
the concern of government that public transport should be 
placed firmly within the orbit of local authority planning, 
which from the implementation point of view suggested that the 
values inherent in local government reorganization would 
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invade the bus industry. 
B. Public Transport and the Conservative Government 1970-74 
local Authorities and School Transport 
In one particular respect the local authorities had formed 
a close association with the bus industry for many years. The 
1944 Education Act included clauses which gave local authorities 
the responsibility of providing free transport for children 
living more than three miles from their school, while in the 
case of children under eight years the limit was reduced to two 
miles. As Moseley notes, the policy: ". ... made all county 
councils major. forces in the transport development of the 
rural areas of their counties. The Act also marked the 
introduction of a pioneer 'standard' into rural transport 
planning ('all children living over three miles from their 
school shall have free transport as a right') - perhaps a 
generously high standard of provision which might sit 
uncomfortably with standards in other fields of rural transport 
if ever these are developed. " 
1 
A further significant feature of school transport is that 
unlike other types of passengers schoolchildren provide a 
captive market for the bus operator. For many private 
operators school contracts provide an essential source of 
income, while for NBC subsidiaries the provision of bus passes 
for schoolchildren provides a valuable source of revenue. As 
the services provided by an NBC subsidiary are usually tailored 
to fit a stage carriage network the contract services are 
usually left to the private operators, and a county council can 
possess considerable power not only in the level of financial 
resources which it releases to operators but also in the extent 
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to which it chooses to either tender for contracts or issue 
bus passes. The money is invariably paid out by education 
departments, and politically school transport is usually 
regarded as a separate subject from the provision of bus 
subsidies in general. In Chapter Nine we will see that 
Oxfordshire CC used school contracts as a policy tool in an 
attempt to implement its market model, and also that owing to 
general public opposition a Conservative Government was 
compelled to abandon its attempts to repeal the 1944 Education 
Act clauses relating to school transport. 
It might be argued that free school transport is-- ;a 
politically sacrosanct subject because it provides a valuable 
service even for car-owning families. In contrast, the county 
councils were extremely slow to implement Section 34 of the 
1968 Transport Act, which allowed for local authorities to 
subsidize services in rural areas (with central government 
providing half the cost). No subsidies of this type were 
provided until 1971, when C1.1 million was granted to operators. 
A similiar amount was provided in 1972, £1.6 million in 1973, 
£2.8 million in 1974 and £1.3 million in 1975, at which time 
the grant was superseded by the new grant system which will be 
described later in this chapter. 
2 
Central Government Reorganization 
During the early 1970s the consensus at both national and 
local levels favoured a move towards a higher degree of 
comprehensive and co-ordinated planning. Nationally this change 
was first manifested in November 1970 with the creation of the 
Department of the Environment (DoE) . The DoE was formed by 
combining three ministries, those of Transport, Housing and 
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Local Government, and Public Building and Works. Painter 
states that: "The central idea behind DoE was better policy 
co-ordination through departmental integration of closely 
related functional responsibilities. " 
3 Politically, 
Transport was down graded, and the new Minister for Transport 
Industries worked under the Secretary of State for the 
Environment. Only the Secretary of State was a member of the 
Cabinet and he: ". ... occupied a position akin to a 
presiding overlord, with authority to take major 
transdepartmental decisions when they arose, and to interfere 
in the separate functional fields of his Ministers. " 
4 The 
priority given to transport by the Government would thus 
largely depend on the extent to which the Secretary of State 
took an interest in that particular policy sector. Painter 
considers that in reality there was little true policy 
co-ordination within the DoE and that over the years there was 
a quickening trend towards fragmentation. Typical of the 
course of events was the history of the Strategic Planning 
Directorate within the DoE, which was initially given the main 
responsibility for co-ordinating policy planning and reviewing 
strategy. The SPD was intended to occupy a highly prestigious 
position within the DoE, but in 1973 its name was changed to 
the Central Policy Planning Unit and its role was modified : 
to place more emphasis on serving the routine 
activities of PMG (the Department's central management board) 
while specifying its role in policy analysis to lie in 
transdepartmental matters referred to it by PMG. " 5 By 1975 
the CPPU's role had been reduced still further and little of 
its original prestige remained. The apparently inherent 
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tendency towards fragmentation and sectorization within the 
DoE left the Transport sections in a strange political position. 
Although much of the work carried on as before there was no 
longer an MoT to give focus to the policy sector. 
Within the DoE several new Planning Directorates were 
formed with the intention of integrating the various policy 
areas but again during the course of time the trend was towards 
sectorization. Directorates with relevance to transport 
included those for Urban Project Appraisal, Urban Policy and 
Urban and Passenger Transport. Eventually the Urban Policy 
Directorate lost its function, which was ultimately shared 
between the Urban and Passenger Transport and Local Transport 
and Roads Directorates (the latter being the new name for the 
Urban Project Appraisal Directorate). 
6 
Although 
sectorization continued, the new Directorates were important 
for their function of introducing a higher degree of integrated 
planning into the Transport Ministry. Nevertheless, it was 
highly significant that the Directorate General of Highways 
remained intact and separate from the new system. 
7 The world 
of road building was still considered to be inviolate by the 
Government, but the new Directorates could at least offer an 
alternative source of expertise to the Minister. Starkie 
considers that the introduction of the Directorates could be 
directly attributed to a new anti-motorway mood: "The Urban 
Policy Directorate, for example, now combined under a single 
Under-Secretary divisions responsible for urban planning, urban 
motorways and transport policy, and conservation and amenity. 
This was in marked contrast to the structure of the MoT in the 
mid-1960s when the responsibility of one Under-Secretary was 
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restricted to urban transport policy, a transport policy which 
failed to even include motorways. " 
8 
A move away from a predominantly pro-road building 
interest within the MoT suggested that in future public 
transport would receive a more favourable hearing. The chief 
evidence of this change was to manifest itself in the general 
transport planning process associated with local government 
reorganization. The Directorates were the chief creators of 
this process, which elaborated on the new transport 
responsibilities given to the county councils. 
The Maud Commission 
Local government reorganization was implemented with 
remarkable speed by the Conservative Government, but its basic 
principles had already been set out in the Report of a Royal 
Commission which sat during the lifetime of the previous 
Labour Government. During the 1960s, a general consensus had 
developed which held that reorganization of the local 
government system had become a policy area which required to be 
given a high priority. As Dearlove comments: "Practically 
every academic textbook and virtually all official reports on 
local government contain diagnoses of the ills of the pre-1972 
system. There has been constant and general agreement as to 
the 'problems', 'defects' or 'weaknesses' ... ."9 Dearlove 
outlines these criticisms as including out of date boundaries, 
excessive fragmentation and overlaps of responsibility, an 
unnecessarily high degree of central control, a gap between 
local authorities and the public and the inefficiency of small 
units. 
10 
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Discussions on the structure and efficiency of local 
government had continued for many years, and in 1958 Boundary 
Commissions for England and Wales had been set up in order to 
examine the possibility of reform within the existing 
fragmented structure. These Commissions did not prove to be 
a success and in 1966 the Minister of Housing and local 
Government, Richard Crossman, set up a Royal Commission on 
local Government in England (excluding Greater London which 
had undergone a reorganization of its local government system 
in 1963). The Commission was given terms of reference which 
included the ins. tructionfo". ... make recommendations for 
authorities and boundaries, and for functions and their 
division, having regard to the size and character of areas in 
which these can be most effectively exercised and the need 
to sustain a viable system of local democracy. " As Richards 
comments: "It will be noted that this phraseology contains a 
hint of the perennial conflict between efficiency and 
democracy. " 11 Sir John Maud, who was appointed Chairman of 
the Commission, had already chaired a Government appointed 
committee on management in local government, and again as 
Richards comments: ". ... one expected Lord Redcliffe-Maud 
(as he became in 1967) to produce a structure in harmony with 
the ideas of the earlier Maud Committee .... which showed 
a heavy emphasis on efficiency. " 12 
The Maud Commission did not produce its Report until 
1969,13 and its recommendations reflected a general consensus 
that the local government structure required considerable 
rationalization. In Particular, the Maud Commission was 
anxious to unite urban and rural areas in order to facilitate 
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more efficient planning and provision of services. 
Redcliffe-Maud himself, together with Wood, express the spirit 
behind the recommendations thus: ". ... the Commission was 
convinced that the town-country dichotomy should be ended for 
those environmental services which depended on suitable 
geographic areas - town planning, highways and transportation, 
major development, fire, police. It refrained from proposing 
new areas which were completely urbanized, and proposed the 
inclusion of large rural tracts in the area of new authorities 
based on the conurbations, as well as a union of town and 
country in the less urbanized parts of England. " 
14 
In addition, the Commission concluded personal services 
such as education and social services required a minimum 
authority population size of 250,000. As a result, it was 
recommended that all-purpose Unitary authorities should be 
created wherever possible. The boundaries for the Unitary 
authorities outlined by the Commission would have led to the 
disappearance of several counties such as Cheshire and 
Staffordshire, with many of the new authorities built around 
centres of population. For the areas around Birmingham, 
Liverpool and Manchester, the Commission considered that the 
size of the population in the Metropolitan Counties required 
a two-tier structure. It is significant that these 
Metropolitan Counties, with the exception of Tyne and Wear, 
corresponded with the existing Passenger Transport Areas. 
From the transportation point of view, the chief significance 
of the Maud Commission was that it stressed the need for 
comprehensive transport planning to be undertaken by large 
Unitary authorities. 
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Not surprisingly, the Association of County Councils 
opposed the Maud proposals, for their implementation would 
have decimated the old structure. The ACC had itself 
recognized the need for larger administrative areas and a 
higher degree of comprehensive planning, and proposed to the 
Commission a minimum population size for a top-tier authority 
of 500,000, (based on the existing county boundaries) but in 
addition hoped to see a second tier of authorities with a 
population range of 40,000-150,000. Richards notes that: 
"Had the ACC suggested a lower figure for major authorities, 
they would have opened the way for an increasing number of 
large towns to claim independence and maintain existing County 
Borough status. " 
15 
Again not surprisingly, the Conservative 
Party supported the ACC's proposals, for the Maud structure 
with its emphasis on urban centred authorities, would have 
tended to favour control by the Labour Party. 
Changing Attitudes to Transport Policy 
In contrast, the Labour Government largely supported the 
Maud proposals in a White Paper published in February 1970.16 
Events took a new course, however, when the Conservatives 
returned to power after the General Election of June 1970. 
The speed with which the new Government took up the torch of 
local government reorganization indicated the general consensus 
of the need for change. It could nevertheless also be said 
that the Conservatives were anxious to get on with the job on 
the grounds that it was likely to be a lengthy task and any 
delay might enable a future Labour Government to introduce 
legislation on its own terms. The new Government wished to 
introduce change, but it was determined that the new structure 
would not harm them politically. 
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Public transport's place within the context of local 
government reorganization was thus largely determined by the 
trend towards comprehensive planning, together with an official 
wish for larger administrative areas. We have already seen 
that the creation of the DoE and the Planning Directorates 
suggested a more sceptical attitude towards the road builders 
within Government circles, and at the local level it was 
becoming increasingly evident that the cost of accommodating 
the car could become prohibitive. Starkie refers to the 
controversy during the 1960s with regard to the proposals for 
London's Ring Motorways, and also notes: ". ... similar 
instances of strong general opposition to the highway emphasis 
of urban transport studies was to be found in many other towns 
and cities in the early 1970s. Moreover, the protest against 
motorways spilled over to suburban and rural areas, although 
here the level of debate was often more parochial and largely 
confined to those immediately and adversely affected. " 
17 
The revolt against road building led to an increase in the 
number and influence of pressure groups lobbying for 
preservation of the environment, and we will refer to their 
impact on transport policy later in this chapter. 
This emerging official view was perhaps best illustrated 
by Baroness Sharp, a former Permanent Secretary at the Ministry 
of Housing and Local Government. Baroness Sharp was a member 
of the Maud Commission, but in 1969 she was appointed by the 
Labour Government to conduct an enquiry into the manpower 
implications of future transport planning. The Baroness 
herself saw the inquiry as being: ". ... very closely 
related to the work of the Royal Commission. It is an inquiry 
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into the numbers and kinds of people - the skills - needed to 
grapple with traffic and transport in the years ahead, 
especially in urban areas where traffic and transport are at 
their most intransigent and likely soon, unless something can 
be done, either to grind to a halt or to destroy all peace 
and privacy or, probably, both. " 
18 
The future of urban transport planning was considered by 
Baroness Sharp to be dependent on a more rational local 
government structure together with a preparedness to develop 
a total transport policy. At that time she considered that 
the local government structure made it: ". ... very difficult 
for them (the local authorities) to evolve a comprehensive 
transport policy .... also .... we are still only 
slowly and reluctantly coming to realize what the growth of 
vehicles on the roads is going to mean.? ' 
19 
As a result of 
these future needs, the transportation authorities (her term 
for comprehensive transport planning units) would require: 
a team of people able in concert with the land use 
planners, to identify their traffic problems and transport 
needs, to analyse and cost the possible choices, to manage an 
integrated programme of capital investment, traffic management 
and public transport. " 
20 The Sharp Report 21 highlighted 
the lack of integration in local authority transport planning 
(e. g., the autonomy of municipal bus undertakings) and Starkie 
notes: "The general isolation of public transport in the 
transport-planning organization of local authorities is 
something that emerged very clearly. " 22 
Still further reinforcement of the aspirations for 
comprehensive planning had also been set in motion in the 1960s 
278 
by means of the 1968 Town and Country Planning Act. This Act 
set out a new planning system which required each county to 
prepare a Structure Plan. A Structure Plan: ". ... consists 
of a written statement, illustrated diagrammatically and 
setting out and justifying policies and general proposals for 
the development and other use of land in the county authority's 
area, including measures for the improvement of the physical 
environment and the management of traffic. " 
23 The Structure 
Plan concept also reflected a growing trend in that the Plan 
was required to pass through a lengthy consultation process. 
During the 1970s we shall see that increasing political 
importance was placed on the need for wide-ranging consultation 
within the transport policy process at both the national and 
local levels. Structure Plans thus set transport planning 
firmly within total land use policy. In reality, Structure 
Plans were to become the principal means by which the 
reorganized authorities evolved their planning policies. 
In sum, the Maud Commission, the rising cost of road 
building, the Sharp Report and the 1968 Town and Country 
Planning Act represented a firm movement towards placing 
public transport within the mainstream of a new transport 
planning system. local government reorganization could not be 
introduced without some degree of responsibility for the future 
of public transport being placed on the new authorities, but 
the actual nature of that responsibility was to be decided by 
the Conservative Government. 
Public Transport and the 1972 Local Government Act. 
Even prior to the General Election, the Conservatives had 
pledged themselves to introduce a two-tier system. Only eight 
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months after the new Government had taken office the first 
Secretary of State for the Environment, Peter Walker, issued 
a White Paper setting out proposals for the reorganization of 
local government. 
24 This was an extremely thin document 
and perhaps reflected the reality that by this time the 
principal values underlying reorganization had already been 
decided. The Government proposed that six Metropolitan 
Counties should be created - Merseyside, South East Lancashire 
and North East Cheshire (roughly the Manchester area), the 
West Midlands, West Yorkshire, South Yorkshire and Tyne and 
Wear. Each of these extremely large authorities was to be 
subdivided into second-tier District authorities. In this 
respect, although Maud only recommended three Metropolitan 
Counties, the Government had largely accepted the Commission's 
findings. Outside the Metropolitan Counties, however, the 
concept of new Unitary authorities was abandoned. Instead the 
traditional Shire Counties largely retained their identity, but 
with increased power. The County Boroughs, (large self-governing 
urban areas), Urban and Rural Districts were all to disappear 
and although the new Shire Counties were to be subdivided into 
Districts, these second-tier authorities were to have much 
less power than their counterparts in the Metropolitan Counties 
e. g., the Metropolitan Districts controlled Education but the 
Shire Counties took responsibility for this service in their 
areas. It was anticipated that local Parish Councils would be 
created where the demand existed, but their real power was to 
be minimal. 
With regard to public transport, the Government proposed 
that the function of the existing Passenger Transport 
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Authorities should be taken over by the new Metropolitan 
Counties. Four out of the six proposed Metropolitan Counties 
already had PTEs operating within their boundaries, the 
exceptions being South and West Yorkshire. In the separate 
local government reorganization for Scotland, it was also 
proposed that a PTE be set up to serve Glasgow. The 
Conservatives, who had so vehemently opposed the PTE concept 
three years earlier, were now proposing to extend it ! This 
sudden change of heart could be explained in the total context 
of local government reorganization and the existing public 
transport structure. Having accepted the need for a higher 
degree of comprehensive planning, and given that four PTEs were 
already well established, the Government was unlikely to 
recommend a more fragmented system. To return the four PTEs 
to control by District Councils so soon after the reverse 
process had taken place would have been a costly business both 
politically and economically. To create three new PTEs 
(including Glasgow) was likely to prove less troublesome, and 
in any case apparently allowed public transport to more easily 
become part of a County's total transportation planning process. 
The Government's decision also emphasized the PTEs as a rival 
policy concept to that of the NBC. In the long term, the 
spread of PTEs could lead to the demise of the NBC, while in 
the short and medium term a Metropolitan County committed to 
comprehensive planning might be hostile towards an operator 
other than the PTE running services within its area. In the 
next chapter we will see that the new West Midlands County 
fought an eventually successful battle to take over Midland 
Red services within its area. 
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It might be thought that the emphasis on comprehensive 
planning would have threatened the existence of the NBC in the 
Shire Counties, and indeed the Government proposed in the 
White Paper that the new Counties should take control of all 
municipal undertakings, but no reference was made to the NBC 
25 Mr. Gailey, Chief Executive of the NBC from services. 
1969-71, stated that the Government did consider several 
proposals for the structure of public transport after local 
government reorganization, e. g., regional transport authorities, 
but that there was never any serious suggestion that the NBC 
should disappear. It was a Conservative Government which had 
set up the THC in 1962 and the NBC represented a continuation 
of that concept. 
26 The Government thus perceived the NBC as 
an organization which, despite being state-owned, held strong 
commercial values. 
The difficulty for the NBC was that 1970 had been a 
disastrous year financially, and there was an awareness within 
the organization that subsidies for operating losses were 
urgently required. Nevertheless, it was important that the 
company should demonstrate to the Government that it was still 
a commercially viable organization. It could be argued that 
in addition the preservation of the NBC appealed to the 
Government on-the. grounds that it was a national organization, 
responsible to Parliament, and therefore more amenable to some 
degree of central control than regional transport authorities. 
The NBC was also no doubt assisted by the Government's 
preoccupation with setting up new PTEs and also political 
divisions within the Counties. We noted in Chapter Four that 
the Labour Government in 1968 was chiefly concerned with public 
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transport in the urban areas. Although the Conservative 
Government was naturally more associated with the interests 
of rural areas (as indicated by its retention of the Shire 
Counties), urban transport was by no means synonymous with 
the Metropolitan Counties. Abolition of the County Boroughs 
represented a considerable loss of political and administrative 
status for many major towns and cities which would now be 
integrated into the surrounding Counties. It was inevitable 
that this unification of urban and rural areas would cause a 
considerable amount of political tension, for the more rural 
Counties were traditionally Conservative territory, while the 
County Boroughs were often Labour strongholds. 
The Government's decision to transfer control of municipal 
bus undertakings to the new Shire Counties dismayed the towns 
and County Boroughs which operated their own buses, for they 
feared that control of these services would pass to Conservative 
controlled Shire Counties. As a result the Association of 
Public Passenger Transport, representing the municipalities, 
launched a determined campaign during 1971 to keep control of 
the local bus undertakings in the hands of what would be the 
new District Councils. Perhaps slightly surprisingly, this 
campaign proved successful and the municipalities kept control 
of their buses. Possibly the Government considered that the 
political tensions which would have been caused by switching 
control would not be compensated for by the benefits to be 
gained from comprehensive planning. The Government's decision 
on the municipal bus undertakings was a move towards 
fragmentation. The Shire Counties would be expected to 
integrate public transport into the total planning process, but 
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the Districts would operate their own buses. In this climate 
the NBC had reason to be confident that the Government would 
not risk any further plans aimed at achieving integration of 
bus services within the Shire Counties. 
It is also the case that the Association of County 
Councils has never lobbied for direct control of bus services 
by its constituent members (a further factor assisting 
preservation of the NBC). Although we will see that the Shire 
Counties have become considerably involved in public transport 
policy during the 1970s, one of the ACC officials stated that 
this had happened "almost by accident. " It would be fair to 
say that it is Government which has placed responsibilities on 
the Shire Counties for public transport rather than these 
Counties actively seeking to carry this burden themselves (we 
will see in our case studies that some Counties have assumed 
these responsibilities with far more enthusiasm than others). 
Apart from the APPT campaign,. public debate on the role of 
public transport within the new local government system was 
relatively muted. Local government reorganization as a whole 
was a massive subject, and within this context the future of 
the bus industry was not a prime object of political attention. 
In addition, by the early 1970s reorganization itself had 
somewhat passed its peak as a political topic. Richards 
comments that: ". ... a general weariness had surrounded the 
whole question. There was broad agreement that some change was 
essential; that without reform local powers would be further 
eroded by central departments. ... Undoubtedly another 
factor which eased the path of the (1971 Local Government) Bill 
was that both the Opposition and the Government backbenchers 
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were far more concerned about other social and economic issues. 
In 1972 local government was far from being top of the 
political agenda. " 
27 
A good indication of official attitudes towards the NBC 
during the early 1970s is provided by minutes of evidence 
given during 1972 to the Select Committee on Expenditure. 
28 
The Committee eventually produced a Report on Urban Transport 
Planning, 
29 
and it is interesting to note that the Committee 
appeared to interpret this subject as being one of interest 
only to the new Metropolitan Counties. The future of the NBC 
was only considered with regard to its role as an operator 
within those Counties. Thus Mr. Skyrme, Chief Executive of 
the NBC, was asked if the company should hand over to the 
PTEs stage services within the PTAs, and replied that: 
of. ... certainly we would not think it our duty to hand over 
any services to any authority. If it should appear that the 
right way of carrying out the responsibilities which are laid 
upon us under the Act is for a sale then the sale should be 
on normal commercial considerations. ', 
30 The possibility of 
the NBC handing over its services to the Shire Counties, on a 
commercial basis or otherwise, was not discussed. Mr. Skyrme 
himself claimed that the NBC required subsidies not only in 
the rural areas (as already provided for in the 1968 Transport 
Act) but in the urban areas as well. 
31 For the NBC, it was 
the need for financial assistance from all local authorities 
which was of paramount importance, while the political 
boundaries between Metropolitan and Shire Counties were of 
lesser importance. 
When the Committee took evidence from DoE officials the 
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emphasis was still on the PTAs, but glimpses were given of the 
Department's attitude towards the NBC. At one point G. C. 
Wordale, Principal Finance Officer for the Transport Industries 
Section of the DoE., was asked directly if the breaking up of the 
NBC was not something which the Department was considering. 
His reply of: "No" 
32 
was unequivocal but hardly enlightening. 
We saw in Chapter Four that the Government faced a dilemma with 
regard to allowing integration of services within the PTAs, 
while at the same time enabling the NBC to operate commercially. 
One of the Committee members, John Horam, (himself to become a 
Labour Transport Minister) raised this point by asking: "Is 
the only attraction of having the system as it is at the 
moment, with the NBC straddling urban and rural areas, the 
fact that it does straddle the urban and rural areas and 
therefore there is cross-subsidization ?" 
33 G. W. Moseley, 
an Under Secretary in charge of the DoE's Urban Transport 
Directorate, replied: "I think this is one of the strongest 
reasons, 
34 
and went on to say: ". ... if we remove that 
argument I think there could well be an argument in favour of 
taking over all the passenger transport within a PTA area, 
subject to the point that there are routeings between the PTA 
area and other towns and cities which are an important part 
of communication. " 
35 
Moseley's remarks suggest that the Directorates made 
cross-subsidization a higher policy priority than the 
implementation of an. integrated public transport system. The 
company busman should be allowed his traditional freedom to 
operate commercially, and not be forcibly deprived (at least 
by central Government) of his most lucrative routes. The 
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officials had no objections to local agreements by which PTEs 
would take over the NBC routes (and in view of the values 
underpinning local government reorganization might privately 
have welcomed them), but the Department did not wish to be 
blamed by the NBC for destroying the company's business. In 
addition for a Conservative Government, with its allegiance 
to the rural areas, cross-subsidization was of political 
importance and was not to , 
fie totally sacrificed to serve the 
interests of comprehensive planning (although we will see in 
Chapter Seven that the Government gave tacit support to the 
take over of Midland Red routes by the West Midlands PTE. In 
this case it appeared that where the local authority possessed 
sufficient political will to initiate a take over the 
Government would not stand in its way). 
In its Report the'Committee__recommended that within the 
new Metropolitan Counties all the NBC services should be handed 
over to the PTEs, 
36 but the Government replied that the 
differing characteristics of each area rpquired local agreements. 
37 
The NBC's position within the new Shire Counties was neither 
discussed nor even referred to at any time by the Committee, 
who significantly took no evidence from the Association of 
County Councils. The fragmented public transport structure in 
the Shire Pounti. es was to be retained, but there were political 
pressures encouraging the Government to give greater attention 
to the problems of the bus industry. The NBC itself was anxious 
to persuade the Government that bus transport could no longer 
be paid for out of the fare box, and that increased subsidy in 
some form was essential on both economic and social grounds. 
The financial plight of the NBC had become more publicly obvious 
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during 1971 and The Times devoted a leading article to, the 
subject in July of that year. The writer considered that new 
policies were needed for road passenger transport, and that 
local government in particular needed to examine its attitude 
to the bus industry: "With rapidly rising costs both for 
school buses and stage services, local government is being 
forced to look hard at something it has previously taken for 
granted, starting with the acquisition of the staff and 
expertise needed to do so in an informed way. From this will 
certainly emerge new transport packages in town and country, 
with a reshaping of both stage and special services to get 
better utilization, economy, and service to the travelling 
public. The role of the licensing system and the Traffic 
Commissioners will need to be critically reviewed if greater 
flexibility and competitiveness is to be achieved. " 
38 Once 
again, The Times did not suggest that the NBC should disappear, 
but rather seek to improve efficiency while central and local 
government decided: ". ... what and from whom urban unprofitable 
bus services should be bought in the public interest. " 
39 
Much of the running in the campaign to obtain aid for 
rural bus services was made by Conservative MPs representing 
country areas. Most notably, a House of Commons debate on 
rural transport consisted principally of Tory MPs making 
heart-felt pleas for the Government to prevent decimation of 
bus services in the areas they represented. 
40 In reply the 
Under Secretary of State for the Environment, Eldon Griffiths, 
pointed out the grants already available to operators, and also 
stressed the potential importance of the rural bus grant. He 
also revealed that the Government was taking a fresh look at 
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the licensing system and the scope for different types of 
services: "In effect, we are in the process of making a 
fundamental reassessment of our rural transport policies. We 
are ready and willing to look at any useful idea. " 
41 We 
will see later in this Chapter that the Government did 
eventually propose changes in the licensing system, but it 
was local government reorganization which represented the real 
change and ushered in a new era of County Council involvement 
in public transport. 
The massive 1972 Local Government Act set out the design 
of reorganization and contained 274 Sections, of which two 
were concerned with public transport. Section 202 dealt with 
the PTAs and stated that each Metropolitan County would become 
a Passenger Transport Area and the County Council become a 
Passenger Transport Authority. Each Metropolitan County was 
to have a PTE. Section 202 placed the PTEs more directly in 
political hands in order to encourage a higher degree of 
comprehensive planning, although no reference was made to the 
position of other operators within the Metropolitan Counties. 
Section 203 was concerned with public transport in the Shire 
Counties and for the first time placed on them a specific 
responsibility for public transport. Each County was given 
the duty of: ". ... acting in consultation with persons 
providing bus services within the County and, so far as 
appropriate, with the Railways Board, to develop policies which 
will promote the provision of a co-ordinated and efficient 
system of public passenger transport to meet the needs of the 
County and, for that purpose, to take such steps to promote 
the co-ordination, amalgamation and reorganization of road 
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passenger transport undertakings in the County as appear to the 
County Council to be desirable. " 42 Although the Counties 
were not to have any direct control over the operators, they 
were instructed to determine the needs of the County and to 
ensure that the operators met those needs in the most efficient 
manner possible. 
Section 203 went on to instruct each District that it must 
operate its bus undertaking in accordance with County policy, 
while all the other operators and the Railways Board were to: 
It. ... co-operate with one another in the exercise and 
performance of their respective functions for the purpose of 
co-ordinating the passenger transport services within the 
County and to afford to one another such information as to 
proposed changes in their services as may be reasonably required 
for that purpose. " 
43 Each County and District was given the 
power to make grants to any operator operating within its area 
(not only for rural services), while a District would be able 
to claim compensation from the County for carrying out the 
latter's policy, with possible recourse to arbitration (the 
Government clearly feared tensions arising from the 
District-County relationship). 
Section 203 thus recognized the fragmented nature of the 
public transport structure in the Shire Counties, but its 
allegiance to concepts of comprehensive planning required that 
the Counties should not be let off the hook with regard to 
taking a high degree of responsibility for the welfare of the 
public transport system. Although there was a political logic 
behind the retention of a fragmented public transport structure 
within the Shire Counties, it could not disguise the fact of a 
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certain incompatibility with the values underlying local 
government reorganization. We have previously noted that the 
public transport debate at this time was relatively muted, but 
the apparent gap between theory and practice did not pass 
entirely unnoticed. 
In May 1971 the Secretary of State for the Environment, 
together with the local authority associations set up a Study 
Group on Local Authority Management Structuresfin order to 
produce advice for the new local authorities on management 
structures at both member and officer level. The Clerk of 
Kent County Council, M. A. Bains, was appointed as Chairman of 
the Working Group, and the eventual Report became known as the 
Bains Report. 
44 The contents of the Bains Report were 
entirely in the main stream of the general climate of opinion 
at that time on the subject of how local government should be 
run in the future. The feature of the Report with which it 
became chiefly associated was the recommendation that the new 
authorities should adopt a corporate approach to their affairs: 
if. ... in order to ensure that their resources are most 
effectively deployed. " 
45 It was also recommended that 
each authority should appoint a Chief Executive who would be 
the chief official and set the tone of the authority. Although 
it was stressed that each decision should be made at the lowest' 
practicable level, the emphasis was clearly on efficiency and 
co-ordinated central planning. 
The Working Group had appointed a large number of advisers 
to deal with each aspect of local authority activity, and the 
three advisers on transportation included L. H. Smith, the General 
Manager of Leicester City Transport. In 1974 Smith made a 
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biting attack on the public transport structure after local 
government reorganization, claiming that it was totally against 
the spirit of the Maud Commission and the Bains Report. 
Despite himself being a municipal busman, he condemned the 
Government's decision to keep the undertakings in the hands 
of the Districts: "It abandoned without any explanation, in 
transportation terms, the considered views that had developed 
from the dialogue, which had been going on for some five years, 
that transportation solutions could only be a balanced interplay 
between planning, road construction, parking policies and 
public transport all under the control of one authority.,, 
46 
Smith went on to say that the 1972 local Government Act 
had dealt with co-ordination in public transport, when it was 
full integration which was required. He considered that the 
NBC's commitment to fulfil obligations laid down by the Minister 
had adversely affected the quality of service, while the 
municipal undertakings put quality of service first, and that 
the differing objectives of the two organizations prevented 
proper co-ordination. 
47 
In addition to these organizational 
effects, he also claimed that fragmentation adversely affected 
the political position of public transport: ". ... elected 
members at County level have been so long used to'the system 
of financing roads that, together with the overwhelming 
pressure from the civil engineering lobby, we shall be getting 
"the crumbs from the rich man's table" rather than sitting 
there with an equal voice sensibly apportioning the funds 
available. If the public transport view is presented as it is 
in many Counties by a third or fourth tier Transport Officer 
working under the County Clerk or Engineer trying to advise on 
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the different policies of two or more large independent 
transport operators in the County, the chances of reaching the 
right decisions from the passengers' point of view are very 
remote. " 
48 We shall see in later chapters that in some 
Counties at least these fears of Smith were well-founded. 
Smith's severe criticisms of the public transport system 
in the new Shire Counties were not generally echoed, and a 
ground swell of support for integration of services did not 
develop at any time during the 1970s. Nevertheless, it did 
suggest that the NBC could not automatically assume that its 
future existence was assured. 
The Shire Counties themselves did not show any great 
enthusiasm at the time for full integration, and were. more 
concerned with problems of reorganization generally, and with 
regard to public transport the appointment of Co-ordinators. 
Even without full integration, the introduction of Shire 
County Public Transport Co-ordinators did represent a 
significant landmark. Possibly the group most affected by this 
development were the Traffic Commissioners, who now had rivals 
for their position of authority. A considerable weakness of 
Section 203 of the 1972 Local Government Act was that it made 
no mention of the Commissioners, and hence left their future 
role unclear. It was no doubt hoped by the Government that 
Co-ordinators could reach some form of accommodation with the 
Commissioners, but where a County wished to take on its full 
statutory responsibilities the Commissioners were likely to 
lose a large amount of their power. 
The appointment of a Co-ordinator introduced a major new 
"office" into the public transport system, and with the 
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Counties becoming more financially involved with the bus 
operators the long established operator-Commissioner 
relationship was disrupted. In later chapters we will be 
examining in detail the evolution of the relationships between 
several of the NBC subsidiaries and the Shire Counties, while 
we will see later in this Chapter that the 1978 Transport Act 
did make a relatively rudimentary attempt to clarify the 
position of both the Co-ordinators and the Commissioners. 
Transport Policies and Programmes and Transport 
Supplementary Grant 
Having given public transport responsibilities to the new 
local authorities, the Government was anxious to introduce 
a framework which would allow for more rational and co-ordinated 
transport planning. Section 203 required each Shire County to 
appoint a Public Transport Co-ordinator, but the overall aim 
was to integrate public transport into the total planning 
system. We have described the thinking behind the creation of 
the DoE, and central Government was anxious that the Counties 
should have similar objectives of comprehensive planning. 
During 1972-73 the Government entered into a period of detailed 
consultation with the local authority associations which 
eventually resulted in the creation of Transport Policies and 
Programmes (TPPs) and Transport Supplementary Grant (TSG). 
Although the initiative for TPPs and TSG come from the 
Government, the local authorities were sympathetic towards 
their aims. Local government reorganization itself was not to 
be introduced until April 1974, but the first elections were 
held a year earlier and by this time there was general optimism 
that a new era was at hand. This atmosphere was conducive to 
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the creation of a consensus on the need for local authorities 
to become involved in comprehensive transport planning. The 
NBC was also pleased to see the Counties taking more 
responsibility for transport planning, for it gave some hope 
that revenue support would be more forthcoming than in the past. 
The degree of agreement: between the principal interests gave 
the introduction of TPPs and TSG something of a similarity 
with the 1930 Road Traffic Act, with a major policy change 
being accepted with little debate. 
Although Transport Supplementary Grant was not given 
statutory force until the Local Government Act of 1974, a 
detailed outline of the process surrounding its allocation was 
provided in a 1973 DoE Circular. With regard to the need 
49 
for change, it was stated that: "Local transport problems 
increasingly involve decisions on the allocation of the 
resources available between different kinds of transport, and 
about inter-related policies on e. g., parking, traffic 
management and public transport. Transport problems'therefore 
need to be viewed comprehensively and set in the wider context 
of land-use planning .... The multiplicity of transport 
grants, at different rates, some payable to operators, some to 
local authorities, is not suited to the comprehensive approach 
that is now needed. In addition, the present specific grants 
involve the Departments in a considerable amount of detailed 
control of individual projects.,, 50 The objectives of the 
new system were thus listed as being to: 
1. promote the development and execution of comprehensive 
transport plans by the new County Councils and the Greater 
London Council; 
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2. eliminate bias towards capital or current expenditure 
or towards particular forms of expenditure; 
3. distribute central government grant in a way that 
reflects as far as possible the needs of individual areas; 
4. reduce the degree of detailed supervision by central 
government over individual schemes. 
51 
It could be said that there is an innate conflict between 
the third and fourth objectives, for distribution of the grant 
would depend on central government's definition of need, and a 
Minister would be unlikely to stand aside in areas where it 
was considered that money was being misspent. From the point 
of view of public transport, the second objective suggested 
that the new system might reduce the incentive for local 
authorities to spend money on capital projects at the expense 
of revenue -------------support. The Government provided a 75% 
grant towards the cost of building or improving principal 
roads, while we saw in Chapter Four that the. 1968 Transport 
Act allowed for government grants towards public transport 
infrastructure schemes. The new grant was intended to have 
the effect of ending this discrimination in favour of capital 
projects. 
In order that the Government could make a decision on the 
level of grant each County was required to produce a Transport 
Policy and Programme document in June or July of each year. 
It was intended that each TPP would', include estimates of 
transport expenditure for the following year, together with: 
1. a statement of the County Council's transport 
objectives and strategy covering 10-15 years; 
2. a five year expenditure programme to implement the 
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strategy, which would be rolled forward annually; 
3. a statement of past expenditure and physical progress 
and the extent to which the programme was meeting the objectives 
52 
and policies underlying it. 
The Government saw the TPPs as being in direct line with 
the Structure Plan concept, and indeed local authorities were 
expected to see the work done on these two plans as one 
continuous process. Once all the TPPs had been received the 
Government would determine the amount of a County's transport 
expenditure for the following year which could be accepted 
for the purpose of allocating Transport Supplementary Grant. 
The Government would also set a threshold level of transport 
expenditure. Any sum spent on or below this level was expected 
to be financed through the general Rate Support Grant, but the 
difference between the-threshold level and the accepted 
expenditure limit was to become eligible for Transport 
Supplementary Grant. The Government anticipated that 70-75% 
of this difference would be accounted for by TSG, with the 
remainder supplied by the County through the rates. It was 
anticipated that TSG would be announced at the same time as 
RSG, usually in December. It should be noted that the payment 
of TSG did not carry with it any compulsion as to how the 
money was actually spent i. e., a County did not have to spend 
the money on the lines set out in its TPP. Nevertheless, it 
was likely that if a County's expenditure was significantly 
out of line with its stated plans then this could be reflected 
in the following year's level of TSG. 
From the point of view of an NBC subsidiary, it could 
place a claim for subsidy to a County prior to preparation of 
a TPP. The County could include revenue support in its total 
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bid to the DoE, but the actual amount which the subsidiary 
would receive could only be determined after the allocation of 
TSG. Thus almost a year could pass between an initial claim 
and a County's final decision. In addition, the money might 
not be paid until the end of a financial year and in these 
cases two years would elapse between the initial claim and the 
final payment, in which time the subsidiary's financial state 
could be very different from what had been originally 
anticipated. These classic implementation problems in which 
extents overtake expectations were to become a source of 
irritation to the NBC, while the Counties would blame the 
company for poor quality planning. 
Despite these difficulties, the advent of TSG did mean 
that the NBC was able to look for a higher level of subsidy in 
the future. The 1968 Transport Act had provided only for grants 
to rural areas, but now a County could subsidize an entire 
network. It was generally hoped that the Counties would enter 
into the spirit of the new era by evaluating alternative 
strategies in terms of social costs and benefits. In 
describing the-system Tyson considered that it enabled a 
Council: ". ... to consider transport policy as a whole and 
costs and benefits to the community as a whole. It can be used 
to decide resource allocation between roads and public 
transport, between passenger and freight facilities etc., and 
is thus directly relevant to the problems now faced by Councils, 
such as whether to spend Lx million on a road improvement, a 
railway upgrading or a reduction in bus fares in order to reduce 
congestion in an urban area. " 
53 
Although the identification 
of social costs and benefits can be described in economic terms, 
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in many cases the conclusions must be based on political 
judgments, for as Tyson comments noise, atmospheric pollution, 
severance and visual intrusion cannot be easily measured in 
physical terms. 
54 In this context, public transport needed 
a strong political voice within the local authorities if it 
was to exert a strong influence on the decision-making process. 
The reality of decision-making by the local authorities proved 
to be based more on the place of the Public Transport 
Co-ordinator within the local government hierarchy, together 
with the state of the current economic climate. 
TPPs and TSG had the effect of politicizing public 
transport, for the subject now became part of the local 
government community. In placing public transport on the local 
political agenda it allowed an opportunity for sympathetic 
groups and individuals to put pressure on the County Councils 
for greater assistance to the bus industry. As events have 
transpired there has been little grassroots political activity 
in this direction, with only spasmodic and isolated attempts 
made to influence the local authorities. A lack of local 
activity has thrown into greater relief the relationship 
(outside the more integrated structure found in the Metropolitan 
Counties) between the Shire Counties and the NBC subsidiaries. 
We noted at the commencement of Chapter Five that throughout 
the 1970s, and into the 1980s, the NBC derived only a 
relatively small percentage of its income from the Shire 
Counties, and the essence of the Chapter was to indicate that 
the company remains a largely autonomous organization. 
Nevertheless there is considerable political significance in 
the NBC-Shire County relationship, for as the bus industry 
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becomes less and less commercially viable, greater attention 
is thrown on to how a network of services can meet public need 
within a given financial constraint. 
In order to assist the NBC, the PTEs and the local 
authorities in building up the various interrelationships 
required by the new legislation, the DoE set up a Working Party 
to develop a standard form of accounts for the whole industry. 
The eventual Report was published in 1974 by the Chartered 
Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy and has since 
become generally known as the CIPFA Report. 5 The NBC was 
5 
particularly pleased to see acceptance by all interested 
parties of the accounting principles set out in the CIPFA 
Report, for the company could confidently hold that in making 
its claims for subsidy it was operating on lines approved by 
all the local authorities. In reality the issue of costing is 
not so clear cut, and it is privately recognized by 
representatives from both the NBC and the Counties that there 
is considerable room for flexibility in costing a service or 
set of services. Smith generally praised the CIPFA Report 
but considered that it was weak on cross-subsidization and 
cross-boundary services. 
56 As these are two of the basic 
elements by which an NBC subsidiary would make a subsidy claim 
to a particular County, Smith's analysis suggests that the 
NBC continues to hold the trump cards. We shall see in our 
case studies that Counties have found difficulty in judging 
the validity of the NBC figures, and on many occasions have 
not even bothered to make a challenge. In these cases it 
would appear that the Counties accept limits on their control 
of the NBC subsidiaries, and are wary about challenging the 
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company to reveal more information. 
Although the DoE claimed that it wished to exert less 
control over local authorities with regard to the 
implementation of transport policy, we have already described 
how the Government could use TPPs and TSG as weapons to enforce 
its will. In the case of the 50% grant towards the cost of new 
buses the Government retained complete control and this scheme 
remained outside TSG. The Expenditure Committee had 
recommended that it should be included in TSG, 
57 but the 
Government replied that although the grant would cease by 1980, 
it was important to have regard to the plans of bus 
manufacturers. 
58 Starkie suggests that the new bus grant 
was excluded because manufacturers were situated in Regional 
Development Areas 59 e. g., the Leyland National Plant at 
Workington. In this case, local authorities could not be 
trusted with satisfactory implementation of the Government's 
industrial strategy 
Ironically, the 1972 and 1974 Local Government Acts were 
to be implemented eventually by the Labour Government which 
took office in March 1974 (indicating the consensus on TPPs 
and TSG). The creation of legislation on local government 
reorganization had taken the full lifetime of the Conservative 
Government and it was left to Labour to supervise its 
implementation. One particular piece of legislation which 
suffered as a result of the change in Government was the 1973 
Road Traffic Bill which was originally intended to change the 
road service licensing system. The state of the licensing 
system was also to occupy the minds of the Labour Government, 
and this subject will be dealt with in a later section of this 
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Chapter. 
C. The Bus Industry and the Labour Government 1974-79 
In examining the Labour Government's impact on the bus 
industry we must consider two parallel strands of activity. 
Firstly, the Government was given the task of implementing the 
legislation passed by the previous Conservative Government. 
We have seen that there was little inter-party conflict with 
regard to Sections 202 and 203 of the 1972 Local Government 
Act or the section of the 1974 Local Government Act concerning 
TSG (in which TPPs played an integral role in the process of 
allocating the Grant). The Labour Government had originally 
favoured the concept of Unitary authorities, but local 
government reorganization was now a fact and further change at 
this time was unthinkable. Both central and local government 
entered into the new era in an expansive mood and were fully 
committed to the introduction of comprehensive planning, but 
these hopes were quickly dashed by the effects of a general 
deterioration in the economic climate. The overriding need 
to control public expenditure dominated the TPP and TSG system 
during the 1970s and led to central Government exerting more 
control over public spending than had been intended originally. 
Secondly, a Labour Government embarked on what had become 
by this time its normal critical review of transport policy. 
This process lasted almost throughout the lifetime of the 
Government, and commenced in a generally critical mood of 
existing structures. In time this criticism abated and the 
eventual 1978 Transport Act reflected more the Government's 
experience in implementing the TPP and TSG system rather than 
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the introduction of any radical ideas. Perhaps the most 
prominent feature of this second process was the emergence of 
a more sympathetic attitude by the Government towards public 
transport, particularly after a new Department of Transport was 
set up in 1976 and William Rodgers became Secretary of State. 
These two strands of activity became more linked and 
interwoven with the passage of time, but in order that we can 
fully appreciate the nature of the policy review process it is 
necessary that we first examine the initial development of the 
TPP and TSG system. 
The Initial Implementation of TPPs and TSG. 
In Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine we will be examining in 
detail the developing relationships between several Shire 
Counties and NBC subsidiaries with particular regard to the 
provision of subsidy. Although in many respects these 
relationships had a life of their own, they must be placed in 
the context of transport expenditure as a whole and the 
relationship between central and local government. Mackie 
illustrates well the extent to which the Government was forced 
to alter course when he notes that the 1975 Public Expenditure 
White Paper envisaged an increase in expenditure on roads and 
local transport of 1% between 1975-76 and 1978-79. Two years 
later, the 1977 White Paper was planning for a decrease of 
23% in that area of expenditure for the same three year 
period. 
60 In the first TPP submissions for 1975-76, the 
Government accepted 68% of the total bids for transport 
expenditure from Counties in England and Wales (1874.84 million), 
with the total TSG amounting to ¬250 million. 
61 
The 1973 Expenditure Committee Report had recommended a 
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low initial threshold so that a large slice could come from 
TSG and enable the Government to evaluate each County's 
TPP. 62 The Government agreed that the early threshold 
should be low, but hoped that in time a higher proportion 
could be absorbed as part of the Rate Support Grant. 
63 
The 
threshold is normally based on a rate per head of population, 
and since its inception all Counties have qualified for at 
least a certain amount of TSG. The Government's initial hope 
that TSG would be distributed according to need, and might in 
some cases be wholly met by the RSG, has been superseded by an 
anxiety to evaluate and control each County's transport budget. 
As Mackie comments there was: ". ... an element of tension 
between the idea of a true supplementary needs-related grant 
and the desire to secure adequate scrutiny of local transport 
expenditure. " 
64 
The first set of TPPs and TSG represented something of a 
honeymoon period, for by the second year the Government was 
exerting more searching controls over the Counties. After 1974, 
the Government issued expenditure guidelines for each County 
prior to the preparation of its annual TPP: "Counties were 
asked to present alternative programmes of expenditure, one at 
the lower end of the range, and the other representing a 
preferred option within the range. The aims were twofold; 
first, to provide a framework for planning related to the 
resources likely to be available; secondly, to secure a common 
basis of comparison between Countiest programmes. " 65 The 
majority of the Counties quickly perceived the nature of the 
Government's message and submitted bids which were at or near 
the lower guideline level 
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Within this overall total of local transport expenditure 
there are several categories. Firstly, the typesof expenditure 
which broadly consist of road construction, road maintenance 
and public transport subsidies. Secondly, the division of 
expenditure between Metropolitan and Shire Counties. For 
example, Mackie's analysis points out that although accepted 
expenditure during the 1970s was usually fairly equally divided 
between Metropolitan and Shire Counties, the Metropolitan 
counties normally received about two-thirds of the TSG total 
because they had a higher expenditure per head of population 
accepted than the Shire Counties, 
66 
, 
(a factor largely 
explained by the Labour Government's natural tendency to 
support the urban areas). 
More significantly, the 1970s saw a radical decline in 
local authority expenditure on road construction: "Thus the 
bids for local road projects for England and Wales for 1978-79 
were little more than half of those for two years previously. " 
67 
The chief beneficiary of this reduction was not the bus 
industry but road maintenance. For example, the 1975-76 
figure for planned road construction in the English Shire 
Counties represented 54% of total expenditure, but by 1978-79 
this percentage had fallen to 24%. In contrast, the equivalent 
figures for other road expenditure (mainly maintenance) were 
41% and 67% respectively. In the same period planned public 
transport subsidies rose from 3% to 8%. 
68 The chief trend of 
expenditure was towards maintaining the existing road network 
rather than supporting public transport, although Mackie notes 
that expenditure on maintenance and lighting has fallen by 
about 10% in real terms since the early 1970s. 69 This figure 
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reflects the general restrictions placed on local transport 
expenditure during the decade. 
It was politically significant that revenue support for 
public transport (together with expenditure on new town roads) 
was specifically excluded from the Government's transport 
expenditure guidelines issued to the local authorities. We 
saw in Chapter Five that the mid-1970s were difficult years for 
the NBC when the rate of inflation rose dramatically. The 
PTEs also suffered during this period, and the Government 
decided that the financial situation of the whole bus industry 
was such that it had become a special case. The effect of this 
decision on the local authorities was that: 't. ... whereas 
the rest of a County's transport expenditure .... has been 
constrained by the guidelines, proposed expenditure on public 
transport revenue support has been determined only by each 
authority's policy and'its capability of financing the 
expenditure (assuming that the whole of it received TSG). " 70 
The Government's decision must be seen in the context of the 
wide difference between the claims for bus subsidies placed 
upon it by the Metropolitan and Shire Counties. Each of the 
Metropolitan Counties made large subsidy claims during the 
1970s, with the result that in some years the Government was 
able to accept less than half of the original bid. 
Matters came to a head in 1976 when the Government 
successfully persuaded all but one of the Metropolitan Counties 
to reduce their original bids: "The exception was South 
Yorkshire, which as a result had no expenditure accepted except 
for some continuing capital works which the Government had 
already agreed to support. " 71 The sanctions placed on South 
306 
Yorkshire did not deter it from its low fares policy and the 
money needed was levied from the rates, but the Government's 
action demonstrated the depths of its displeasure when it was 
considered that a County had stepped badly out of line. During 
this period the Metropolitan Counties were all Labour 
controlled, and it was likely that in excluding bus subsidies 
from the general TPP expenditure guidelines the Government was 
hoping to assist the Counties in implementing an electorally 
popular policy. 
The South Yorkshire case illustrated that the Government 
was not prepared to go beyond a certain point, but the 
percentage of transport expenditure devoted to bus subsidies 
by the Metropolitan Counties was fez, higher than that found in 
the predominantly Conservative controlled Shire Counties. 
Between 1975-76 and 1979-80, the Metropolitan Counties as a 
whole at no time planned to spend less than 24% of total 
transport expenditure on public transport subsidies, with the 
highest percentage being 36%. For the Shire Counties the 
equivalent low figure was 3%, and the highest 10%. 
72 Some 
of the Metropolitan Counties' money went to local PTE rail 
services, but the gap between the two types of authority was 
a wide one. While the Government was attempting to control 
bus subsidies within the Metropolitan Counties, in the Shire 
Counties underspending (in the eyes of the Government) was on 
occasions the order of the day. In a number of cases the 
Government accepted a level of bus subsidy which was higher 
than that originally bid by the County. In Chapter Nine we 
will study the public transport policy of Oxfordshire, which 
resulted in the Government cutting back the County's grant for 
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road building in an attempt to enforce a higher level of bus 
subsidies. As the NBC is the overwhelmingly predominant 
operator in the Shires, the policies of these Counties are 
of considerable importance to the company. Our case studies 
will show that these Counties adopted a wide range of public 
transport policies, and a similar wide range of subsidy levels, 
but in none of these cases was there an example of the 
Government penalizing an overspending County on the lines of 
South Yorkshire. 
The PTEs are large undertakings with bus fleets of a much 
greater size than nearly all of the NBC subsidiaries, but there 
can be no doubt that the NBC has received much lower levels of 
subsidy than its counterpart organizations, nor that relatively 
speaking the Metropolitan Counties spend a higher level of 
resources on bus subsidies than do the Shire Counties. This 
discrepancy often appears to be taken for granted by all parties 
concerned, but it does indicate the differing values and 
organizational structure of the Metropolitan and Shire Counties. 
The early appearance of municipal bus undertakings had the 
effect of quickly placing public transport on the political 
agenda of those County Boroughs and towns which ran their own 
services. The creation of the PTAs saw the amalgamation of 
municipal undertakings in the largest urban areas and to some 
extent separated bus operation from the local authorities, but 
local government reorganization gave the new Metropolitan 
Counties more direct control over the PTEs. Although the PTEs 
retained a separate identity the quality of the bus services in 
a Metropolitan County could be seen by voters in political 
terms (particularly in South Yorkshire). 
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We have seen that in the Shire Counties the situation was 
far more fragmented and uncertain, with the Districts 
retaining control of their own bus services. The 
municipalities could therefore continue to subsidize their own 
services through District resources without any recourse to 
subsidy from the County. Many of the largest urban areas 
within the Shires ran their own buses e. g., Leicester, 
Nottingham, Hull, Brighton, Plymouth and Southampton, and 
cities of this size were reluctant to become dependent on 
County authorities. The Counties were thus left to deal mainly 
with the NBC subsidiaries operating inter-urban and rural 
services. In addition, in many Counties it was the Districts 
which took responsibility for concessionary fares, usually 
provided for retired or disabled people. The 1972 Local 
Government Act allowed either Counties or Districts to 
administer these schemes, but on the whole Counties were 
reluctant to become involved in what was a politically 
sensitive policy area. The Shire Counties had a statutory 
responsibility for public transport co-ordination, but the 
power given to the Districts caused inevitable implementation 
problems. We shall see in Chapter Eight that in Cheshire the 
County Council was able to exert little control over the three 
municipal undertakings in its area. Although the CC and 
Crosville (the local NBC subsidiary) experienced a far from 
tranquil relationship, the municipalities suspected them of 
working together in an attempt to undermine the latter's 
authority. 
Unlike the municipalities, there was little tradition in 
the Shires for involvement with the bus industry. The new 
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Public Transport Co-ordinators had largely to build the 
organization up from scratch, and amongst councillors knowledge 
of the bus industry was often sketchy. In this environment, 
the subject of subsidies to the NBC was not one which attracted 
a high degree of political attention. In addition, we have 
seen that the NBC regarded itself as a commercial organization. 
Although anxious to build up satisfactory relationships with 
CCs, and by no means averse to receiving subsidies, it did not 
wish to become a political football. The differences in 
attitude to public transport between the Metropolitan and Shire 
Counties can of course be viewed in Party political terms, with 
the working class image of the bus being identified with the 
interests of the Labour Party. Although this analysis is part 
of the answer, we should also be aware that the historical 
background together with organizational structure is of equal 
if not greater significance. 
The relative autonomy of District bus undertakings and the 
NBC subsidiaries did not allow the Counties a great deal of 
freedom in implementing their Section 203 responsibilities. 
The Bains Report appeared to recognize the weakness of the 
Counties' position when it observed that their new role: 
will mean that they will require expertise which will 
probably not be readily available within the County Council 
structure. It may well prove difficult to recruit properly 
qualified senior staff for the County, but the necessary 
expertise is, however, likely to be on hand in the management 
of municipal public transport undertakings within the County 
Districts, and also in nationalized and private undertakings. 
There would seem to us to be merit in making use of that 
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expertise, even if only on a part-time advisory basis, rather 
than attempting to recruit scarce full-time officers. " 
73 
It was thus recommended that the Counties would achieve a 
better quality of co-ordination if they did as they were told 
by those who were being co-ordinated 1 The Bains approach was 
endorsed by the Government, although it considered that such 
an arrangement would not: ". ... obviate the need for the 
County Council to employ experienced full-time officers at a 
less senior level to carry out the day-to-day implementation 
of the Council's public transport responsibilities. " 
74 
The proposed minor role of the County in implementing 
Section 203 might have recognized political and administrative 
realities, but was hardly an encouragement to those Counties 
who hoped to develop their own expertise and adopt a more 
positive approach. The recommendations also failed to 
recognize that where Counties were providing increased levels 
of subsidy, they were unlikely to be content with accepting 
without question the advice of the busmen. We will see later 
that a good number of Counties have indeed adopted a relatively 
passive approach to public transport planning, but in Counties 
where a relatively high level of subsidy is allocated to the 
NBC a more aggressively interventionist policy is to be found. 
The Shire Counties may not be large-scale subsidizers in 
comparison with the Metropolitan Counties, but the sums are not 
negligible, particularly when compared with former years. In 
1975 the NBC received 96.5 million in revenue support from the 
Shire Counties, but in 1977 the figure had risen to £26.8 
million. 
75 Although the status of the Public Transport 
Co-ordinator differs widely from County to County, he is now 
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an established part of the local authority and bus industry 
scene, and it is unlikely that either his role or the level of 
subsidies will greatly diminish in the immediate future. 
Our case studies will examine in detail the various Shire 
County approaches to public transport planning, but from the 
point of view of Central Government the general problem was 
one of coping with policy problems in the context of economic 
circumstances which placed severe restraints on public 
expenditure. We have seen in this Section that it was the 
adverse economic climate which caused early problems for the 
TPP and TSG system. During this period many of the idealistic 
hopes for comprehensive planning and greater local autonomy 
were quickly dashed by the pressure of events, yet during 
these crises the Government was also conducting a wide-ranging 
review of transport policy. 
The 1976 Consultation Document. 
When the Labour Government took office in March 1974 it 
initially retained the previous Departmental structure. 
Anthony Crosland was appointed Secretary of State for the 
Environment with Fred Mulley as a subordinate Minister for 
Transport. By this arrangement Transport continued to lack a 
voice in the Cabinet, but as events transpired its days of 
relative political anonymity were nearing an end. Crosland 
himself had a personal interest in transport policy and prior 
to the General Election had headed a Labour Party research 
team examining proposals for a more integrated transport 
structure. 
76 Despite the apparent failure of the BTC there 
was still a strong feeling within the Labour Party that a 
similar type of organization should once more be set up in 
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order that more rational and co-ordinated transport policies 
could be implemented. 
Crosland was anxious that transport policy should not be 
left to drift along, and in July 1974 appointed a Departmental 
Transport Central Policy Review Committee. The chief figures 
on this Committee were Sir Idwal Pugh, Second Permanent 
Secretary at the DoE with responsibility for the transport 
industries and Humphrey Cole the Director General of Economics 
Resources and Senior Economist at the Department. The 
Committee did not present its Report to the Secretary of State 
until December 1975, a delay which suggests that the Secretary 
of State's hopes for an integrated transport policy might not 
have been entirely shared by the Department. The trend of 
thought in the Labour Party at that time is indicated by the 
transport policy recommendations of the TUC and a special 
study group set up by Socialist Commentary. The TUC proposed 
an integration of transport under a National Transport 
Planning Authority, 77 and this view was basically endorsed 
by the Socialist Commentary group. 
78 
We have seen that by the end of 1975 the Government was 
encountering considerable difficulty in controlling local 
authority transport expenditure, and these problems no doubt 
made the Secretary of State anxious that his new policy 
initiative should not further delayed. The problems of British 
Rail were also causing concern at this time, for the 1974 
Railways Act had replaced subsidies for individual services 
with a global Public Service Obligation, and by the mid-1970s 
BR was receiving total subsidies of over £400 million per annum. 
Despite Crosland's anxiety to produce a document on transport 
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policy, the Departmental Committee's Report ran to several 
hundred pages, 
79 
and it was the Spring of 1976 before he 
could present his conclusions to the Cabinet. By a typical 
irony of politics, production of the document coincided almost 
exactly with the resignation of Harold Wilson as Prime Minister. 
His successor, James Callaghan, took office in April 1976 and 
immediately appointed Anthony Crosland to be Foreign Secretary. 
Crosland had already written the Foreword to the transport 
document, but it was presented to Parliament on 13th April by 
Peter Shore, his successor at the DoE. 
The Report itself took the form of a Consultation Document 
and invited responses from interested parties and the public in 
general. We have previously outlined how a consultative phase 
was a key element in the Structure Plans, and this emphasis on 
policy-makers sounding out comment on various options and/or 
proposals before coming to a decision was a particular 
development within the policy process during the 1970s. 
Superficially, it might appear that a consultative phase will 
tend to give a policy a more pluralistic nature. In addition 
to general comment, groups can also have more opportunity to 
plan a campaign in opposition to elements of the policy they 
dislike. Perhaps in collaboration with other groups a virtual 
veto can be placed on the Government's ability to introduce the 
original policy, and instead an agreement could emerge based on 
a consensus of interests. It could also be said that a 
consultative phase assists cognitive elements of the process by 
enabling those with detailed knowledge to point out some of the 
policy's misconceptions about the real world. 
Although a more pluralistic policy can result from 
.a 
trend 
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towards greater consultation, we should also note that a 
policy-maker will still usually be left with a choice to make 
between competing interests. In this respect a consultation 
process can strengthen the position of a Government which 
claims that its decision (which may be the one it intended to 
make in the first place) has greater legitimacy because opinion 
and advice has been sought from all the interests. Consultation 
need not be totally identified with pluralism, for a group's 
power is only derived from the influence which it can wield 
over the Government. Possibly the most important phenomenon of 
a consultation process is the inevitable passage of time, for 
the world moves on and general economic and political 
circumstances can often be more influential in shaping policy 
than the response from a particular group or number of groups. 
This proved to be the case with the Transport Consultation 
Document, when considerable changes within the Government and 
in its general political situation during 1976-77 gave a new 
perspective to the policy-making process. 
The Consultation Document itself referred to the TUC and 
Socialist Commentary Reports as providing evidence that the 
degree of public debate warranted a thorough review of transport 
policy. 
80 Reference was also made in this connection to the 
Report by an Independent Commission on Transport 
81 
set up 
under the sponsorship of the Ecological Foundation, which 
indicated growing concern with the inter-connection between 
transport and the quality of the environment. To these points 
the Government added other-changes which justified a review at 
that time. These were, the increasing problems of those without 
cars, the energy crisis caused by the rise in oil prices in 1973 
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and the all-consuming need to control public expenditure. 
82 
Although the Government perceived a need for a more 
integrated approach towards transport pricing and investment, 
demands for a BTC type of organization were rejected. It was 
considered that an agency operating outside Government would be 
inappropriate, when most of the vital decisions on transport 
were properly the responsibility of central and local government. 
Transport policy decisions were now thought to be political in 
nature, and hence subject to democratic control. 
83 It was 
also likely that this emphasis on transport's place in the 
political world reflected the Government's anxiety to keep a 
more direct control over expenditure, for an external agency 
might not be entirely trustworthy in implementing a government's 
wishes. At the same time we should also note that the 
Government was already dealing with a number of external 
agencies. The NBC, BR, the National Freight Corporation, the 
PTEs and to some extent the local authorities themselves were 
all organizations highly dependent on Government finance, but 
which also made important policy-making decisions for 
themselves. It would appear that it was the prospect of an 
unwieldy central co-ordinating agency which upset the Government, 
but no reference was made to the BTO experience. 
As an alternative to a central agency the Government 
proposed that a National Transport Council be set up: "This 
would be a high-level forum, with a Minister as Chairman, on 
which all the main interests would be represented - management 
and the trade unions, the industries, both public and private, 
local government and consumers. " 84 The Council would not have 
any specific powers but would: ". ... become a national focus 
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for monitoring developments on a regular basis and examining 
critically the pricing and investment strategy across the whole 
field of transport. " 
85 The basis for suggesting the Council 
appeared to be that by bringing the principal interests 
together a more rational and co-ordinated policy would result, 
although obviously the Government would still have the last 
word with regard to allocation of resources. 
Despite rejecting a national agency, the Government 
appeared to favour greater integration within the bus industry. 
It was thought that national-'policies could not be applied 
where different parts of the industry were financed in different 
ways, and so two possible options were proposed. Firstly, it 
was suggested that the NBC boundaries might be reorganized to 
match them with Counties or groups of Counties. This proposal 
implied that the Counties had now become the premier element in 
public transport planning and that the NBC should be organized 
accordingly. Secondly, - the Government suggested the integration 
of the NBC, PTE and municipal undertakings into a unified 
publicly-owned sector of the industry: "This might be a highly 
centralized structure with regard to some of its activities, 
such as ve. icle procurement; but might be decentralized so as 
to give independence to regional or sub-regional operating units 
whose areas coincided with those of Counties or groups of 
Counties. " 
86 
This second proposal appeared to be suggesting something 
on the lines of a nationwide PTA network, although it was not 
made clear the degree to which the new operating units would be 
subordinate to the local authorities. The Government was 
concerned that much work would need to be done on drawing up 
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suitable boundaries and membership of controlling bodies. 
Rather mystifyingly, it was also stated that a further issue 
would be the relationship between the new authorities and the 
PTEs. As the PTEs were to form part of the new organization 
this point suggested that the Government had a rather confused 
image of the future structure (it was possible that the 
Government was split between-its wish for greater integration 
and a fear that further reorganization would upset the Labour 
controlled Metropolitan Counties). In any case, the Document 
stressed that detailed negotiations would take place with the 
bus industry and the local authorities. 
In discussing the problems of the bus industry in general, 
the Document did not offer any radically new initiatives. 
Importance was placed on traffic management and bus priority 
schemes, but in the context of a continuing programme (with 
resources inevitably limited). For urban areas, it was thought 
that reliable services were of primary importance, even at the 
expense of lower frequencies, while in the rural areas the call 
was for more use of unconventional forms of service. 
87 These 
recommendations had the obvious advantage that they did not 
imply any great commitment to bus revenue support, and indeed 
the Government was anxious to make clear that it did not 
consider subsidy in itself to be a satisfactory solution to 
public transport problems: "The social objective of transport 
policy therefore points clearly to the provision of a basic 
public transport network. This is not a matter of paying out 
indiscriminate subsidies, for all the evidence shows that these 
go predominantly not to the less well-off minority .... but 
to the better-off. It is the better-off who travel most.,, 88 
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It was acknowledged that this statement appeared to have more 
applicability to the railways than the buses, but the latter 
would also need to be subject to public expenditure constraints. 
This need for economy pervaded the contents of the whole Document, 
for it was planned that total transport expenditure would decline 
from £2,394.8 million in 1975-76 to £1,983 million in 1978-79. 
Despite the concern expressed for public transport, it was also 
estimated that local authority bus subsidies would decline from 
£134.7 million in 1975-76 to £60 million in 1978-79.89 
To slightly counterbalance this blow to the bus industry, it 
was announced that the new bus grant would not necessarily be 
terminated completely in 1980, but might be phased out gradually 
over a number of years. Nevertheless the projected subsidy 
levels suggested a considerable gap between the Government's 
social objectives and its willingness to pay for their 
implementation. 
The Consultation Process 
The Government allowed until the end of July 1976 for 
comments on the Document, but a further major organizational 
change was to come about before the DoE could appraise the 
many responses from the different interests. Early in 
September the new Prime Minister announced his first Ministerial 
reshuffle, and a principal feature of these changes was the 
creation of a new Department of Transport. It was reported 
that Mr. Callaghan was anxious to create a new Department to 
deal with policy-making as a result of the Consultation 
Document, although it was also considered that the Prime Minister 
was generally not enamoured with the Super Department concept. 
In addition, Peter Shore, the Secretary of State at the DoE. 
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was thought to be concerned that his overall duties prevented 
him from giving sufficient time and attention to transport 
policy. The Times noted that the new DTp would generally 
please the transport interests who had been preasing for a 
stronger political voice and more cash. At the same time it 
was feared that the separation of transport from general 
planning would lead to less rational policy-making. 
90 
We have seen earlier how Painter illustrates the trend 
towards sectorization within the DoE, and in the light of 
these developments the creation of the DTp was a logical 
development. Transport had suffered a loss in political status 
between 1970 and 1976 despite the interest shown in the policy 
area by Anthony Crosland. The victory for sectorization over 
integration reflected the difficulty for Government in breaking 
down a grouping of officials and interests with a 
long-established political and administrative identity. The 
values of comprehensive planning had dominated Government 
thinking in the early 1970s, but the experience of the DoE 
suggepted that the transport community did not see itself as 
forming an integrated part of a ger_eral land-use planning 
community. Now Transport was once again represented at the 
highest political Tavel. The new Secretary of State for 
Transport, William Rodgers, had a seat in the Cabinet and 
authority to. deal with all sectors of transport policy. Like 
Anthony Crosland, Rodgers had previously indicated a strong 
interest in transport policy and it was generally considered 
that he had an expert knowledge of the area, 
Richardson and Jordan point out that the number of groups 
in a bargaining positign with government has increased 
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enormously in recent years, and as a result policy areas have 
become overcrowded. This overcrowding is caused partly by 
governments becoming mQre active, but also results from 
organized group action compelling governments to act. 
91 The 
Government received over 1-, 000 replies in response. to the 
Consultation Document, although "The great majority of these 
replies are in the form of. l. etters from members of the public 
and local authorities throughout the.. country. " 
92 Thus only 
a relatively small number of these replies could be described 
as coming from those in. a bargaining position with the. 
Government, although in certain cases a group with relatively 
little political power could still claim to have an. influence 
in the policy process, e. g., some of the groups concerned 
abop. t the quality-of the e zironment. 
Some of the groups who produced responses such as the 
Liverpool Society for Social Responsibility in Science and the 
Tyneside Action Committee Against the Cuts might have had 
little influence over the Government, but there was still a 
wide-range of "bargaining" groups whose views could not be 
ignored by the Minister. Within the public transport sector 
these would include all the local authority associations, the 
trade unions, the Confederation of British Road Passenger 
Transport and the NBC. Environmental and consumer groups also 
contributed to the debate, while organizations concerned with 
the railways also had views on the public transport policy in 
general. We will briefly examine the contents of a few of 
these responses, although we will see later that other factors 
were also of importance in determining the final policy. 
Not surprisingly, the NBC on the whole was suspicious of 
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greater integration, although in one respect the company was 
not averse to an attempt at empire-building. The NBC's response 
was twenty-seven pages long and reflected fears that a more 
integrated bus industry could lead to the company's destruction. 
The NBC forcibly expressed the view that: "There is a positive 
case for an organization with the present NBC structure. This 
meets the need for a national organization able to play an 
effective role in matters of national policy .... 
Fragmentation of NBC's present assets and operations into Shire 
County ownership .... would result in a multiplicity of 
transport policies, none of which would be national .... 
Any changes now contemplated should avoid the expense of further 
structural change so far as possible. " 
93 The NBC hoped that 
the County Councils would enter into a closer relationship 
with subsidiaries, but not to the extent of the Counties 
running the buses themselves. 
In contrast to the NBC's hopes for an arm's length 
relationship with the Counties, the company was of the opinion 
that the municipal undertakings should lose their separate 
identities: "The District Undertakings are managed by 
experienced professional bus operators and could form part of. 
a national bus company managed as now by appropriate delegation 
to accountable subsidiaries. " 
94 
The NBC's view was that such 
a merger would bring benefits all round, no doubt not least to 
the NBC itself 
The NBC gave qualified support to the concept of a 
National Transport Council, but was concerned that the new body 
could only be effective in examining policy if it were to be 
largely independent of government. With regard to finance and 
subsidies, the NBC was clearly worried that Counties might 
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withdraw support for services at short notice and suggested 
that operators might receive the money direct from central 
government. At the time of local government reorganization the 
NBC had favoured the County Councils being the bodies 
responsible for revenue support, but already it appeared that 
the vagaries of the TPP and TSG system did not appeal to the 
company. Strangely no specific reference was made to the 
Government's plans for radically cutting back subsidies, and 
the company preferred to place the emphasis on the value of 
uniform accounting and the need for more stable relationships 
with the County Councils. 
The Association of County Councils was also unhappy about 
the TPP system, but on the grounds that too much control was 
being exercised by central government. The ACC had hoped that 
TSG would be progressively merged with RSG, but: It .... 
there have been some disquieting indicators that Departmental 
thinking is veering in the direction of specific controls. " 95 
The ACC favoured a three-yearly TPP, but nevertheless wished 
the Counties to retain control of bus subsidies. The 
Conservative control of the ACC was also reflected in the hope 
that subsidies in rural areas should be the policy priority. 
With regard to the NBC it was inevitably recommended that the 
capital debt be abolished (the Counties resented the fact that 
a proportion of subsidies could be returned to central 
government in the form of capital debt repayment). It was also 
thought that some reorganization of subsidiaries could take 
place in order to be more commensurate. with County boundaries, 
but the Association was against the creation of Regional 
Transport Authorities and reserved its position on the proposed 
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National Transport Council. 
In general, the ACC criticized the Consultation Document 
for: ". ... its inadequate recognition of the 
inter-relationship of land-use planning and transportation 
planning. " 
96 It was considered that mobility as such was 
less important than transport's position within an overall 
planning strategy. In the latter part of the 1970s rural 
transport problems began to be approached more from the point 
of view of accessibility rather than mobility e. g., services 
could be made available to those living in remote areas rather 
than ensuring that they could reach the services. The ACC's 
response suggested that it was anxious to achieve maximum 
local control, and in particular the view was held that the 
role of the Traffic Commissioners now had little relevance. 
The Counties were becoming increasingly aware that they were 
supplanting the Commissioners and wished to give their new 
powerful position more official recognition. At the same time 
no complaint was made against the proposed reduction in 
subsidies, and we have seen that the Counties did not provide 
revenue support to anywhere near the same degree as the 
Metropolitan Counties. There was thus a dilemma for the Shire 
Counties between increasing their power while at the same time 
limiting the financial commitment. 
A significant organizational development during the 1970s 
was a rationalization of the groups representing the various 
sections of the bus industry. The BET sale to the THC had 
considerably weakened the private sector of the industry, 
chiefly represented by the PVOA. We described earlier in this 
study how the PTA was generally regarded as the more significant 
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organization politically, and the PVOA's loss of the BET 
companies strengthened this state of affairs. In 1974 the 
PVOA recognized the weakness of its position by agreeing to a 
merger with the PTA. At the same time they were joined by the 
Scottish Road Passenger Transport Association and the new group 
became known as the Confederation of British Road Passenger 
Transport, usually referred to as the CPT. The CPT was 
strengthened further in 1976 when the majority of the municipal 
undertakings left the Association of Public Passenger Transport 
(formerly the Municipal Passenger Transport Association) which 
hence was dissolved. Only twelve municipalities remained 
outside the CPT (later reduced to nine), although all the 
District undertakings were also represented on the Association 
of District Councils. The ADO is represented at national level 
by District Councillors, who would be unlikely to accept that 
the CPT was qualified to speak for them. In contrast it is the 
municipal busmen who represent the Districts within the CPT. 
This difference in representation emphasizes not only the CPT's 
role as a general meeting place for busmen, but also exposes 
its own internal weaknesses, for it cannot speak directly for 
any of its constituent organizations. 
The CPT is divided into four sections: the Nationalized 
Sector (the NBC, the Scottish Bus Group and Ulsterbus), the 
Transport Executive Sector (the PTEs and London Transport), the 
Local Authority Sector and the Coach and Independent Bus Sector. 
Within the CPT itself there are five functional committees: 
External Affairs, Internal Affairs, Technical and Engineering, 
Traffic and Training. Full-time officers include an Economics 
Executive, a Legal and Parliamentary Executive and a Public 
325 
Relations Executive. Nevertheless, the headquarters' staff is 
only 22 strong, (at times it has been severely short-staffed) 
and this is hardly sufficient for the CPT to put itself forward 
politically as "the voice of the bus industry. " The CPT may 
appear to anticipate a future integration of all sectors within 
the industry, but during the 1970s it was not realistic to 
expect the NBC to achieve unanimity with the PTEs, while we have 
seen that the municipalities fought hard to maintain their 
independence. As a result of these differences and its own 
relatively small-scale organization the CPT could not claim to 
have great political influence, although its staff did develop 
useful relationships with DTp officials. We shall see in 
Chapter Nine that the internal weaknesses of the CPT were clear 
during 1979, when the NBC could not identify itself with the 
CPT's response to delicensing proposals put forward by the 
Conservative Government. 
In its response to the 1976 Consultation Document, the CPT 
put forward the view that insufficient emphasis was given to 
the economic advantages of the bus. All sectors of the 
industry could agree that the bus industry had a positive role 
to play within the total transport system: "It is therefore 
unfortunate that so much emphasis is placed in the Consultation 
Document on the need to provide for the disadvantaged. " 97 
The entire industry could also agree with the CPT's point 
(although the NBC did not mention it) that the reduction in 
revenue support was to be regretted. With regard to 
organizational restructuring the CPT favoured the status quo 
and could see no point in change at that time: "The need is 
to improve the way in which the present system works: to 
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concentrate on the best possible level of operation, rather 
than seek changes in organization. " 
98 No reference was 
made to amalgamation of the NBC and municipal undertakings, or 
any other such sensitive issue! The CPT's contribution to the 
debate was thus based on the general merits and efficiency of 
the bus industry as a whole and the need for continued financial 
support from the Government. 
A notable feature of transport policy during the 1970s 
was the increasing political importance of groups concerned with 
the quality of the environment. Kimber, Richardson and Brookes 
have described how amenity groups fought EEC plans to increase 
maximum weights for vehicles during the early 1970s. In time 
this activity led to the relevant groups forming coalitions, 
beginning with the Transport Reform Group in 1971.99 In 1973 
fears about the future of the railway network led to the 
formation of Transport 2000, which included within its 
membership not only the BR Board and the National Union of 
Railwaymen but also environmental groups such as the Council 
for the Protection of Rural England, the Conservation Society, 
the Civic Trust and Friends of the Earth. Other members now 
include the National Federation of Women's Institutes, the 
Ramblers' Association, the National Union of Townswomen's 
Guilds and the Electric Vehicles Association. It is significant 
that Transport 2000 was originally set up to pursue the 
development and promotion of rail transport within an integrated 
transport policy, and rail interests do play a prominent part in 
the organization. 
With the passage of time, Transport 2000 has widened its 
activities to include all forms of public transport, although 
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none of the bus operators are members of the organization. At 
times, bus and rail may be in direct competition, and there is 
perhaps a suspicion on the part of such groups as the NBC that 
Transport 2000 remains too much of a rail orientated institution. 
There is obvious potential for a political alliance between 
environmental groups and public transport operators, but the 
tensions within the bus-rail relationship together with 
forebodings which some operators hold about the potential 
threat to their business caused by voluntary efforts (e. g., 
social car schemes run by Women's Institutes) could inhibit 
development. 
Transport 2000 has founded a number of Regional and local 
groups, but on the whole the organization's main impact has 
been at national level. In 1976 it produced a response to the 
Consultation Document which it claimed was the most 
comprehensive statement of an alternative to the Government's 
more roads - less public transport policy. 
100 Publication of 
this document was followed by a meeting with William Rodgers. 
It is difficult to assess the exact political impact of such 
groups as Transport 2000, for we have seen that the Government 
itself was becoming less enthusiastic about future roadbuilding 
plans, while the rising price of oil during the 1970s had thrown 
political attention generally-on the need to conserve energy. 
William Rodgers himself states that Transport 2000 played no 
prominent part in the policy-making process, and that he saw 
the group as being very much rail orientated. 
101 
The 1977 White Paper and the 1978 Transport Act. 
William Rodgers' remarks with regard to Transport 2000 
highlight the Secretary of State's own approach to policy-making. 
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It has been said of him that: "At Transport he consulted 
everybody; indeed one of his faults is listening to too many 
other people's opinions and heeding too many of those he 
hears. " 102 He has also been described as an emotional 
politician with a strong populist instinct. These comments 
suggest that the Secretary of State was likely to be particularly 
susceptible to policy-making by means of seeking consensus and 
accommodation within the transport community. Although there 
is evidence to suggest this analysis of Mr. Rodgers' policy 
style was correct, it could also be argued that he held 
particularly strong personal views on certain aspects of 
transport policy which he was determined to see reflected in 
the eventual policy outcome. When taking office he was known 
to be particularly concerned about the future of public 
transport, and there is no doubt that his policy was a good 
deal more sympathetic to the bus industry than that suggested 
in the Consultation Document. On the-whole it would appear 
that on this occasion a Minister's own views coincided with 
the general trend of political circumstances at that time 
Government policy was set out in the form of a White Paper 
published in June 1977. In addition to the issue of transport 
policy itself there were two other factors at that time which 
placed the Labour Government in a delicate position. Firstly, 
since its return to power in 1974 the Government had sought to 
develop a special relationship with the trade unions. It was 
considered by Labour that Governments of both Parties had 
fallen largely as a result of a failure to achieve a mutual 
understanding with the unions, and that a remedy for this 
situation was an absolute policy priority. The new relationship 
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forged between Labour and the unions became known as the 
Social Contract -a term which is difficult to define, for the 
understanding was of an informal nature. Its chief political 
feature was that union leaders were brought more closely into 
the policy-making process in return for exercising voluntary 
wage restraint. For the purposes of our study it is significant 
to note that the trade unionist most associated with the Social 
Contract concept was Jack Jones, the General Secretary of the 
TGWU. Mr. Jones frequently chaired meetings of the Liaison 
Committee held between representatives from the Labour Party 
and the TUCýand was generally thought to be the Social 
Contract's leading advocate. We have seen that the TGWU ifi 
the union with the largest number of members within the bus 
industry, and there could have been obvious political 
implications for the future of the Social Contract if the 
Government had proposed public transport policies which entailed 
a high number of job losses. 
Secondly, earlier in 1977 the Labour Government lost its 
overall majority in the House of Commons. As a result of this 
setback, the Government entered into an informal-understanding 
with the Liberal Party, in which the latter's support for key 
pieces of legislation was enlisted in return for a degree of 
consultation. This Lib-Lab pact enabled the Government to 
remain in power but placed further constraints on its ability 
to act independently. The majority of the Liberal MPs 
represented rural constituencies and were concerned with the 
decline of bus services in these areas. The new power of the 
Liberals gave them greater political leverage which could be 
seen in tangible form if transport policy was more sympathetically 
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inclined towards the problems of the rural areas. 
The contents of the White Paper could be said to reflect 
the existence of the Social Contract and the Lib-Lab pact, 
although the strength of the direct link is clearly a 
contentious matter. The White Paper as a whole was dominated 
by the need to contain expenditure: "Expenditure planned for 
the end of this decade will in real terms be much the same as 
ten years earlier and well below the peak of two years ago. " 
103 
In a similar fashion to the Consultation Document, the 
objectives of transport policy were given as contributing to 
economic growth, meeting social needs by securing a reasonable 
level of personal mobility, and minimizing the harmful 
environmental effects resulting from transport use. The 
Government acknowledged that these objectives could frequently 
conflict, although the drive to improve industrial performance 
was seen to be the main priority. This overriding objective 
suggested that transport would have to take its turn in the 
allocation of public expenditure as a whole, and also that 
transport policies based on entirely social and environmental 
values were not likely to be given a high priority. 
As in the Consultation Document public transport was seen 
as providing necessary mobility for those without a car, and 
in these terms it was the maintenance of the public transport 
network which was the objective rather than any degree of 
expansion: "Subsidy should be paid only where there is a clear 
requirement for it to meet social needs in transport that 
would not otherwise be met. " 
104 
The principle that people 
should be attracted out of their cars by means of subsidies to 
public transport was rejected on the grounds that congestion 
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was not a sufficiently severe problem and in any case traffic 
management and parking controls could usually perform the job 
more efficiently. Nevertheless in financial terms there was 
to be a major policy change with regard to the bus industry. 
Instead of reducing bus subsidies by more than half by 1980, 
as proposed in the Consultation Document, they were now to 
remain at the then current level of £150 million. In addition, 
within this sum £15 million was to be switched from the urban 
to rural areas. In reality, this reallocation meant that the 
Government wished the Shire Counties to make claims for higher 
bus subsidies in their TPPs. Three further measures to assist 
the bus industry were also proposed. Two years previously the 
Government had placed an embargo on the introduction of new 
concessionary fare schemes or the improvement of existing ones. 
This ban was now lifted with the result that local authorities 
would be expected to spend an extra £25 million on concessionary 
fares by the end of the decade. Direct help was given to the bus 
industry by not abolishing the bus grant altogether by 1981, 
but instead phasing it out by 1985. Fuel tax rebate was also 
increased by means of raising the minimum fare services on which 
it could be claimed from 11p to 21p. 
This policy change could be attributed to several factors 
including the responses to the Consultation Document by the 
operators and the CPT (although the NBC did not stress this 
point in its Document), the existence of the Social Contract 
and the lib-Lab pact, the work of environmental groups such as 
Transport 2000, a new approach to transport policy caused by 
the creation of the DTp, and the personal views of the Secretary 
of State himself. The important corporatist trends of the 
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Social Contract and the Lib-Lab pact might appear to be the 
most powerful and influential elements, although William 
Rodgers denied that this was the case, and stated that the 
Social Contract played no part whatever in his decision to 
maintain the level of bus subsidies: "This was very much my 
own personal decision in the light of my view about priorities 
and the evidence given by many people who I saw in the course 
of an extensive process of consultation in the winter of 1976- 
77.105 Similarly, with regard to the rural areas he thought 
that the White Paper was in draft before the Lib-Lab pact: 
"I was much impressed by their neglect - as indeed I was 
generally by the important role for the bus. I had no 
discussions with the Liberals before making my decision, 
although I know that it was attractive to them. " 
106 Several 
Liberal MPs obviously did consider that the new money for 
rural areas came as a result of the pact, and claimed that the 
x; 15 million was switched as a direct result of their new 
understanding with the Government. It is significant to note 
that the Secretary of State was anxious to deny the infiltration 
of corporatism into policy-making, but instead stressed 
individualism and pluralism. Mr. Rodgers was on the right-wing 
of the Labour Party (he later left the Party to become a 
founder member of the Social Democratic Party) and his reply 
suggests that he was a less enthusiastic supporter of 
corporatism than some of the other Ministers. 
The Secretary of State was also known to be unenthusiastic 
about further integration within the transport industries and 
this view was reflected in the White Paper: "Massive upheavals 
are costly and they cause uncertainty for management and workers. 
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It is more important in present circumstances to give the 
industries a clearer definition of their task and to establish 
closer working relations between them and the elected 
authorities so that their skill and expertise can be applied 
most effectively to meeting transport needs. " 
107 Thus the 
proposals in the Consultation Document for operator integration 
were summarily dispensed with and the NBC could breathe again. 
Similarly, the concept of a National Transport Council or a 
National Transport Planning Authority were rejected on the 
grounds that the setting up of the DTp: ". ... allows a fresh 
start to be made which combines clear responsibility for 
transport planning with the traditional advantages of Ministerial 
accountability to Parliament. " 
108 The Government thus held 
the view that it was the proper policy-making body, and not 
some external agency. At the same time it was hoped that the 
National Economic Development Office might create a Transport 
Committee (known as a little NEDDY), and also that the House of 
Commons might set up a Select Committee on Transport. 
With this, emphasis on political accountability went the 
view that any policy decisions could be made at the local 
level. We have previously described how on several occasions 
the Shire Counties allocated bus subsidies which were below the 
. eligible expenditure 
limit, and William Rodgers was particularly 
anxious that the underspending Counties should be made to 
account more publicly for their action. As a result, it was 
proposed that each Shire County should produce an annual Public 
Transport Plan. The PTP would be an extension of the Structure 
Plan and TPP system (although unlike the TPP it was to become 
a statutory document), but it was hoped that the public 
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circulation of a detailed written plan followed by a period of 
consultation would force the Counties to review their public 
transport policies. Despite the commitment to local 
decision-making it could also be said that the production of a 
PTP would allow central government to keep a closer check on 
the Shires. As with the TPPs and TSG, the PTPs were a 
two-edged sword when the central government held the vital 
purse-strings. 
Each County was expected to produce its PTP in close 
co-operation with the operators and other local authorities. 
The Plan would set out the County's public transport policy 
for the next five years, giving particular attention to the needs 
of the rural areas. In the case of services which required 
revenue support, each County would be required to enter into a 
binding agreement with the operator, thus providing a higher 
degree of security for all concerned. 
The Shire Counties were on the whole not too pleased 
about the prospect of producing further plans (the ACC has 
consistently campaigned for the abolition of the PTPs) but the 
Government did sugar the pill by further increasing the power 
of the Counties at the expense of the Traffic Commissioners. 
In future the Commissioners were to have regard, in making 
their decisions, to the Counties' policies and plans for local 
transport. The Commissioners' powers over road service 
licensing were retained, and this new requirement was likely 
to intensify their rivalry with the Counties. The Conservatives 
at this time were pressing for the total transference of 
quantity licensing to the Counties, and this latest move 
suggested that both Parties favoured a restructuring from the 
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traditionally predominant operator-Commissioner relationship 
towards a new operator-Shire County relationship. We shall 
see in our case studies that during the late 1970s the role of 
the Commissioners was called into question in several Counties, 
best exemplified by a set-piece confrontation in Oxfordshire. 
The 1977 White Paper was not a radical document in the 
sense that it recommended any organizational restructuring for 
public transport or offered a basic reappraisal of transport 
policy. The 1968 Transport Act set up the NBC and PTAs, the 
1972 local Government Act brought the Shire Counties into the 
public transport community, while the 1974 Local Government Act 
brought about the TPP and TSG system. In comparison the chief 
features of the White Paper were a more sympathetic attitude 
towards the financial plight of the bus industry and the 
proposed introduction. of PTPs (together with licensing changes 
which we will discuss shortly). Neither of these decisions 
represented a fundamental policy change, although the new help 
for the bus industry did represent an obvious change of heart 
by the Government. Perhaps the chief political significance of 
the White Paper was that it indicated the growth ofa, public 
transport community during the 1970s, and the difficulty of 
placating these interests in the midst of severe restraints on 
expenditure. The spirit behind the 1968 Transport Act and the 
legislation of the early 1970s was that resources would be 
available to make the most of new comprehensive planning 
systems. By 1977 the policy priority was to keep the public 
transport system afloat despite severe financial problems. 
The White Paper proposals were put into statutory form by 
means of the 1978 Transport Act. Several Labour MPs, prompted 
by the CPT, the NBC and the ADC attempted to introduce clauses 
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which would have allowed operators to appeal to the Secretary 
of State where they felt aggrieved over decisions in a 
County's PTP. This move was unsuccessful as was the CPT's hope 
of introducing a clause which would have allowed an operator 
to charge over-riding passengers an excess fare. This clause 
was strongly supported by the Conservatives and accepted in 
Committee but was thrown out at the Report Stage, largely 
because of strong opposition from the TGWU which considered 
that collection of the penalty fares would present difficulties. 
The Conservatives also attempted to change the Bill by switching 
control for road service licensing from the Commissioners to the 
Counties, but this was defeated in Committee on the casting vote 
of the Chairman. 
Compared to the 166 Sections of the 1968 Transport Act the 
1978 Transport Act contained only 25 Sections, eight of which 
were concerned with road passenger transport. Although 
Section 203 of the 1972 Local Government Act was now repealed, 
The First Section of the 1978 Act was an almost complete 
restatement of its contents. The Second and Third Sections 
detailed the requirements for each PTP. In addition to 
describing its policies and objectives and the means of 
achieving them, each County was required to give a review of the 
Communities' public transport needs, including an account of the 
criteria applied to determine need. The question of what 
constitutes needs with regard to public transport is one which 
the Counties have not surprisingly found difficult to interpret, 
and on the whole criteria are employed which fit most closely 
with the resources available. Many Counties argue that need 
cannot be uniformly applied, for in some areas the demand for 
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public transport could be much less than in another one 
superficially similar (we shall see that this was one of the 
main elements in Oxfordshire CC's public transport policy). 
The clause demanding an account of the criteria employed 
to determine need was only added at the Report Stage of the 
Bill, and was meant to enforce a more explicit explanation by 
a County of how it arrived at its policy decisions. Given the 
Government's disquiet about spending on public transport in 
the Shire Counties, it was no doubt hoped that the existence 
of specific criteria would enable the DTp to more closely 
monitor the allocation of bus, subsidies in these areas. The 
clause also tended to assume that the Counties would have 
sufficient information available to perform this job 
satisfactorily. In reality the NBC was not always prepared 
to be so compliant, for the company considered that it 
possessed an indispensable expertise. To emphasize this point 
the NBC had employed consultants to produce a Report on methods 
of assessing minimum standards for rural transport. 
109 
We 
shall see in our case studies that the NBC's Market Analysis 
Projects were partly conceived as a means whereby the company 
could demonstrate the ability to control its own destiny. 
The County was required to consult with operators, 
Districts and other Counties when preparing or revising its PTP. 
In addition to these bodies, a preliminary draft was also to be 
made available to Parish Councils, trade unions: °. ... and 
others appearing to the County Council to be especially 
concerned with transport matters. " 110 The Counties were thus 
given the discretion to consult a wide selection of groups, 
although it could be said that by the draft stage the scope for 
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change might be limited. Finally, the published PTP was to be 
made generally available to the public. The Government no 
doubt hoped that the PTPs would instigate a new grass roots 
interest in public transport, but bus passengers continue to 
remain politically unorganized. 
Agreements between Counties and operators were expected 
to remain in force for three years, although discretion was 
allowed to the parties involved. In addition, operators were 
required to furnish information which the County needed to 
fulfil its statutory PTP obligations. The Counties nevertheless 
did not have the power to compel an operator to take a certain 
course of action, but it was no doubt assumed that the Counties 
would obtain compliance by means of their control of subsidies. 
The Counties were also required to give details of 
concessionary fare schemes in their PTPs, while the remaining 
public transport Sections of the Act were concerned with 
licensing. We will examine these measures shortly when we look 
at the general trend towards liberalisation of the licensing 
system during the 1970s. 
One further public transport policy development appeared, 
perhaps surprisingly, in the 1978 White Paper on the Nationalized 
Industries. In order to strengthen the voice of the bus 
passenger it was proposed that the Central Transport 
Consultative Committee, which had been set up by the 1962 
Transport Act to act as a consumer watch-dog over rail services, 
should be renamed the National Transport Consumers' Council and 
include bus services within its sphere of responsibility. 111 
In the event the Labour Government did not have time to pass 
the legislation necessary for this change before it lost office 
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in 1979. 
The White Paper also proposed that Public Transport Users' 
Advisory Committees should be set up in each Shire County 
consisting of consumer interests and councillors. The 
Committees would assist in the preparation of PTPs and also 
deal with complaints about bus services. The Government's 
advice on Transport Users' Committees did not carry the force 
of law and many Counties were reluctant to set them up. The 
Counties no doubt feared that strengthening the voice of the 
consumer would increase the political pressure for higher 
subsidies, and the recommendation must be seen as part of the 
general campaign instigated by William Rodgers to force the 
Shire Counties into allocating a higher level of bus subsidies, 
112 
It would nevertheless be fair to say that at the commencement 
of the 1980s the political voice of the bus passenger remained 
extremely weak. 
D. DeJ icensing in the 1970s. 
In the days when demand for bus travel was buoyant it was 
generally accepted that the orthodox stage carriage service 
provided the best means of road passenger transport in even the 
most rural areas. We saw in Chapter Three that Crosland-Taylor 
realized even in the 1920s and 1930s that some rural routes 
would never be profitable but company pride and later the 
cross-subsidizing function of the Traffic Commissioners ensured 
that the majority of these services were maintained. Political 
concern about the problems of rural transport were reflected in 
the creation of the Jack Committee in 1959, while some 
experimental services were set up during the 1960s. After a 
1963 survey of sample areas there was a lengthy hiatus before 
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it was finally decided that the Post Office might run a bus 
service in association with its collection and delivery work. 
The first Postbus came into operation in 1967 but only after 
lengthy consultations with operators, unions and the Traffic 
Commissioners. 
The detailed discussions required before the first Postbus 
commenced operation reflected the Post Office's concern about 
the economics of the operation, and also gave rise to the 
suspicion of operators that this unconventional service would 
jeopardize their own businesses. Thus one of the conditions 
for providing a Postbus was that it should not compete with 
any existing bus service. Both operators and trade unions are 
inevitably uneasy about experimental or unconventional services 
which could represent the thin end of the wedge and destroy 
their livelihood, while similar doubts are held about any 
proposed relaxation of the licensing system. 
Governments are all too aware of operators' objections in 
these policy areas, but are also beset by the problem of 
keeping the public transport system afloat on limited resources. 
Schemes which encourage voluntary effort could save public 
money and Governments of both Parties have pushed forward the 
process towards relaxation of the licensing laws. Labour 
Governments are particularly sensitive to union objections and 
are also traditionally associated more with urban rather than 
rural areas. To counter this, we have already seen that 
William Rodgers (perhaps partly as a result of the Lib-Lab 
pact) was particularly concerned about the problems of the 
rural areas, while it could also be said that a Labour 
Government which saved money by means of voluntary effort in the 
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rural areas would free resources for use in the urban areas. 
The Conservative Government of 1970-74 attempted to change 
the licensing system but was frustrated in its efforts by the 
intervention of the General Election in February 1974. In 1970 
the DoE set up Committees in Devon and Suffolk to undertake a 
survey of local bus services. The Committees concluded that 
since a continuing decline in demand for services was inevitable, 
the emphasis should not be on providing open-ended subsidies 
but instead on the encouragement of voluntary effort within the 
community itself. 
113 
After lengthy and difficult negotiations 
with both the NBC and the unions the Government introduced 
several de, _, 
licensing clauses into its 1973 Road Traffic Bill. 
During the Second Reading the Minister for Transport Industries, 
John Peyton, stated that the Bill would: ". ... make 
legitimate the already widespread practice of giving lifts in 
return for payment. Subject to safety requirements Minibuses 
should be free from road service licensing outside urban areas 
and away from existing bus routes. In addition, the interest 
of the public is to be made the principal criterion to be 
considered by the Commissioners in deciding whether a road 
service licence should be issued. " 114 Mr. Peyton was clearly 
concerned about objections to these proposals, for despite 
acknowledging the advice of operators and trade unions he 
admitted that at a later stage he would propose amendments 
which would meet some of the views expressed. He considered 
that the operators now saw eye-to-eye with the Government, but 
made no reference to the unions. 
The Government faced an uphill battle in achieving 
acceptance for its proposals, although it was significant that 
the Opposition spokesman on Transport, Fred Mulley, supported 
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the measure to legalize car-sharing. At the same time he was 
anxious that nothing should be done to make still more difficult 
the operation of existing services. 
115 When Mr. Mulley 
himself became Transport Minister later in 1974 he omitted 
from the Bill altogether the clauses concerned with road 
passenger transport. Instead he announced during the Second 
Reading of the new Road Traffic Bill that a Departmental 
Committee had been set up to discuss the subject of the bus 
licensing system. Meetings had already taken place with 
operators and trade unions and further discussions were 
planned. 
116 The Labour Government was anxious that some 
degree of de licensing should take place but was not prepared 
to go ahead without placating the fears of operators and 
unions (perhaps with the fortunes of the Social Contract also 
in mind). 
Although there was no immediate threat to the operators 
the NBC could not assume that it would be protected by the 
Government, and in 1975 the company took matters into its own 
hands by founding an unconventional service itself. The 
Marketing and Research Department initially put the idea to 
Eastern Counties,. one of the NBC subsidiaries. Norfolk County 
Council agreed to co-operate and thus the concept of the 
Community Bus was put into action. A remote part of North 
Norfolk was chosen, comprising six small villages and a 
population of just over 600 where 80% of households owned a car. 
The high level of car ownership no doubt indicates the NBC's 
confidence that such an area was unlikely to provide business 
for an orthodox stage carriage service. Nevertheless mobility 
and accessibility in the area for those without a car was a 
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problem: "So beautiful and peaceful are the hamlets they have 
only one school, one pub and not a single shop between 
them. " 117 A Village Bus Committee was founded although the 
area to be served and the pattern of services was worked out 
in close collaboration with Eastern Counties : The company 
provided the 12-seat minibus and also trained the volunteer 
drivers who were all required to possess PSV licences. The 
County Council also contributed to the planning process, but 
more importantly agreed to underwrite any losses. Union 
agreement for the scheme was also secured, and union members 
assisted in the training of drivers. All the various interests 
were represented on a Steering Committee, although day-to-day 
operation was in the hands of the local Bus Committee. 
The Norfolk Community Bus proved to be a success, with 
the result that similar schemes were taken up in other areas 
including East Sussex, Northamptonshire and Clwyd in North 
Wales. The Community Bus is significant politically for the 
manner in which it demonstrates a group attempting to manage its 
own environment. The NBC did not wish to operate services in 
unremunerative deep rural areas, but feared that services run 
by volunteers might eventually spread and invade the company's 
more lucrative inter-urban services. The Community Buses were 
thus to be "feeders" for NBC routes or provide services in 
areas or at times which offered no competition to the company. 
By taking the initiative in setting up Community Buses the NBC 
became a policy-making body in advance of the Government. To 
a Labour Government concerned about the NBC and union objections 
to de_licensing, the Community Bus was also a popular 
proposition, and an official guide was produced in order to 
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advise communities how to go about founding a project of their 
118 
At the local level the Community Bus took on the own. 
appearance of a corporatist approach to policy-making. The 
close co-operation between the NBC, County Council and unions 
suggested that the parties were prepared. to participate in a 
scheme which offered benefits to each at minimum inconvenience. 
The Community Bus concept captured widespread political 
and general public attention. It is significant that the 
Select Committee on Nationalized Industries in 1978 chose to 
study Innovations in Rural Bus Services. Although the Report 
included a wide-ranging survey of the NBC activities, particular 
attention was given to Community Buses. The Committee 
concluded that Community Buses provided a valuable but limited 
contribution to the rural transport network. Particular 
emphasis was given to how provision of these services could 
improve the public image of the NBC. 119 It could also be 
said that the existence of Community Buses could enable the 
NBC to argue that general de licensing was unnecessary, for the 
company possessed the social conscience and the expertise to 
provide for those without access to orthodox bus services. 
The difficulty for the NBC was that the constraints placed on 
the use of a Community Bus prevented it from becoming a totally 
flexible and universally accepted means of providing an 
unconventional service. 
The Government was reluctant to commit itself on any 
de licensing proposals until after the consultative phase of 
the policy review process. The Consultation Document itself. 
suggested that changes in the licensing code would have to be 
examined in the light of the results of various experiments. 
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These experiments were mainly in urban areas, such as dial-a-bus, 
and it was thought such services as shared taxis and car pooling 
might eventually be introduced (the emphasis on urban areas 
possibly reflected Anthony Crosland's concern for these areas 
rather than rural transport problems). The current licensing 
system was defended on the grounds that it provided stability, 
but it was also considered that innovation and change was 
inhibited by the monopoly of the established operator. 
120 
Publication of the White Paper coincided with two separate 
pieces of legislation which indicated that by 1977 the 
Government had decided that changes in the licensing system 
could wait no longer. In its response to the Consultation 
Document the NBC had inevitably made a strong defence of the 
existing licensing system, and considered that the flexibility 
already existed to encourage innovation. The examples of 
Community Buses and Section 30 permits (from the 1968 Transport 
Act by which operators could run stage carriage services 
carrying no more than twelve passengers or carry fare paying 
passengers on a school bus where there were no other transport 
facilities available to meet the needs of the proposed route) 
were cited as providing sufficient flexibility. 121 
Despite the NBC's objections, the company did participate 
in a number of schemes as a result of the Passenger Vehicles 
(Experimental Areas) Act 1977. This piece of legislation 
empowered the Secretary of State to designate experimental 
areas within which the laws relating to public service vehicles 
might be modified for up to two years. In the event sixteen 
groups, of Parishes were so designated, four in Devon, five in 
North Yorkshire, four in Scotland and three in Wales. The 
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experiments covered a wide range and included buses with 
flexible routes, a Community Bus (with NBC involvement), 
private cars charging fares and Postbuses. 
122 The NBC was no 
doubt prepared to co-operate in the experiments on the 
principle that they were for only a limited period and did not 
represent any permanent change. 
A more permanent change was brought about by the 1977 
Minibus Act. Although a Private Member's Bill it was fully 
supported by the Government and largely brought about one of 
the changes proposed by the Conservatives in 1974. Minibuses 
of between six and eighteen seats used by voluntary 
organizations were now exempt from PSV licensing, as were their 
drivers. The vehicles were also exempt from road service 
licensing, although fares would be charged providing no profit 
was made. Permits for these vehicles were available from the 
Commissioners and the local authorities, but the Secretary of 
State also gave this power to 68 voluntary organizations 
themselves. This delegation of authority made the system 
largely self-regulating and indicated the Government's view 
that public transport of this type need be of no concern to 
the Commissioners or the bus companies. A wide range of 
organizations was given authority to issue permits e. g., the 
Boys' Brigade, the Church Army, the National Union of Students, 
the Spastics Society and the British Trust for Conservation 
Volunteers. 
The White Paper on Transport Policy announced that more 
general modifications of the licensing law would be considered 
after further consultations, but for the present two further 
changes were recommended. Firstly, Community Buses were to be 
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made part of the official system, and Sections Five and Six of 
the 1978 Transport Act were exclusively concerned with 
outlining how these schemes should work. In a sense, this 
recognition represented a triumph for the NBC in having 
initiated a scheme which was later considered by Government to 
be of sufficient value to warrant being given special 
legislative status. At the same time the Government proposed 
to take Community Buses a step away from the NBC's control by 
exempting them and their drivers from PSV licensing. This 
move was consistent with placing Community Buses in the same 
category as voluntary organization minibuses, but it also 
suggested that the Government was anxious for Community Buses 
not to become totally dependent on the NBC for their existence. 
Although the NBC had founded the Community Bus concept, the 
Government had the power to loosen the link, although the 
schemes were to remain under the control of the Commissioners. 
Secondly, legislation was to be brought forward which 
would remove the restrictions forbidding car owners to make a 
charge when giving lifts. Thus the 1978 Transport Act allowed 
private car owners and non-commercial organizations with 
vehicles up to seven seats to give lifts for payment. In 
addition to legalising a widespread practice this provision 
also made it easier to operate Social Car Schemes. Usually 
operated by the Women's Royal Voluntary Service, these schemes 
provide volunteer drivers for those in need of transport where 
satisfactory public transport services did not exist. The 
1978 Act also made it legal to advertise car-sharing for the 
purposes of journeys to work or club activities, although the 
advertisements could only be placed at work, in the club, or in 
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the club magazine (the Conservative Government's 1980 Transport 
Act abolished all controls over advertisements for car-sharing). 
Two further relaxations of the licensing laws in the 1978 
Transport Act were the abolition of the twelve-seat limit on 
non-school contract services wishing to obtain a Section 30 
Permit and the introduction of short-term (up to six months) 
road service licences. 
123 
The Labour Government had no intention of abolishing the 
road service licensing system or removing the powers of the 
Commissioners, but in total the Experimental Areas Act, the 
Minibus Act and the 1978 Transport Act did represent a 
significant policy change. The NBC appeared to be generally 
reconciled to these changes, no doubt calculating that failure 
to co-operate in incremental change might cause the Government 
to penalize the company with regard to future finance. The 
TGWU was particularly concerned about the threat of car-sharing 
and opposed the legislation process brought about by the 1978 
Act. There were also doubts expressed about the Community Bus 
concept by Larry Smith, National Secretary of the TGWU's 
Passenger Services Group. In giving evidence to the SCNI, 
Mr. Smith expressed the fear that: It. ... if the idea grows 
that all you need to do is to get volunteers to do it in other 
places (away from the deep rural areas) the position of the 
network operator will be eroded. Then you will not get 
sufficient volunteers and it will undermine the current 
services being provided. " 
124 The union view indicated a fear 
that voluntary effort might ultimately bring great harm to the 
established operator and his employees. The deelicensing 
measures did indeed place more responsibility on voluntary 
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bodies who were becoming increasingly aware of their role in 
providing public transport in rural areas, although their 
relationship with the established structure was inevitably a 
delicate one. The focal point at national level for much of 
the voluntary movement is the National Council for Voluntary 
Organizations. This organization was formerly known as the 
National Council of Social Service, but changed its name in 
1980 for the reason that it was concerned not to become 
mistakenly identified with local authority social services 
departments. Many voluntary organizations are affiliated to 
the NCVO,. but at national level appear to leave matters 
concerned with rural transport largely in the hands of the 
NCVO's Rural Department. The NCVO has a full-time Rural 
Transport Office+hich gives the organization a higher degree 
of expertise on transport matters than can be found in many of 
its affiliated groups. 
In addition to individual groups, other organizations 
affiliated to the NCVO are the Local Rural Community Councils. 
All but one of the Shire Counties in England has a Community 
Council, the first one of which was founded in 1920. A Community 
Council acts as a focus for local voluntary organizations, and 
can also be a link between these groups and the local authority. 
The Community Council's full-time officers can also assist in 
the promotion of new ideas and encourage local initiative in 
variQus areas,, including public transport. In this sense the 
Community Councils can be seen as the local arm of the NCVO. 
It cannot be said that the voluntary movement generally 
has offered a oo-ordinated political challenge to the existing 
public transport system. We have seen that the Community Bus 
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was an NBC concept, while such things as Social Car 
Schemes are 
usually organized at a fragmented local level. It is perhaps 
in the nature of things that voluntary effort is difficult to 
co-ordinate into a strong political voice at either County or 
national level. An attempt to overcome this obstacle has 
recently been made by the creation of the group Rural 
Voice, 
which it is hoped will give the rural areas more influence 
in 
the policy-making process at both national and local level. 
Many of the organizations affiliated to the NCVO also belong 
to Rural Voice, although it would appear that the latter might 
take on a more general lobbying function than the former has 
previously undertaken. If the voluntary movement can gain a 
higher degree of political influence then it could offer a 
greater threat to the NBC, although at the local level the 
company can take heart from the extent to which its services 
and expertise are required by the Shire Counties. 
At the national level the NOVO consults informally with 
the NBC. It is significant that the NBC has recently appointed 
a Community Involvement Officer, who has been working closely 
with the NCVO on projects in Devon and Cornwall. As with 
Community Buses, it would appear that the NBC is here again 
attempting to manage its environment and promote its public 
image. Another of the organizations with which the KCVO has 
informal contact is the Association of Transport Co-ordinating 
Officers. Founded after local government reorganization, ATCO 
brings together the County Co-ordinating Officers into a 
national group. ATCO also has Area Groups and an Annual 
Conference, but by its nature is prevented from having an overt 
political voice. Transport Co-ordinating Officers nevertheless 
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frequently wield enormous influence over Counties' public 
transport policies, and the NCVO's ability to influence the 
members of ATCO could be of greater political significance 
than more public lobbying. 
The NCVO also has close links with the environmental 
movement. Many of these environmental groups are affiliated 
to the NCVO, while in 1979 Transport 2000 prepared a guide to 
participation in PTPs which was published by the NCVO. 
125 
There appears to be a strong cross-fertilization of ideas and 
activity between the environmental and voluntary movements 
which is likely to be strengthened by the foundation of Rural 
Voice. We should nevertheless note the strong NUR influence 
within Transport 2000, while plans are also afoot for the 
National Union of Agricultural and Allied Workers to be 
absorbed by the TGWIT. In this sense strong transport union 
involvement in political movements concerned with rural areas 
and the environment might veto moves towards an increasing role 
for voluntary effort in public transport, (thus the unions may 
literally "manage the environment"! ). In addition the NBC, 
through Community Buses and its Community Involvement Officer, 
can also claim to be representing the interests of rural areas. 
E. Conclusion 
The 1970s saw a greatly accelerated pace in national 
political activity concerned with the bus industry. At any one 
time throughout the decade it would have been possible to 
witness Environment or Transport Ministers either preparing or 
presenting legislation, while the introduction of the TPP and 
TSG system gave them new responsibilities for monitoring the 
allocation of transport expenditure at the national level. 
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The deteriorating financial position of the bus industry was 
one obvious reason for the increased attention given to it by 
Governments, although the depth of the crisis only appeared to 
become apparent in the second half of the decade. In the early 
1970s the chief policy change was to bring road passenger 
transport into the comprehensive planning system envisaged as 
a result of local government reorganization. Partly for 
traditional and structural as well as political reasons the 
Shire Counties were reluctant to commit resources to bus 
subsidies, and the Government encountered great difficulty in 
its attempts to both coerce and persuade them to spend more. 
The 1977 Transport White Paper and the subsequent 1978 
Transport Act did not superficially indicate any major policy 
change, but the percentage of the 1978 Act devoted to aspects 
of bus operation was greater than any previous legislation we 
have studied and brought road passenger transport more into 
the political limelight. The personal views of William Rodgers 
played a part in this development, although it also suggests 
that the new DTp was somewhat less dominated by road building 
interests than its predecessor. In addition, public transport 
was occupying the attention of an increasing number of groups, 
as reflected in the response to the 1976 
. 
Consultation Document. 
The rise in oil prices and general concern about the quality of 
the environment highlighted the value of public transport, 
but at the same time this increased attention threw an 
increasingly critical gaze on the existing licensing system. 
In this sense we could say that the Traffic Commissioners and 
operators such as the NBC might not have welcomed these new 
developments, for while a policy area remains a political 
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backwater the status quo is more likely to be retained. 
Compared to the equivalent legislation of the 1960s, the 
legislation of the 1970s had a less partisan appearance. The 
concept of the THO appeared to epitomize the philosophy of the 
Conservative Government in 1962 (the NBC was basically a THC 
creation under a Labour Government), while the PTAs were 
associated with the Labour Government. The Conservative 
Government's plans for local government reorganization differed 
from Labour's in recommending a two-tier system, but the values 
underpinning the system were essentially similar. 
This consensus was indicated by the Labour Government's 
anxiety to make the Conservative created TPP and TSG system 
work efficiently. The 1977 Transport White Paper rejected 
greater integration of transport industries and the creation of 
any BTC type of organization, and instead concentrated on 
attempting to make the local authorities more politically 
accountable and to introduce greater flexibility into the 
system. It is significant that the de licensing proposals put 
forward by the Conservatives in the 1973 Road Traffic Bill were 
initially withdrawn by Labour, only to reappear in their own 
legislation at a later date. This convergence of policy 
between the Parties could be explained partly by the 
Conservatives' adoption of corporate and comprehensive planning 
as a valuable tool for the purpose of creating greater policy 
rationality and general efficiency (particularly exemplified 
by the creation of the DoE), and also by Labour's counter move 
away from organizational restructuring as a cure for 
transport's ills. 
Despite the high degree of legislative activity the NBC 
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survived unscathed, although with the aid of some good fortune. 
Firstly, if the Labour Government had won the 1970 General 
Election and implemented the Unitary Authorities recommended 
by the Maud Commission then the NBC might have passed over 
control for bus services to these new Counties. The Conservative 
Government initially suggested that the municipalities would 
lose control of their undertakings to the new Counties, but in 
the event the fragmented system remained. In addition, the 
Conservatives had a particular affection for the holding company 
concept. Secondly, the 1976 Consultation Document suggested that 
the various bus undertakings might be integrated, but William 
Rodgers was not well disposed to this idea. A more left-wing 
Minister might not have been so happy to preserve the status quo. 
Probably the most significant result of the 1970s' 
legislation was the intervention of the new Shire Counties 
into the affairs of the bus industry. The NBC could not ignore 
this development, for it required the subsidies allocated by 
the Counties, but the company was extremely suspicious 
(sometimes with good reason) that the Counties would challenge 
the subsidiaries' independence and authority. In addition the 
decade also saw the Counties increasingly take over the 
authority formerly enjoyed by the Traffic Commissioners, with 
the result that the NBC-County Council relationship largely 
replaced in importance the old operator-Commissioner 
relationship. In the next three Chapters we will examine in 
detail how several of these important new relationships 
developed, giving particular attention to the various policy 
styles of the Counties. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
IMPLEMENTATION IN THE 1970s: 
1. Midland Red and the County Councils. 
A. Introduction. 
In the following three chapters we will be examining in 
turn the activities of > four NBC subsidiaries with particular 
reference to the development of Market Analysis Projects and 
the companies' relationships with the relevant County Councils. 
The four subsidiaries are Midland Red, Potteries Motor Traction, 
Crosville Motor Services and City of Oxford Motor Services, 
(the PMT section will be incorporated into the chapter on 
Midland Red). Earlier we briefly outlined the origins and early 
development of these companies, and discussed the distinctive 
character of each. By the nature of the service which it 
provides, and regardless of the degree of central control which 
may be exerted, each NBC subsidiary is confronted by particular 
local problems. 
We have also studied the activity of the NBC in terms of 
implementing the 1968 Transport Act, and attempted to indicate 
that the development of the Company could be traced through 
this particular policy process. In the previous chapter we saw 
that a considerable amount of legislation affecting the NBC was 
passed during the 1970s, although the immediate effects fell 
principally on the County Councils. As the 1970s progressed 
and the Counties became more directly concerned with public 
transport, the NBC was compelled to come to terms with this new 
influence on its work. In the 1930s, the Traffic Commissioners 
and the bus companies developed a mutually dependent relationship 
which continues to this day. The addition of the County Councils 
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has nevertheless provided a new and powerful interest to this 
relationship. The full effects of this tripartite relationship 
are still not fully apparent, and in many cases the parties 
concerned appear to be unsure of their exact authority and 
responsibilities within the evolving system. We noted that in 
some instances the 1930 Road Traffic Act, the 1968 Transport 
Act and the legislation of the 1970s possess conflicting 
objectives, and this confusion inevitably produces a certain 
amount of tension and uncertainty. The situation is likely to 
be made still more complex by the implementation of the 1980 
Transport Act, which has the principal objective of introducing 
a higher degree of competition into the bus industry. In the 
latter part of Chapter Nine we will briefly examine this new 
legislation. 
In the next three chapters we will be principally concerned 
with analysing a number of County Council-NBC subsidiary 
relationships. By their nature, no two bus networks or Counties 
are completely alike, and each area has particular individual 
characteristics. Nevertheless, we can classify the attitudes 
adopted by the Counties with regard to public transport planning 
into three broad categories: 
1. The passive approach. This largely involves an 
acceptance of the status quo and a reluctance to intervene in 
NBC affairs. 
2. The ply approach. The Counties adopting this 
policy are likely to be far more interventionist as a result 
of their objective of devising and implementing a comprehensive 
plan for public transport. 
3. The market_ approach. Paradoxically, implementation 
of a public transport system based on the market model can also 
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involve a considerable degree of intervention. Achievement of 
the objective implies the introduction of a higher degree of 
competition, usually by encouraging the private operator at the 
expense of the NBC. 
We shall see that Counties which can be placed in the first 
category usually tend to have more amicable relations with the 
NBC subsidiaries than those which come within the second and 
third categories. The dynamics of policy implementation, 
however, can in time lead to more amicable relationships being 
developed between the NBC subsidiaries and Counties which adopt 
policies based on either the planning or market approach. It 
is also important to recognize that throughout this period the 
NBC has not remained static in attempting to build relationships 
with the Counties. 
The early 1970s was a time of considerable reappraisal for 
the NBC in general, and no NBC subsidiary underwent more 
heart-searching than Midland Red. The combination of the 
depressed economic state of the Company and the increased 
County Council involvement led to the introduction of Market 
Analysis Projects (MAP) (originally called the Viable Network 
Project). MAP was subsequently adopted by the NBC as a whole, 
and has come to symbolize the Company's objectives of cutting 
costs, restructuring services and developing working 
relationships with County Councils. We will see that the 
evolution of MAP within Midland Red has involved an increase in 
consultation prior to implementation. The company has sought to 
develop relationships with County Councils which do not require 
the sacrifice of its own independence, and on the whole has been 
successful in achieving this aim. 
A further interest in the policy community of local bus 
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operation is the private operator. Potteries Motor Traction 
has several private operators running fare stage services in 
close proximity to itself, and in this Chapter we will also see 
how this has presented difficulties in the implementation of 
MAP. The case of the PMT is also of interest for the manner in 
which it has brought Staffordshire County Council into its 
planning process. In this respect its attitude can be 
contrasted with that of Midland Red, which also operates 
services in Staffordshire. 
The development of MAP within Crosville has been 
particularly marked by the policy of Cheshire County Council. 
The case of Cheshire is perhaps the leading example of a County 
attempting to devise and implement a co-ordinated and 
comprehensive plan for public transport, even to the extent of 
taking the initiative in restructuring services. Cheshire's 
approach led inevitably to disagreements with Crosville over 
the introduction and development of MAP, with the heart of the 
argument based on the extent to which a County can control the 
bus services of an NBC subsidiary. A further problem for 
Croaville is that of cross-subsidization and subsidy. We saw 
in the experience of Crosland-Taylor the extent to which 
industrial Cheshire bus services subsidize those in rural 
North Wales. In response to their own doubts concerning 
Crosville's costing methods, the relevant Counties have 
attempted to monitor the company's accounts in order to prevent 
what they might consider to be a misallocation of subsidy. 
The relationship between City of Oxford Motor Services and 
Oxfordshire County Council offers probably the prime example of 
an ideological confrontation between the NBC subsidiaries and 
County Councils. Oxfordshire County Council developed a policy 
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towards public transport based on promoting the virtues of 
competition and a free market. This approach presented a direct 
threat to the bus company-Traffic Commissioners relationship 
built up since 1930, and culminated in a fiercely fought test 
case during 1976-77. In Chapter Nine we will examine the 
Oxfordshire confrontation in detail, including the role of MAP 
in this particular County, and the links between the policy of 
Oxfordshire County Council and the contents of the 1980 
Transport Act. This most recent legislation represents the first 
concerted attempt by a Conservative Government to dismantle the 
regulatory system for the bus industry set up in 1930, and its 
implementation could have profound implications for the future 
of the NBC. 
The varying nature of the NBC subsidiary-County Council 
relationships illustrates the manner in which legislation may 
be implemented in several different ways. In many respects the 
legislation affecting the bus industry has bred a power struggle 
between the NBC, the Traffic Commissioners and the County 
Councils and a position of equilibrium is not easily obtained. 
In nearly all cases however (even in Oxfordshire) some kind of 
working relationship has developed. We have discussed the 
importance of identification in creating a unity of objectives 
within the NBC, and identification can also be important in 
developing an inter-organizational consensus. Where no 
organization possesses clear authority over other groups, then 
some degree of identification (either voluntary or involuntary) 
can play a significant part in creating some form of consensus. 
The nature of this consensus could be seen as a type of 
"comprehensive reprogramming", where interests adopt new values 
and perceptions. 
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B. Midland Red 1969-77 
The Financial Position Deteriorates 
We referred to Midland Red (MR) being the flagship of the 
NBC. In terms of fleet size (1,036 vehicles in 1979) it is the 
largest of the subsidiaries, and many of its senior managers 
have moved on to regional and central level (the current NBC 
Chief Executive) Robert Brook, is a former General Manager of MR). 
In recent years the creation of MAP has reaffirmed MR's status, 
but the early 1970s saw a crisis which threatened the future of 
the company. 
MR ceased to manufacture its own vehicles in 1970, and 
subsequently its vehicle buying policy became centrally controlled. 
BET had allowed investment in its bus companies to run down, and 
MR had been forced to borrow £400,000 from the BET Federation 
Joint Deposits and Advance Scheme. 
The early 1970s were depressing ones for the NBC in general, 
with the financial position deteriorating rapidly. In 1970 MR 
suffered a passenger loss of 10.15% 
1 
and. embarked on a 
drastic programme of service puts. In common with all NBC 
subsidiaries, MR presented an ultimatum to the local authorities 
that many services would be abandoned unless a large increase in 
subsidies was immediately forthcoming. The section of the 1968 
Transport Act which made provision for a rural transport grant 
was only sketchily implemented by the local authorities. In 
1971 MR received only 29595 in rural bus grant, and a large 
2 
number of rural bus services were consequently jettisoned by the 
company. Within the area covered by the West Midlands Traffic 
Commissioners, rural mileage was reduced by 25,501 miles per 
week in 1971-72 (as against a reduction of 2,986 miles in tho 
preceding year), and a high proportion of this loss was accounted 
367 
for by MR services. 
3 
In addition to general cost cutting, MR also sold two of 
its garages, thereby raising £240,000. In 1972 it was stated: 
"The intention is that the company's rural operations must 
become profitable so that if and when the company's urban 
operations pass to the West Midlands PTE the routes remaining 
with the company will be viable. " 
4 The PTE sale was to take 
place the following year, but the problem of making rural 
services profitable in the 1970s was one which could not easily 
be solved by either MR or any of the NBC subsidiaries. 
During the early 1970s MR was suffering from a shortage of 
maintenance engineers, while the neglect of investment by BET 
and the difficult financial position of the NBC had also led to 
a shortage of vehicles. The generally depressed state of MR at 
that time culminated in a serious accident at Dudley bus station 
in 1971, when a parked double-decker ran away and killed two 
people. Several spot checks were made on MR vehicles, and over 
thirty were ordered off the road immediately. Subsequently, the 
Traffic Commissioners ordered MR to take sixty of its vehicles 
off the road for three months. 
5 
This was a great humiliation 
for a company which had prided itself on the quality of its 
custom-made vehicles, and symbolized the severity of its decline 
over a relatively short period of time. 
The Sale of Services to the PTE 
MR had been negotiating with the West Midlands PTA in an 
attempt to reach an operating agreement since the latter's 
inception, but the PTA was determined to control all the services 
within its area. The 1972 Local Government Act gave the new 
Metropolitan Counties direct control over the PTE, and in the 
West Midlands the size of the new County entailed the PTE taking 
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over municipal services in Coventry in addition to its existing 
responsibilities. The first elections for the West Midlands 
County Council in April 1973 gave control to the Labour Party, 
who were committed to the (never implemented) policy of 
introducing free public transport to the area. The PTA had been 
negotiating to take over MR services within its area for several 
months, and the imminent reorganization of local government 
hastened the process. 
MR was still not happy about selling off many of its most 
lucrative services, but pressure was placed on the company by 
NBC headquarters, although MR executives believed that the real 
source of pressure was the Government. The new concept of the 
Metropolitan Counties was designed to facilitate comprehensive 
planning, and the West Midlands County Council (with the support 
of the Government) did not wish to be continually bargaining 
with MR. With regard to the NBC it might be said that as a 
grant of £7 million and several loans had already been received 
from the Government, - the company had little scope to fight MR's 
case. The 1967 White Paper had stated that: "The agreements 
between the Executives and the NBC companies must not destroy 
the basis on which the NBC companies can operate profitably, " 
6 
but on this occasion the Government's eagerness to give the West 
Midlands County Council a good start took priority over the 
provisions of the 1968 Transport Act. 
The sale was eventually completed in December 1973 for a 
total sum of f, 3-#600,000: "Included in the transfer were 1,235 
employees, 7 freehold properties, 413 omnibuses and associated 
assets. " 
7A few PTE routes also passed to MR. For MR 
services which ran into the PTE area, it was agreed that the PTE 
would pay the costs and receive the revenue from within that 
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area. The figures for costs and revenues are arrived at by 
means of a seven day sample taken over four weeks. In effect 
this arrangement has amounted to MR receiving a subsidy from 
the PTE, e. g., in 1978-79 the PTE was paying 9700,000 net for 
cross-boundary services. The 1967 White Paper stated that: 
"The NBC companies cannot be expected to enter into agreements 
which would entail their operating at a loss, and so form a 
back-door method of gaining Government money to subsidize the 
operation of local transport services. " 
8 In the MR instance, 
services running into the PTE area have operated at a loss, and 
the ratepayers in the West Midlands County have subsidized 
passengers from surrounding Counties. In contrast, PTE 
cross-boundary routes are not subsidized by MR. The 
Director-General of the West Midlands PTE considered that this 
was because: U. ... they are mainly historic routes. " 
9 
i. e., the PTE has never pressed MR over the matter. The 
one-sided nature of the costs and revenue agreement suggests that 
a compensating "back-door" subsidy formed an integral part of the 
MR sale. Ironically, the higher wages and cheaper fares within 
the PTE mean that the lucrative services previously owned by MR 
ar . early all now operating at a loss. In this case at least, 
the resident of the West Midlands County is gaining the benefit 
of his own subsidy. 
MR argues that its subsidy from the PTE was offset by the 
agreement to service all the vehicles it sold to the PTE for as 
long as they remained in the fleet or for a maximum of four years. 
Although this agreement did compensate the PTE to some *extent, 
it expired in 1977, while the costs and revenue agreement 
continues indefinitely. 
The agreement between MR and the PTE highlights the 
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essentially political nature of cross-subsidization. The West 
Midlands County Council was so anxious to control directly all 
the bus services within its area (the PTE also controls the 
timing, routeing and fares of MR services entering the area) 
that it was prepared to grant a long-term subsidy to MR (in 
addition to the 93,600,000 paid initially). In order to fulfil 
a planning function, the Metropolitan County perpetuated the 
concept of cross-subsidy between urban and rural areas. 
Passengers travelling on services previously owned by MR gained 
in terms of lower fares (although they themselves were 
contributing towards this subsidy), but part of the Government 
grant intended for West Midlands County was syphoned off by 
MR for the benefit of passengers in other Counties. The 
agreement also illustrates the conflicting objectives of 
legislation, for the "back-door" subsidy took it outside the 
spirit of the 1968 Transport Act, although the West Midlands 
County Council could claim to be implementing the planning 
responsibilities given to it in the 1972 local Government Act. 
The sale to the PTE left MR with cash in hand, but a much 
reduced system of services. MR's response was to consolidate 
its empire once more by taking over a number of private operators. 
In this respect MR were considerably assisted by Shropshire 
County Council and Telford New Town Development Corporation. 
These two bodies had called in the transport consultants Colin 
Buchanan and Partners (who we shall see also played a significant 
part in the development of MAP) in order to undertake a survey 
of public transport in Telford. The consultants concluded that 
the bus network was hopelessly inefficient and unco-ordinated, 
and that one operator for the area would suffice. In 1978 MR 
purchased the goodwill attached to the road service licences of 
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seven independent operators in Telford for the sum of £545,000 
10 
i. e., MR purchased the services and not vehicles or garages. 
In theory, MR could have applied to the Traffic Commissioners to 
take over the service compulsorily, but the company did not wish 
to be so ruthless, although the strong support of the County 
Council could no doubt be used as a bargaining tactic by MR. 
It should be noted that if the 1978 Transport Act had applied 
at the time, the Commissioners would have had a statutory 
responsibility to consider the views of the County Council. 
Despite the acquisition of private operators in Telford 
and in other parts of the Midlands, MR's financial fortunes 
continued to deteriorate as the 1970s progressed. In 1975 MR 
made a record loss of £1,429,757, and although this was reduced 
to £256,165 in 1976, the position continued to be serious. It 
was at this time that the concept of a Viable Network Project 
began to surface, leading eventually to the development of 
Market Analysis Projects throughout the NBC. 
C. The Development of MAP 
MAP and the Political Dimension 
Since 1977, MAP has become a focal point of attention for 
NBC corporate activity, and in doing so has been given a high 
degree of attention by both subsidiaries and County Councils. 
Indeed, a principal objective of MAP could be seen as an attempt 
to accommodate the interests of both NBC and the County Councils. 
Each individual MAP eventually leads to a local revision of 
services, but the superficial uniformity of the process conceals 
a wide diversity of circumstances, The development of MAP on a 
time-scale, must be placed in conjunction with the differing 
character of NBC subsidiaries and the various policies on public 
transport adopted by the County Councils. In this context, Imo. ' 
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itself becomes a dependent variable, and can mean what the 
parties concerned want it to mean. Nevertheless, MAP has 
undoubtedly acted as an agent of change, and the effects of its 
impact are not yet fully discernible. 
Wildavsky considers that: "The tension between analysis, 
which seeks out error and promotes change, and organization, 
which seeks stability and promotes its current activities, is 
inevitable. " MAP began (and is still to some extent 
officially portrayed) as a management tool which would employ 
modern technology to improve the NBC's performance. Although 
this activity remains a central pillar of NAP, the process has 
inevitably developed political aspects. The tension which 
Wildavsky refers to is particularly evident in two respects 
with regard to M. A. P. Firstly, even the most sophisticated 
information system can lack the detail and flexibility to ensure 
satisfactory implementation. Thus, if discretion is taken away 
from the local level and insufficient attention given to 
particular circumstances, then the programme will be 
over-centralized and inflexible. Secondly, the policies adopted 
by County Councils can conflict with the objectives of the NBC. 
These conflicts can arise from differing values with regard to 
public transport planning (most typically in Counties encouraging 
the private operator), but can also occur as the result of a 
more basic power struggle. We saw in the previous chapter that 
the public transport legislation of the 1970s created a confusion 
of control with regard to the NBC, County Councils and the 
Traffic Commissioners. In areas where County Councils consider 
themselves to be the supreme authority with regard to public 
transport planning (as was the case with Cheshire C. C. ) then a 
conflict over the introduction of MAP is almost inevitable. 
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Wildavsky concludes that: "Culture is creative if it makes use 
of the effective intelligence, which we call policy analysis - 
simultaneously recombining resources and objectives, means and 
ends, instruments wielded by government with public preferences 
so that they, together, form an improvement. " 
12 
It might be said that the development of MAP has seen 
culture interacting with a technological programme in a form of 
policy analysis. The creative culture referred to by Wildavsky 
could also be seen as achieving progress by consensus, or in 
terms of the aggregative implementation model outlined by 
Dunsire. Both Wildavsky and Dunsire stress the imprecisions and 
ambiguity inherent in all policy implementation (and good policy 
analysis). In essence, they argue that the closer we study 
reality, the harder it becomes to discover a chain of causality 
or a pattern of activity. With regard to MAP, the closer we 
examine the character of individual subsidiaries and their 
relationships with'County Councils, the more difficult it 
becomes to evaluate the nature of MAP itself. In our 
implementation model we stressed the importance of interaction 
and speculate that this might lead to an exchange of values. 
In our case studies and in the Conclusion we will be examining 
the extent to which this might have occurred. Ultimately, the 
chief importance of MAP may be its role in smoothing out some 
of the rough edges where the NBC and County Councils interact. 
In its turn, MAP can itself be changed by this process of 
interaction. In the implementation process, it is often the 
reality of change itself which comes to dominate the other elements. 
The Organizational Significance of MAP 
Although the character of MAP has varied from area to area 
and developed over time, one person in particular is identified 
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with the process. The Planning and Co-ordination Officer for 
the Midlands and West Region, Brian Barrett, originally devised 
the system and was instrumental in its adoption by MR. 
Mr. Barrett had worked for some time on transport research at 
Newcastle University (we shall see in Chapter Nine a link 
between Brian Barrett's background and that of the public 
transport co-ordinator for Oxfordshire C. C. ) and subsequently 
at several bus companies. In Downs' terms, he might be 
described as a climber within the NBC, also representing a. 
trend within the company towards executives with a more academic 
background rather than the traditional Crosland-Taylor type of 
busman. To some extent he has been able to by-pass the 
traditional NBC promotion structure by the creation of new 
posts. It could nevertheless also be said that in developing 
MAP he was putting forward his own conception of how the NBC's 
interests could be best served. In this sense, he could also be 
described as an advocate. To the senior managers participating 
in the MAP project, the process might appear to be the central 
activity of the NBC, yet at the operational level it might 
appear to be one component in a complex set of activities. 
What later became known as MAP was originally entitled 
the Viable Network Project (VNP) and was undertaken in 
Stratford-on-Avon during 1977. Although the VNP was tailored 
to meet the needs of MR, it was closely monitored by the NBC 
senior executives, and by April 1978 it had been decreed that 
MAP should be adopted by the NBC as a whole (the NBC Chief 
Executive's former position as General Manager of MR was seen 
by many to be an important consideration in priority given to 
NAP). A small central Project Direction Team was set up at 
Redditch, under the control of Brian Barrett. 
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The reason given by the NBC for the change of name from 
VNP to MAP was that it feared the use of the term viable 
network would give the impression that no further subsidy would 
be required, and thus let the Counties off the hook. The NBC 
has discovered that in many cases the implementation of a viable 
network for even a brief period of time is an unattainable 
objective, and requires a subsidy if it is not to collapse 
altogether. The term Market Analysis nevertheless clearly 
associates the project with the commercial objectives of the 
NBC, rather than an obligation towards bus transport as a social 
service. In this respect it is inevitable that MAP should be 
regarded by many Counties as a means of achieving a considerable 
reduction in subsidies to the NBC. 
The word Market is a politically significant word, which 
can be given various connotations. During the period of MAP's 
implementation, nearly all the Shire Counties have been 
controlled by the Conservative Party, and in some of these 
the word 'market' has a wider meaning than that given to it by 
the NBC. To an NBC subsidiary MAP entails an analysis of its 
own market, and there is naturally no suggestion that the market 
might be better served by other operators! In Counties with a 
natural antagonism towards any state owned undertaking (although 
they might be broadly in sympathy with the commercial objectives 
of MAP), there is a strong suspicion that the NBC's job could be 
better executed by the private operator. In these cases tension 
arises between the County and the relevant NBC subsidiary, which 
will inevitably be exacerbated when a particular MAP does not 
achieve the savings anticipated. We will see in Chapter Eight 
that this has been particularly the case with regard to Crosville 
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and Clwyd County Council, while in Chapter Nine we will be 
examining a particularly severe confrontation between City of 
Oxford Motor Services and Oxfordshire County Council. 
One further aspect of MAP concerns its acceptance by the 
NBC subsidiaries themselves. When MAP was first adopted as 
corporate policy it was reported that: "NBC local management 
is displaying simmering hostility to MAP too. They feel that 
in their 'well run' companies there will not be the same 
magnitude of painless savings so far displayed at Midland Red 
and City of Oxford (the first two subsidiaries to undertake 
MAP). " 13 It was stated at MAP headquarters that nearly all 
subsidiaries had initially claimed that: "We don't need MAP, " 
but that most of them had come to accept the programme as being 
of use. In analysing MAP the SCNI Report concluded that MAP 
had been accepted by MR, but that: "It may also be the case 
that in other NBC subsidiaries where the application of MAP 
stems from national policy rather than specific local circumstances 
local management may be less enthusiastic. " 
14 A way round this 
problem for MAP headquarters has been to place their "own men" 
at the head of affairs. Thus the MAP leaders at both PMT and 
Crosville had previously worked on the City of Oxford MAP, and 
were clear advocates of the MAP principle. The leaders clearly 
perform a cognitive function in instructing staff on the MAP 
process, but also give MAP headquarters the reassurance that the 
programme will be implemented with at least a fair degree of 
enthusiasm. 
Allied to this aspect of control and identification within 
the MAP process is the age group of those most closely involved 
in the programme. The large majority are of a relatively young 
age, and this can enhance the image of MAP as a type of 
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"NBC revolution", - hence giving the younger generation of 
executives something with which they can identify. In this 
respect MAP might also symbolize the periodic need of an 
organization to renew itself. When Crosland-Taylor became 
Chairman of Crosville on the death of his brother, he suggested 
to the Chairman of Tillings that receipts might be improved. 
The Chairman was sceptical: "'Well, do you mind if I try? ' I 
replied, 'I don't say it can be done, but we haven't really 
looked at it that way. ' 'And why haven't you looked at it that 
way? ' The old man was always direct, and if an awkward question 
was possible he could be depended upon to ask it. 'We just 
haven't and that is why I want to do it now. ' 'Ah, well, ' he 
said, 'have a try - but I don't suppose you'll be able to do 
anything. 
15 
Crosland-Taylor describes how he met his Divisional 
Managers, when it was decided that: "There would be the maximum 
of new vehicles and the standard of maintenance of all assets 
would be improved. Publicity was to be completely overhauled, 
and on top of all that all services were to be reviewed twice a 
year - after winter and summer working - so that we could become 
more elastic and open up the good traffic and clamp down on the 
bad. " 16 The nature of Crosland-Taylor's programme (apart 
possibly from the luxury of the maximum of new vehicles) is very 
similar to the objectives expressed in MAP, while his conversation 
with the Chairman might reflect the tension between the enthusiasm 
displayed by those who devised MAP and the scepticism of the 
older busman. MAP involves new methods of data collection and 
analysis, but even those closely concerned with MAP concede that 
the busman's continuing battle with the equation between costs, 
revenue, investment and level of service has an eternal quality. 
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The Objectives of MAP and the MAP Process 
The official objectives of MAP are linked to the various 
phases of the process: 
1. to make detailed surveys of bus passenger demand and 
of the attitudes of the existing and potential passengers; 
2. to examine the operational performance of the bus 
service in different areas; 
3. to develop a series of plans for reshaping the bus 
services, their method of operation, staffing and management 
in such a way as to enable the Company to move into a position 
in which it could cover its operating costs; 
4. to provide an improved quantified basis for discussions 
between the NBC subsidiary and the various local authorities on 
the new network and its possible enhancement under revenue 
support to meet specific objectives beyond those commercially 
attainable; 
5. to establish an ongoing method for monitoring and 
controlling cost effectiveness. 
17 
The MAP survey methods were devised by MR with the help 
of Colin Buchanan and Partners, who we saw above had already 
completed a survey in Telford. Each MAP study is nearly always 
based on the services operated from a particular depot 
(sometimes two or three are grouped together). The survey work 
is sometimes undertaken by company staff e. g., inspectors and 
administrative staff, but more often part-time workers are 
employed. The"M. AP week" is divided into three sections, 
weekdays, Saturday and Sunday. Each service is surveyed at 
least once in each section (i. e., one weekday, one Saturday, 
one Sunday), while certain special sections e. g., market day 
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services may also be added. The overall picture given is 
described as a "snapshot" of the demand for services at a 
particular time of the day. 
The word "snapshot" conveys a particular meaning and 
highlights one of MAP's limitations. In some cases, the data 
collected from these surveys can give a distorted picture and 
lead to faulty conclusions being made. For those working closer 
to the operational level, the data collected from the MAP survey 
may fail to be a complete or moving picture. Even large-scale 
survey work cannot cover all services at all times, and gaps can 
appear. To a bus driver, depot superintendent or divisional 
manager, their own picture may look different to the "snapshot". 
This divergence can create classic problems of central-local 
relationships. Those to be interviewed are selected at random. 
The limit on MAP survey expenditure inevitably restricts its 
effectiveness on occasions, despite the large amount of 
information which it provides. As MAP has progressed, the NBC 
has attempted to cover this gap by means of "extended data. " 
This consists of projecting data for passengers who do not fill 
in forms (forms are handed in by passengers on leaving the bus) 
and for journeys not surveyed. The difficulty with this method 
is that errors and misconceptions may be compounded. Eventually, 
the NBC hopes that data will be collected and processed 
automatically on the bus when a passenger purchases a ticket, 
but this type of technology is expensive and the company lacks 
the resources to develop it extensively at the present time. 
In addition to the on-bus survey, a passenger attitude 
survey is also undertaken. Members of the public are selected 
at random, and questioned in their homes with regard to attitudes 
on public transport. This information is seen as being valuable 
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in the development of marketing techniques and in highlighting 
problems on particular services. As with the on-bus survey, 
limited resources restrict the numbers who can be surveyed. 
The processing of data reflects the increased use of 
technology by NBC. One of the principal incentives for MR to 
instigate MAP was the installation of a computer system at its 
headquarters. The NBC now has four computer centres, although 
nearly all the data is processed at the MR centre. It might be 
said that one of the subsidiary objectives of MAP is to provide 
work for the computer centres and assist in their development. 
Those working on MAP remark on how "microchip" technology has 
developed since MAP's inception, and that the Scottish Transport 
Group, (which adopted MAP in 1979) is reaping the benefit. 
Initially, data was produced in terms of zones, advancing to 
networks (which give a better picture of travel patterns) and 
finally to survey replies by individual passengers. 
It is the replanning of services phase of MAP which is 
inevitably the most contentious and political aspect of the 
process. We have already referred to the inherent tensions of 
the NBC subsidiary-County Council relationships, and our case 
studies will show how MAP relates to these. We will also see 
how subsidiaries have varying approaches to producing MAP 
networks. MR initially was over-reliant on central control, 
but in more recent times has become more liable to consult its 
own staff. It has nevertheless been reluctant throughout to 
bring County Councils into the MAP process. In contrast, PMT 
has worked fairly closely with Staffordshire County Council, 
although this relationship has created some problems of its own. 
City of Oxford prepared a centrally controlled MAP in a short 
period of time, as a response to the immediate crisis in ita, 
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relationship with Oxfordshire County Council. In this case, 
although MAP did achieve some cost savings, it was probably 
the image projected of MAP itself which was of primary importance. 
like MR, Crosville covers a large geographical area, and has 
tried to learn from the former by, to some extent, decentralizing 
the MAP process, although this course of action can also lead to 
some central-local tensions. 
In addition to the various interpretations of MAP, there are 
also more general problems concerning scheduling and the 
allocation of costs. The essence of cost savings for MAP is to 
reduce the number of vehicles needed at peak times. Outside the 
peak, services are running at marginal cost (i. e., the cost of 
running that particular service), and this can be extremely low. 
The key for the preservation of a sparsely patronized off-peak 
service is that it should be integrated in the level of network 
dictated by the peak vehicle requirement. If an off-peak 
service is placed outside this network, then the NBC will only 
preserve it if the County Council is prepared to purchase a 
further vehicle and subsidize its cost. The choice between 
placing a service (or a particular section of a service) inside 
or outside the network may be an extremely marginal one, and in 
putting forward a limited number of options to a County Council 
there may be little room for flexibility. Those who devise a 
MAP network (and bus scheduling is a specialized task) can 
therefore have considerable power in deciding the level of public 
transport in a particular area. 
The subject of cost allocation can also place the NBC staff 
in a powerful position. In the previous chapter we described how, 
despite the agreed CITFA method of costing, allocation of costs 
is not an exact science. In addition, forecasting the revenue 
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which will be gained from a particular network is even more 
problematical. Some of those working on MAP admit that estimates 
of, possible savings on a particular rescheduled set of services 
must sometimes be plucked out of the air. The complexity of the 
problem gives the MAP planners and schedulers considerable scope 
for discretion in making the financial calculations for a 
particular network. 
The position over NAP is still further complicated by 
ambiguities with regard to overlaps and cross-subsidization. 
Although each MAP area (or bus depot) is officially regarded as 
a separate entity for the purpose of the study, there is 
inevitably some overlap-in services between depots. 
Cross-subsidization is also a difficult concept to isolate 
and identify, for it can occur over area, time or even particular 
sections of one route. The NBC has introduced some degree of 
differential fare levels, but the system of standard charging 
is still widespread. There are also political, constraints, for 
a County Council may object to differential fares within its 
own area. A County Council may therefore assist in the process 
of cross-subsidization, while leaving the NBC to determine the 
general level of fares. Given the complexities of allocating 
costs, setting fare levels, forecasting revenue, determining 
vehicle requirements and scheduling services, it is perhaps not 
surprising that the SCNI should conclude: "In examining the 
Hereford MAP report, a discontinuity appeared between the 
detailed survey analysis and the network proposals, the link 
not being immediately evident. " 
18 It might be said that on 
these matters the NBC's power is derived from the existence of 
a cognitive gap between itself and the. uninitiated; 
In the case of MAP, expertise can confer a considerable 
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amount of power on those who possess this specialized knowledge. 
Richardson highlights a weakness of enforcing pollution control 
in Sweden, where County administrations and local authorities 
have failed to exert effective control over the polluters. 
19 
County Councils in England now possess considerable authority 
with regard to public transport planning, but we shall see in 
many cases only a small staff is engaged in this work, who in 
reality find it difficult to challenge the expertise of the 
NBC staff. 
Related to the expertise of the NBC and the extensive 
revision of services entailed in MAP, we could identify a 
further programme objective. In a declining market, the NBC 
has been forced into a position of continual contraction. The 
work of MAP inevitably continues that process, but the modern 
technology, thq expertise and the emphasis on meºrketing can 
present a picture to the outside world of a. progressive 
organization. In addition, the detailed survey work and mass 
of data can be used as proof by the NBC that it. does not abandon 
unremunerative routes lightly. It might be hoped by the NBC 
that a County Council and the public at large will accept a 
contraction in services if it can be shown that the decision is. 
made only after a great deal of detailed research and analysis. 
All the MAP networks are naturally monitored, and we will 
see later in this chapter that on some occasions extensive 
revisions can take place. It is from this kind of experience 
that MAP has tended. to become more decentralized, but MAP itself 
is a 'single line' process. However detailed a survey may be, 
it can only isolate conditions at a particular moment in time, 
and MAP must eventually be placed in the context of time and 
circumstances. In 1980 the NBC suffered a massive decline. n 
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passenger numbers, and some of the earlier MAP networks were 
already becoming outdated. The MAP survey teams are dismantled 
once a project is completed, and until more automated systems 
of data collection are installed the subsidiaries must cope 
with the situation of the moment. 
In some cases MAP team leaders have been absorbed into the 
staff of a subsidiary where a project has been completed, but 
the future of the MAP organization as a whole remains uncertain. 
The headquarters team at Redditch consists of only five people, 
including a representative from Colin Buchanan. The consultants 
help to provide staff for survey work and also play a large part 
in the production of MAP reports themselves. The MAP Direction 
Team is responsible to the NBC headquarters through the Chief 
Executive's Steering Group, which in addition to the Chief 
Executive consists of the Regional Directors, the Director of 
Research and Strategic Planning and a representative from NBC 
computers. 
Having devised the system, the main responsibility of MAP 
headquarters is to educate the, subsidiaries. The chief 
intermediary between headquarters and the individual subsidiary 
is the MAP Regional Co-ordinator. It was considered. at MAP 
headquarters that on the whole the NBC staff were resistant to 
accepting computer technology, but that in any case the actual 
preparation of a MAP report was undertaken by a small group 
working under the team leader. We referred above to central. -local 
tensions caused by MAP, and its organizational structure 
emphasizes this point (the headquarters staff of MAP were 
described by one County Council public transport co-ordinator as 
being: 11. ... too clever for their own good. "). Once a 
project commences, the regional co-ordinator meets the MAP team 
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only about once a month, leaving a high degree of local 
discretion. Each MAP is checked at headquarters, although 
discovering anything but the most obvious anomalies must create 
evaluative difficulties. 
In recent times MAP headquarters has been concentrating more 
on forward planning. It is perhaps significant that in 
August 1979 Brian Barrett was appointed the NBC's first Group 
Marketing manager (once more creating a new office: ), leading 
a small team with the responsibility to develop marketing 
techniques in the company and its subsidiaries. The NBC has 
often been compared adversely with British Rail for its failure 
to develop special fares for off-peak services, while publicity 
for services has often been sparse (MAP has also made progress 
in this area by issuing special timetables and promotional 
material on the implementation of each revised service network). 
Brian Barrett's new responsibility may symbolize the NBC's 
realization that MAP cannot represent a "once for all" 
rationalization, and that a viable network may in many cases 
prove eternally elusive, but that at least the company can make 
a positive attempt to improve its image and obtain the maximum 
revenue possible. 
D. Midland Red and the County Councils 
MR runs services into thirteen Counties, but in several 
cases its involvement with the County Councils is slight. The 
principal Counties in which it operates are Warwickshire, 
Leicestershire, Derbyshire, Staffordshire, Hereford and Worcester, 
Shropshire and Oxfordshire. The special case of Oxfordshire is 
best considered with that of the City of Oxford, but in this 
section we will be examining MR's relationship with these other 
six Counties. 
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The VNP commenced in Warwickshire, and MR regards its 
relationship with this County as being particularly amicable. 
We will see that in the case of Leicestershire and Derbyshire 
there have been particular problems with regard to implementation 
of a particular MAP network. MR's most acrimonious relationship 
is that with Hereford and Worcester C. C., where a series of 
disagreements have left the two bodies a wide distance apart. 
The problems of rural transport are particularly evident in 
Shropshire, where the County has encouraged community involvement 
in providing public transport. Staffordshire C. C. has been 
rather more interventionist than the other Counties, although it 
has failed to become directly involved in MR's MAP. It has been 
more successful in working with PMT, but we shall see that this 
involvement carries with it commensurate responsibilities and 
risks. 
1. Warwickshire 
The relationship between MR and Warwickshire is epitomized 
by the appointment of Paul Merryweather to be the company's 
Operational Development Manager in 1978. Mr. Merryweather had 
formerly worked in the Treasurer's Department of Warwickshire 
C. C., and his move to MR was considered by the company to be of 
considerable importance. The new post of Operational Development 
Manager was itself part of an NBC organizational experiment 
(once more MR appeared in its role as NBC's laboratory) involving 
the separation into three parts of duties previously given to 
the Traffic Manager. The Operating Manager was given general 
responsibility for the maintenance of services, while the 
Marketing Manager was closely involved with the implementation 
of MAP and the day-to-day relationship with the County Councils. 
The Operational Development Manager was to be concerned with 
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MR's strategic development, giving particular attention to how 
the company might gain a better understanding of the local 
authority 'mind', (by 1980 it had been decided that this 
arrangement made decision-making too fragmented, and a more 
hierarchical structure was implemented, which included the 
re-introduction of a Traffic Manager. In the reshuffle 
Mr. Merryweather became Secretary of MR, with the Operational 
Development Manager working under him). 
The relatively close relationship between the County Council 
and MR was further reflected in the experiment of a VNP in 
Stratford. The key to the amicable relationship is given in the 
County's first Public Transport Plan. In discussing the 
relative merits of MR and the private operator the County 
stated: "Some have even suggested that if the independent bus 
operators took over routes from the NBC companies, the needs of 
the travelling public would be better met at lower fares. " 
20 
Such speculation was quickly put in its place: "The County 
Council does not support these views and believes that the 
public interest and need will be best met by the guarantee of 
stability of any operator's territory and by the prevention of 
wasteful competition that would be implied if the licensing 
system were to be sufficiently relaxed. " 
21 In discussing 
transport policy in Sweden, Richardson concludes that p-olicy 
styles may differ from one policy area to another. 
22 
We saw 
earlier in the chapter that in the case of the County Councils 
and public transport policies, several different policy styles 
are identifiable. Warwickshire may be placed in the passive 
category and has an approach based on trust in the traditional 
regulatory system and faith in the efficiency of the NBC. 
At the outset of MAp, Warwickshire appeared to believe that 
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the programme would solve most of the County's problems with 
regard to subsidy and general efficiency of the service network. 
It is particularly significant to note that an amicable 
relationship between a County Council and an NBC subsidiary is 
not necessarily dependent on the relative size of subsidy. In 
the "league table" constructed on the basis of bus revenue 
support as a percentage of total transport spending, Warwickshire 
appears at the lower end. For 1980-81, the County is fifth 
from bottom, with 4.14% of total transport spending devoted to 
bus subsidies. Hereford and Worcester, with whom MR has a 
generally acrimonious relationship, is slightly higher up the 
table with 5.96%. We shall see in the next chapter that 
Crosville has had many differences with both Cheshire and Clwyd 
Counties. Yet these Counties are near the top of the table with 
16.76% and 15.4% respectively. 
23 
A higher level of subsidy 
might of course indicate a less efficient bus company, while in 
some Counties the social needs might require a higher proportion 
of unremunerative services, but this particular table does at 
least give some guide as to the relative importance which each 
County attaches to supporting the bus network as opposed to 
roadbuilding and maintenance etc. It might be thought that MR 
would look more favourably on a County which devoted more of 
its resources to public transport, but we have seen previously 
in this study that it is commercial viability which is uppermost 
amongst the NBC objectives. An NBC subsidiary which received a 
large subsidy might fear a loss of independence, while it might 
also be considered to lack efficiency by other subsidiaries. 
In the case of Warwickshire, what mattered for MR was that 
the County recognized the status quo and would discourage a 
transfer of services to the private operator. In return, MR was 
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committed to implementing MAP throughout the County and keeping 
subsidy to a minimum. The faith which Warwickshire had in MAP 
is illustrated by evidence given by Mr. McMillan, the County 
Treasurer, to the SCNI investigating Innovations in Rural Bus 
Services. Mr. McMillan formed part of the Association of County 
Councils' delegation which gave oral evidence. We shall see that 
those actually concerned with public transport occupy a 
relatively low position within the Warwickshire County Council 
hierarchy, and the presence of the Treasurer in the delegation 
would indicate the priority given by the County to the financial 
implications of rural transport policy. In relation to MAP, 
Mr. McMillan stated: "The right approach to this MAP has to be 
modestly optimistic. As I said before it depends on the NBC 
subsidiary and local authority recognizing what their roles are, 
and co-operating in getting the right answer. We in the Midlands, 
with MR, were faced with this situation three years ago where 
MR was faced with the prospect of a loss of approaching £4 million, 
24 This statement and we just had to do something about this. " 
reflects the high priority given to cutting costs by both 
Warwickshire and MR. 
In its 1979 PTP, the County (rather naively) confidently 
hoped that: "In the future, the MAP networks being introduced 
by MR should obviate the need for a block grant. However, for 
the transitional period until each MAP network has reached a 
position of viability, revenue support from the County Council 
will be on a network basis where MAPs have not been implemented, 
and on a route-specific basis where they have been implemented 
and where routes outside the MAP network are required by the 
25 
County Council. " The County hoped that a viable network could 
390 
be constructed, and that individual unremunerative services 
could be costed. We described earlier in this chapter how the 
NBC subsidiaries have encountered great difficulty in constructing 
any lQng-term viable network, and also noted the difficulties 
in costing particular routes. Hence, by 1980 the County was 
beginning to perceive that MAP was not the panacea for all ills. 
In 1979 the County assumed that a subsidy of £200,000 
would be required for each of the following five years, but by 
1980 the position bad deteriorated and the subsidy for 1980-81 
was set_ at £300,000. It had been hoped that by this time it 
would have been possible to cost individual routes, but it was 
admitted that: It. ... such negotiations are complex and are 
influenced by the interaction between the commercial network 
and the additional services and journeys that the County Council 
has secured. More revenue support is required in this TPP 
compared with that in 1979-80 to provide for a contingency 
situation so that if bus operators face problems, the C. C. may 
be placed in a position of "buying time" until conditions can 
be re-assessed and amendments made to the network. " 
26 The 
County had discovered that MAP was not a "once-for-all" panacea, 
and that more subsidy was required just to keep the network 
intact, rather than support individual services. 
The position was further complicated by the delay in 
implementing MAP in Warwickshire. It had originally been planned 
that all the MAPS for the County would be completed by the end of 
1979, but lack of resources caused MR to put back those for 
Leamington and Rugby. The Leamington MAP revisions were brought 
into operation during 1980, but the Rugby Report was only 
completed at the end of 1980, with the consultation phase still 
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to come. 
The County Council officially allows eight weeks for 
consultation after publication of the Report, a relatively 
short period of time for discussing often extensive changes in 
an area's bus service. The C. C. discusses MAP with the relevant 
District and Parish Councils, but no outside groups are brought 
into this process. We discussed in the previous chapter the 
large number of groups directly or indirectly concerned with 
public transport, and outlined the responsibilities placed on 
the Counties with regard to the PTP consultation process in the 
1978 Transport Act. A County may consider itself obliged to at 
least take note of comments made by environmental and transport 
groups with regard to the PTP, but it is under no statutory 
obligation to consult on the contents of a MAP Report. Yet 
while a PTP may give a general policy outline, it is MAP which 
can actually change the shape of the bus services. Warwickshire 
C. C. does not have as extensive a list of consultees as some 
other Counties (none of the environmental groups and only one 
transport group, the Railway Development Association), but the 
MAP consultation process is considerably more restricted. To a 
bus company with severe financial problems, speedy implementation 
of MAP is a priority, while a C. C. also has a financial incentive 
to obtain cost savings quickly. It is clearly against the 
interests of both for consultation over MAP to continue over a 
long period of time. Members of the Warwickshire C. C. team 
concerned with public transport stated that on some occasions 
both they and MR staff had been forced to "burn the midnight oil" 
in order to meet a deadline for MAP implementation, although 
they also considered that any objections to specific MAP 
proposals were dealt with satisfactorily. 
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In reality the MAP consultation process has in some cases 
spread beyond eight weeks. We referred earlier in this chapter 
to Wildavsky and his comments on the tension between analysis 
and organization. When the Leamington MAP Report was published 
in November 1979, both the C. C. and MR decided to intensify the 
consultation process with particular regard to the Parish 
Councils, and over forty meetings were held. This process was 
praised by the Traffic Commissioners during the public 
hearings, 27 and implementation proceeded relatively smoothly. 
A further factor in the implementation of MAP within MR 
concerns the role of the Divisional Manager. Until recently, 
there were four Divisional Managers (reduced to three in June 
1980), one each for the North-East (based at Leicester), 
South-East (Rugby), South-West (Worcester) and North-West 
(Cannock). The personality and background of the Divisional 
Manager for the South-East, Mr. Townsend, has played a 
particularly significant part in the Warwickshire MAPs. As a 
former bus driver, Mr. Townsend had spent all his career with 
MR and had built up a wealth of detailed knowledge on his own 
territory. In such a large NBC subsidiary as MR, each division 
is almost a company on its own, and the Divisional Manager has 
a wide-ranging set of responsibilities. He is concerned with 
nearly all aspects of operation, including traffic and staff 
establishment. Only major policy decisions such as fare levels 
are beyond his jurisdiction. In the case of Mr. Townsend, he 
considered that a matter referred upwards would be a failure on 
his part. In the early days of MAP he was unhappy about the 
lack of consultation, and thought that some of the proposed 
service revisions were unrealistic. During the course of the 
Nuneaton MAP in 1979 he had several disputes with MR headquarters 
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over the nature of the proposed changes, and he considered that 
the resultant network was more practical than if the original 
proposals had been implemented. 
28 
The independent approach of Mr. Townsend towards-NAP and 
his relationship with MR headquarters in general is also 
illustrated by his relationship with Warwickshire County Council. 
We stated earlier in this section that the County Council 
Treasurer appeared to have considerable influence over public 
transport policy in Warwickshire. As with several County 
Councils, the public transport section is situated in the 
County Engineer's Department. We remarked in the previous 
chapter that many County Councils mirror the situation in the 
Department of Transport, where public transport policy is placed 
in a subordinate position to that of roads. A group of four 
work on public transport within Warwickshire County Council, 
and occupy a relatively junior position within the Engineer's 
Department. The Public Transport Co-ordinator has initiated a 
fair degree of research, including a detailed analysis of public 
transport need within the County (we discussed in the previous 
chapter the subjective nature of needs analysis), but his voice 
within the bounty's planning process is inevitably restricted. 
He has nevertheless obtained influence over the contents of 
MAP by his close relationship with Mr. Townsend. The two men 
co-ordinated their response to MAP proposals, even to the extent 
of arranging that one of them sent a letter to MR headquarters 
setting out half the proposals, and the other sent a letter 
containing the other half! Despite his relatively junior position, 
the public transport co-ordinator has influenced implementation 
of MAP and the MR-County Council relationship generally by 
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developing his own specialized expertise and linking it with the 
knowledge and discretionary power of MR's Divisional Manager. 
This sub-structure therefore came to occupy a position of some 
authority in the implementation process, alongside the more 
senior relationship between MR headquarters and the County 
Treasurer. 
The Warwickshire experience suggests that, despite the 
large-scale data collection involved in MAP, the process requires 
a high degree of consultation at the local level if it is to be 
implemented smoothly (a conclusion associated with Dunsire's 
aggregative theory of the implementation process and which will 
be further examined in Chapter Ten). In the following section 
we will examine a MAP where less consultation and deliberation 
led to serious implementation problems. 
2. Leicestershire, Derbyshire and the "Lancer" Network 
The approach to public transport policy adopted by 
Leicestershire C. C. is on the whole similar to that of 
Warwickshire. MR is basically left to get on with the job, while 
the County fills in any gaps which the company may leave as a 
result of MAP. Although MR operates in only the South-West 
corner of Derbyshire, the County is worthy of note for its 
interventionist approach. 
In Leicestershire, four people work on public transport, 
until recently as part of the Highways Department, although a 
new Planning and Transportation Department has now been formed. 
The County illustrated its basic support for NBC in replying to 
comments made by certain Parish Councils that a greater degree 
of competition was required: "Such competition would be wasteful 
of expensive resources, and the Traffic Commissioners are legally 
obliged in their licensing function to have regard to the 
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desirability of fixing fares to prevent wasteful competition in 
the public interest. " 
29 This defence of cross-subsidization 
indicated that the County Council had become integrated into 
the existing regulatory system. 
To some extent this non-interventionist approach was forced 
upon both Warwickshire and Leicestershire, for both lacked either 
the resources or the expertise to seriously challenge MR's 
position. (we shall see in the case of Oxfordshire that an 
enormous amount of energy may be expended in attempting to bring 
about radical change, and even then with only limited success). 
In view of its general approach, one of the official policies 
held by Leicestershire C. C. appears startling: "The County 
Council is committed to .... securing control of public road 
passenger transport, and in particular Midland Red, in the 
County by elected representatives. " 
30 Not surprisingly, it is 
later added that: "This is a long-term aim and there is no 
expectation of its fulfilment within the life of the first 
PTP. " 31 In the second PTP the words "Midland Red" are 
excluded from the policy statement, but the general objective 
remains. The difference in tone between the severe policy 
statement and the later qualification reflects a difference in 
attitude between councillors with no particular responsibility 
for public transport, and officers who deal with MR on a 
day-to-day basis. The officers see the strongly-worded policy 
as a safety-valve for councillors who feel dissatisfied with the 
quality of bus service, while in reality both the officers and 
MR realize that it has no chance of being implemented! This 
could be described as a "placebo" policy, in the sense that it 
manages the dissent of those not satisfied with the status quo 
32 
(although the policy might be seen as an extremely small straw 
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in the wind in that the Counties will one day wish to assert 
more direct authority over the NBC). 
Although Leicestershire has a generally non-interventionist 
approach towards MR it has devoted a higher percentage of its 
total transport expenditure to public transport than Warwickshire 
(9% in 1979-80). Despite the recommendation of the 1978 Transport 
Act for three year agreements between operators and County 
Councils, Leicestershire only budgets its revenue support for one 
year at a time, claiming that government RSG and TSG are too 
unpredictable to look further ahead. (Leicestershire may be 
contrasted in this respect with Warwickshire, where revenue 
support is projected for five years ahead, although they stress 
that the figures for later years are only provisional). For 
1980-81 Leicestershire switched some of its planned transport 
expenditure from revenue support to road maintenance, causing 
MR to speedily implement a 10% cut in bus services. The 
North-East Divisional Manager of MR accepted this crisis with 
equanimity, considering that the company could not go on asking 
the County for ever increasing sums of money. This view once 
more illustrates the NBC philosophy that revenue support is less 
important than allowing the company to implement cuts without 
impedance. 
MR runs services only over the South-West corner of 
Derbyshire, but this County is of interest because of its 
contrasting approach to that of Leicestershire, with particular 
regard to the "Lancer" MAP network. Derbyshire can be classed 
in the planning and interventionist category of Counties with 
regard to public transport policy. 
the legislation of the 1970s had: 
The County made it clear that 
IN laid a duty on 
County Councils regarding overall transport planning within their 
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area. Therefore the forward planning of Derbyshire's public 
transport network now rests within the County Council rather 
than with each individual operator working in isolation .... 
In short therefore the County Council is charged with the overall 
development of public transport policy, but is reliant on the 
co-operation received from the public transport operators if 
these policies are to be made effective. " 
33 
The Public Transport Unit of Derbyshire C. C. forms part of 
the Planning Department, in pointed contrast to Warwickshire and 
Leicestershire's placement of public transport matters within 
the road orientated Surveyor's Department, and has a staff of 
ten. The general approach of Derbyshire was described by the 
Public Transport Co-ordinator as one of true co-ordination 
(in terms of the 1972 Local Government Act and 1978 Transport 
Act) as compared to mere consultation in some other Counties. 
Commensurate with Derbyshire's relatively high-powered public 
transport team is the County's position in the revenue support 
league table. For 1980-81 Derbyshire was placed fourth, with 
15.8% of total transport spending devoted to public transport. 
The Co-ordinator claimed that this level of subsidy inevitably 
meant that the County would wish to play a prominent part in 
the planning process of any NBC subsidiary, but it should be 
noted that to the NBC such a claim might not be considered valid. 
The NBC recognizes that a County has the right to grant any level 
of subsidy it wishes, but the company retains the right to devise 
and control its own service networks. (In the next chapter we' 
will be studying this conflict in more detail when we examine 
the case of Crosville and Cheshire). 
The case of the "Lancer" network illustrates the problems 
which can occur in implementing a MAP network together with the 
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contrasting approach to public transport planning adopted by 
Leicestershire and Derbyshire County Councils. "Lancer" also 
includes the Burton-on-Trent area of Staffordshire, and although 
we will be dealing with Staffordshire C. C. more fully in a later 
part of this chapter, we will include the Burton aspect in this 
section. "Lancer" actually covered services operated from the 
Coalville depot in Leicestershire and the Swadlincote depot in 
Derbyshire. Before accepting the revised network, Derbyshire C. C. 
insisted on consulting all Parish Councils, together with all 
schools and various other interested parties such as social 
workers. As a result of these consultations, several objections 
to the new network arose, and detailed discussions were held 
with MR. In contrast, Leicestershire C. C. invited comments from 
District Councils, who in turn were expected to consult with 
their respective Parish Councils. Derbyshire C. C. attempted to 
persuade Leicestershire to undertake more consultation, but 
without success. To MR, the Derbyshire method was seen as 
excessively time consuming and interventionist, although 
eventually most of Derbyshire's recommendations were accepted. 
As with Warwickshire, the position of the Divisional Manager 
was of importance with regard to "Lancer". The North-East 
Divisional Manager was unhappy with some of the suggested 
revisions, and in the words of a public transport co-ordinator 
"bent the network. " Nevertheless, the Divisional Manager was 
still unhappy about some of the implemented changes, and this 
disquiet appeared to be confirmed in the number of revisions to 
"lancer" within a relatively short period of time. These 
revisions culminated in the Omnibus Society's local correspondent 
commenting that: "Major revisions to the "Lancer" network (yet 
again! ) were introduced on 22nd March 1980. ... It is 
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noteworthy that in many respects the pattern of services is now 
close to that applicable prior to MAP: " 
34 The experience of 
"Lancer" suggested that it was a case where the MAP surveys, 
and the centralized nature of MR's operations, had combined to 
produce a network which was out of touch with reality. 
The most public controversy concerned with "Lancer" involved 
a failure to obtain clearance on the lines outlined by Pressman 
and Wildavsky. Previous to MAP, Burton-on-Trent services were 
operated exclusively by East Staffordshire District Council. In 
February 1979, as part of the "Lancer" network, the West Midlands 
Traffic Commissioners granted permission to MR and two independent 
operators to run services into Burton. East Staffordshire D. C. 
had opposed the application on the grounds that the streets of 
Burton were unsuitable for vehicles longer than its own, but the 
Commissioners overruled this objection. The Council followed up 
this setback by immediately applying to the High Court for an 
Order of certiorari. The judges in the Queen's Bench Division 
granted the Order (which enabled the Council to apply for a full 
hearing in the High Court which could overrule the Commissioners, 
decision), while at the same time allowing the new services to 
start. East Staffordshire claimed that they had not been given 
the opportunity by the Commissioners to submit all their evidence, 
and were clearly concerned that MRts new services would reduce 
their revenue. 
35 In the event, East Staffordshire decided 
that the chances of winning a High Court action did not justify 
the likely, expense, and withdrew the application. 36 
Nevertheless, the incident illustrated that MAP could not be 
regarded as a purely technical exercise by the NBC, and that the 
programme at times required a high degree of co-ordination. 
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Staffordshire C. C. was criticized by both MR and neighbouring 
C. C. s for its failure to ensure the agreement of 
East Staffordshire D. C. prior to the Commissioners' hearing, 
and it was considered that they had failed in their statutory 
responsibility to co-ordinate relations between various 
operators. Staffordshire C. C. claimed that in many ways the 
Burton case was a "storm in a tea-cup", and that anyway the 
final decision was the responsibility of the Commissioners. 
This ambiguity concerning the authority possessed by the 
C. C. s and the Commissioners was brought about by the 1972 Local 
Government Act and the 1978 Transport Act giving greater 
responsibility to the County Councils, while failing to clarify 
the new position of the Commissioners. It would appear that in 
the West Midlands, the Commissioners have come to assume that 
the C. C. s will have done nearly all the co-ordination spade-work 
prior to hearings, (later in this chapter we will see particular 
evidence of this attitude in the implementation of MAP by 
Potteries Motor Traction). In turn, the role of the County 
Councils raises questions concerning the degree to which the 
Commissioners now possess any real authority. In the case of 
Burton, Staffordshire C. C. supported MR, and the Commissioners 
endorsed this decision. East Staffordshire D. C. opposed this 
consensus, but in time were forced to accept the powerful nature 
of the opposing forces. When the County Council and an NBC 
subsidiary reach agreement, other interests (including that of 
the Commissioners) find it difficult to oppose such a powerful 
alliance. To this extent, implementation it the 1970s has 
seen the County Council-NBC subsidiary relationship replace in 
importance that forged in the 1930s between the area operators 
and the Traffic Commissioners. 
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Ironically, MR discovered that its lack of experience in 
running services into Burton was a severe handicap in its ability 
to operate efficient services. Timings proved inaccurate, and 
in some cases passengers were seen to leave MR buses outside 
Burton and instead board municipal buses going to the town 
centre: MR's Barton services have undergone several revisions, 
and improved their efficiency, but on the whole the innovation 
has not proved a success. In the case of Burton, the municipality 
found itself in a vulnerable position. As a contrast, Leicester 
City Transport has resisted any new incursions by MR. The 
company has no plans to introduce MAP for its services running 
into the City, and it seems unlikely that the position will 
change in the future. The County Council does not wish to 
change the status quo, for the City receives only a small 
subsidy from the C. C. (f, 14,000 in 1980-81 as opposed to MR's 
£404,000). As a powerful, relatively self-sufficient interest, 
Leicester City Transport is well insulated from the effects 
resulting from the MR-C. C. relationship. 
In this chapter we have so far examined Counties with a 
passive approach to public transport planning, while also briefly 
looking at one interventionist County. We now turn our attention 
to the third type, that of the market approach., 
3. Hereford and Worcester 
In Hereford and Worcester thirty-six independent operators 
provide 40% of total stage carriage services, but significantly 
carry only 11% of total passengers. 
37 Many of the independent 
operators run the County's "deep" rural services, which in many 
cases may only run once a week. Nevertheless, the relatively 
large number of private operators has assisted in giving the 
C. C. encouragement that MR's influence might be diminished. 
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Politically, it might be argued by the NBC that a Conservative 
controlled C. C. 's "market" policy on public transport represents 
no more than a euphemism for an endemic dislike of state owned 
enterprises. In Chapter Nine we shall see that Oxfordshire C. C. 
openly stated its market approach, and attempted to set out a 
theoretical and philosophical justification for its policy. In 
contrast, the Hereford and Worcester PTPs are relatively bland 
documents, and give only small hints at the undercurrent of 
ill-feeling between themselves and MR. 
The County's extremely general objective for public 
transport policy is given as being: "To optimize the economic, 
environmental and social benefits from expenditure on public 
transport within the limits of the available resources. " 
38 
As the statistics at the beginning of this section would 
indicate, MR runs its services on urban and inter-urban routes 
within the County, which are generally regarded as being the 
most profitable (or least loss-making). 
We noted in the section on Warwickshire that Hereford and 
Worcester gives a higher percentage of its total transport 
expenditure to public transport than the former County, but the 
policy on school contracts indicates the differing attitudes 
towards the NBC. In a generally declining market, school 
contracts represent one of the few stable elements in the 
busman's world. Warwickshire C. C. stress that their Education 
Department: ". ... has pursued for some years, a practice of 
purchasing scholars' contract tickets on stage carriage service 
buses to help to ensure the retention of a comprehensive network 
of stage carriage routes for the benefit of the users.... " 
39 
This emphasis on bus passes rather than contracts strongly 
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favours MR, for the school services are integrated with the 
service network. In effect, the County is giving an extra 
subsidy to MR. In contrast, Hereford and Worcester places the 
emphasis on contract services: "At present the Education 
Department has over 500 contracts. ... These are mostly 
held by independent operators, especially in the rural areas, 
and many of these companies are not involved in stage carriage 
services. " 
40 Many of these contracts have operated for many 
years, but MR's lack of access to the schools' market inevitably 
makes it more difficult for the company to operate at a profit 
in Hereford and Worcester. 
The heavy losses being made in the County (together with 
doubts concerning the availability of subsidies in the future), 
induced MR to introduce MAP to Hereford and Worcester at an 
early date. Revised services for nearly all areas of the County 
were introduced by the Autumn of 1979, but MR has continued to 
experience considerable difficulties in the County. In March 
1980 MR obtained permission from the Traffic Commissioners to 
abandon twenty rural routes around Hereford, 
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while in 
August 1980 a further reduction in services around the Hereford 
and Worcester areas was implemented. 
42 MR considered that a 
large contributory factor to their troubles in these areas arose 
from the C. C. 's attitude towards bus access in the two City 
centres. At the March 1980 hearing, MR's Marketing Manager 
stated that losses could have been considerably reduced if the 
company had been granted access to the centre of Hereford. He 
went on: "Though talks have continued ever since the (MAP) 
network began in March 1978, every effort by MR to give improved 
services and lower fares to the bus passengers by making more 
direct services possible has been blocked. " 43 The County 
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argued that though the traffic management plan in Hereford had 
been long delayed, they were required to undertake a statutory 
consultation process. To MR, the delay appeared to exemplify 
the County's hostile attitude towards the NBC. 
ER's attitude towards the C. C. was soured still further 
during 1979-80 when the County put forward a plan to ban all 
buses from the centre of Worcester. The Council considered 
that the Leyland National was too large and unwieldy a vehicle 
to be seen in the narrow streets of Worcester, and MR countered 
by demanding compensation of £100,000 a year. 
44 A long series 
of meetings followed, with MR eventually accepting compensation 
of £26,000 per year, but the resultant effect was a further 
deterioration in the relationship. 
MR was also aggrieved by the County's refusal to extend 
subsidy agreements beyond one year and the omission from the 
subsidy of any provision towards the NBC's capital debt. It is 
perhaps significant that the Chairman of the West Midlands 
Traffic Commissioners was also highly critical of the County's 
work. On one occasion he accused the Council of failing to do 
its homework on the planning of a school service. In reality 
the issue involved the withdrawal of MR stage services in a 
case where the County decided to save money by awarding a school 
contract to a private operator. Two operators applied, and the 
Chairman of the Commissioners was critical of the County's 
decision to support the lowest tender as opposed to what he 
considered to be the more convenient service. 
45 
The Chairman 
was dubious about the C. C. 's ability to co-ordinate efficiently, 
but underlying this criticism it might be said that a County 
which did not support the status quo was liable to be 
unpredictable in its behaviour. In Chapter Nine we will see 
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that the East-Midlands Traffic Commissioner was highly critical 
of the radical market model adopted by Oxfordshire C. C. 
Hereford and Worcester employs a staff of nine to work on 
public transport. This figure is above the average, but as with 
several other Counties the staff are situated in the County 
Surveyor's Department. The numbers employed on public transport 
indicate that the County gives a fairly high priority to this 
policy area, although MR and the Chairman of the Traffic 
Commissioners would argue that their efforts are chanelled in 
the wrong direction! In 1980-81 Hereford and Worcester allocated 
5.96% of its total transport spending to public transport. The 
figure placed it in the lower part of the Counties' "league 
table" although (as we noted earlier in the chapter) it is a 
higher percentage than that of Warwickshire, with whom MR has an 
amicable relationship. 
The basic philosophy of Hereford and Worcester is indicated 
by its response to the 1980 Transport Act. We will be briefly 
examining this piece of legislation in Chapter Nine, but its 
principal objective was to increase competition in the bus 
industry, and one of the provisions concerned the creation of 
experimental trial areas, where all licensing regulations would 
be temporarily abolished. Hereford and Worcester was to the 
forefront of Counties wishing to volunteer for this experiment, 
but the initial enthusiasm has waned. To its disappointment, 
the County discovered that many of the private operators did not 
share their zeal for a "free for all. " Some of the operators 
are suspicious of their local competitors, while nearly all share 
the fear that MR, despite its current problems, would revert to 
its 1930's policy of driving competition into the ground. In this 
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case, the policy objectives of the co-ordinators are likely to 
be frustrated in their implementation by the opposition of the 
intended participants. 
4. Shropshire 
Although the private operator plays a prominent part in 
Shropshire's public transport system, the County Council policy 
approach can be placed in the passive category. Shropshire is 
largely a rural County, with the predominant part of the 
population found in the Shrewsbury and Telford areas. Large 
areas of Shropshire are of such a rural character that MR has 
been content to leave the sparse bus services in these areas 
entirely in the hands of private operators. In this respect, 
the MR-County Council relationship is not of such fundamental 
importance in Shropshire as in some other Counties. Twenty-seven 
private operators carry about half the total number of passengers 
on scheduled bus services in Shropshire, while also holding many 
school contracts. Nevertheless, we saw earlier in this chapter 
that the re-organized "Tellus" network in Telford was of 
considerable importance in the eventual development of MAP. 
Shropshire County Council has only a staff of three working 
on public transport, and as with Hereford and Worcester they are 
situated in the County Surveyor's Department. Shropshire is 
placed in the lower half of the "league table" with 6.11% of 
total transport spending devoted to public transport subsidies 
in 1980-81. It might be said that Shropshire's rural character 
has produced naturally a prominent place for the private operator 
of a kind sought by Hereford and Worcester. Despite this 
position, Shropshire does not favour any major reorganization of 
services, as it is considered that small operators would lack the 
resources to take on further work. Despite its limited resources, 
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the County has attempted to develop its expertise by producing 
an "approved network. " This method consists of assessing need 
and determining the level of subsidy to retain or establish 
approved routes. 
46 This analysis was progressing, area by 
area, (concentrating mainly on the areas served by the private 
operators) until the advent of MAP. Analysis by the County of 
MR's MAPS has halted Area studies, for a County with such 
limited staff resources must respond to initiatives taken by MR, 
and cannot have more than one major piece of work in hand at a 
particular time. 
Two other features of Shropshire's public transport system 
(with particular reference to the prominence of the private 
operator) are worthy of note. Firstly, the major part of 
Shropshire's expenditure on bus subsidies (I394,000 in 1980-81) 
goes to MR for maintenance of urban services (particularly in the 
Telford area). In contrast, only half the private operators 
claim subsidy. This does not necessarily mean that the private 
operators are more efficient than MR, for many of the infrequent 
rural services are cross-subsidized with school contracts. The 
behaviour of the private operators, however, does sometimes lead 
to a paradoxical situation where the commencement of a subsidy 
has led to a substantial increase in fares! The County does not 
wish to maintain what it terms "artificially low fares, " 
47 
and 
so seeks to implement a common fares system. The public transport 
co-ordinator considered that many private operators did not wish 
to claim a subsidy because they feared interference from the 
County in monitoring their accounts. We have seen that MR also 
fears outside intervention in its affairs, but in the case of 
Shropshire it could be said that the NBC subsidiary benefits 
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financially as a result of the independent nature of the private 
operator. 
Secondly, Shropshire County Council has carved out a 
particular niche for itself by the development of social car 
schemes. These schemes in general involve volunteers in 
providing emergency public transport or in areas where scheduled 
services are unavailable. We described in the previous chapter 
the political significance of voluntary effort in the provision 
of public transport, and Shropshire provides a prime example of 
conditions where this work can be developed. In areas where 
the NBC subsidiaries (or even private operators) run scheduled 
services, proposed voluntary schemes may encounter great 
difficulties. Both the NBC itself and the trade unions are 
inevitably suspicious of outsiders becoming involved in public 
transport, but in Shropshire there is ample scope for voluntary 
effort. Commencing, in Bridgnorth in 1971, it is estimated that 
a half of the County's rural polulation now has access to a 
social car scheme. 
48 These schemes enable the County to 
claim that it is fulfilling its statutory responsibility to 
co-ordinate public transport, while also acting as a laboratory 
for those Counties where the political scope does not exist for 
such unconventional services. 
5. Staffordshire 
The C. C. and MR 
Staffordshire C. C. can be placed in the category of those 
Counties with a planning and interventionist approach to public 
transport policy, and has led to the County having a differing 
relationship with the two NBC subsidiaries operating within its 
boundaries. MR operates in the South of the County, and in 
general attempts to resist any intervention from the C. C. 
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In contrast, Potteries Motor Traction, which operates in the 
North of the County, has worked closely with the County over 
several years. We shall see that this relatively close 
relationship has led to difficulties for the C. C. with regard 
to its co-ordination responsibilities. 
Staffordshire C. C. puts forward the view that the granting 
of subsidy and the statutory responsibilities concerning 
co-ordination gives the local authority certain rights and 
responsibilities with regard to the NBC: "In addition the 
co-ordination role which the C. C. is attempting to fulfil is 
not clearly understood (by the NBC subsidiaries) and is often 
taken to be simply one of subsidy distribution. Bus company 
managements are often suspicious of the C. C. 's role and uncertain 
of the future of their industry, which they see as being at the 
mercy of the vagaries of politics. " 
49 To a basically 
interventionist County, the behaviour of MR can prove particularly 
irritating: "MR in particular appears to suffer the disadvantages 
of size, intensified by a strongly centralized management 
structure, with the result that the top management are unable to 
keep in touch with day-to-day operations and changing needs. " 
50 
This criticism openly reflects the County Council's 
dissatisfaction with the company's structure, but also indicates 
frustration that MR chooses to retain an arm's length 
relationship with the Counties. 
Unlike Shropshire, the vast majority of the three hundred 
stage carriage routes in Staffordshire are served by the NBC 
subsidiaries. Potteries Motor Traction(PMT) is the predominant 
operator, running almost half the vehicle mileage in the County. 
MR runs abouteafifth of the total mileage, while in the South- 
West of the County the West Midlands PTE operates a number of 
410 
cross-boundary services which together total about one tenth of 
stage carriage miles in Staffordshire. 
51 The place of the PTE 
has entailed their involvement in MR's MAP process, with the 
result that a wide-ranging exchange of services has taken place 
between the two organizations. Despite its statutory 
responsibility as a co-ordinating body, the C. C. has taken little 
part in these negotiations. 
Staffordshire C. C. has generally encountered considerable 
difficulty in attempting to develop a closer relationship with 
MR. In attempting to establish: ". ... a standardized 
financial monitoring and forecasting system .,. .. difficulties 
have been encountered in obtaining from certain operators 
(chiefly MR) supporting information about assumptions etc., 
and in interpreting and imposing any kind of standardized format 
on the information received. " 
52 The somewhat distant 
relationship between Staffordshire C. C. and MR has been 
accentuated by the Divisional Manager's lack of involvement in 
affairs generally. The County normally deals direct with MR's 
Marketing Department at Birmingham, and unlike Warwickshire 
there does not appear to be a "special relationship" between 
County Council staff and the Divisional Manager. 
The general lack of control over MR has recently led the 
Midlands branch of the Association of Transport Co-ordinators 
(the role of which we discussed in the previous chapter) to join 
with the Midlands Treasurers' Group in establishing a Working 
Party with the aim of devising a form of agreement which would 
be acceptable to both the C. C. s and the NBC. It is also likely 
that the Working Party will have the unofficial objective of 
enabling the Counties to compare notes on MR's apportionment of 
costs. Some Counties suspect that MR can at times adjust its 
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costs within a particular area according to the level of subsidy 
which it expects to receive. The Counties have decided that by 
greater co-operation and co-ordination they will be able to 
exert more authority over MR, but the company may not be so 
easily controlled. We have seen that the various C. C. s have 
far from a uniform attitude towards public transport planning 
and the associated relationship with MR. In addition, the 
company retains a considerable degree of professional expertise 
which none of the Counties is able to match. The Counties' 
most direct route to greater control over MR is likely to come 
through the company's financial hardships and its need to rely 
more heavily on external aid. 
The C. C and PMT 
i'd's attitude towards Staffordshire C. C. can be contrasted 
with that of Potteries Motor Traction. In Chapter Two we saw 
how PMT developed its operations almost exclusively in the 
compact urban area of North Staffordshire. The character of 
PMT's network makes it unusual within the NBC9 for the majority 
of subsidiaries cover predominantly rural areas. The North 
Staffordshire public transport system is also unusual for an 
urban area in that. private operators run a significant percentage 
of stage carriage services. We shall see that the importance of 
these operators has played a considerable part in the development 
of PMT's relationship with the Council. 
Close liaison between PMT and the County commenced in 
January 1977 when a joint project team was set up to survey and 
rationalize the North Staffordshire bus network. This team 
developed a rationalization procedure known as the Passenger 
Information and Collection System (PICA). 53 The information 
collected by means of the PICA system was similar to that of MAP, 
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although not on such a large scale. When the MAP system was 
adopted by the NBC as a whole, some private doubts were expressed 
by both PMT and the County Cquncil as to its validity, but 
eventually it was agreed that the joint project team should 
continue in being, but would work on MAP instead of PICA. Two 
of the County Council staff were seconded to PMT for the duration 
of MAP, and assisted closely in the evaluation of the data. 
PMT officials considered that this arrangement enabled the 
County to become more aware of the pressures and constraints 
under which the Company was-operating, although it might be argued 
that in time the seconded officials were more likely to become 
part of the PMT organization rather than that of the C. C. On 
occasions the County Officers at PMT made recommendations which 
were not accepted by C. C. headquarters, although it was 
considered at PMT that the officers had retained their separate 
identity. 
In addition to the secondments, the PMT maintained informal 
contact with staff at County headquarters, who were kept 
informed about the contents of a MAP report before its 
publication. For each MR and PMT MAP, the County published a 
District Plan, which was in effect a highly detailed route-by- 
route response to the bus company's proposals. The publication 
of the District Plans illustrated Staffordshire's interventionist 
approach to, publ, c transport planning, and also enabled the 
County to assert some degree of authority over both MR and PMT. 
The District Plans were distributed widely, and were the 
documents discussed when consultation meetings were held. 
Although the MAP groundwork was carried out by PMT, the County 
officers could take the lead at the meetings, for it was their 
recommendations which were being considered. The County 
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consulted each District and Parish Council direct, while also 
holding a large number of public meetings. - 
The County also exerted authority over the PMT by insisting 
that the MAP household survey should be conducted by the. West 
Midlands PTE (the C. C. contributed to the cost of MR and PMT 
MAPs). The PTE conducts its own surveys and employs staff for 
this purpose (often former bus inspectors). The C. C. claimed 
that the PTE possessed greater expertise in this area than the 
PMT, although the company considered that the resultant report 
reflected the PTE's lack of local knowledge with regard to the 
North Staffordshire area. 
The planning and. interventionist approach.. Qf Staffordshire 
C. C. is reflected in their staff of nine working on public 
transport within the Planning Department. The Public Transport 
section is divided into two parts, one dealing with MR and the 
other with PMT -a division which tends to accentuate the 
County's contrasting relationship with the two companies. The 
relationship between the planning approach and the priority 
given to public transport is also reflected in the County's 
place in the upper part of the "league table" with 10.2% of 
total transport spending in 1980-81 going to public transport. 
It is also significant to note that the planning approach is 
invariably associated with general support for the current 
licensing system. A County which wishes to implement a 
comprehensive plan for public transport is unlikely to want a 
fragmented system which can be difficult to control and 
co-ordinate. In this senge there is a particular common interest 
between interventionist Counties and NBC subsidiaries (it 
might also be argued that interventionist Counties might have 
long-term designs on obtaining direct control over the bus 
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network, which would be difficult to implement -where a multitude 
of private operators ran the services). 
One particular example with regard to PMT and the 
implementation of MAP illustrates that a County which seeks-to 
build a close relationship with an NBC subsidiary, can find 
itself in a vulnerable position when seeking to fulfil its 
-co-ordinatory function. On 28th May 1980 the proposals for 
reorganization of routes as a result of the East Central 
Staffordshire MAP came before the West Midlands Traffic 
Commissioners. After half a day, the Chairman of the 
Commissioners declared himself to be utterly bewildered, and 
sent the various parties away to discuss their problems. Four 
private operators had placed objections to the PMT proposals 
and all refused to give ground in what they considered to be a 
basic challenge to their own viability. 
54 
We referred earlier to the importance of the private 
operator in North Staffordshire, several of whom were of 
sufficient size to be a significant factor in the PMT's plans. 
One NBC official (not employed by PMT) considered that in return 
for allowing the County to work in close liaison with PMT, the 
company expected the County to "deliver" the private operators 
with regard to agreement on service reorganizations. The 
difficulty for the County was that in seeking to build a closer 
relationship with an NBC subsidiary, it aroused the suspicions. 
of the private operators. In the words of one of the County 
officers, the private operators were, ". ... independent-minded 
entrepreneurs, " who were rather mistrustful of a C. C. which 
appeared to be on such close terms with the NBC. 
A further difficulty for the County exemplifies a recurring 
dilemma in the MAP Process. The PMT wished the proposed 
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reorganization to be placed before the Commissioners as quickly 
as possible, for every day that implementation was delayed 
entailed further financial losses. At the hearing, the PMT 
claimed that the new measures would produce a saving of half a 
million pounds a year, and that a delay in implementation would 
cost the company £10,000 per week. For the C. C. it was stated 
that they had reluctantly agreed to go along with a short 
consultation period because of the PMT's serious financial 
position. 
55 The County did not wish to increase its subsidy 
payments to PMT, but it could not fulfil its co-ordinatory role 
in the allotted time. 
After two days, the hearing was reconvened. In two cases, 
the PMT had (at the C. C. 's request) agreed to abandon several 
routes in favour of a private operator, but after further 
consultations two operators remained opposed to the PMT's 
proposals. At this point the Chairman of the Commissioners 
bluntly asked the County officers: "Are you as a local authority 
facing up to your responsibilities? " 
56 As the hearing had 
originally been scheduled for early May, the Chairman added: 
"Goodness knows what the state of play was at that time .... 
it is clear to me that the case is not ready for presentation. " 
57 
The Chairman's strong remarks took no account of the 
County's dilemma, and provoked a strong reply from the Chairman 
of the C. C. 's Transportation Sub-Committee. He claimed that the 
short consultation period had placed a heavy strain on the 
officers (50 separate meetings) and that the outstanding decisions 
were ones which only the Traffic Commissioners could make. 
58 
The Chairman of the Commissioners considered that the legislation 
of the 1970s had placed full responsibility for co-ordination on 
the shoulders of the Counties, while Staffordshire C. C. claimed 
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that where serious disputes arose between operators, the 
Commissioners must be the ultimate arbiters. This dispute 
exemplified legislative overlap. The provisions originally set 
out in the 1930 Road Traffic Act were still in operation, 
although they had apparently been largely superceded by the 
legislation of the 1970s. The contents of the 1978 Transport 
Act gave the C. C. s full co-ordinatory powers, but the full 
magisterial apparatus of the Traffic Courts remained. 
The contentious issues concerning the two private 
operators who remained in dispute with PMT were finally heard 
in July 1980. Nearly two months of further consultation had 
failed to resolve the issue, but during an adjournment it was 
agreed that PMT would withdraw its application and the route 
would be shared by the two private operators. 
59 As with the 
earlier hearing, the Traffic Court appeared to have the effect 
of bringing the issues to a head and ensured a settlement. In 
this respect, we might argue that the Commissioners' hearings 
continue to have a powerful significance for the bus industry. 
Despite their co-ordinatory powers, the C. C. s lack the 
Commissioners' specific power to award a route to a particular 
operator. In addition, the quasi-judicial atmosphere of the 
Traffic Courts can give added authority to the Commissioners' 
words. The PMT case illustrates that all parties are unclear 
as to the modern meaning and function of the Traffic 
Commissioners' hearings. When the C. C. was placed in a dilemma, 
it looked to the Commissioners for help, but the Chairman passed 
the responsibility back. Ultimately, it appeared to be the 
PMT's urgent need for an agreement (as a result of its parlous 
financial position) which brought about a settlement. 
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E. Conclusion 
In this, 6hapter we have examined the development of MR in 
the 1970s and the company's evolving relationship with the 
C. C. s. The company's financial position and its need to show 
the Counties that it could "put its own house in order" led 
to the development of MAP. In one sense, NAP reflected a 
continuation of organizational concerns of the NBC which we 
outlined in Chapter Five, i. e., the need to maintain independence 
by remaining commercially viable. By minimizing its subsidy 
claims, MR hoped to demonstrate its efficiency and hence remain 
free from outside intervention in its affairs. 
Despite NAP, MR remains dependent on subsidies (which do 
not cover all its losses) but has been largely successful in 
retaining control of its own affairs. We saw how the various 
County Council approaches to public transport policy could be 
placed into three categories of passive, planning and market, 
and studied how the development of these policies affected the 
relationship with MR. By its nature, the passive approach 
produced a largely non-interventionist policy which resulted in 
an amicable relationship with MR. We briefly examined the 
paradox (which we shall examine more closely in Chapter Nine) 
that the market approach apparently requires a relatively high 
degree of intervention by the C. C., and also noted that this 
challenge to the established operator produced a hostile 
relationship with MR. The planning and interventionist approach 
also tended towards a hostile relationship, although the limited 
degree of intervention achieved by Counties such as Derbyshire 
and Staffordshire kept disputes at a low level. (Ironically, 
MR appeared to be on more distant terms with the interventionist 
Counties than with the passive Counties). It was also the case 
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that, unlike the market approach, the interventionist Counties 
were not challenging the basic validity of the licensing system. 
As a contrast to MR, we briefly examined the more amenable 
PMT, and its willingness to accept Staffordshire C. C. into its 
planning process. The problem for the County was that in 
becoming more closely linked with an NBC subsidiary, it 
jeopardized its relationship with the private operators. The 
County might have had a better chance of "delivering" the 
private operators if it had maintained an arm's length 
relationship with PMT: This case study also illustrated the 
currently ambiguous nature of the relationship between the 
C. C. s and the Traffic Commissioners. 
The disparate approach of the Counties prevented them from 
adopting a uniform attitude towards MR and assisted the company 
in maintaining its independence. The case of MR illustrates 
how implementation of the 1970s legislation by the C. C. s has 
placed them in a potentially powerful position in respect to 
the NBC subsidiaries, but also indicates the capacity of the 
company busman to retain control of his own industry. In the 
next chapter we will be looking at the Crosville Company, and 
in particular, studying how a County with a strong planning 
and interventionist approach attempted to assert its authority. 
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f"Postseript 
In September 1981 MR underwent a radical restructuring, 
when the Head Office in Birmingham was closed down and five new 
companies formed. These consisted of one each for North, South, 
East and West, together with a company to run the express 
services. It was considered. by MR that the new structure would 
cut costs and enable the company to run more efficiently. The 
new companies do not have their own secretaries, but share them 
with other NBC subsidiaries. It was originally intended that 
the Central Works should also close, but it was eventually 
decided by the NBC that the Works would remain open and take in 
work from outside the company. 
The measures taken by MR can obviously be seen as a 
manifestation of the NBC's problems during a recession, but it 
is significant to note that the territory covered by each of 
the four new area companies corresponds exactly to the old 
Divisional structure. Each of the Divisional Managers enjoyed 
a considerable amount of autonomy, and the reorganization 
appeared to represent a recognition by MR that formerly the 
company had been somewhat unwieldy and difficult to control. 
In its earlier years the NBC had placed an emphasis on company 
rationalization, but events at MR suggested that this trend had 
been placed into reverse (perhaps once more MR was fulfilling a 
role as the NBC's laboratory). It was also no doubt hoped by 
the NBC that the break up of MR would satisfy those CCs who had 
complained that the company's senior management was too remote 
from the operational level. More radically, smaller NBC 
subsidiaries might more easily facilitate a take over by a County, 
or group of Counties, at some future date. 
420 
CHAPTER SEVEN: References. 
1. Annual Reports of the Traffic Commissioners 1971-72. P. 26. 
2. Ibid. P. 27. 
3. Ibid. 
4. The Omnibus Magazine January/February 1972. 
5. Ibid. 
6. Public Transport and Traffic Cmnd. 3481 1967 Para. 55. 
7. Midland Red Report and Accounts 1973 
8. Public Transport and Traffic op. cit. Para. 57. 
9. Interview 29: 9: 78. 
10. Midland Red Report and Accounts 1977. 
11. A. Wildavsky: The Art and Craft of Policy Analysis 
op. cit. P. 36. 
12. Ibid. P. 42. 
13. Motor Transport 5: 5: 78. 
14. Innovations in Rural Bus Services op. cit. Para. 85. 
15. The Sowing and the Harvest op. cit. PP. 71-72. 
16. Ibid. P. 72. 
17. Introduction to Midland Red MAP Reports 
18. Innovations in Rural Bus Services op. cit. Para. 76. 
19. J. J. Richardson: 'Agency Behaviour: The Case of Pollution 
Control in Sweden' Public Administration Winter 1979. P. 481 
20. Public Transport Plan 1979/80 - 1983/84 Warwickshire 
County Council P. 15. 
21. Ibid. 
22. J. J. Richardson: "Policy-Making and Rationality in Sweden: 
The Case of Transport, " British Journal of Political 
Science July 1979 PP. 341-353. 
23. Motor Transport 5: 1: 80. 
24. Innovations in Rural Bus Services op. cit. Q. 108. 
421 
CHAPTER SEVEN: References. (Continued) 
25. PTP 1979/80 - 1983/84 Warwickshire C. C. 
26. Ibid. 1980/81 - 1984185 P. 82 
27. Motor Transport 19: 4: 80 
28. Interview 28: 5: 80 
29. Public Transport Plan, 1979-84 Leicestershire C. C. P. 22 
30. Ibid. P. 13 
31. Ibid. P. 15 
32. See J. J. Richardson and Britt-Marie Kinblad: 'Programme 
Evaluation and Effectiveness Auditing in Sweden. 1 
33. PTP 1979/80 to 1983/84 Derbyshire C. C. PP. 38-39. 
34. Omnibus Society: Midlands Branch Bulletin No. 123 
35. Motor Transport 23: 2: 79 
36. Ibid. 23: 3: 79 
37. Hereford and Worcester PTP 1980/81 P. 7 
38. Ibid. P. 4 
39. Warwickshire C. C. PTP 1980/81 P. 6 
40. Hereford and Worcester PTP 1980/81 P. 9 
41. Motor Transport 8: 3: 80 
42. Ibid. 2: 8: 80 
43. Ibid. 8: 3: 80 
44. Ibid. 6: 4: 79 
45. Ibid. 29: 3: 80 
46. Shropshire PTP 1980/81 P. 4 
47. Ibid. 1979/80 P. 18 
48. R. Fearnside: 'Experience of Lift-Giving Schemes in 
Shropshire I Ninth Annual Seminar on Rural Public Transport 
Polytechnic of Central London 1980 P. 12 
422 
CHAPTER SEVEN: References. (Continued). 
49. Confidential Statement on Institutional Constraints in 
Field of Public Transport Co-ordination 
Staffordshire C. C. 1977. 
50. Ibid. 
51. Staffordshire C. C. PTP 1980/81 P. 5. 
52. Ibid. Appendix B. 
53. Ibid. 1979/80 P. 3.14 
54. Evening Sentinel 29: 5: 80. 
55. Ibid. 
56. Ibid. 30: 5: 80. 
57. Ibid. 
58. Ibid. 5: 6: 80. 
59. Ibid. 8: 7: 80. 
423 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
IMPLEMENTATION IN THE 1970s: 
2. CROSVILLE AND THE COUNTY COUNCILS 
A. Introduction 
Chapter Three examined the philosophy of the busman in the 
context of James Crosland-Taylor and his work at Crosville. 
We saw how Crosville developed a system of services over an 
extremely large territory, extending from its home base of 
Cheshire to cover nearly all of north and central Wales. The 
contrast between industrial areas of Cheshire and sparsely 
inhabited parts of Wales is acute, and gives Crosville a 
particularly distinctive character. 
In this chapter we will be dealing with the 
inter-relationship between Crosville and the County Councils 
within its territory. In particular, the case of Crosville 
enables us to examine in more detail the dynamics of the 
relationship between an NBC subsidiary and a County with a 
strong planning and interventionist approach. Cheshire CC has 
been in the vanguard of those Counties which have attempted to 
develop their own expertise with regard to passenger transport 
planning, and hence challenge the independence and power of the 
NBC. This challenge has inevitably produced periods of tension 
between Crosville and Cheshire, but the need to balance this 
tension is a countervailing pressure bringing the two organizations 
together in order to negotiate a stable environment. We referred 
in the previous chapter to the link between Counties with a 
planning approach and opposition to a fragmentation of the 
service network. These Counties would find great difficulty in 
controlling and co-ordinating a system where many operators are 
at work, whereas one operator (however recalcitrant he may be 
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at times) can be given concentrated attention. 
In the case of Crosville and Cheshire the conflicting 
pressures (driving the two parties apart at one time and then 
bringing them together at another) have fuelled the dynamics of 
a relationship different from any of those involving MR. The 
arm's length approach adopted by M. R. has tended to produce a more 
static relationship with the Counties, none of whom has possessed 
the will or authority to directly challenge the company's 
autonomy. The Crosville-Cheshire relationship could be equated 
with that between Staffordshire CC and PMT (Staffordshire officers 
expressed the hope that one day they could emulate the power of 
Cheshire), but Cheshire's direct challenge to Crosville's 
authority has inevitably produced a more variable relationship 
than that experienced by Staffordshire and the Potteries company. 
We will see that in time a degree of synthesis in the approach to 
public transport planning has been achieved by Crosville and 
Cheshire CC with the relationship having arrived at negotiated 
order. It might, be said that the working out of tension between 
Crosville and Cheshire has ironically resulted in a greater 
identification of values than that to be found between MR and 
the Counties with a passive approach to public transport planning. 
In the case of the latter, a "live and let live" relationship may 
store up tensions to be released at a later date (e. g., when a 
County might discover that MAP does not solve all its subsidy 
problems). The Crosville-Cheshire relationship has eventually 
resulted in more channels of communication being introduced and 
a higher cognitive element between the two than can be found in 
the case of MR and its Counties. (The transition from conflict 
and tension to an increase in the cognitive element need not be 
restricted to Counties adopting an interventionist approach, for 
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we will see in the next chapter that the market approach 
propounded by Oxfordshire CC eventually led to a higher degree of 
identification and communication with City of Oxford Motor 
Services). 
Crosville has adopted a more decentralized approach to the 
development of MAP than MR, but we will see in studying the 
situation in Clwyd that this policy can present problems of its 
own. In addition, the more remote parts of Central Wales are a 
long way from Chester, and the relatively sparse service network 
in these areas can appear less significant to the company than 
its "heartland" of Cheshire and North Wales. 
B. Crosville-and Cheshire CC 
The Crosville Approach to Public Transport Planning 
In Chapter Five we described how Crosville took over a large 
part of the territory operated by the North Western Road Car 
Company when the latter was disbanded in 1972. This further 
expansion gave Crosville a powerful position as Cheshire's 
predominant bus operator. By 1980 Crossville was operating 
11.36 in. stage carriage vehicle miles in Cheshire out of a total 
of 117.14 m. The remaining miles were distributed between the 
three municipal undertakings of Warrington (2.22 m. ), Halton 
(1.10 m. ), and Chester (1.09 m. ), Greater Manchester PTE 
(1.01 m. ), and independents (0.02 m. ). 
1 It is nevertheless 
significant to note that although Crosville operated about 
two-thirds of the vehicle miles, it carried only just over half 
the'total number of passengers within Cheshire (33.12 in. out of 
a total of 64.8 m. ). 
2 In contrast, the three municipalities 
ran barely one-quarter of the vehicle miles but carried over 
two-fifths of the total passengers (27.29 in. out of a total of 
64.8 m. ) 
3 These figures signify Crosville's lack of access to 
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some of Cheshire's most densely populated areas, although the 
company does run services into all three of the towns where the 
municipal operator predominates (Crosville also has operating 
agreements with Greater Manchester and Merseyside PTEs, where 
there has been no wholesale take over of services on the lines 
of the West Midlands PTE and MR). 
Financially, Crosville is not in such a strong position as 
the municipalities with regard to remaining independent of aid 
from the CC (on average Crosville has received about 80% of 
Cheshire CC's annual subsidy to bus operators). In the days of 
Crosland-Taylor, cross-subsidization could be employed on a large- 
scale basis in order to keep the company profitable, but by the 
early 1970s the strain was becoming unbearable. The position in 
1971 was set out clearly by the General Manager, who in replying 
to public criticism of service cuts stated that 
cross-subsidization had broken down as a result of many urban 
services becoming unremunerative. He consequently considered it 
entirely logical that the community as a whole should bear the 
burden, rather than it being borne by the small section 
represented by urban and inter-urban bus travellers. 
Crosville acknowledged the need for subsidy, and that: 
.... all of the services will be subject to local authority 
control in the matter of timing, frequency and fares and the 
local authority will be able to decide when the financial 
assistance provided exceeds the benefit to the community. 
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In these circumstances they could discontinue the subsidy, and 
the service would be dropped. One of the major benefits of 
the exercise is that this gives local authorities the complete 
right to decide what will continue and what will not and at 
what fare. " 
4 
This statement apparently implied that Crosville was 
about to surrender control of its services to the local 
authorities, but the spirit of the busman reasserted itself 
in a later part of the article. In refuting a suggestion that 
councillors were more in touch with local requirements than 
Crosville, Mr. Wyke Smith commented: "With the greatest 
respect I must point out that the operation of buses is not a 
job for amateurs no matter how well intentioned, and that the 
alteration or discontinuance of just one timing can have a 
profound effect on both cost and revenue. Whilst I accept that 
local people know more about the requirements of their own 
particular community, it is the responsibility of the bus 
company to put together these requirements into one practical 
pattern at a reasonable cost. " 
5 The-local authorities were 
to be given control of services, so long as it was understood 
that Crosville had the right to the last word! 
Cheshire CC's Approach to Public Transport Planning 
When Mr. Wyke Smith made his comments, Cheshire County 
Council's subsidy and involvement in public transport planning 
was at a minimal level, but his words anticipated the events to 
come. By the time of Cheshire CC's first TPP in 1975-76: 
". ... the operators supplied their own forecasts and 
TSG was granted on this basis. The fact that the operators' 
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estimates turned out to be very considerably less than the 
eventual deficits, prompted the CC to develop its own method of 
forecasting. " 
6 This step signified the CC's commitment to 
challenging the expertise of Crosville, who received by far 
the largest share of the subsidy. After local government 
reorganization in 1974, Cheshire CC created a Transportation 
Unit within the Department of Highways and Transportation. 
The new unit was split into three sections: Co-ordination, 
Planning and Traffic Management. By 1980 there were eighteen 
people in the unit working on public transport, a figure well 
above that for any of the MR Counties. 
Cheshire's Transportation Unit also sought outside help 
in the development of its own forecasting model, and employed 
as a consultant a transport economist (W. J. Tyson) from 
Manchester University. Cheshire CC was clearly suspicious of 
Crosville's forecasts and considered that: It. ... the 
operators were not adept at providing their own deficit 
forecasts. " 7 The CC also claimed that the development of 
an alternative model had encouraged Crosville to improve its 
own forecasting, and that: It. ... the CC can now obtain 
much assistance in its own forecasts by means of joint 
discussions with the operators before forecasts are prepared, " 
8 
The County nevertheless acknowledges that policy objectives 
may differ between themselves and the operator: "For example, 
the CC for whom the implicit policy objective of meeting need 
would seem to mean serving the maximum number of passengers for 
a given level of revenue support, may make different 
assumptions about the rate of future fares increases from an 
operator whose priority is financial return. " 
9 The CC 
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saw itself as safeguarding the interests of the public, who 
might suffer as a result of Crosville's need to meet financial 
targets set by the NBC (although Crosville could claim that its 
professional experience and expertise enabled the company to 
keep in closer touch with needs of the public than the CC). 
At the heart. of Cheshire's determined attempts to develop 
its own forecasting model was the County's objective of 
assuming real power over Crosville. In the eyes of Cheshire, 
any County which merely accepted the word of an NBC subsidiary 
and allowed the company to "get on with its job" was not 
fulfilling its statutory obligations. This attitude was 
closely bound up with (and to the County might have appeared 
inseparable from) the philosophy of "he who pays the piper 
calls the tune", for Cheshire has consistently appeared near the 
top of the "league table". (In 1980-81,16.7% of the County's 
transport expenditure was allocated to public transport). 
The strength of its convictions gave the Transportation Unit 
an almost evangelical fervour in its anxiety to speak from a 
position of strength. 
The CC Develops its Policy 
By 1976 the Transportation Unit had sufficient confidence 
in its forecasting model to set up a special Study team. This 
team was given the task of preparing a number of policy 
options with regard to the level of services which could be 
expected for particular levels of revenue support. Seven 
alternative networks were prepared, at one extreme was the 
existing network with its corresponding support cost, and at 
the other extreme a basic network requiring little or no support. 
10 
It was emphasized that there was to be no attempt to specify 
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particular services which might be cut, but rather to illustrate 
the general level of service that could be provided for a 
particular sum of money. 
11 The Report outlining the various 
options did in fact go into a fair degree of detail with 
regard to service reductions which would be required in various 
areas, and left little doubt of the large reduction in services 
which would be required if subsidies were to be severely 
curtailed. From the point of view of the Transportation Unit, 
a principal objective in producing the document was to spell 
out to councillors and the public in general the implications 
of denying a subsidy to operators. If councillors could 
understand that the bus services in the areas they represented 
might be decimated if revenue support was curtailed, then 
this realization might make them more sensitive to the 
political implications of maintaining bus subsidies. In 
contrast to Counties with the passive approach, the public 
transport element of Cheshire's Transportation Unit had no 
intention of becoming a political backwater, and perceived that 
one of its principal objectives was to educate councillors 
on the connection between subsidies and maintenance of the 
service network. 
The network approach to provision of stage carriage bus 
services required that Crosville would retain its predominant 
position. During the consultation process on the policy 
options document, it was suggested by Chester City Council 
that revenue support could be directed towards socially 
necessary services rather than the entire network. The CC 
rejected this view, on the grounds that it was extremely 
difficult to isolate costs and revenue for a particular service: 
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"Hence, it affords a greater element of control to give 
revenue support on a network basis and as such would help 
negotiations between the CC and operators on questions of 
rationalization. " 
12 Cheshire CC had made control a prime 
policy objective, although it might be argued that subsidizing 
a network did not necessarily imply that control was being exerted. 
If costing an individual service is difficult, then costing 
a network within a single County (and Crosville covered 
several Counties) is even more difficult. In addition, the 
County does not have direct control over fare levels, or 
activities at the NBC headquarters. As we noted earlier in this 
chapter, a County seeking control will usually prefer to deal 
with one operator rather than many, although even in the 
Cheshire situation Crosville could maintain discretionary 
power over a large range of its affairs. 
From Crosville's point of view, Cheshire's commitment to 
the network approach was heartening, and one of the company's 
staff was seconded to the Transportation Unit to assist in the 
preparation of the policy options. On the subject of scope 
for private operators, the options document stated that there 
might be some areas where the small man could take a more 
active part, but also claimed that: "There is evidence that 
independent operators' costs are not always lower than those 
of the major stage carriage operators, " 
13 
and also that: 
"From our discussions it does seem doubtful whether the 
private sector has the resources, or even the desire, to take 
on any large scale commitment should a significant reduction 
in the existing stage carriage network become the aim of the 
County. " 14 
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Similarly, in reply to suggestions that better services 
could be provided if the licensing laws were relaxed, the CC 
took the view that: "The concept is attractive but suffers the 
main disadvantage that uncontrolled competition would be 
detrimental to the stability and reliability of the bus 
network of services. " 
15 Also, with regard to the 
desirability of carrying school children on stage carriage 
services rather than awarding special contracts (usually to a 
private operator): "It is generally in the CC's overall 
interest that as many pupils as possible should make the 
home-to-school journey on the established stage carriage network 
provided additional duplication is not required. Indeed the 
Education Department is taking care to ensure that this policy 
is adopted. " 
16 
Crosville could take further comfort from the result of 
the consultation process on the policy options. After 
consulting with District Councils and the operators, the CC 
selected an option which provided for only a slightly reduced 
set of services. Operators were requested to make cost 
savings of £400,000 by 1980-81, but the plan also, recommended an 
increase in subsidy of 19% in real terms. 
17 Implementation 
of the plan involved obvious hazards, for the CC's calculations 
contained projections for operators' costs and revenues over 
a five year period. 
We described in Chapter Six that the 1978 Transport Act 
indicated a greater commitment to public transport by the 
Labour Government than was originally proposed in the earlier 
consultation document, and indeed the 1978 Act itself encouraged 
County Councils to make a long-term commitment with regard to 
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revenue support for bus services. The Cheshire approach to 
public transport planning was thus endorsed by the Secretary 
of State for Transport, William Rodgers. When announcing 
TSG for 1979-80 Mr. Rodgers made a special point of commending 
Cheshire: "I very much welcome the work that Cheshire are 
doing on public transport planning and in assessing the needs 
of their communities .... Cheshire have 
done more than many 
other Counties to take their responsibilities for public 
transport seriously and I very much hope that they will continue 
to build on their achievements so far. " 
18 
With Mr. Rodgers as Transport Secretary, Cheshire could 
feel confident that the political and financial support of 
central government for their policy would be maintained. The 
difficulty was that over a five year period governments and the 
economic climate could change, and the plan become unrealistic. 
Proponents of the market approach (such as Oxfordshire CC) 
claim that there is too much uncertainty in the political and 
economic environment for long range planning to be feasible. 
Cheshire counters that some kind of commitment and stability 
to the public transport network is preferable to an ad hoc 
approach. The question of long-term commitments is fundamental 
to the differing philosophies of Cheshire and Oxfordshire. We 
shall see in the following chapter that the NBC subsidiaries have 
learned to cope with both types of approach, but in the case of 
Cheshire, the County's intent of a long-term commitment to 
revenue support had certain strings attached which were 
extremely unattractive to Crosville. 
The Macclesfield Area Study 
The preparation of policy options by Cheshire CC 
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represented only the first stage of the County's plans. Once 
the consultation process was completed and an option selected, 
it was intended that the Transportation Unit should: ".... 
conduct detailed area studies which would explore in greater 
depth the steps necessary to be taken to maintain revenue 
support within the guidelines. .... These detailed studies 
will attempt to get the maximum public transport mobility for 
a given level of revenue support which means examining every 
available method of public transport provision. " 
19 
Although the CC stated in the policy options document 
that it did not envisage any significant expansion in the role 
played by private operators or unconventional services, the 
local authority was anxious to assert itself as the chief 
planning and co-ordinating body. In the eyes of Cheshire CC, 
Crosville was only one component of the total transport system, 
and should therefore accept that the County had the final word. 
Crosville had co-operated in the preparation of the options 
document, and could rest easy in the knowledge that the 
company's predominant position would not be challenged. 
Despite the CC's reference to ".... every available method 
of public transport provision" the area studies would be 
chiefly concerned with rationalizing and replanning Crosville's 
routes. In its determination to assert control over the 
operator the CC was not prepared to leave this detailed work 
in the hands of Crosville. For their part, the heirs of 
Crosland-Taylor were equally determined to uphold the status 
and authority of the busman. The CC could rely on the 
co-operation of Crosville on general planning matters, but 
when the County intensified its interventionist approach a 
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crisis was inevitable. 
In preparing the area studies, Cheshire's Transportation 
Unit gave priority to the Warrington and Macclesfield areas. 
We will refer to the case of Warrington later in this section, 
but it was in Macclesfield where the County's ability to 
undertake detailed service planning was more immediately 
tested. 
The Macclesfield area had previously been served by North 
Western Road Car, but when this company was dissolved its 
services were split between Crosville and Greater Manchester 
PTE (the latter in this case operating mainly the cross-boundary 
routes into the Manchester area). During 1978, the 
Transportation Unit conducted survey work on passengers' 
movements in order to: It .... design a network which takes 
account of both the CC's and the operator's objectives. This 
network is designed jointly with the operators and their staff 
have been seconded to the study for this purpose. " 
20 
Crosville did co-operate in the preparation of the Macclesfield 
study, but their participation was subordinate to that of the 
CC. In the document outlining the consultees' responses to the 
policy options, Crosville expressed: ". ... their readiness 
to reassess the routeing pattern, " 
21 but in the event it was 
the Transportation Unit which was to reassess the routeing 
pattern, with the assistance of the company. 
As in the earlier case of the forecasting model, the 
Transportation Unit enlisted outside help in the preparation 
of the Macclesfield study. The Department of Transport 
Studies at Leeds University was asked to check the bus crew 
schedules through their computer, in order to ensure that the 
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revisions were viable. It was later acknowledged by the 
Transportation Unit that the local complexities of crew 
scheduling made it impossible for the Leeds computer to 
properly evaluate the data, and contributed towards the 
difficulties which the CC was to encounter in Macclesfield. 
Even prior to implementation, the Transportation Unit 
ran into difficulties with its plans for Macclesfield. 
Greater Manchester PTE was not happy with some of the service 
rationalizations proposed and could not reach agreement with 
the CC. 
When it was realized that the PTE revisions could not 
be implemented for some time, the County decided to go ahead 
separately with the Crosville proposals. In their turn, 
Crosville were not happy with the Transportation Unit's 
general approach to the Macclesfield study. In particular, 
they were uneasy that the relevant Divisional Manager (i. e., 
the man whom the company considered possessed the required 
detailed knowledge about the Macclesfield area) was rarely 
consulted during the preparation of the study. Crosville 
eventually agreed to publication of the Macclesfield study 
because of the need to make immediate cost savings, while the 
County's commitment to subsidizing the company's services 
left the operator with little room to manoeuvre. 
The Macclesfield area proposals were published in October 
1978. Although the list of consultees was a long one 
(including District and Parish Councils, local MPs and County 
Councillors, together with a wide range of local groups), 
only a month was allowed for the consultation process. We 
referred in the previous chapter to the dilemma between 
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conducting an extensive consultation exercise and implementing 
service changes quickly in order to save costs, and Cheshire's 
Transportation Unit found itself in this position in the case 
of Macclesfield. It might also be argued that to local 
councillors and groups a detailed and seemingly complex set 
of proposals for bus service revisions cannot be easily 
absorbed and analysed. It is only when the practical effects 
of the changes are perceived that a reaction is forthcoming. 
The moment of truth for Macclesfield occurred in May 1979, 
when the service revisions were implemented. The consultation 
exercise yielded only a small official and public response, 
but within days of the changes taking place a hostile public 
reaction was well under way. It was reported that: "Protests 
are still pouring in to the Divisional office of Crosville at 
Crewe, and also the office at Macclesfield about the recent 
revision in the bus services to the area, and these include a 
petition with 300 signatures on Macclesfield's Weston Estate. 
The complaint states that due to a reduction in the number of 
buses on the services many people are being left at stops 
because the buses are full. " 
22 During the next few weeks 
the complaints continued to mount, and towards the end of June 
there was an intervention from the MP for Macclesfield, 
Nicholas Winterton. The MP wrote to Cheshire CC's Director 
of Highways and Transportation, Mr. Knight, on behalf of the: 
". ... many constituents who have written to me. " 
23 
Mr. Knight replied that his Department was in touch with 
Crosville and were taking any practical measures they could 
to adjust the new services to meet passenger complaints. He 
also emphasized that some reductions in services were inevitable 
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if costs were to be placed in line with the level of revenue 
support. 
24 
The culmination of the Macclesfield case arrived in 
August 1979, when Crosville announced that the County and the 
company had agreed to revise some services within the budget 
available and also to provide extra journeys in the areas of 
greatest need. 
25 Although in the eyes of the public 
Crosville and the CC were placed together as bearing 
responsibility for the service revisions, it could not have 
been entirely displeasing for the company that the changes 
had not been well received by the bus passengers. The 
County could claim that any cutback in services was likely to 
arouse complaints, and that major service revisions invariably 
encountered teething troubles (as we saw in the previous 
chapter in the case of the "Lancer" network), but there 
could be no doubt that events in Macclesfield had strengthened 
Crosville's position with regard to future local plans. 
The Introduction of MAP to Cheshire. 
This struggle for authority and power between the CC and 
Crosville was further highlighted by the dispute over the 
introduction of MAP in Cheshire, which ran largely parallel in 
time to the Macclesfield case. When Crosville put forward plans 
for adopting MAP to the CC in 1978 the Transportation Unit 
rejected the programme on the grounds that the County would 
have insufficient involvement in the process, i. e., the kind of 
relationship which existed between MR and the passive counties. 
Pressure was also exerted on the Transportation Unit by NBC's 
General Manager and the relevant Regional Director, but little 
progress was made. Further developments occurred when the 
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Select Committee on Nationalized Industries was preparing its 
Report on Innovations in Rural Bus Services. In the course of 
collecting evidence members of the Committee visited Cheshire, 
when the Transportation Unit took the opportunity to put 
forward its case on MAP. 
The Transportation Unit was encouraged by the response it 
received from the Select Committee. The CC emphasized its case 
by submitting a memorandum to the Committee which publicly set 
out Cheshire's general approach to public transport planning 
and in particular the attitude towards MAP. The relatively 
lengthy memorandum initially outlined the matters which the 
CC considered were the main elements in public transport 
planning. These included such factors as need and integration 
of services and fares. In a clear reference to its opinion on 
MAP the CC considered that its responsibilities represented: 
a wide-ranging task extending far beyond considerations 
simply of market analysis and commercial aims. Its wide scope 
and extent makes it a task which it is appropriate for ecs to 
carry out within the framework of current Government policy on 
transport generally and on public transport in particular and 
the availability, taking into account the amount of grant 
available, for its support. " 
26 
In staking its claims for 
supremacy over Crosville, the CC was invoking support of the 
relevant statutes: "With the above requirements in mind it 
would appear that ccs are best equipped to do public transport 
planning and that is, indeed what the Transport Bill (later to 
become the 1978 Transport Act) requires. " 
27 
We saw earlier that Mr. Rodgers' public commendation for 
Cheshire's approach to public transport planning indicated 
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that the CC could feel confident of official support for its 
policy. The CC's basic self-confidence was reflected in the 
second stage of the memorandum, which set out the case against 
MAP. The County claimed that in order to fulfil its 
responsibilities, it must retain the initiative with regard to 
data collection and computer analysis (the memorandum was 
written prior to implementation of the Macclesfield proposals ; ). 
It was considered that MAP could be useful in improving the 
efficiency of an NBC subsidiary, but the County was also of the 
opinion that MAP was not innovatory and should not be the main 
tool for transport planning because of its predominantly 
commercial objectives. In the County's view, NBC's proper role 
was to implement changes with regard to agreements with Trade 
Unions and submissions to the Traffic Commissioners: "It is 
this latter stage of planning concerned with implementation on 
which operators should concentrate their efforts. They are 
best equipped to do this - indeed the only agency who can 
properly do it - just as ccs are best equipped to do the plan 
preparation. " 
28 
The content of the memorandum reflected the assertive, 
almost pugnacious, approach of Cheshire CC towards public 
transport policy. The main source of this pugnacity was the 
Transportation Unit, which saw itself as pioneering a trail 
where other local authorities could follow. As we noted 
earlier, the Unit also saw part of its role as that of an 
educator, not only of external bodies but also of its own 
councillors. We referred earlier in this chapter to the Unit's 
perception that the policy options document would demonstrate 
to councillors the consequences of adopting a particular level 
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of revenue support. In a similar manner to Leicestershire CC 
there is also an example of a "placebo" put forward to keep 
councillors happy. The memorandum contended that Elected 
Members of the CC would be less remote from policy-making if 
they became Board members of the major NBC subsidiary in their 
area. The Transportation Unit considered that this was an 
impractical proposition on the grounds that the NBC boards had 
little power, and also that a councillor would suffer a 
conflict of interests between the company and the CC. The 
paragraph was inserted at the request of councillors who 
wished to exert more control over Crosville. The Transportation 
Unit had the same objective, but was determined that the 
policy should be implemented in a "rational" manner! 
When Crosville had studied the CC's memorandum, the 
company decided that it should issue a reply. Crosville's 
memorandum set out to justify its own role in public transport 
planning, and in particular the importance of MAP. The 
company was also anxious to put forward its own suspicions 
concerning the motives of the Transportation Unit: "Whilst 
the County stresses, at the outset, the need for full 
co-operation between the CC and bus operators, it could be said 
that their comments .... are largely in self justification 
of the not inconsiderable Transportation Planning Unit which 
the County at present has . . 11 
29 Crosville saw the Unit 
as an obvious threat to its own status, and interpreted the 
motivation behind the latter's behaviour in terms of 
self-aggrandizement rather than rational planning. 
Crosville went on to throw doubt on the County's 
professional expertise and the quality of the Macclesfield 
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study in particular: ". ... the 
(CC's) paper over-emphasizes 
the skills available to a cc in specific areas of route and 
time-table planning. Crosville would not wish to dispute 
with Cheshire that the objectives and financial targets for 
the planning of bus routes should be fully discussed, agreed 
and greatly influenced by the CC. However, the translation 
of those guidelines into a major revision of services on the 
ground is the same problem which faces a MAP exercise .... 
On the experience of the Macclesfield study (recently 
undertaken in Cheshire with Crosville co-operation) it is not 
clear that Cheshire's method of survey and analysis produces 
data in a clear enough form. MAP has concentrated its 
programmes on doing just that. " 
30 
In their memorandum Crosville were anxious to indicate 
that the company was prepared to co-operate with the CC, but 
it was also determined that MAP should go ahead in Cheshire. 
A programme such as MAP gave Crosville an opportunity to seize 
back the initiative in the detailed planning of services. 
Crosville considered that the County's concern for meeting 
needs was too abstract a concept and that meeting demand was 
more realistic an objective (we discussed the difficulty of 
defining need in Chapter Six). The company also pointed out 
the Transport Bill's reference to the importance of a County 
implementing its plans in a spirit of full co-operation with 
the operator. Unlike the County, Crosville did not see its 
own role as being the implementing agency after a plan had been 
prepared: "If this is the only company involvement it is too 
late to make an effective plan. To a large extent this is 
what is happening in Macclesfield and the results are that the 
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detailing of schedules prepared by the CC will be difficult 
and negotiations based on such schedules may well prove 
ineffective in achieving the maximum possible savings.,, 
31 
The submission of memoranda to the Select Committee 
marked the low point in the relationship between Crosville 
and Cheshire CC. The Select Committee was generally impressed 
with Cheshire's approach and put pressure on NBC to allow the 
County more participation in MAP. In addition, there were 
other factors encouraging a compromise. The difficulties 
which the County encountered in Macclesfield made it reluctant 
to prepare a further study on similar lines, and the ready-made 
programme of MAP with its techniques of data collection and 
analysis provided an opportunity for the Transportation Unit 
to hand this task over to Crosville. For its part, Crosville 
was prepared to integrate the County closely into the MAP 
process and also acknowledged that MAP should form part of the 
County's area studies. The company thereby preserved its 
status as a plan initiator while also maintaining a relatively 
high level of revenue support. 
This compromise enabled pride to be satisfied on both 
sides. Perhaps more important than philosophical arguments 
over the difference between meeting needs and demand, the 
reconciliation of the two interests confirmed Crosville's 
power with regard to detailed services planning and scheduling, 
while also endorsing the County's ultimate control with regard 
to public transport planning as a whole. Counteracting the 
confrontation between the two interests was a pressure towards 
consensus. This consensus was based on the satisfaction of 
interests, but the agreement also implied an exchange of values. 
444 
By integrating MAP into the area studies, Crosville acknowledged 
itself to be part of a wider planning process, while the County 
recognized that the commercial values enshrined in MAP could 
be of value in the process of rationalizing services. (The 
trend towards integration might also facilitate a process of 
identification, for if Crosville and the CC work together for 
a long enough period, then the values of each might become 
indistinguishable from one another). 
The participation of the CC in the Crosville MAP process, 
itself implies that the two parties are anxious to evolve a 
common approach, for as we described earlier in this section 
there is a strong element of common interest drawing them 
together. A member of the CC's Transportation Unit is seconded 
to Crosville headquarters for the duration of MAP, while a 
feature of Crosville'. MAP Process is its more decentralized 
nature when compared to MR. After the data has been collected 
and processed by the computer it is handed over to the relevant 
Divisional office. At this point, the detailed service 
revisions are worked out usually by an Assistant Divisional 
Manager and a member of the CC's Transportation Unit. Depot 
Superintendents are also consulted during this period. When 
the proposals are ready for submission, the MAP process is 
metamorphosed into a CC area study. We described in the 
previous chapter how Staffordshire CC took the initiative 
during the consultation process by publishing District Plans 
in response to MAP Reports. In a similar manner, Cheshire 
CC publishes a Consultation Report. The CC issues the Report 
to all relevant District and Parish Councils, 
. 
invites comments 
from members of the public, and holds public meetings. 
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The Effects on Other Operators of the Crosvifle-Cheshire 
CC Relätionship. 
The above process applies in areas of Cheshire where 
Crosville is virtually in a monopoly position with regard to 
stage carriage services. In areas shared with other operators 
the situation can be more complicated. We described in the 
previous chapter how private operators were suspicious of the 
relationship between PMT and Staffordshire CC. In Cheshire, 
a similar attitude is adopted by municipal operators and PTEs. 
In Macclesfield we saw how Greater Manchester PTE was unable to 
reach agreement with the CC. The Crosville revisions were 
implemented in 1979, but it is only in 1981 that the revisions 
involving the PTE have been brought into operation. The 
Warrington area was covered by five operators: Crosville, 
Warrington Borough, Greater Manchester PTE, Merseyside PTE 
and Ribble (another NBC subsidiary). In 1980, the Cheshire 
PTP stated that: ". ... the Warrington area study presents 
special difficulties because of the complicated network of 
stage carriage services provided by three main bus operators 
at three different fare scales. " 
32 In an area with such a 
high degree of inter-working, Crosville could not undertake 
MAP, and neither could the CC impose a settlement on all the 
operators. 
Operators such as the PTEs and the municipalities received 
little or no revenue support from Cheshire CC, and were not 
prepared to forfeit services merely at the behest of the 
County. The implicit threat that revenue support could be 
reduced in certain circumstances was a powerful tool of 
control for the CC in its dealings with Crosville, but where 
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the County did not possess this sanction its will could not 
be imposed. Although the statutes gave considerable authority 
to the ccs, they did not grant any means of seizing direct 
control over operators. The problem of control without the 
power of coercion is one which we shall be discussing in the 
Conclusion. 
Cheshire CC's difficulties in this area were best 
illustrated by the attitude of Chester City Transport towards 
the CC and Crosville. The City Council's own undertaking 
received, no subsidy and prided itself on its ability to run 
a profitable service network in and around Chester. As the 
inter-urban operator Crosville ran many services into and out 
of Chester, but with picking up and setting down restrictions 
in the City. A relaxation in these conditions would have 
reduced Crosville's deficit (and the CC's level of revenue 
support), but Chester City was unwilling to cc-operate as a 
result of being highly suspicious of the relationship between 
Crosville and the CC: "Inevitably, since NBC receive 
approximately 80% of the total revenue support, it is 
understandable that considerable discussions take place 
between the CC and Crosville. However, in the context of the 
PTP it is important that the influence of operators should be 
related to the level of passengers carried rather than to 
revenue. support required. " 33 In its response to the CC's 
PTP proposals, Chester City was making the point that the CC 
should not equate its co-ordinating role with allocation of 
revenue support, and that the City was not prepared to sacrifice 
its interests in order to assist Crosville and the CC.: "The 
CC appear to be under the delusion that any measures which can 
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improve revenue for Crosville will assist them in reducing 
revenue support, but this is a short-sighted policy which 
takes no account of the effect upon the City Council 
undertaking which would lose financial viability and require 
revenue support. "" 
34 
Faced with Chester City's refusal to co-operate in 
detailed rationalization plans an area study was not a 
practical proposition, although the City Council had declared 
itself to be in favour of such a study in principle. At this 
point the CC and Crosville decided to conduct a joint MAP in 
Chester, which was implemented in October 1980. The CC then 
proposed that Crosville's picking up and setting down 
restrictions might be relaxed in return for Chester City 
receiving some of the Crosville services. The City Council 
gave tentative acceptance to this proposal, and it was hoped 
that plans could be implemented during 1981. 
We have seen in this section the dynamic nature of the 
relationship between Crosville and Cheshire CC,. but it is 
interesting to note that in the eyes of Chester City the two 
interests were indivisible. Endemic tension with regard to 
problems of control remained, but the CC and Crosville had 
built up a relationship based on inter-dependence and common 
interest, leading to an exchange and convergence of values. 
C. Crosville and the Welsh Counties 
The Dual Character of Crosville 
In this section we will briefly examine Crosville's 
relatiionship with the Welsh Counties in which the company 
operates services, i. e., Clwyd, Powys, Gwynedd and Dyfed. A 
key factor to note from the outset is that although Crosville 
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runs its buses over an extremely wide area of Wales, the 
number of services and passengers carried is relatively 
small compared to Cheshire and the industrial areas of North 
Wales. We saw in Chapter Three that in the eyes of 
Crosland-Taylor Crosville had succumbed to temptation in 
expanding its territory so far into Wales. Commercially the 
venture could not be justified, but the new services did 
spread the Crosville name across most of Wales. From the 
early 1930s onwards the Welsh services could only weaken 
Crosville's financial position, ' but the attitude of the 
Traffic Commissioners towards the maintenance of 
cross-subsidization enforced the company's compliance in 
maintaining its Welsh connection. 
The impact and effects of Crosville's involvement in 
Wales can be looked at from two aspects. From Crosville 
headquarters in Chester, the Welsh Counties can be viewed. as 
forming only a relatively small part of the company's business, 
while geographically Chester is a long way from Central Wales. 
From the CC s' point of view, Crosville headquarters can appear 
equally remote, although their own public transport network is 
naturally of importance to them. Crosville has two Welsh 
divisions, one based_at Wrexham and the other in Caernarvon. 
The Wrexham Division deals with the Counties of Clwyd and 
Powys, whilg. Caernarvon's Division covers Gwynedd. In addition, 
the depot at Aberystwyth has a special area status, for it is 
situated in the County of Dyfed. We described in the previous 
section how MAP was developed as a more decentralized process 
in Crosville than in MR, with the Divisional Managers taking 
the lead in evaluating the data, although in contrast to 
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Cheshire the Welsh counties on the whole took little direct 
part in the preparation stage of MAP. 
The question of cross-subsidization is_a sensitive one, 
although it is accepted by the Crosville counties that some 
degree of cross-boundary revenue support still takes place. 
We have discussed earlier in this study the difficulties of 
isolating the cost of a particular service, and the policy 
of standard charging for fares is still almost universally 
employed by NBC subsidiaries. Unlike MR, the Crosville 
counties do not meet on an official basis, but a number of 
ad hoc meetings do take place. 
Cheshire CC would prefer subsidy to be paid on the basis 
of a contract, whereby a fixed sum would be paid at the 
beginning of each year. The County considers that this would 
provide an incentive for efficiency and minimize 
cross-subsidization, for the company would be free to save 
what amount it could from the fixed sum paid. Under the present 
method, the CC has become suspicious that Crosville's claims at 
the end of a year nearly always correspond very closely to the 
maximum amount which the County has allowed for bus subsidy in 
that year. In its turn, Crosville denies the existence of any 
"cost-switching" in order to claim the maximum total amount of 
subsidy from the counties, and considers that counties are 
given sufficient information to make an accurate judgment of 
costs and revenues. In reality, the question of apportioning 
costs does not appear to have been a major point of contention 
either between the counties or between Crosville and the 
counties. (In one case, it was found that a county had been 
paying subsidy on a cross-boundary service which had not 
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operated within that County for nearly two years! ). The 
financial state of the bus industry in the 1970s left little 
scope for cross-subsidization in the traditional sense, and 
the main problem for all the Counties was in dealing with 
Crosville's deficit. 
Of the four Counties, it could be said that Powys and 
Gwynedd are in the passive category of approach to public 
transport planning. Dyfed is of the planning and interventionist 
type, while Clwyd. can be placed in the market category. We 
will be studying the market approach more closely in the 
following chapter (on Oxfordshire), while we have already 
examined both the passive and planning approaches in some detail. 
There are nevertheless certain features of Crosville's Welsh 
Counties which throw further light on the dynamics of the 
relationship and the characteristics of Crosville. 
Clwyd CC. 
From the point of view of our study Clwyd is perhaps the 
most noteworthy of the Welsh Counties, for it combines the market 
approach with a relatively high degree of financial support 
for Crosville. Clwyd is placed near the head of the "league 
table", with 15.4% of its total transport spending being 
allocated to public transport in 1980-81. In addition, prior 
to 1981 Clwyd was committed to financing all of Crosville's 
deficit within the County. Yet Crosville regarded Clwyd CC 
with a higher degree of suspicion than any of the other 
Counties or operators in its area (with the possible exception 
of Chester City Transport). 
_ 
The generally acrimonious 
relationship between Crosville and Clwyd was based (like MR 
and Hereford and Worcester) on the County's hopes that private 
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operators could take a more prominent role in providing stage 
carriage services. Clwyd was also to the forefront of those 
counties which introduced experimental services. These 
services included a community bus, which required co-operation 
between Crosville and the CC. 
Although such unconventional services as postbuses and 
social car schemes did not offer any direct threat to Crosville 
in Clwyd, they implied a fragmentation of the system which 
could in the long-term affect the company's network. The 
relationship between Crosville and Clwyd CC hung crucially 
around the ability of MAP to improve the company's efficiency. 
In anticipating the implementation of MAP, the CC considered 
that its results would raise certain issues: 
1. To what extent should revenue support be paid for a 
Crosville stage carriage network as existing or as amended ? 
2. Can other stage carriage operators supply more 
cost-effective services ? 
3. Can other modes of public transport serve the 
observed social needs more cost-effectively ? 
35 
The questions posed by Clwyd implied that if MAP did not 
make predicted savings, then the CC would encourage a 
fragmentation of the network. 
It is interesting to note that Crosville did not have 
a particularly high regard for the expertise within Clwyd CC. 
The County is unique in the counties covered by this study, 
for the Public Transport Section is situated within the 
Administrative and Legal Services Department. The CC considers 
that as public transport provision has many legal aspects 
(e. g., agreements with operators and the Traffic Courts) this 
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is the most appropriate place for the section. Eight people 
work in the Public Transport Section, although four of these 
are concerned with school transport. (The integration of 
education transport with public transport as a whole can also 
imply a threat to an NBC subsidiary, for we shall see in the 
case of Oxfordshire that by converting school contracts into 
stage carriage services the basis of an area network can be 
undermined). 
At the time when Cheshire CC and Crosville were working 
together on MAP and the area studies, the company had developed 
respect for the County's expertise, but it was considered by 
Crosville that Clwyd's Public Transport Section was out of 
touch with reality. In Cheshire the introduction of MAP had 
assisted in bringing the company and the County together, but 
in Clwyd the opposite was the case. Unlike Cheshire, Clwyd 
refused to contribute towards the cost of MAP, and took no part 
in the collection or initial evaluation of the data. In the 
eyes of Crosville, Clwyd CC was demanding results from MAP 
without appreciating the company's difficulties. 
The progress of MAP in Clwyd was not helped by a dispute 
between Crosville and a private operator. The CC had 
encouraged private operators in the Wrexham area to participate 
in MAP, but in July 1979 one of these operators (Wright's) sued 
Crosville in an attempt to obtain MAP data on its services. 
Crosville was prepared to supply all parties with the computer 
output data, but the private operator was demanding the raw 
data. The route concerned was one with some degree of 
interworking between Crosville and Wright's and there existed 
a strong feeling of mutual suspicion between the two parties. 
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A partner in Wright's claimed that Crosville's behaviour 
showed that private operators ought not to contemplate joining 
NBC schemes, but Crosville would not budge. 
36 The case had 
still not been settled early in 1981, and continued to be a 
highly sensitive issue within Clwyd CC. 
Although the County failed to bring about an agreement 
between Crosville and Wright's, MAP as a whole went ahead, 
with the first revision being introduced in Deeside early in 
1980. The timing of these changes was unfortunate, for in 
April 1980 steelmaking ceased at the Shotton steelworks on 
Deeside. Combined with general recession, the economic 
climate on Deeside declined dramatically and reduced demand 
for bus services. Although the CC acknowledged the adverse 
environment, it was not happy with Crosville's work on MAP 
and the ever mounting deficit. 
At Crosville headquarters it was claimed that the expertise 
at Divisional level in Clwyd was not of the required standard 
for the preparation of a MAP Report. This attitude represents 
the converse of MR, where Divisional officers considered that 
MR headquarters lacked sufficient local knowledge to devise 
MAP service revisions. The central-local tensions within NBC 
subsidiaries represented differing perspectives. In the eyes 
of central management, they themselves were the people who 
best understood how to evaluate computer processed data 
(despite Crosville's more decentralized approach to MAP). 
For the Divisional officers, a mass of data was no substitute 
for detailed local knowledge of the service network. As the 
Select Committee commented (a point which we outlined in the 
previous chapter) in MAP there did appear to be a point of 
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discontinuity where data evaluation met local experience. 
In addition to external factors, the politics of MAP included 
this internal cognitive gap. 
Clwyd CC became more dissatisfied with the results of 
MAP during 1980, and by February 1981 had adopted a more 
aggressive approach towards Crosville. The CC claimed that 
trunk routes (mainly run by Crossville) should be 
self-supporting. In addition, it was decided to pursue a 
policy of converting school contracts (run by private 
operators) to stage carriage services, and also to introduce 
more unconventional services. 
37 The sum of these proposals 
obviously held little cheer for Crosville, and could only 
cause a further deterioration in the relationship with the 
CC. We saw that MAP in Cheshire eventually assisted in 
achieving a degree of synthesis between the CC and Crosville, 
but in Clwyd it appeared to have the opposite effect. 
Gwynedd and Powys CCs. 
In contrast to Clwyd, both Gwynedd and Powys had a 
relatively tranquil relationship with Crosville. Both could 
be described as counties adopting basically a passive approach. 
In Powys, NBC runs approximately 80% of stage carriage miles, 
38 
while in Gwynedd, Crosville itself runs 91% of stage carriage 
miles. 
39 In 1980-81, Gwynedd CC allocated 9.76% of transport 
expenditure to public transport, while the figure for Powys 
was 3.52%. Both Gwynedd and Powys are highly rural counties, 
and few of the Crosville routes in these counties are profitable. 
In Powys there are a considerable number of small private 
operators, and this creates co-ordination difficulties with 
regard to timetabling etc., but there is no suggestion by the 
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County that the private operators might take over Crosville 
routes. In Gwynedd there are few private operators, which 
the County admits is a considerable aid in performing its 
co-ordinating role (we saw that the policy adopted in Cheshire 
did not favour a fragmentation of the system). 
The numbers employed in the public transport sections of 
Powys and Gwynedd CCs are three and five respectively. Powys 
has not participated directly in the preparation of Crosville's 
MAP, and for a period Gwynedd adopted a similar policy. After 
the initial MAPs in Gwynedd, the CC decided to adopt a more 
interventionist approach, and officers worked side by side on 
plan preparation with Crosville's Divisional management. 
This policy was adopted for two reasons. Firstly it was 
considered that more direct participation enabled the County's 
proposals to be in-Qorporated in MAP Reports from the outset, 
and secondly the integration speeded up MAP preparation, 
thereby assisting early implementation and cutting costs. 
Although Gwynedd CC had no plans to adopt a deliberately more 
interventionist approach, the force of circumstance had 
pushed it somewhat away from a passive approach. In this case, 
as in Cheshire, MAP had tended to bring Crosville and the CC 
closer together. 
Dyfed CC. 
Dyfed CC could broadly be placed in the planning and 
interventionist category, although not to the same extent as 
Cheshire CC. It is nevertheless interesting to note that, 
like Cheshire, Dyfed was highly suspicious of MAP. Since 
local government re-organization, Dyfed had worked closely 
with the operators in revising and rationalizing services 
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within the County. In 1979 this approach was taken a stage 
further when the CC appointed consultants Peat, Marwick, 
Mitchell and Company, together with Social and Community 
Planning Research, in order to develop a method of assessing 
public transport needs. The study did not attempt any 
detailed analysis of services., but it was hoped by the CC that 
the consultants could prepare a Report which would assist the 
operators in developing criteria for their own work on service 
revisions. 
Compared to Cheshire's eighteen, only four people worked 
on public transport in Dyfed, and the County was in no position 
to undertake a Macclesfield type of study. The CC was 
nevertheless unhappy about MAP, and considered that: 
such extra studies are unnecessary at this time and 
could introduce disruption to services when it has been 
intended that there should be a period of stability. It is 
CC policy that the impgsjtion of MAP will not be supported 
in areas in which service revisions have been completed 
following extensive studies by the CC. " 
40 At this point 
Crosville decided to go it alone and produced a MAP Report 
based on services emanating from the Aberystwyth depot. The 
County did not know that Crosville was undertaking this work 
until the plan was published, and they also took no part in 
the consultation process. 
Dyfed's relationship with Crosville was also tied up'with 
the long distance between the County and company headquarters 
in Chester. The Dyfed officers considered that Crosville's 
central management had little knowledge of affairs in the 
County, and they generally resented the inferior status which 
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in their opinion the company afforded to the area. Crosville 
acknowledged this state of affairs at the time of the MAP 
preparation when the Aberystwyth Depot Superintendent 
(basically concerned with operational efficiency) was 
succeeded by an officer with a higher managerial status. 
Dyfed CC was pleased with this change, for on the whole it 
considered that the local office operated more efficiently 
when intervention from above was kept to a minimum. 
Despite Dyfed CC's dissatisfaction with MAP, there did not 
appear to be any long-term effects on its relationship with 
Crosville. Basically, MAP was regarded by the County as being 
a relatively brief interruption in the long-term evolution of 
joint planning between itself and the company. In the case of 
Dyfed, there was no suggestion that a swing towards the 
private operator was likely to increase efficiency. In 1980-81 
Dyfed devoted 12.93% of its total transport spending to public 
transport, and for 1981-82 it was planned that the NBC 
subsidiaries should maintain their share of this expenditure 
(approximately 75%). 
D. Conclusion 
In this chapter we have been chiefly concerned with 
examining the dynamics of the relationship between Crosville 
and Cheshire CC's strong planning and interventionist approach. 
We saw that there are strong forces driving the two organizations 
apart, but also others pushing them together. On the whole the 
forces encouraging co-operation have been more powerful, 
although the battle for control over service planning suggests 
an endemic rivalry. The identification of interests has led to 
an exchange and identification of values, and this process 
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appears to have subordinated the rivalry to a secondary role. 
The degree to which the interests of Cheshire CC and Crosville 
were perceived as being indistinguishable by a third party was 
indicated by the behaviour of Chester City Transport, which 
viewed both the company and the County with a high degree of 
mistrust. 
In addition to the policy adopted by Cheshire CC, the 
commercial and financial importance of the County to Crosville 
compelled the company to give a great deal of attention to the 
CO.. In contrast, the more rural areas of Wales are a long way 
from Chester, and in some cases (Dyfed in particular) are 
regarded as remote outposts of the company's empire. To 
counties such as Gwynedd and Powys the relationship with the 
Divisional office of Crosville 
importance to the relationship 
emphasized Crosville's role as 
company serving Cheshire and i: 
and the other operating in the 
Wales. 
Politically, the policies 
was equal (if not greater in 
with Chester, a factor which 
two companies in one, i. e., one 
adustrial areas of North Wales, 
deeply rural Central and West 
adopted by both Gwynedd and 
Powys did not challenge Crosville's position, and in these 
counties the company could on the whole act from a position of 
strength. In Clwyd the situation was more complex. Although 
the County gave Crosville a relatively high level of revenue 
support, it adopted an increasingly hostile attitude towards 
the company. By threatening Crosville with a greater 
fragmentation of the system, Clwyd was pursuing the market 
model which we also saw in the previous chapter with regard to 
Hereford and Worcester. Having examined the passive and 
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planning approaches to public transport policy we will now 
turn to a more detailed study of the market approach in the 
form of the policy exhaustively pursued by Oxfordshire CC. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
Implementation in the 1970s: 
3. The Case of Oxfordshire 
A. Introduction 
At the heart of Cheshire CC's relationship with Crosville 
lay the quest for control. The CC was not able to impose 
absolute control over Crosville, but neither could the company 
separate itself from the influence of the County. Although 
the relationship between Oxfordshire CC and City of Oxford 
Motor Services (CONS) followed a different course of events, 
we will see that once again confrontation eventually led to a 
plateau of consensus. 
This similarity may superficially appear to be surprising 
in that the Cheshire CC approach was based on planning, 
intervention and central control while Oxfordshire CC's 
approach emphasized the importance of decentralization, 
flexibility, deregulation and competition. A common element 
to both counties was the radical objective of loosening the 
authority and power of the local NBC subsidiary and to replace 
it with a higher degree of local control. Although the 
counties achieved some degree of success in fulfilling their 
parallel aims, both Crosville and COMS could claim eventually 
that their ability to plan and implement the services of their 
own choice had not been seriously impaired. 
Although Oxfordshire CC attempted to implement a market 
model, this did not entail a total laissez-faire approach. 
The effort required to change the status quo involved the CC 
in a substantial amount of activity which could be placed on a 
scale of intensity equal to that undertaken by Cheshire CC. 
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Although Oxfordshire CC wished to decentralize service planning, 
the policy could not be initiated without prompting from the 
centre. In addition, the County's chosen policy too7/of the 
extended school contract also necessitated a degree of central 
direction. The CC undoubtedly intended to introduce more 
flexibility into the system, but mixed in with this aim was the 
objective of switching control from the NBC to a locally based 
structure. 
From the COMS' point of view, the CC's policy offered an 
obvious threat to its position, although the company was by no 
means unsympathetic to the County's commercial objectives. 
Eventually, it was the Traffic Commissioners and the Government 
who frustrated the CC in its aim of extending the influence of 
the private operator, and led to a more tranquil relationship 
with the COMS. In achieving this new plateau MAP was to play 
a key part, and indeed MAP itself can be seen as a response to 
the policy put forward by Oxfordshire CC. 
Perhaps most importantly, the policy pursued by Oxfordshire 
CC indicated a general change in values. From 1930 until the 
1970s there had been an acceptance by governments of both 
parties that the basic regulatory system was the most suitable 
form for governing the bus industry. During the 1970s the 
Conservatives began to seriously question this system and to 
eventually put forward proposals based on values similar to 
those adopted by the Oxfordshire CC. When a Conservative 
Government returned to power in 1979 it almost immediately 
placed before Parliament a Transport Bill intended to abolish 
a significant portion of the road service licensing system. 
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B. The Development of COMS 
We saw in Chapter Two how the COMS in its early days was 
mistrustful of sending its buses far from the City of Oxford: 
"The operation missed by the COMS is stressed by the fact that 
in 1922 South Midland Touring and Transport Company limited was 
set up with headquarters in Oxford itself and was a 60-vehicle 
company served in the metropolis by London Coastal Coaches 
limited in a little over a decade. " 
1 Under the Oxford and 
District Tramways Act, Oxford's City services were leased by 
the City Council to COMS, but this Act was repealed in 1951.2 
The agreement with the City Council gave COMS a monopoly in 
Oxford itself, and although there were a large number of 
operators in the County as a whole, the majority of these 
traditionally have been involved in contract work. In 1980, 
COMS operated over 80% of stage carriage services in Oxfordshire, 
but only 10% of school contract services. MR and Alder Valley 
(another NBC subsidiary) operate approximately 10% of stage 
services and the private sector the other 10%. In contrast, the 
private operators provide 90% of school contract services in a 
County which prefers allocating contracts to issuing bus passes. 3 
Oxfordshire is a County which radiates from the centre, 
and a high proportion of the population lives in the centrally 
situated City of Oxford itself. 
County is rural in character, 
Outside Oxford, much of the 
and in these areas bus services 
are often infrequent, or in a few cases non-existent. COMS' 
name itself denotes a strong connection with the City, although 
Stenning notes that since the repeal of the Oxford and District 
Tramways Act, the company's urban and rural services have been 
4 largely integrated. At the time of the NBC's foundation 
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the Oxford-based South Midland Company was owned by another NBC 
subsidiary, Thames Valley. In 1971, ownership of South Midland 
passed to the COMS, and since that time all the COMS' buses 
bear the fleet name of Oxford South Midland. 
5 In reality, 
South Midland's primary function of providing coach travel 
formed the basis of the new National Travel Midlands, but the 
COMS' fleet name allowed the company to present a less 
parochial image. Nevertheless, City of Oxford Motor Services 
remains the official title of the company. Although the COM, S 
operates a-few services in neighbouring counties, the vast 
majority of its services operate in Oxfordshire. In this 
respect, the COMS could be equated with PMT in being a 
relatively small NBC subsidiary serving an identifiable 
localized area. 
In the early 1970s COMS was in a rather depressed state, 
and in particular suffered from a severe shortage of maintenance 
staff. 
6 
In later years a transformation was wrought by a 
commercially minded management which placed the COMS to the 
forefront of NBC subsidiaries. The most obvious indicator of 
the drive towards increased productivity by the COMS was its 
achievement in becoming the first NBC subsidiary to implement 
100% one-man operation. We described in Chapter Five how the 
NBC Planning Department was situated in Oxford (next door to 
the COMS' headquarters) and that its first head was the General 
Manager of the COMS, while in 1979 the company's Traffic 
Manager was appointed to head the Scottish Bus Group's 
equivalent of MAP. We shall see later in this chapter that 
the COMS was one of the first NBC subsidiaries to introduce 
MAP, and it was considered by NBC management that if MAP could 
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make the COMS more efficient, then it could do the same for 
every other subsidiary. 
In relation to public transport policy as a whole, the 
COMS naturally did not wish to see a change in the regulatory 
system, but was anxious to encourage the market for bus travel. 
In 1977, the General Manager of the COMS at that time, J. M. 
Bodger, stated his opinion that a principal aim. of the operator 
should be to: "Develop marketing techniques that will relate 
fares to the price of items that are in every day use especially 
in the home. " 
7A further objective should be to: "Avoid 
over-pricing in order to maintain or to provide facilities that 
are required to meet welfare or other objectives. " 
8 The 
second of these objectives implied that the operator should be 
subsidized for unprofitable but socially necessary services, 
and that these services should not be paid for by means of 
cross-subsidization. 
Allied to this view, Mr. Bodger considered that both 
centreland local government should adopt a comprehensive 
approach to transport. This policy should include assessment 
of need, relieving traffic congestion in urban areas and land 
use implications for transport. With regard to the operators 
they: ". ... must be prepared to play their part and assist 
local authorities in their difficult task by providing all the 
material that is required to permit value for money assessments. 
In return local authorities must appreciate that operators 
cannot adjust their facilities overnight. Hasty changes in 
policy may not produce the most cost-effective package in the 
long-term. Being a busman, I am sure that buses can, and do, 
contribute more than many/authorities recognize, to a 
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comprehensive transport package. " 
9 As with Mr. Wyke Smith 
at Crosville, Mr. Bodger wished bus services to form an 
important part of local authority planning (including the 
provision of subsidies for unprofitable services), but at the 
same time was anxious that the COMS should retain autonomous 
control over its basic network of profitable routes. 
As an example of the type of planning which he considered 
to be ideal, Mr. Bodger pointed to Oxford City Council. When 
it was frustrated in its attempts to construct a City by-pass 
through Christ Church Meadow, the City Council in 1973 
introduced a more public transport orientated system. The 
policy included Park-and-Ride facilities, the introduction of 
bus lanes and the closure of central streets to general 
traffic. 10 It is significant that at this time the policy 
community concerned with public transport in Oxfordshire 
included not only the City Council and the COMS but also 
Oxfordshire CC. 
C. The Development of Oxfordshire CC's Public Transport 
Policy. 
Ironically, Oxfordshire CC's radical market policy sprang 
from an already active planning approach to public transport 
co-ordination. The County was one of the first to pay subsidies 
to bus operators under the terms of the 1968 Transport Act (in 
1970). In addition: "It was also one of the few counties to 
appoint a transport co-ordinating officer prior to local 
government reorganization. As a result, when the new CC took 
up office in 1974, its transport co-ordinating role was 
becoming well established in the eyes of the operators, " 
11 
In 1974-75 the CC allocated F, 216,000 in total bus subsidies 
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(to both NBC and private operators) at that time one of the 
highest amounts paid by non-Metropolitan counties. 
12 
In 1974-75 the COMS' deficit amounted to £376,989, while 
the subsidy received by the company from the CC totalled 
£157,485. The CC complained that during 1974-75 the COMS 
issued four different estimates of its total deficit for that 
year, all of which were considerably less than the actual 
deficit. 13 (This is very similar to Cheshire CC's experience 
during the same period). The response made by the CC to the 
COMS' increasing deficit was to commence the process towards 
a radical shift in policy. 
Local Government reorganization in 1974 saw the appointment 
of a new public transport co-ordinator for Oxfordshire. Peter 
Ennor had previously undertaken research into public transport 
policy at Newcastle upon Tyne University, and was now anxious 
to put his ideas into practice. Although he was the prime 
mover behind the policy, Mr. Ennor was anxious to stress that 
it was not a case of an officer attempting to impose a course 
of action on "a bunch of retired colonels. " There were a 
number of University-based County Councillors, and one in 
particular, John Redwood (a Fellow of All Souls' College), 
was a strong proponent of the market policy. 
Redwood is highly critical of the NBC on the grounds that 
it was originally given the instruction to act commercially 
and to pay its way, but that in time the main organizational 
objective has changed to one of promoting bus transport as a 
social service. In his view the NBC saw local government 
reorganization in 1974 as a good opportunity to obtain higher 
subsidies and considers that this attitude, together with 
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government loans, is likely to breed inefficiency and a poor 
quality of service (although as we noted earlier, subsidies to 
the NBC have been considerably lower than those to other public 
corporations such as BR, while successive governments have 
refused to cancel the NBC's capital debt). 
Redwood's solution to the problem is three-fold. Firstly, 
a staggering of work and school hours in order to reduce the 
number of vehicles required at peak times (a policy with 
obvious implementation difficulties). Secondly, the introduction 
of more competition in order to encourage the NBC to improve 
its productivity. Thirdly, that the NBC should be encouraged 
to devise an unsubsidized network, and only then set out claims 
for those services which may (in the language of the market 
model) be bought for the public by the CC, 
14 
, 
This 
recommendation echoes that put forward by the General Manager 
of the COMS . 
Redwood's plan for the NBC as a whole closely corresponds 
to the policy put forward by Oxfordshire CC during the 1970s. 
The additional element, and one particularly stressed by Peter 
Ennor, involved a decentralization of decision-making. Ennor 
considered that: ". ... the best way of meeting people's 
requirements is not to impose standards which will fail to 
satisfy some people and appear wasteful to others, but let them 
decide for themselves what they want .... also best value 
for money will be obtained if the minimum of conditions are 
imposed on both the seller and the buyer. " 
15 
Politically, the principles of competition, deregulation, 
decentralization and flexibility gave Oxfordshire CC's policy 
a firm conceptual foundation. We saw earlier in the study that 
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counties such as Hereford and Worcester and Clwyd were sensitive 
about their policy approach to public transport, and went about 
implementing it in a rather confused and clandestine manner. 
In contrast, Oxfordshire was only too anxious to evangelize 
on behalf of its own approach in the hope that other counties 
would follow its example. Elements (although not all) of the 
policy were unpopular with the COMS, and the Labour Government 
was also to become unhappy with the County's approach, but 
neither could dismiss it out of hand. People such as Redwood 
and Ennor could not be discredited by the NBC or the Government 
as being ignorant of the subject they were discussing. 
D. Implementation of the CC's Policy 
Subsidies and the Market Model 
The concepts of decentralization, deregulation, competition 
and flexibility could be described as the more long-term policy 
aims of the CO. More immediately, the County faced the problem 
of subsidies. In this sense the policy can be seen in two 
separate (but linked) dimensions. Firstly, it expressed a, 
conviction that the existing regulatory system was out of date. 
Secondly, it was hoped that the policy would lead to a 
considerable reduction in the level of subsidies. By 1975, 
Oxfordshire CC had decided that the COMS' latest deficit was 
only the start of what would be evermore desperate cries for 
help by the company, and that the subsidies required would 
place an increasing burden on the County's financial resources. 
In June 1975 the CC announced that the total amount paid 
to all operators in subsidies for 1975-76 would not exceed 
1252,000, compared with revised estimates of ¬440,000 required 
for maintaining the then existing network of services by all 
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operators for the County. The amount allocated to the COMS was 
£150,000, compared with the company's claim for £280,000.16 
At the same time, the CC agreed that it: ". ... would not 
oppose reasonable steps which the company might take in order 
to reduce its deficit whilst broadly maintaining services. " 
17 
In effect, the CC would adopt a non-interventionist approach 
with regard to any fare rises which the COMS considered were 
necessary in order to break even. 
The COMS was extremely unhappy with the reduction in 
subsidy, and in August 1975 implemented a rationalization of 
services (with CC support) which involved a saving of forty 
buses. Although this represented a severe cut back, the 
situation itself was a fairly orthodox one of an NBC subsidiary 
reducing its network of services in response to a deteriorating 
financial position. The real policy watershed occurred in 
November 1975 when a joint CC Planning Department/bus operators' 
technical group was set up to examine public transport in 
Oxfordshire in general, but also to identify by 1st. February 
1976 the services which could be provided if the CC did not 
make any payment towards the cost of operating those services. 
18 
In future, the CC was not prepared to subsidize a total network 
of services. It wished the operators to get on with the job of 
running a commercial business, while individual, socially 
necessary but unprofitable services would be "bought" by the CC. 
Peter Ennor anticipated that the COMS would include some 
degree of cross-subsidization within its unsubsidized network, 
but in his opinion the resulting network was affected as a 
result of Government loans to the NBC and cross-subsidization 
from other counties. He considered that this "backdoor" 
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subsidy distorted the market and. took away from the CC local 
control of its services. This criticism of the NBC typified 
Ennor's belief that the planned approach to public transport 
would inevitably lead to a misallocation of resources and 
inefficiency. He also considered that policies designed to 
restrict the use of the motor-car (such as that implemented by 
Oxford City Council) would fail owing to political limits 
inherent in policies designed to restrict car ownership. In 
default of this policy, the only alternative for the planned 
approach was an ever increasing level of subsidy. 
19 
In contrast, Enrior held the view that the market approach 
offered an opportunity to run bus services where they were most 
needed: "There is no reason why local authorities should not 
continue to help people as each decides is appropriate, in the 
market approach. The difference would be that the available 
resources would be directed at the transport poor rather than 
being spread thinly to the indiscriminate benefit of those 
with and without 
This argument in 
determination to 
philosophical gri 
The Concept 
Oxfordshire 
transport or those willing to 
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g pay the cost. " 
favour of the market approach typified Ennor's 
justify his County's policy on practical and 
)unds. 
of Local Transport Groups 
CC's approach did not stop at a mere instruction 
to the COMS that the company should "act commercially. " A 
crucial element of the policy was that a local community should 
decide its own transport needs by means of transport groups. 
In December 1975 the CC invited Parish and Town Councils outside 
Greater Oxford to set up local transport groups covering an. 
area consisting of between one Town Council and a dozen small 
Parish Councils and Meetings. It was intended that there would 
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eventually be about sixty of these groups, but that the exact 
boundaries would be decided by the local councils themselves, 
even to the extent of some councils switching groups at, times. 
21 
The concept of the local groups introduced the elements 
of decentralisation and flexibility into the County's policy. 
It was not to be. the CC who would decide which bus services 
were socially necessary but the people who it was considered 
were most in touch with local needs. These same people could 
monitor the services and decide if any changes were required 
in order to maintain a flexible approach. In Ennor's view a 
uniform level of need could not be applied to a whole County. 
People who had moved to a rural area from an urban environment 
might demand a local bus service, whereas those who had lived 
in an isolated spot all their lives had become used to making 
their own travel arrangements. Where a strong demand was 
expressed the County would consider "buying" a bus service for 
that community, but where no demand existed such a purchase 
would be pointless. 
Despite its aim of devolving responsibility for service 
planning, the policy did imply that those local groups with 
the strongest lobbying power would obtain preferment from the 
County. Where resources were limited, it would be the County 
who had the ultimate authority as to where the money should be 
spent. We have seen that where a CC subsidizes an NBC service 
network it can encounter extreme difficulty in discovering how 
the money is allocated by the Company. Under Oxfordshire's 
plan, the CC could retain more direct and flexible control over 
its expenditure. Although the service would be costed by the 
operator, the CC would have the option of withdrawing support 
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from that service at only short notice. 
The CC could also increase its control by a local public 
transport group being more pliable to its demands than an NBC 
subsidiary. The CC was anxious that each local group should 
consist not only of councillors, but would also include 
representatives from Women's Institutes, Senior Citizens' Clubs 
and public transport users in general. Although some of the 
groups did include this type of member, it was inevitable that 
most of the groups would be dominated by Town and Parish 
Councillors. The local groups were not part of the official 
local government structure and hierarchy, but the vast majority 
of local councillors in Oxfordshire's rural areas were of a 
like mind politically to the Conservative controlled CC, while 
local areas heavily dependent on CC resources for many services 
would be wary of challenging the centre too strongly. 
In addition, the local groups also required guidance from 
the centre on the subject of public transport. The market 
could not operate unless the consumers had the necessary 
knowledge, and the CC was determined to provide them with that 
knowledge During 1976 the CC issued to each Parish a copy 
22 
of its handbook. This document set out the general public 
transport situation in Oxfordshire, and also described the CC's 
policy of instructing the operators to devise an unsubsidized 
network. The CC made it clear to the groups that it was up to 
them to decide their own needs and how best they could be 
provided. It was suggested that the alternatives to the 
orthodox bus service should be considered. These included 
car-sharing, community buses, Postbuses and the importance of 
voluntary effort in general. The document concluded by outlining 
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the function of the Traffic Commissioners and the procedure of 
the Traffic Courts. It was nevertheless made clear that the 
CC wished to see the end of the road service licensing system 
in favour of the market approach. At the heart of the 
document, however, was a description of the CC's principal 
(and most controversial) policy instrument. 
Extended School Contracts 
The concept of the extended school contract was highly 
objectionable to the COMS, but the CC made it clear to the 
local groups that they would be expected to employ this method 
as the principal means of providing unprofitable services. 
Although the COMS did not object to the local transport 
groups in principle, the company suspected that these groups 
would be indoctrinated by the CC and hence become mere puppets 
in the process leading towards implementation of a market 
policy. We saw earlier in this chapter that the commercially 
minded management of the COMS had no objections to being asked 
to devise an unsubsidized network, provided that the CC left 
it in peace to operate its network. It could be argued that 
the COMS would be anxious to maximize its unsubsidized network 
(with the possible aid of the "hidden" Sub! ýýºdte$ objected to by 
Peter Ennor) on the grounds that the fewer services left to be 
covered by the CC, the more the company could retain control 
over its affairs. In this case, cross-subsidization limited 
external control. Extended school contracts were a different 
matter, and the company would do everything in its power to 
frustrate their implementation. 
The extended school contract rested on the principle of 
an operator with a school contract extending his operation to 
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include stage carriage services. Initially, the CC would 
invite bids for a school contract together with the right to 
claim hourly incentive payments for providing transport on 
behalf of a local transport group. The number of hours 
allowed for one operator to claim incentive payments was 
limited by the CC to 50 hours per week, with the rate paid 
being reduced after the first 30 hours. The nature of the 
service itself was to be decided by the successful contractor 
himself after consultations with the local group. Normally, 
the amount paid by the CC for the school contract element of 
an extended school contract would be less than for a school 
contract on its own. 
Oxfordshire CC had become increasingly worried about the 
cost of school transport provided under the 1944 Education 
Act. In June 1975 the CC's Environmental Committee set up a 
joint Working Party with the Education Committee to examine 
the cost of school transport and subsidized services in 
general. 
23 It was estimated that school transport would 
cost the CC £1.3 million in 1976-77,24 but the introduction 
of extended school contracts would reduce the direct expenditure 
of the Education Department. It was intended that the 
operator's tender for an extended school contract would be 
less than for a school contract alone, the sum being made up 
by the CC's incentive payments. These incentive payments would 
come out of the subsidies budget. In the language of the 
market model, the subsidies would become incentive payments 
whereby operators would be encouraged to run off-peak services. 
By employing this policy, the CC could release a proportion of 
the Education Department's budget for other purposes. 
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We saw this process in reverse in the case of Warwickshire 
CC, where more was spent on bus passes than contracts by the 
Education Department in order to supplement the income of MR. 
In these cases, education and public transport policy overlap 
and invade each other's policy community. Prior to implementation 
of the 1972 Local Government Act, the provision of school 
transport could be perceived as a functional part of education 
policy. In later years, the appointment of public transport 
co-ordinators and the introduction of bus subsidies indicated 
that school transport could be perceived as another form of 
subsidized service (i. e., the CC paid a cost which would 
otherwise be met by parents). In the case of Oxfordshire, it 
was intended that responsibility for school transport should 
be taken away from the education community and placed in the 
hands of the public transport community. Peter Ennor was 
eventually given control of all school transport as part of 
the plan to implement extended school contracts, although the 
school transport element of the contract would continue to be 
paid for by the Education Department. The market model 
required that public transport should extend its community, 
but in bringing school contracts and bus subsidies under the 
same umbrella the CC heightened tension within the community, 
Bardach describes the fostering of competition as one means 
of dealing with monopoly power, and the CC considered that by 
allocating subsidies to the private sector instead of the COMS 
it could place the company in a position where it would be 
forced to "act commercially, " while it could also be said that 
by expanding the role of the private operator the CC offered 
an implied threat to the future of the COMS. 25 
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Bardach also notes that incentives offer a means whereby 
one may control the several, but also considers that: 
"Unfortunately, the limitations of incentive systems are in 
proving it, " 
26 
and that payment will usually be made for 
inputs rather than intangible outputs. Oxfordshire CC was to 
pay the operator for the hours he worked (the inputs) rather 
than the service itself or the quality of service (the outputs). 
The CC did possess the sanction of removing a contract from an 
operator who did not show sufficient enthusiasm for running 
stage carriage services, while payment was not to be made for 
services which a local group did not support. Nevertheless, 
the local group might support a wide range of services (they 
were not paying the bills 1), while the operator could maximize 
his revenue by running his buses around the area for a certain 
number of hours per week. 
This control problem for the CC was outweighed by its 
objective of switching resources from the public to the 
private sector. In theory, the COMS could tender for an 
extended school contract, but its operations were tied in with 
providing the peak demand for stage carriage services in the 
County. We noted earlier that private operators provided 90% 
of school contract work, and the COMS was not equipped to 
invade this territory. Although the school contract had 
become part of the public transport community, the main 
unsubsidized network operated by the COMS and the extended 
school contracts were to be separate worlds. From the COMS 
point of view, the public transport community linked them 
closely with TSG and the provision of subsidies, but the CC 
intended to sever that link. In this sense, a new local 
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community was to be created consisting of the CC, the local 
groups and the private operators. 
The CC claimed that this new structure need hold no fears 
for the COMS, as it would be completely separate from their 
network. The COMS thought differently, for it feared that 
the extended school contracts represented the thin end of the 
wedge which would eventually destroy the company's business: 
"The company's view is that the so-called area bus services 
(i. e., extended school contracts) will not develop purely as 
local links within parish group zones or as local area feeders 
to main route services, but will inevitably develop as direct 
links between rural zones and urban centres. " 
27 COMS' most 
lucrative routes were those linking outlying districts with 
Oxford, and the company did not want to see these invaded by 
the private operator. 
Matters came to a head in June 1976, when two private 
operators applied to operate stage carriage 7 services 
in the North-West of the County as part of an extended school 
contract. The COMS had also applied to revise its services in 
the area as part of the plan to create a viable network. The 
COMS opposed several of the private operators' applications, 
while the operators themselves put in an objection to several 
of the COMS' proposals. The private operators had the backing 
of the CC and the relevant local transport groups, but numerous 
other representatives from various local groups together with 
members of the public were also called as witnesses by the 
private operators. One of the private operators even went to 
the expense of employing a QC from London (who Peter Ennor 
considered behaved as if the hearing was a murder trial at the 
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Old Bailey rather than the more usual solicitor. The 
hearing lasted for a total of fifteen days, spread over a 
period of seven months from June 1976 to January 1977. 
The hearing was implicitly accepted by both sides as a 
test case which would determine the future of extended school 
contracts in Oxfordshire. We discussed earlier in this study 
the relationship which grew up between the Traffic Commissioners 
and the territorial companies, and in this Oxford case there 
was a strong identification of interests and values between 
the COMS and the Chairman of the Traffic Commissioners. 
Despite the complexity of the rival route claims made by the 
COMS and the private operators, the real significance of the 
case was an encounter between two different "orders of 
comprehension". The values expressed by Oxfordshire CC 
represented an alternative perception of how a public transport 
system should operate. The market model placed great stress 
on words and phrases such as "buy", "expressed demand", 
"value for money" and "incentives", where the Commissioners 
and the COMS emphasized the importance of "network", 
"co-ordination" and "public interest". 
We shall see later that in the case of the COMS the 
introduction of MAP provided a bridge whereby the CC and the 
company could once more occupy the same community, but it was 
the Commissioners who had the power to abort the extended 
school contract concept. The County's support of deregulation 
held an obvious threat for the future of the Commissioners, and 
the fragmentation of the system implied by the introduction of 
extended school contracts was also perceived by the latter as 
endangering their future role. As in the case of Staffordshire 
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CC we can describe a power struggle between the CC and the 
Traffic Commissioners, but in the case of Oxfordshire there 
were deep differences in terms of values and the language 
used to express those values. The County's policy on extended 
school contracts represented a wish for radical rather than 
incremental change, and the Commissioners were not disposed 
towards any form of compromise. 
Although the hearing was concluded in January 1977, the 
Commissioners' decision was still awaited at the beginning of 
May in that year. Since the formation of the local transport 
groups, the CC had issued to them a periodic Newsletter (one 
of the actions which fuelled COMS' suspicions that the groups 
were being indoctrinated by the CC), and the May issue 
expressed the opinion of one group on the Commissioners' delay 
in issuing a decision: "The CC in attempting to fulfil its 
proper function under Section 203 of the Local Government Act 
of 1972 to promote a system of rural public transport to meet 
the needs of the travelling public, is being frustrated by the 
archaic, antediluvian procedures of the Traffic Commissioners. " 
28 
Such an opinion of the Commissioners was hardly likely to 
enhance the group's prospects of obtaining an extended school 
contract! 
The group's wait was soon over, for on 9th May 1977 the 
Commissioners issued a remarkable 72-page document which 
supported all the COMS' applications and rejected out of hand 
all the extended school contract applications. Only the latter 
half of the decision was concerned with the detailed judgment 
of particular route applications. The first half consisted of 
an outline of Oxfordshire CC's public transport policy which 
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the Commissioners scathingly attacked in their Report. The 
nature of the Traffic Commissioners' document emphasized the 
extent to which the extended school contracts had become an 
ideological issue epitomizing the different values of the CC 
and the Commissioners. In the eyes of the Commissioners, the 
County was attempting to sabotage a system which had worked 
satisfactorily for many years: "The logical end (of the 
implementation of extended school contracts) would be that the 
County of Oxford would have no integrated bus network but a 
host of unrelated services practically all in the hands of 
different operators. The objectives of the existing legislation 
would have been defeated and the County would have returned to 
a concept of passenger transport by road considered to have 
been obsolete since 1930. " 
29 
like the COMS, the Commissioners also accused the CC of 
indoctrinating the local transport groups, while also claiming 
that the County was abrogating its responsibility for 
co-ordination: "The statement that incentive payments will be 
made only for services indicated by the parish groups as being 
beneficial to the local people appears to us to disregard 
entirely the obligation of the CC and the Traffic Commissioners 
to have regard to the needs of the wider community and of the 
county or area affected as a whole in relation to traffic.,, 
30 
The County spoke about the need for decentralization and 
flexibility, but to the Commissioners the provision of need 
necessitated a co-ordinated network approach: "It will be seen 
that the Traffic Commissioners are required to concern 
themselves not merely with individual services, but with the 
needs of the area affected as a whole, ýý 
31 
and so: 11. ... it 
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would, to say the least, be imprudent for the Traffic 
Commissioners to countenance any general policy which fopters 
the interests of the private sector to the detriment of the 
public sector unless that policy also secures the long-term 
needs of the community as a whole for basic public transport 
facilities. Any policy which serves parochial requirements 
at the expense of the community as a whole cannot in our view 
be regarded as being in the public interest. " 
32 The 
statements made by the Commissioners illustrate the cognitive 
gap between themselves and the CC. Apart from the power 
struggle, the Commissioners and the County inhabited different 
worlds where the perception of how a public transport system 
should operate was entirely different. 
The judgment given by the Commissioners on the CC's 
policy was completely in the mainstream of policy implementation 
with regard to the bus industry. The private operators placed 
an appeal with the Secretary of State, which was heard in 
November 1977, but the Minister upheld the Commissioners' 
decision. We saw in Chapter Six that William Rodgers was 
anxious to devolve responsibility for public transport to the 
local authorities, and was also hoping (and perhaps even 
assuming) that the CCs would be happy to spend money on 
supporting public transport in rural areas. 
Mr. Rodgers considered that the policy adopted by Cheshire 
CC represented a proper attitude to implementing his policy, 
but by 1977 Oxfordshire had become something of a cause celebre 
and an embarrassment to the Government. In announcing TSG for 
1978-79, Mr. Rodgers considered some counties had not been 
particularly forthcoming about the White Paper's call for more 
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support for rural bus services: "In some cases it would be 
wrong of me to hide my deep disappointment. This settlement 
should encourage those councils who so far have failed to do 
as much as they could for rural transport to think again and 
change course. The transport needs of rural areas are urgent 
- so should be our response.,, 
33 
During the late 1970s Oxfordshire consistently appeared 
at the bottom of the "league table" (2.729 of total transport 
expenditure was devoted to public transport in 1980-81), while 
the County also failed to take up its full allocation of TSG. 
During 1978, the Under-Secretary of State at the DTp, John 
Horam, visited Oxfordshire in an attempt to persuade them to 
spend more of their TSG allocation. He referred to his visit 
in evidence given to the SCNI: ". ... I was recently 
in 
Oxfordshire and talked to them about their policies, which had 
given me some concern, and found that of the, I think, 
approximately £148,000 which Oxfordshire had bid for in the 
current financial year, so far they had spent a very small. 
amount -I think of the order of £20,000, and I was encouraging 
them to make sure that for, the first time this year (they are 
one of the counties which have not given the money to the 
operators which they had asked for) they would try to meet 
their commitments. They gave me an assurance that they would 
try harder this year. " 
34 
Despite the Minister's claims, Oxfordshire CC was by that 
time implementing a policy which required NBC subsidiaries to 
operate self-sufficient viable networks, with services being 
"bought" only for those local transport groups which demanded 
them. Although the County did eventually take up its relatively 
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small public transport segment of TSG allocation for that year, 
it had-, no intention of obeying the Government's exhortations to 
spend more on public transport in rural areas. The control 
problem for the Government was that although sanctions could be 
placed on local authorities which (in the Government's view) 
overspent on particular services, it was difficult to penalize 
counties which underspent. The sanction which the DTp decided 
upon was to cut back the amount allowed for Oxfordshire's 
programme of . road building and maintenance. 
For 1979-80 
Mr. Rodgers recognized only 6% of the County's road building 
plans, but the CC Leader retorted: "The Council is not going 
to be bullied in this way. Mr. Rodgers is trying to force us 
into spending money on public transport in areas where there 
is as yet no firm evidence that it is needed; ' 
35 
A further basic difficulty for the Government was that 
implementation of its policy depended to a large extent on NBC 
subsidiaries placing claims for subsidy before the CC. If the 
CC did not respond, the Government could claim that the County 
was falling down in its obligation towards supporting public 
transport. Mr. Horam's statement suggested this was the case 
in Oxfordshire, but we have seen that the COMS was a 
commercially minded company and perfectly happy to operate a 
viable network. Despite the COMB' opposition to extended 
school contracts, contacts between the company and the CC 
were not broken. Once the CC's extended school contract 
concept had been frustrated, a new relationship emerged between 
the two bodies, and one which went beyond the minimal consensus 
type. In forging this new relationship, the emergence of MAP 
played a crucial role. 
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We discussed MAP in Chapter Seven in terms of its 
development as an MR programme. MAP did start life as MR's 
Viable Network Project and was first implemented in Stratford, 
but it can be argued that the appearance of MAP is best, 
explained in the context of Oxfordshire CC's policy. A 
key 
element in understanding this connection is the personal 
relationship between Brian Barrett and Peter Ennor. We saw 
previously that Barrett was, the principal motivating 
force 
behind MAP and rose , swiftly 
in the managerial hierarchy of 
the NBC. At an earlier date, he was Deputy Director of the 
Transport Operations Research Group at Newcastle upon Tyne 
University, while Ennor was a Research Associate in the same 
Group. The two men worked closely together, and had come to 
share many opinions on the subject of public transport. Ennor 
himself considered that MAP was developed as a dixect response 
to his CC's policy, andthat when he put this point to Barrett, 
the latter: ". ... became so angry that 
I thought the suggestion 
must be true. " Ennor's view was rejected at MAP headquarters 
36 
on the grounds that MAP was developed as a 
in order to improve efficiency and develop 
CC s in general. Perhaps the most pertinei 
Barrett and tenor shared the view that the 
"act commercially" while the CC identified 
socially necessary services. 
company-wide programme 
relationships with 
at factor is that 
NBC should be left to 
needs and subsidized 
We referred earlier to interpretations of the word 
"market" and that in the NBC context the use of the word 
indicated a concern for analysing demand rather than providing 
competiti-on on the supply side. Oxfordshire CC was. only 
concerned with demand where it could not be met by the COMS 
and after the abandonment of extended school contracts appeared 
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to be content with an NBC dominance in these areas. The refusal 
of the Traffic Commissioners to accept extended school contracts 
coincided (perhaps not quite by chance) with the COMS' 
announcement that the company was about to begin work on MAP. 
The traditional alliance between the Traffic Commissioners and 
the area bus companies had prevented the implementation of 
extended school contracts,, but the County could claim that the 
introduction of MAP demonstrated the wisdom of issuing an 
ultimatum to an NBC subsidiary with regard to the provision of 
subsidies. It could also be argued that by making maximum 
viability (perhaps with the help of the "hidden" subsidies which 
the County disliked so much) commensurate with maximum independence 
the County offered an incentive to the busman to seek revenue 
wherever it could be found. The County could therefore exercise 
some degree of control over the company by encouraging it to 
maximize efficiency, although in certain circumstances the NBC 
might increase its subsidy claims in other directions i. e., other 
Counties or Central Government. 
In addition to introducing MAP, the CONS was also concerned 
that the local groups were not sufficiently informed of the 
company's activities. In June 1977, shortly after the 
commissioners had announced their decision on extended school 
contracts, the COMS produced its own Newsletter which it 
circulated widely throughout the County. 
37 In essence, the 
document put forward the case for the network approach and 
defended the role of the Traffic Commissioners: "Oxford South 
Midland (the fleet name) does not believe anyone should look 
upon the recently published decision of the Traffic Commissioners 
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as the winning or losing of a battle but as guidance for all 
concerned to follow. What is needed in Oxfordshire is a new 
start with the County Council, District Councils, Parish 
Groups, Private Operators and Oxford South Midland all getting 
together to evolve a policy which will benefit the community 
by making the fullest possible use of all existing resources. " 
38 
The CONS could afford to adopt this slightly patronizing tone, 
as for the moment its fortunes were in the ascendant. 
After the frustrations experienced with extended school 
contracts, the CC was relieved to throw itself whole-heartedly 
behind the preparation and implementation of MAP. The extended 
school contracts case had proved extremely costly financially 
to the private operators (an absolute resource constraint on 
change), while the officers of the CC had devoted considerable 
time to the case (a further resource constraint). The CC only 
employed a maximum of six people to work on public transport, 
with the figure reduced to four after the implementation of 
MAP. In addition a further six people worked on school 
transport. 
The COMS published its MAP proposals early in 1978, and 
the CC invited comments from all councils and transport groups. 
About thirty of the groups were highly active during this 
period (still only half of the total number), while the CC 
allocated £70,000 to be spent on services not covered by the 
COMS' viable network. This money was originally intended to be 
spent on incentive payments for extended school contracts, but 
the main part of it would now be given to the COMS. The 
reorganization of services took place in July 1978, since which 
time the relationship between the COMS and the CC has been 
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relatively stable. Many of the local groups have become 
inactive, and the CC has ceased publication of its Newsletter 
since the implementation of MAP. As with Cheshire CC and 
Crosville, a strong identification of values exists between 
the COMS and Oxfordshire CC. The COMS retains its independence 
and operates a cross-subsidized network, although it should be 
noted that in 1979, according to the current cost accounting 
method, the company made a loss of £121,000.39 Oxfordshire 
CC refuses to enter into three year agreements with the COMS, 
as recommended by the 1978 Transport Act, on the grounds that 
such agreements would lack flexibility. Subsidized services 
are usually guaranteed for one year, although in some cases 
the commitment is of an even shorter duration. 
From 1978, Oxfordshire CC adopted a more passive attitude 
towards policy implementation. This approach could partly be 
ascribed to the introduction of MAP and the decision to abandon 
extended school contracts. At the same time it was also likely 
that the County was less aggressive in its attitude because it 
had reason to believe that the policy trend at national level was 
moving in its favour. We saw in Chapter Six that the 1973 
Road Traffic Bill represented a change in attitude by the 
Conservative Party towards the road service licensing system, 
and these doubts were to become still stronger while the Party 
was in. Opposition. Oxfordshire was to play a key role in 
shaping Conservative policy, which culminated in the 1980 
Transport Act. We could observe that the CC's behaviour 
indicated that a group may adopt a more conciliatory tone in 
implementing legislation when it believes that the next round 
of policy-making will go in its favour. 
490 
E. Oxfordshire CC and the 1980 Transport Act 
An Inter-Personal Issue, Network 
In September 1977 the Conservative spokesman on Transport, 
Norman Fowler, produced a policy document entitled 
The Right Track. 40 This document was relatively bland in 
tone with the objectives set in general terms. Firstly: 
"Central objectives of transport policy must be to achieve 
value for money (a key phrase adopted by Oxfordshire CC in 
setting out its transport policy) and to assist in economic 
recovery. " 
41 The objectives stressed the need for competition 
and innovation and on public transport emphasized the 
requirement for higher productivity and the identification of 
specific needs or services. 
In the section devoted to buses, Mr. Fowler criticized 
the Labour Government for its tardy approach to the introduction 
of new types of services, and committed a future Conservative 
Government to at least some degree of delicensing and more 
experimental services. At the same time: ". ... we will 
consult closely with the interested organizations and unions 
on such schemes and experiments - but that will be our 
approach. It is less than revolutionary to suggest that a 
law fashioned in the decade after the First World War does 
not meet the modern requirements of the travelling public. " 
42 
It could also be said that the exact nature of the Conservative 
Party's proposals on delicensing were considerably less than 
obvious 
Having completed the policy document, Fowler set about the 
task of seeking advice on how the policy should be elaborated. 
In the course of these discussions, Fowler was particularly 
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impressed by the views of the Director of Oxford University's 
Transport Studies Unit, Ian Heggie. In May 1977 the 
Conservatives called a Commons' debate on the problems of rural 
transport, in the course of which Norman Fowler referred to the 
case of Oxfordshire. At this time the CC was awaiting the 
Traffic Commissioners' decision on extended school contracts, 
and Fowler joined in the. criticism of the Commissioners: 
"After four days in December it (the Commissioners' hearing) 
finally finished. I say 'finally' with the proviso that we 
still do not know, 2nd May 1977, what the result of that 
application is. As a method of responding to local need, I 
should have thought that even Hon. Members opposite might 
think that the process is slightly deficient.,, 
43 
Fowler went on to criticize the cost of hearings for a 
private operator, and in support quoted from a letter written 
by Heggie to The Economist. With regard to policy, Fowler 
stated that: "Our aim will be to change the law to allow services 
to develop naturally in response to different - and they will 
be different - needs of various local areas. The law should 
help initiative; it should not hinder it. We shall reform the 
law to make this possible, and our aim will be quite simply to 
set the local people free. " 
44 Fowler's remarks indicated 
that he was moving towards the Oxfordshire CC principles of 
deregulation, competition, decentralization and flexibility. 
In reply, William Rodgers severely criticized Oxfordshire for 
not giving greater support to the COMS. We saw previously that 
the Secretary of State had himself introduced a limited number 
of transport experiments, but his criticism of Oxfordshire was 
based on the assessment that the needs of passengers in rural 
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areas were being neglected. 
45 
Ian Heggie himself had become highly interested in 
Oxfordshire's public transport policy, and held several 
meetings with members of the Planning Department. The public 
transport section formed part of the Planning Department 
(reflecting the County's attitude that public transport was 
too important a subject to be merely a subsidiary part of the 
Highways Department) and the Chief Planning Officer, John 
Barrow, was a strong advocate of the County's policy. Another 
important figure was Barry Cooper, the County's Chief Traffic 
Engineer. Cooper had previously held a similar position in 
Southampton, where he won national recognition for designing 
a scheme to ease traffic congestion by the use of sophisticated 
electronic signals. Barrow and Cooper had frequent contact 
with Heggie, and the latter became enthusiastic about the 
Oxfordshire approach. Eventually, Fowler himself made several 
unofficial visits to the County and held detailed discussions 
with officers. 
We have seen that the Conservatives had expressed doubts 
about the bus licensing system since the early 1970s, and 
Fowler had himself expressed these doubts in The Right Track. 
The difficulty for the Party was that in presenting a policy 
based on deregulation, the impression was not given that the 
quality of service would deteriorate. The advantage of the 
Oxfordshire approach was that the policy could be given a 
coherent philosophical explanation. The County's concepts of 
extended school contracts and local transport groups introduced 
"rational" elements of ordered competition and decentralization 
rather than a mere "free for all. " 
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The bus industry also held a particular attraction for 
the Conservatives at that time because it offered an opportunity 
for the Party to demonstrate its commitment to the market 
economy. Under the leadership of Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, the 
Conservatives had severely attacked the interventionist 
approach of successive governments, and advocated policies 
strongly based on the principle of "less government". In this 
climate the regulatory system of the bus industry apparently 
offered something of a "sitting duck" as a target for radical 
policy change. 
11c 
In Chapter One we referred to Heclo's concept of the issue 
network: This idea implies a loosely-linked set of 
interrelationships which combine to provide the prime motivating 
force behind the policy process. In discussing Heclo, Grant 
Jordan refers to inter-personal issue networks where the 
relationships between individuals can have an influence over 
policy. 
46 In this chapter we have identified a set of 
relationships linking Brian Barrett, Peter Ennor, John Redwood, 
John Barrow, Barry Cooper, Ian Heggie and Norman Fowler. In 
turn these relationships had a significant effect on the NBC, 
. MAP., local authority public transport policy and Conservative 
Party policy. In covering a wide area of groups (i. e., the 
academic world, the bus industry, local government and a 
political party) the network has a pluralistic image. In 
another sense, however, the behaviour of the individuals 
concerned can be defined in terms of one interest. This 
interest was to develop a market model for the bus industry and 
to put it into practice. If we picture the individuals in 
terms of an inter-linking discussion group then the 
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interrelationships take on a more corporatist image. 
A policy can emerge as the result of a consensus between 
the primary interests, but in this case we shall see that the 
primary interests were taken unawares by Conservative policy. 
The unofficial and corporatist nature of the issue network 
allowed policy to be developed in an unobtrusive way, no doubt 
assisted by the Conservatives being the Opposition Party. It 
might be argued that while a Party is in opposition it is 
generally excluded from the official policy community, and is 
thus more free to develop its own network of contacts and also 
to meditate on a particular problem. In this way a new 
government can present a policy which appears highly corporatist 
to those who are chiefly concerned with the government 
community. 
Although Mr. Fowler was generally impressed with the 
Oxfordshire approach, he could not base an assessment of the 
County's policy on any large-scale implementation experience. 
We have seen that the extended school contracts concept hardly 
got off the ground, while the local transport groups had not 
proved to be generally active. Apart from the period covering 
the MAP consultation process, only a handful of the groups met 
regularly, and even these became less active with the passage 
of time. Discussion concerning the market model therefore 
concerned its theory rather than its practice. In this sense 
the feedback from local to national level was not so much 
concerned with how the experiment had been implemented and an 
assessment of its effects, but with how the policy environment 
might be changed in order to accommodate the market model. 
(e. g., abolition of the Traffic Commissioners). It could be 
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said that the policy discussion-was more concerned with theory 
and hoped for expectations rather than the results of practical 
experience. 
A New Government and a New Policy 
When the Conservatives returned to power in May 1979, it 
was generally thought by the bus industry that the new 
Government would enter into a lengthy period of consultation 
before presenting any legislative proposals. Politically, it 
appeared that the DTp had been downgraded, for Norman Fowler 
was given the title of Minister for Transport rather than that 
of Secretary of State. In addition, he was not a member of 
the Cabinet, although he did attend all Cabinet meetings. 
This rather strange arrangement was officially explained as 
being the result of insufficient funds being available to pay 
for another Cabinet Member (Fowler eventually became an 
official Member of the Cabinet in January 1981. Despite the 
apparent downgrading of transport, the new Minister could be 
placed firmly in the DTp tradition of relatively inexperienced 
but ambitious Ministers. We have seen that Herbert Morrison, 
Barbara Castle and William Rodgers were all labour Ministers 
of this type. We have previously described the new Government's 
commitment to radical change, and Fowler was determined to 
introduce an early measure in order to demonstrate that a new 
era was at hand. 
The Confederation of Passenger Transport assumed that the 
new Minister would propose some changes to the licensing system, 
but took the remarks concerning consultation in The-Right Track 
at face value. In July 1979 the Director General of the CPT, 
Denis Quin called for a speedy one-man inquiry into licensing 
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and stated that the CPT was in favour of change, : ". ... but 
balanced and better change. " 
47 At about the same time the 
Association of County Councils, no doubt sensing the change in 
the political climate, put forward a set of radical proposals 
which included the removal of the Traffic Commissioners' powers 
with regard to road service licensing, an end to TPPs and PTPs, 
absorption of TSG by RSG, and the removal of legal requirements 
for free school transport. 
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In the midst of what appeared to be the preliminaries of 
an orthodox consultation process, in August 1979 the Minister 
abruptly announced the proposed contents of a forthcoming 
Transport Bill. The main points of these proposals included 
the abolition of licensing for express services, excursions 
and tours, fares control by Commissioners to be abolished, 
several Trial Areas to be agreed with Counties where all road 
service licensing would be suspended for a period, and car 
owners to be allowed to advertise seats on a cost and sharing 
basis. Stage carriage licensing was to continue, but would 
operate on the criterion that a licence would be granted unless 
it was specifically proved to be against the public interest. 
The Minister stopped short of recommending the total abolition 
of road service licensing, but the idea of Trial Areas suggested 
that in Counties with a like mind to the Government's such a 
step need not be far away. A restraint on the Minister might 
have been the thought that in urban areas Labour controlled 
Metropolitan Counties would not take kindly to competition 
springing up against the PTEs. 
The Minister announced his outline for the Bill during a 
press conference, in the course of which he publicly acknowledged 
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the assistance of his policy adviser, Ian Heggie, in framing 
the proposals. 
49 
Heggie himself cited the contribution of 
MAP in developing his ideas: "An enormous success, for it 
showed that the bus industry could be very much more 
effective. " 
50 No doubt the irony was not lost on Heggie 
that an NBC programme should assist in the formation of free 
market ideas. Brian Barrett replied to Heggie's comment by 
stating that the latter had misunderstood the essence of MAP: 
". ... which is after all an information tool rather than a 
solution. It is the way in which the most mobility of people 
can be ensured within any given allocation of resources.,, 
51 
It could nevertheless be argued that the original concept of 
MAP was based on the assumption that NBC was a commercial 
organization, i. e., the company would be free to run a 
profitable business while the counties paid for the loss-making 
services. It could also be the case that implementation of 
MAP would place NBC in a better position to cope with 
competition by reducing the element of cross-subsidy. Although 
MAP itself did not imply the introduction of greater competition 
into the bus industry, it did suggest that the NBC should pay 
more attention to its commercial position than had hitherto 
been the case. 
The Minister gave interested parties two months to comment 
on his proposals. The CPT was upset at the lack of 
consultation by the Minister, but its chief problem was in 
reconciling the interests of both the NBC and the private 
sector. Eventually, the Coach and Independent Bus Sector and 
the NBC went their separate ways. CIBS supported a relaxed 
licensing system, but wished it to continue for all types of 
498 
travel. The independent sector was thus not against a higher 
degree of competition in principle, but feared the implications 
of a free-for-all. 
52 The NBC was against delicensing in 
general on the traditional grounds that a comprehensive network 
best served the public interest. 
The period of consultation ended in October 1979, and when 
the Minister put forward the new Transport Bill in the following 
month there was only one significant change. Originally it had 
been intended that express services would be defined as those 
with a minimum journey of 25 miles. After pressure from the 
NBC, this limit was raised to 30 miles. 
In addition to the Transport Bill, another piece of 
legislation with significance for the bus industry came before 
Parliament during 1980-81. Certain clauses of the Education 
No. 2 Bill would have repealed the sections of the 1944 
Education Act dealing with free school transport. We discussed 
earlier in this chapter the significance of school transport 
for Oxfordshire CC's public transport policy, and how its 
removal from the education sector would assist the implementation 
of extended school contracts. The abolition of free school 
transport was also one of the ACC' recommendations. The 
Government hoped to save £30 million per annum by repealing the 
1944 Act clauses, but when these proposals became publicly 
known a large amount of dissent was expressed. Many private 
operators considered that it would mean an end to their 
business, (apparently they had never heard of extended school 
contracts : ), while parents and many looal groups lobbied both 
the Government and CCs. Opposition to the clauses also grew 
in Parliament and in March 1980 they were defeated in the 
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House of Lords. In the face of so much opposition the 
Government accepted the defeat and the 1944 Act clauses 
remained in force. 
Implementation of the 1980 Transport Act 
The Transport Bill suffered no such setback and received 
the Royal Assent almost unchanged from its original form. 
Nevertheless the school transport affair indicated that 
general acceptance of the new policy could not be taken for 
granted by the Government. In particular, the Trial Areas 
were to prove a considerable source of embarrassment. The 
Government had hoped that the Trial Areas concept would be 
eagerly taken up by the CCs, but in the event few expressed 
interest. Several Counties decided that good results could 
be obtained by co-operation with the Traffic Commissioners, 
while also fearing that the Council could be left with a 
large Bill when the trial period of two or three years came to 
an end. Most significantly, Oxfordshire eventually decided 
against setting up a Trial Area within the County. Many of 
the Oxfordshire officers were disappointed that the Government 
had not opted for full-scale delicensing and feared that Trial 
Areas contained several pitfalls. Apart from the cost 
considerations, it was thought that cross-boundary problems 
would make implementation an impractical proposition. In 
addition, many private operators showed little enthusiasm for 
subjecting themselves to open competition. 
The refusal of Oxfordshire and several other Counties to 
set up Trial Areas deeply disappointed the Government, which 
by the latter part of 1980 was becoming somewhat desperate. 
In November of that year it was reported that four Counties 
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were to be offered large cash incentives by the Government to 
set up Trial Areas. For example,: "In Devon, Mr. Fowler 
hinted that up to £500,000 and an offer of free minibuses 
would be given if the County proceeded with three 'trial Aeas, 
including one covering Exeter. " 
53 
Early in 1981 Norfolk and 
Hereford and Worcester CCs announced the intention to set up 
Trial Areas, although in the Hereford and Worcester case the 
local private operators protested strongly that existing 
arrangements were satisfactory. 
The failure to abolish the 1944 Act clauses and the 
difficulties over Trial Areas indicated that the market model 
for public transport was not to be easily accepted in the real 
world. The section of the 1980 Transport Act which attracted 
most public attention was the abolition of licensing for 
express services, excursions and tours. Although the private 
operators had favoured a relaxation in the licensing system, 
many feared the effects of all-out competition. A typical 
view was expressed by Ron Whittle, a prominent private operator 
and a former Chairman of GIBS. At the time when the Transport 
Bill was beginning its passage through Parliament, Mr. Whittle 
considered that general delicensing would have a detrimental 
effect on the deep rural areas, while an immediate improvement 
would be seen on the most lucrative routes. He nevertheless 
feared that even on the well patronized routes, competition 
would make for bankruptcies which would lead to a general 
deterioration in services. 54 
Express services, excursions and tours were deregulated in 
October 1980. By March 1981 it was being reported that 
competition had led to a decrease in the average real fare, 
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while at the same time many of the less well used routes were 
suffering reductions in service. It was also suggested by 
The Omnibus Magazine that: "It has become very clear that the 
main beneficiary of the. deregulation has not been the 
independent sector, as both proponents and opponents of the 
Act assumed, but National Travel. .. The ability to reduce 
, 
fares in response to independent competition was a noteworthy 
feature.,, 55 
Although this judgment may be premature, it does indicate 
the possibility of a serious dilemma for advocates of the 
market model. The policy might achieve success in reducing 
fares, but ironically competition may benefit the public 
corporation rather than the public sector (private operators 
might claim that Government subsidies to the NBC lead to 
unfair competition). It is doubtful if a Conservative 
Government would wish its policies to have the effect of 
harming the private operator, despite the theoretical 
commitment to a free market. From the NBC point of view, with 
the traditional value-Q of the busman still prominent, it might 
even be argued that to some extent the company welcomed the 
opportunity to prove that the spirit which motivated Power and 
Shire at MR during the 1930s was still alive! 
F. Conclusion 
Both Oxfordshire CC and the Conservative Government 
achieved only partial success in implementing the market model. 
We have seen that the CC's initial objective was to control the 
level of bus subsidies by means of cash limits. The 
commercially minded management of the COMS was willing to 
co-operate in identifying an unsliboidized network, and the CC 
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could claim that the eventual implementation of MAP vindicated 
its approach. Other areas of the policy were not so successful. 
Extended school contracts failed principally as a result of the 
veto placed upon them by the Traffic Commissioners, while the 
County discovered that apathy at the local level was an almost 
insuperable obstacle to the successful introduction of local 
transport groups. 
The aspect of the CC's policy which was most successful 
concerned the control of subsidies, and came about as a result 
of adjustments within the existing system. The COMS was well 
disposed towards the commercial approach, and was happy to 
leave the social service element of the services in the hands 
of the CC. The CC itself was also pleased to see the 
introduction of MAP, for it suggested that the COMS recognized 
the need for greater efficiency. In contrast extended school 
contracts were seen by both the COMS and the Traffic 
Commissioners as serious threats to their existence, while the 
local transport groups appeared to the general public to be a 
somewhat esoteric concept. The CC itself could not change 
the regulatory system, but by means of an inter-personal 
issue network it could hope to influence policy at the national 
level. 
The Conservative Government stopped short of total 
deregulation (to the disappointment of Oxfordshire) but from 
the point of view of the bus industry the 1980 Transport Act 
was a radical measure. In the event, the Trial Areas concept 
did not prove easy to implement while the early evidence 
suggested that deregulation of express services might not 
have the effects hoped for by the Government. In addition, 
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a public outcry led to the abandonment of the scheme to repeal 
the free school transport clauses of the 1944 Education Act. 
On the whole, the'experience in both Oxfordshire and at 
national level demonstrated the resilience and persistence of 
the existing structure within the bus industry. It could 
nevertheless be argued that in time the values expressed by 
the Oxfordshire CC may become more widely accepted and that 
the associated"issue network Itwill lead to a dissolution of the 
existing system. The relationship between an"issue network, 
corporatism and pluralism within the policy process, and the 
dynamics of change itself is an issue which we will study in 
the Conclusion. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
CONCLUSION 
A. Introduction 
In Chapter One we put forward a number of hypotheses on the 
nature of policy implementation, and the relationship between 
implementation and the policy process as a whole. In this 
Chapter we will attempt to clarify and modify the initial 
analysis in the light of lessons learned from the case-study. 
No single case-study is exactly like any other, and it is 
unwise to draw sweeping conclusions about the British policy 
process from the example of the bus industry. It is possible 
that a model which may be quite appropriate as a description of 
one policy area may be quite inappropriate for another. 
1 
Nevertheless we can study our particular policy sector in the 
general , context 
of what it tells us about the relationship 
between implementation and policy change. The link (or lack of 
it) between these two elements of the policy process demonstrates 
how the case of the bus industry can be placed in the context of 
analyses of the British policy style. In addition, our study 
can also allow us to identify features which enable implementation 
to be more successful and also examine the inter-relationship 
between policy-making processes and policy-implementing processes. 
The dynamics of a policy process are inevitably complex and 
the "straight line" model which we outlined.?, arly in Chapter One 
rarely exists in the real world. Perhaps the most obvious 
feature of implementation is the interaction between the 
objectives of the policy-makers and the day-to-day work of the 
implementers. Any new piece of legislation faces a battle for 
the legitimacy which the respect of the implementers bestow upon 
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it, for without at least some measure of gerwral acceptance and 
support the policy is unlikely to survive. The manner in which 
a policy is implemented may change over a period of time, but 
to be ignored is the worst fate which can befall it. Despite 
the undoubted strengths which it derives from its officiality, 
a new policy can be a weak and helpless creature unless it is 
nourished and developed by the environment which it inhabits. 
B. The Nature of Policy Initiatives 
In Chapter One we hypothesized that activity within the 
implementation process was likely to have a high degree of 
influence over the nature of the policy process as a whole. We 
assumed that the process of "comprehensive reprogramming" comets 
about primarily through everyday interaction during implementation. 
This bottom-up interpretation of policy change implies that 
policy-makers will be made aware by the implementers that a 
change in direction is necessary. Hence central government will 
adjust its stance to fit this new reality at. the operational 
level. 
Many critics of the, British political system have observed 
a general resistance to radical change and an over-emphasis on 
pluralistic methods of policy-making leading to incremental 
change. A typical view-is expressed by Jack Hayward who 
considers that: "In Britain deeply entrenched liberal attitudes 
have made it difficult to contemplate state economic intervention 
as a natural and permanent phenomenon, much less a form of 
planning that would upset traditional self-restraining methods 
of government. " 
2 In Chapter One we attempted to demonstrate 
the endemic limits of control and outlined the functional value 
of pluralism, but we also hypothesized that the officiality of 
government places it in a strong position to inculcate its own 
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values into a policy process. These conflicting models (also 
exemplified by Wildavsky's cogitation-interaction model) are 
the key to the top-down or bottom-up interpretation of change, 
and we should look at our case-study in order to determine how 
policy initiatives came about and the extent to which the 
analysis confirms Hayward's observation. 
When-we examine these policy initiatives we must bear in 
mind that it is not necessarily commensurate with changes in 
policy implementation and policy impact. A degree of 
discontinuity is implicit in the aggregative model with its 
'orders of comprehension' and cognitive gaps, although the 
extent to which the gaps are bridged can play a significant part 
in determining the extent to which a particular policy iA 
successfully implemented. We might hypothesize that the most 
powerful agents of change are likely to be those groups or 
perhaps 'orders of comprehension' which bridge the gaps most 
successfully by communicating with, and then influencing, other 
elements, in the-. policy procQss. In this sense those who have 
the most success in overcoming (or possibly circumventing) the 
natural forces at work in the aggregative model are the real 
power-holders. 
The nature of the message transmitted may be one of values, 
allocation of resources or technical knowledge, but the manner 
in which the message is received will determine its success, 
e. g., if central government can successfully transmit its own 
values to implementing agencies (or at least gain substantive 
control of their activities) then the policy is much more likely 
to be successfully executed (at least from the government's 
point of view). Thus we can also examine our case-study from 
the point of view of the various methods employed by government 
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to implement its policies, and also the manner in which 
implementers and groups attempted to communicate with and 
influence both government and the process in general. In this 
manner we can perhaps identify which means of communication are 
most successfully employed by each element and their relative 
power. 
If we examine policy initiation by itself within our 
case-study, we can determine the extent to which it is derived 
from either a top-down or bottom-up process in addition to 
identifying the source of the policy values. Plowden makes it 
clear that the 1903 Motor Car Act came about as a direct result 
of pressure from motoring interests and that: "At no point did 
it (a memorandum on the draft Bill) suggest that the Government 
might have an interest in the question beyond the basic political 
need to silence an embarrassing clamour. " 
3 The Government had 
formed no firm ideas on the place of the motor car in society, 
but was prepared to officially acknowledge its presence and to 
allow it a degree of freedom. This Act thus came about as a 
direct result of bottom-up pressures in which a set of groups 
were able to impose their own values on the Government. In the 
terms of Wildavsky, the motor vehicle had become a policy 
problem to which a solution was required, but the Government 
lacked sufficient knowledge and experience of this means of 
transport to make a decision itself. In 1903 the Government 
policy amounted to the creation of a negotiated environment by 
means of achieving accommodation with the principal interests. 
In this sense the 1903 Act complies with the general British 
image of pluralistic policy-making. 
A community of interests was also at work in the making of 
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the 1930 Road Traffic Act, but in other respects circumstances 
had changed considerably since 1903. The creation of a Ministry 
of Transport had given new impetus to Government policy in this 
area, and the MoT was from the outset determined to adopt an 
interventionist approach. The MoT produced the original draft 
Bill with the objective of introducing a more rational and 
co-ordinated regulatpr9 system, and saw the introduction of the 
Traffic Commissioners as a means whereby a higher degree of 
central control could be exercised over the industry. At the 
same time it recognized that the system could not work without 
the consent of the area companies. Thus the circulation of the 
draft Bill to the principal interests and the predictable 
findings of the Royal Commission led to a crucial exchange 
between Government and principal group, i. e., the area companies 
were given a virtual monopoly in exchange for being made subject 
to a higher degree of external control. Despite its elitist 
beginnings within the MoT, the 1930 Act became a feasible 
reality as a result of being corporatist in character. 
The Omnibus Owners' Federation was happy to co-operate with 
the Government when it realized how the large companies would 
benefit from the new system, while in contrast the small 
operators were politically unorganized and played little part in 
the policy process. The remarkable unanimity between Conservative 
and Labour Governments, exemplified particularly by the remarks 
of Colonel Ashley during the Second Reading of the Bill, was an 
outstanding feature of this particular policy-making process. 
Although it might have been expected that a Labour Government 
would favour greater regulation and public control over the bus 
industry, the Conservatives were also won over by the Ministry's 
case for greater rationalization. Herbert Morrison's defence 
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of the Bill on grounds of efficiency rather than public 
accountability (although perhaps partly reflecting Morrison's 
own personal political philosophy) also indicated the power of 
the Ministry to influence its Ministers. 
Although given whole-hearted support by the major companies, 
the Road Traffic Bill arose from a top-down process instigated 
by the MoT (significantly the administrative rather than the 
political top). The Bill's contents embodied the values of a 
variety of interests, but its gestation period had covered a 
large part of the 1920s and it could be argued that without the 
work of the MoT it would not have come to pass. The licensing 
system brought about by the 1930 Road Traffic Act was an 
officially instigated radical measure which was manipulated by 
the MoT in order that it should be accepted by all the principal 
interests. Thus the corporatist nature of the agreement should 
not blind us to the skilful way in which the MoT convinced both 
Conservative and Labour Ministers that the Bill was an essential 
measure. 
The road passenger transport aspects of the 1947 Transport 
Act were publicly characterized by the Labour Government's 
general value judgment that a large section of the transport 
industries should be nationalized in order that a more rational, 
co-ordinated, and publicly accountable transport system could be 
created. The Government had few fixed ideas about the bus 
industry, and ironically the Area Scheme concept was originally 
suggested by Sir Frederick Heaton, the Chairman of Tilling. 
The Government appeared to have given little thought to the 
licensing system itself and the main criticism of the Traffic 
Commissioner-Area Company relationship came from backbench MPs. 
Despite Heaton's initiative, the contents of the 1947 Transport 
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Act which affected the bus industry could not be regarded as 
representing an orthodox form of bottom-up policy process. 
Sir Frederick's involvement did give the policy in part a 
corporatist character, for he literally "delivered" his members 
to the Government in return for a sizeable amount of money. It 
might indeed be argued that Sir Frederick's Area Scheme 
suggestion had more to do with his own business plans than any 
sudden conversion to Labour Party policy! 
It is also significant to note the appointment of the 
MoT's former Permanent Secretary to be the first Chairman of 
the BTC. As in 1930, there appeared to be a strong association 
between the objectives of the MoT and Labour Party Policy. The 
MoT's wish to be an aggressive planning Ministry was largely 
commensurate with the Labour policy of greater public control 
and an integrated transport system, and these two interests 
formed a powerful alliance. 
Disregarding later events, neither the BET companies nor 
the municipalities could persuade the Government to change its 
policies, and apart from Heaton's initiative there is little 
sense of negotiated order or a process of accommodation 
surrounding the making of the 1947 Transport Act. The creation 
of the BTC and the Executives was a radical measure, and the 
Area Schemes were only frustrated at the implementation stage. 
The 1947 Transport Act was essentially a Party measure, 
i. e., it is impossible to imagine a Conservative Government at 
any time bringing forward a similar piece of legislation. The 
1962 Transport Act was equally a Party affair, for it largely 
reflected Conservative Party values. It was perhaps ironic that 
having worked with the BTC for so many years the Conservative 
Government should choose to abandon the former at a relatively 
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late date, but the new Boards had a greater degree of autonomy, 
while the THC was directed to "act commercially". The Government 
had become dissatisfied with the performance of the BTC, and in 
this respect it could be said that a learning process had taken 
place, but essentially the THC represented a Conservative model 
of how a state owned industry should operate. The creation of 
the THC could therefore be regarded as a radical Party measure, 
even though there were few tangible effects on the day-to-day 
work of the bus industry. 
The 1968 Transport Act represented a Party policy whose 
values were particularly associated with the socialism of 
Barbara Castle. The PTA concept owed a debt to the old Area 
Schemes, and to this extent the Labour Government learned more 
from its predecessor than from practical experience in the 
intervening years. Active hostility to Mrs. Castle's proposals 
was expressed by VOICE, while the municipalities were only 
marginally more co-operative than they had been in the 1940s. 
Such obstacles were not to deter the Minister, however, who had 
no intention of being swayed from her chosen course of action. 
The campaign of VOICE was seriously undermined by the BET's 
decision to sell its bus companies to the Government. Unlike 
Sir Frederick Heaton, the BET did not make any show of 
ideological support for the Government's plans, although the 
secrecy with which the deal was completed suggested that the 
company was somewhat embarrassed by its actions. Both Tilling's 
and BET were eventually prepared to co-operate with the 
Government when the price was right, although their action 
entailed the companies' departure from the policy process 
altogether. In these cases the Government wished to reduce the 
number of interests within a policy area in the hope that a more 
515 
manageable system could be created. The corporatist nature of 
the bargain did not entail the companies taking any direct part 
in policy-making, but instead involved financial remuneration 
in return for "delivering" their members and departing 
from 
the debate altogether. 
The role of the THQ in shaping the 1968 Transport Act was 
of crucial importance. The THC was a state owned body which 
nevertheless was able to take an active part in the policy-making 
process. Its success in persuading a Labour 
Government that its 
organizational shape should be preserved in the form of the NBC 
and the NFC was a considerable triumph. In the sense 
that the 
THC was officially part of government it might be argued that 
the creation of the NBC came as the result of a top-down process, 
but in reality the THC was an independent interest with its own 
clear organizational objectives. Richardson and Jordan emphasize 
the degree to which policies may be the result of departmental 
4 
conflict within government, and we have also noted how 
Labour public transport policy appeared to depend on forming 
some kind of alliance of interests with the MoT. 
The Government no doubt realized that it would require the 
co-operation and goodwill of the company busmen if it was to 
implement the PTAs successfully, and the creation of the NBC 
ensured a degree of continuity. The 1968 Transport Act thus 
embodied both radical and incremental change. It was radical 
in the creation of the PTAs despite widespread opposition, and 
incremental in the creation of the NBC and the preservation of 
the company busmen. The success of the THC indicated that the 
experience of the Tilling busmen within the BTC and the THC had 
made them more politically aware of how government may be 
516 
influenced. In this sense they had come to occupy a similar 
'order of comprehension' to government without being an 
integrated part of it. The political sophistication of the 
THC was in direct contrast to the relative naivety of VOICE, and 
indicates that government may often be more susceptible to 
pressure from an integral member of its own community than from 
an outside interest. 
The 1972 Local Government Act could be regarded as 
representing more of a consensus than previous Post-War 
legislation affecting the bus industry. Although the NBC valued 
its independence, by the early 1970s the company perceived that 
it required some form of revenue support and at that time 
considered the County Councils to be the proper channel for 
this aid. The local authorities themselves were largely caught 
up in the general movement towards comprehensive planning, while 
the Government created the DoE and also wished to encourage 
corporate management within the County Councils. 
At this time there did appear to be a real policy community, 
to such an extent that as in 1930 there was little public debate 
on the implications of Section 203. Initially it was intended 
that the municipalities would lose control of their bus services, 
but in this case the Government bowed to pressure from an 
outside interest. The Party element was provided by the 
Conservatives' adherence to a two-tier system, for it was 
likely that under a Labour Government Unitary Authorities would 
have been introduced, resulting in the probable disbandment of 
the NBC. The direct intervention of the Shire Counties into the 
work of the NBC undoubtedly represented a radical change, but 
with a high degree of consensus. It was also perhaps significant 
that by 1972 discussions on the reorganization of local 
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government had continued for such a length of time that few 
interests could claim not to have been consulted. 
The 1974 Local Government Act could be seen as an extension 
of the 1972 Act, and the creation of the TPP and TSG system set 
out the procedure by which the Counties were to proceed in 
implementing their new responsibilities. Although the DoE took 
the initiative there were extensive consultations with the local 
authority associations and the bus operators. The policy had a 
relatively low political salience, and there was little more 
general public debate than for the 1930 licensing system. 
The 1978 Transport Act could be regarded as a low-key 
policy resulting from a long public debate. Perhaps 
understandably after the activity of earlier years there was no 
radical organizational change, although the creation of the 
PTPs could be regarded as something of a landmark in the 
politicization of public transport. The TPP, TSG and PTP 
system also allowed scope for greater central control, which 
suggested that the DTP was seeking to fulfil aims which had been 
evident in the 1920s. Nevertheless the suggestions of 
corporatism behind the Labour Government's policy implied a 
type of bottom-up process, in which the Government had reversed 
its original intention of reducing bus subsidies. 
On de licensing, it appeared that a relatively high degree 
of consensus had developed during the 1970s. The 1977 Minibus 
Act and the 1978 Transport Act both represented an acknowledgment 
by a Labour Government that licensing changes were necessary. 
Once again, corporatism was evident in the Government's 
Community. Bus concept (on this occasion there was a strong 
1 
bottom-up element, for Community Buses were running before they 
were officially recognized in the 1978 Transport Act), while the 
518 
increasing political activity of environmental and voluntary 
groups appeared to have some effect on Government policy towards 
car sharing and various experimental services. The policy on 
delicensing had taken on an appearance of decentralization and 
incremental change, but this relatively peaceful progress was 
shattered by the advent of the new Conservative Government. 
Although the 1980 Transport Act might have been still more 
radical, the instigation for the new policy undoubtedly came 
from Norman Fowler's determination to demonstrate his Party's 
commitment to the market model, with the result that the 
Secretary of State placed himself towards the political forefront 
in a job that might have initially been considered something of 
a backwater (we saw in our chapter on Oxfordshire that the 
Conservative "issue network" which was built up based its ideas 
more on values than practical experience in the County itself). 
The top-down process took the principal interests by surprise, 
but this Party measure was rushed through with only a minimum of 
concessions by the Government. 
We could thus conclude from our analysis that a majority 
of legislation affecting the bus industry has had (at least 
superficially) a Party basis and a predominantly top-down 
character. Corporatism has been evident on several occasions, 
but where a government has set its mind on introducing a certain 
policy, even the most powerful interests have been unable to 
veto its progress prior to implementation. The emphasis on 
ideology rather than consensus is perhaps surprising in view of 
popular assumptions about the British style of policy-making, 
and suggests that governments need not be particularly 
susceptible to external constraints. 
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Richard Rose points out that: "Laws are a unique resource 
of government. Whereas many institutions in society are able 
to raise money, hire personnel and organize on a large scale, 
only government has the power to enact laws determining what 
people can do. " 
5 Government's monopoly power in making laws 
is something which no group can emulate, but government itself 
is only one part of society as a whole. In the sense that a 
Party consists of members who might derive their political 
philosophy from general experience, we could link policy to the 
manner in which "comprehensive reprogramming" is caused by 
everyday interaction, but our study suggests greater discontinuity 
than is proposed by this model. 
Rose himself asks the question: Do Parties Make a 
Difference? and bases his study on an examination of British 
government activity between 1957 and 1979. He initially 
considers four different models of Party competition: 
the Adversary, the Consensus, the Manifesto and the Technocratic, 
and tests them against the British experience. The Adversary 
and Manifesto models are based on the twin premises that Parties 
will oppose one another and that a Party which develops its 
policy while in Opposition will carry it out in Government. The 
Consensus and Technocratic models are based on the twin premises 
that there is no difference between Government and Opposition 
and that Conservative and Labour Governments will behave in the 
same way. In examining a number of constitutional changes, such 
as election law, de-colonization and the reorganization of 
central and local government, Rose concludes that the Adversary 
model applies in the majority of cases, although with regard to 
the reorganization of central government and the civil service 
he considers that the Consensus model appears to be more 
520 
applicable. Although we stressed the strong element of 
consensus surrounding the reorganization of local government, 
Rose considers that it was a textbook example of Adversary 
politics. 
6 He points to the manner in which the Local 
Government Bill was hotly contested, and there was no doubt that 
the Labour Party objected to the two-tier system and the 
consequent decline in the power of the County Boroughs. 
Nevertheless the values and aims underlying reorganization, 
e. g., comprehensive planning and corporate management, were 
common to both Parties and it could be argued that this unity 
was more important than the eventual structure. 
In the case of managing the economy Rose concludes that 
there has been a higher degree of consensus, but that a 
Technocratic Consensus Model is too static to be useful. 
Instead he employs the image of a moving consensus, in which a 
secular line of change is observable over a number of years. 
The contrast in Rose's analysis between constitutional change 
and managing the economy, i. e., the Adversary Model being more 
applicable to the former and a moving consensus to the latter, 
tends to confirm that there are differing policy styles within 
the various sectors. Rose, himself, comes to the general 
conclusion that: "Much of a Party's record in office will be 
stamped upon it by forces outside its control. " 
7 He argues 
that Parties are most liable to act as Adversaries when their 
own interests are immediately at stake and when they are 
indebted to a particular group. On the whole, however, he 
considers that there are powerful forces (e. g., resource limits, 
party competition, relationships with civil servants and Global 
politics) pushing a government towards consensus. Thus Parties 
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d9fnake a difference but: "Necessity more than ideological 
consensus is the explanation for similarities in behaviour. " 
8 
If Rose's analysis is correct, then we would expect to find 
Adversary politics in our case-study when a Party has allied 
itself with a particular interest (presumably a type of 
corporatism). The Labour Party is closely allied to the trade 
unions, but despite general union support for both concepts it 
could not be said that the creation of the BTC or the setting 
up of the_PTAs specifically favoured the union interest. 
Perhaps surprisingly, it is easier to ally Labour with the 
interests of the bus companies in the 19307sand also with Sir 
Frederick Heaton in the 1940s, although it could not be said 
that labour was indebted to these companies. Most significantly, 
we have already noted the close correlation between Labour 
policy and Departmental interests. It is easier to find a link 
between Labour and the unions in the 1977 White Paper and the 
decision to revßrse the decline in subsidies, although the 
original decision to reduce subsidies had-also been taken by a 
Labour Government. The commercial orientation of the THC allied 
it closely with Co". ervative values, although in reality its 
inertia only maintained the status quo. Again, the contents of 
the 1980 Transport Act were highly adversarial and no doubt the 
Government hoped that the, private sector would. ienefit, but 
there was no "grassroots! ' support for the measure from the 
private operators. 
What were.. the elements which apparently led to the 
adversarial politics in our case-study, and conversely how did 
consensus policies develop? This point is important not just 
for what it tells us about the nature of policy-making,, but also 
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because autonomous policy-making within the policy process 
suggests a victory for cogitation over interaction. In these 
circumstances what are the effects on implementation? Also can 
a lack of communication and learning within a policy process 
affect the quality of that process? We will examine the 
implications for implementation later in the Chapter, but for 
the moment we can examine how it was that legislation affecting 
the bus industry was first und foremost of a top-down nature. 
The policy-making in this study has predominantly taken 
place in the enclosed world of the Department and groups 
ultimately controlled by government. In this 'order of 
comprehension' radical policy changes, most notably the creation 
of the Traffic Commissioners, the BTC and the PTAs, have 
occurred when the Governments and Departmental officials have 
been largely in accord aver objectives. In addition, the 
Tilling busmen gained an enormous political advantage by 
understanding how the internal policy network operated. The 
radical changes referred to above are of organizational structure 
rather than allocation of resources, and it could be argued that 
the introduction of Bus Grant and latterly TSG represented the 
most far-ranging radical change of all, for implementers are 
likely to feel directly the effects of government decisions on 
the level of public expenditure. 
Richardson, and Jordan point out the manner in which 
Departments are characteristically in competition in 
policy-making, in particular with regard to resources. 
9 If 
one Department is unable to predominate over the others, then 
incremental change in expenditure is likely in all areas. In 
Britain, frequent financial crises have made Governments of 
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both Parties aware of the need to control public expenditure 
and such systems as the Public Expenditure Survey Committee and 
Planning-Programming-Budgeting have been tried in an attempt to 
introduce a higher degree of rational planning into the 
budgeting process. Sectorization and the significance of 
political factors have limited the success of these experiments, 
but the important factor is that within Whitehall no Department 
is likely to be allowed to 'step out of line' for long. Thus 
it would be unlikely that the DTp could act autonomously in 
increasing (or even decreasing) its total expenditure at any 
one time. 
Richardson and Jordan consider that: ". ... Departmental 
pluralism derives from the adopting by Ministers of this 
advocacy role and it has been a recurring theme in prescriptions 
to improve the Cabinet that those Cabinet Ministers allocating 
resources should (as far as possible) not be representing 
Departmental interests. " 
10 Ministers 
-do 
represent Departmental 
interests_lbut the pluralistic character of the process has 
in-built checks and balances which are likely to restrict even 
the most expansionist Department. It may be significant to 
note that the Bus Grant also benefited the Labour Government's 
industrial strategy and had the support of the Prime Minister, 
while TSG was introduced in the expansionist mood which 
generally surrounded the reorganization of local government. 
We saw how the creation of the DoE could not eradicate the 
sectorization of policy areas, and that Departmental status was 
eventually restored to Transport. Despite Departmental 
pluralism with regard to allocation of resources, sectorization 
of policy areas enabled Transport to develop its own particular 
style. Structural change does not carry the same obvious 
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financial implications as the distribution of subsidies, and in 
our study Departmental relationships were not of the same 
importance in introducing the former. Until the 1970s the bus 
industry was not in receipt of official aid, but the MoT had 
become closely concerned with the work of the bus companies 
during the 1920s. The rationalization of companies and the 
subsequent sale to government of both Tilling and BET buses 
brought the vast majority of stage carriage services under 
official control, and prevented the policy community from 
becoming over-large. 
The relative Departmental autonomy with regard to structural 
change gives us a primary clue as to the most powerful interest 
in this particular policy-making process. Party policy was a 
highly significant input, and particularly in the case of Labour 
policy it became the catalyst of change, but on the majority of 
occasions this change could not have taken place without the 
co-operation of the Department itself. 
An extremely strong thread running throughout the legislation 
in this study is the manner in which the MoT sought to increase 
its control over the bus industry, e. g., the Traffic 
Commissioners are appointed by the Minister, the BTC was intended 
to be a strong central planning agency responsible to government, 
the Minister originally had the authority to appoint several 
members of the PTAs, while the TPP, TSG and PTP system enabled 
government to keep a check on the work of the local authorities. 
The strong interventionist character of the MoT and DTp has not 
encouraged a wide public transport policy community to develop 
in this policy area, and clientelism is not particularly 
evident, i. e., external pressure groups do not control the 
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Department. Richardson and Jordan consider that a Departmental 
interest can be influential in determining which problems. are 
put on the political agenda: "This stems from the civil 
servant's role as gatekeeper-of information, which is the main 
basis of the view of civil servants as policy influencers. " 
11 
In this respect, it was quite reasonable for. the MoT and DTp to 
hope that greater political control over the bus industry would 
in reality mean greater central administrative control. 
Counteracting this interpretation of the legislation is the 
creation of the THC and the role of this organization in shaping 
the 1968 Transport Act. We have already remarked how the THC 
gained from its inside knowledge by assisting in the creation 
of the NBC, and the philosophy behind the, THC could itself be 
regarded as somewhat counter to the mainstream of MoT policy. 
In this sense we could argue that there are political gains and 
losses when an important interest comes under official control. 
Although that interest might lose some of its former 
independence, if it retains its identity it can act as a 
counterweight to the power of the Department. The philosophy 
of the company busmen was popular with the Conservatives, while 
the Labour Government also found it prudent not to ignore the 
views of the THC. 
ThQ impression of a small and relatively enclosed 
policy-making community predominates in this study. Party-t, and 
in some cases the individual character of Ministers, has been 
. of considerable importance in the introduction of legislation, 
but this influence perhaps camouflages Departmental interest 
as a highly significant motive power within the policy-making 
process. In this sense the Departmental attitude has shaped 
the policy-making debate, and adversarial politics have been a 
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subordinate function of this central factor. Some degree of 
change is evident in recent years with relaxations in the 
licensing system. If the network of public transport services 
becomes more varied. and fragmented then a more pluralistic 
policy-making process may be developed. Indeed central 
policy-making may become less important in road passenger 
transport policy. Although the situation is very different to 
the 1920s, future years. may see the completion of a cycle in 
which public transport is once more relatively independent of 
official control. The trend towards de licensing under both 
Labour and Conservative Governments suggests that as the full 
financial implications of continued revenue support reveal 
themselves to Ministers and officials, a consensus may emerge 
that resources have been stretched to the limit. In this case 
the limits on a Department's financial resources may affect its 
administrative approach to a policy area. Thus events at the 
operational level will ultimately affect the policy-makers in 
the form of a bottom-up process. 
C. Government and the Means of Implementation 
Although there are signs of an increasing interaction 
between implementation and policy-making with regard to 
legislation and the bus industry, it cannot be said that as a 
whole there is significant evidence of a connection between 
these two elements in the process. What are the implications of 
this phenomenon for the policy process as a whole? If we accept 
that events in the implementation phase are of considerable 
importance to the success of the process, then does this 
discontinuity imply a failure? 
We have attempted to indicate throughout this study that 
the aggregative model, with its images of 'orders of comprehension' 
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and cognitive gaps, can be applied in the case of legislation 
and the bus industry, for the model itself implies a natural 
discontinuity and limits to control. If the behaviour of the 
participants for cognitive and/or motivational reasons 
exacerbates the discontinuity, to what extent does this damage 
the process? In policy studies generally there is an innate 
paradox of how a discontinuity can be at the same time both a 
strength and a weakness. Discretion and the exercising of 
technical expertise can be a powerful force towards efficiency 
and the satisfactory performance of a task, but if in exercising 
this discretion and expertise the discontinuity between levels 
becomes almost complete, then learning within the process 
becomes an impossibility. Wildavsky recommends a mixture of 
cogitation and interaction, with the emphasis on interaction, 
but whichever mixture is chosen there will be certain costs and 
benefits. 
The overlap of policies does not necessarily become evident 
at the policy-making level, but once the implementation process 
commences then each new policy will be superimposed on the 
effects of its predecessors. In our study there was little 
attention given by policy-makers to the impact of new policies 
on old ones, in particular the relationship between the bus 
companies, the Traffic Commissioners and the Shire Counties. 
Given the top-down nature of the policy-making process, and 
the Departmental quest for greater central control, we might 
expect that at the operational level the policy will appear 
somewhat remote and ultimately irrelevant. In certain cases, 
in particular the 1947 Transport Act, this proved to be the 
case, but in others the area companies were to feel the direct 
impact of policy implementation. The appointment of the first 
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Traffic Commissioners in 1930, and of the C. C. Public Transport 
Co-ordinators after local government reorganization in 1974, 
were highly significant policy developments which even the most 
independent operator could not ignore. 
Although the MoT adopted a planning and interventionist 
approach almost from the outset, it circulated the Draft Bill 
and was anxious to obtain consent for the new policy on licensing 
from all the principal interests. The policy might be described 
as having its origins in elitism but it eventually became 
corporatist and achieved a consensus for this radical change. 
A primary feature of the policy was the extent to which it was 
portrayed by all concerned as an administrative rather than a 
political measure, i. e., it was presented as an example of 
rational, value-free, policy-making. Because of the interests' 
differing values, the long-term objectives were not made clear, 
and in this sense it was the presence of a consensus which gave 
the policy its rationality. In commenting on the limits to 
rational policy-making Smith observes that: "The (rational) 
model also suggests a neat division between ends (values) and 
means (instrumentals). But final ends (or goals) are rarely 
specified and all intermediate ends can be seen as means to some 
higher end. Thus there is no clear distinction in policy-making 
between fact and value. " 
12 None of the interests involved in 
the 1930 Road Traffic Act was clear about its higher end, or 
even the exact implications of its implementation. Each of the 
interests had an intermediate end based on its own values, but 
as instruments of change the Traffic Commissioners were not to be 
the compliant servants of any one interest. Richardson and 
Jordan describe how the trade organizations affected by the 
Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1956 were anxious that a 
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judicial rather than an administrative tribunal should be set 
up. These interests considered that: "Experience had shown 
over the years that the courts were not particularly effective 
instruments for controlling monopolies and restrictive 
practices. " 
13 Richardson and Jordan consider that the Board 
of Trade was only too pleased not to be made accountable for 
politically sensitive decisions. Thus: "In the restrictive 
practices case the self-interest of the bureaucracy (the Board 
of Trade) coincided with the self-interest of the outside 
pressure groups. " 
14 
An analogy could be drawn between this case and that of the 
Traffic Commissioners, although by holding the power of 
appointment over the Commissioners government could not 
completely disclaim responsibility for the latter's actions. 
In addition, operators were given a right of appeal to the 
Minister. As the MoT took such a strong initiative in devising 
the new system it could not be said that it was acting under 
duress, or that it wished to remain aloof from the work of the 
bus industry. The local authorities had been the previous 
licensing authorities, but had not exerted any kind of control 
over the industry. The Traffic Commissioners were a half-way 
house by which the MoT could hope to assert some degree of 
authority over the busmen without operating the levers of power 
directly. 
This kind of solution to a policy problem almost inevitably 
leads to a position where the agents of change take on an 
identity of their own which itself influences the nature of the 
process. As Smith observes: "Administrative power is part of 
the price which a modern society pays for efficient 
administration. " 
15 
When we observe the implementation of the 
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1930 Road Traffic Act, there is no doubt that both government 
and the MoT could claim success in producing a more rational 
administrative structure, although the busman had forfeited 
some of his independence. Crosland-Taylor, who later prided 
himself on becoming "State Owned Without Tears, " described in 
graphic detail the enormous increase in paperwork which the 
new system entailed and the need to build up a good relationship 
with the Chairman of the Commissioners. For more than forty 
years the Chairman was a magisterial figure, and although he 
relied on the goodwill of the operators, the principles of 
cross-subsidization enabled him to ensure the continuation of 
unprofitable but socially necessary services. In this sense 
the Labour Party objective of ensuring the greater public 
accountability of the apparatus could be said to have been 
fulfilled. 
By placing an instrument of change near the operational level, 
and creating a new 'order of comprehension', the MoT ensured 
that the 1930 Act would have a profound impact on the industry. 
The price was paid in the discretion allowed to the Chairman and 
the lack of central control over his relationship with the bus 
companies. Although he was appointed by the Minister, there are 
few cases of a Chairman being dismissed, for such a drastic 
course of action could only be taken in the most extreme 
circumstances. The 1930 Act appeared to be deliberately vague 
as to the exact responsibilities of the Commissioners, and the 
logical conclusion to draw is that the MoT wished its authority 
to be of an indirect and informal nature. In examining 
communication within the policy process, Lundquist concludes 
that; "The decision-makers&conscious attempts to influence the 
implementation in a certain direction are called steering. " 
16 
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Lundquist continues by referring to analysis of feedback by the 
decision-maker as review and the manner in which deviations by 
the implementer are corrected as re-steering. Lundquist's 
model is similar to Downs' in that it assumes some degree of 
authority leakage which requires correcting, and it could also 
be said that steering requires the decision-maker to have some 
idea of the direction in which he is moving. The form of 
steering most applicable to the case of the Commissioner is 
indirect. In addition to appointing the Commissioners, 
government provided only the financial resources to operate the 
system. Lundquist concludes that the most reliable steering 
would occur: ". ... if the implementer shaped the evaluations 
of the decision-maker or understood him to be rational. " 
17 
The Commissioners understood that they were intended by 
government to bring some sort of order and control to the bus 
industry, and in this sense could be described as the ideal 
agents to implement the policy. 
The discretion allowed to the Commissioners enabled them 
to obtain the desired results by means of an exchange with the 
bus industry. Cross-subsidization in return for virtual monopoly 
served well as a means of achieving policy objectives and there 
was no need for the decision-makers to institute a process of 
re-steering. The bus operators' acceptance of the need to 
operate unprofitable but socially necessary services also 
indicated that the policy had been successful in reinforcing 
(but not changing) certain values of the busmen. The policy 
was successfully implemented by means of agents operating an 
exchange process at the local level, and also by the exclusion 
of "politics". Over the years the Commissioners' decisions 
developed as a type of common law, in which uniformity by means 
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of precedent was of overriding importance. There were important 
political values underlying the 1930 Act, e. g., the 
disadvantages of competition and the value of uniform pricing, 
but until the 1970s the politicians were oblivious to this state 
of affairs. In this case bureaucracy ruled supreme. 
We have dwelt on the 1930 Act because it represents the 
primary example in our study of a successfully implemented 
policy, i. e., it achieved its intended intermediate objectives. 
Interaction served the ends of cogitation, but as a result the 
'order of comprehension' created by interaction had become a 
powerful institutional force within the process. In this sense 
it might be said that the information content of the 
communication between decision-maker and implementer was 
extremely low, and that central control was exercised not so 
much through what government said to the Commissioners but 
rather through what the Commissioners were allowed to say to 
the operators. This type of indirect control worked in this 
case, but on the next occasion when a new agent was introduced 
into the process the result was not so predictable. 
The C. C. Co-ordinators' impact on the bus industry was 
considerable, as the 1972 Local Government Act intended it to 
be, but the Counties have adopted a considerable diversity of 
approach. Bus transport had become a more political issue and 
the values underpinning ideas about its operation more diverse. 
Self quotes Mannheim's judgment that politics is a non-rational 
matrix interacting with a rationalized sphere of settled 
procedures known as bureaucracy. Self goes on to say: 
"But rational here means routinized and predictable, and just as 
these are functional for bureaucracy (e. g., they both systematize 
and defend its operations), so they are dysfunctional for 
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politics because politicians lose flexibility of response and 
power once committed to following a logical chain of 
co-ordinated decisions. " 
18 The implementation of Section 203 
of the 1972 Local Government Act could not be described as 
routinized and predictable, although the passive approach does 
have some degree of uniformity. There is no equivalent of the 
case law built up by the Commissioners, and in several examples 
the outcomes are highly unpredictable. 
The diversity of approach can be partly attributable to 
political values, most obviously visible in our case study of 
Oxfordshire. Nevertheless, the Co-ordinators themselves have a 
primary role in a policy area where the expertise of many 
councillors is low. The NBC subsidiary-C. C. relationship has 
something of the appearance of the issue network" described by 
Heclo, in which issues become more politicized but also become 
the exclusive domain of experts in the policy area. Few local 
transport or environmental groups have gained significant access 
to the process, which has a highly corporatist appearance. 
We should note that as in the case of the Commissioners, 
the Counties have tended towards a process of accommodation 
with subsidiaries. Once again, interaction within the 'order 
of comprehension' is of prime importance, and we studied in 
particular how seemingly acrimonious relationships had opened 
up channels of communication, which had led in turn not only to 
material exchanges but also an exchange of values. 
Governments discovered that this local interaction was not 
particularly amenable to central control, and that even coercive 
measures were of only limited value. Montjoy and O'Toole 
construct a matrix in which a mandate is either vague or specific 
and new resources are or are not provided. The C. C. 
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Co-ordinators could be placed in the category of vague mandate 
and provision of resources (in the form of TSG) and Montjoy and 
O'Toole conclude that in this case a dominant coalition will 
have the opportunity to focus these activities in accordance 
with its own goals and/or world view. This analysis refers to 
an intra-organizational process, but these hypotheses could be 
equated with the behaviour of Co-ordinators. 
Significantly, in their case studies Montjoy and O'Toole 
also discovered examples of agency inaction in this category. 
This result might be equated with the passive approach in our 
case studies, where Counties appear uncertain or even apathetic 
as to. the correct action. Not surprisingly Montjoy and O'Toole 
conclude that: .... the surest way to avoid 
intra-organizational implementation problems is to establish a 
specific mandate and provide sufficient resources. " 
20 
Although the TPP and TSG system was initially put forward as a 
devolution of authority it could be regarded as an example of 
goal displacement, for by the mid-1970s it was being employed 
as a means of exerting greater central control, (although the 
evidence of our study as a whole suggests that this may have 
been the Departmental objective from the outset). William 
Rodgers was not particularly successful in achieving his aims, 
and Counties such as South Yorkshire and Oxfordshire were not 
inclined to change their approach. Directives became more 
specific, but it was interaction at the local level which 
continued to be the dominant feature in determining policy 
outcomes. Government was successful in initiating a radical 
policy change, but was not so successful in controlling 
implementation of the new system. 
The one obvious example of policy failure was the affair of 
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the Area Schemes. The RPE was captured by the Tilling busmen, 
and the Government was powerless to impose its will on the 
implementers. The creation of the PTAs and PTEs represented a 
classical piece of political (and perhaps bureaucratic) learning 
in that intermediate agencies and lengthy consultative processes 
were dispensed with in favour of direct implementation. 
Structural changes such as the creation of the THC and later the 
PTEs and the NBC aroused a great deal of controversy and comment 
at the policy-making stage, but their implementation has not had 
the same traumatic effect. Unlike the introduction of 
Commissioners and Co-ordinators, agents were not introduced at 
or near the operational level, although it could be argued that 
the Director-General of a PTE has more power than any previous 
municipal busman. 
The 1980 Transport Act was a contentious measure, and the 
removal of licensing regulations for express services and 
excursions was not enthusiastically received by the operators. 
Nevertheless this Act has had a considerable impact on the 
industry and represents an interesting example of legislation 
achieving its objectives without a consensus on the part of 
the implementers. The key to this success appears to be the 
converse of the 1930 Act, i. e., the removal of the original 
agents. The Commissioners lost their licensing powers in this 
sector, with the result that the operators were left to fend 
for themselves, (in time the NBC and the private operators may 
achieve some sort of accommodation with each other, although 
the former could use the Act as a means of lessening its 
commitment to cross-subsidization). Wildavsky's claim that 
policy becomes its own cause is confirmed by this example, where 
radical policy change is achieved by first introducing, and then 
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fifty years later removing, a particular regulatory system. 
Ironically, in the same period the Government suffered a 
defeat on its proposals to remove free school transport. This 
was the one example in our study where "grassroots" opposition 
caused the failure of a policy at the legislative phase, while 
the Trial Areas failed for the same reason as the Area Schemes. 
These disappointments for the Government indicated that the 
implementation of radical change which depended only on the 
consent and enthusiasm of the implementers was likely to fail. 
Central government does not appear to be particularly successful 
in inculcating values into the policy process by some sort of 
identification. It requires particular levers of pgwer, such 
as the introduction of Commissioners and Co-ordinators. Even 
then, government's ability to steer and re-steer is strictly 
limited. It is radical policy initiation which has proved to 
be the forte of government, but the degree of policy success is 
primarily determined by the implementers. 
A further important lever of government power is the 
allocation of resources. The manner in which government 
distributes money does have an observable effect on policy 
outcomes, e. g., if Bus Grant, TSG and fuel tax rebate did not 
exist then the service to the public would be affected. Also 
Government investment in the Leyland National project obviously 
influenced the NBC's investment programme, particularly in 
favouring single-decker buses. Given the decline in passenger 
demand, there was an obvious incentive for the operators 
themselves to encourage the introduction of one-man operation, 
but the Bus Grant accelerated the process. The NBC has a 
somewhat ambivalent attitude towards subsidies, but it has never 
actively campaigned for a reduction in government aid! 
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We have already referred to government's difficulties in 
controlling TSG, and we also saw how the Counties have been 
unable to determine how the NBC subsidiaries calculate their 
subsidy claims. Financial control by either central or local 
government is thus a two edged sword. On one side the authority 
which holds the purse-stringy appears to have considerable power 
in deciding the nature of the policy outcome. On the other side 
that same authority can find itself almost powerless to impose 
significant control over the implementing agency. There is a 
constant battle between financial power-on one side, and the 
power of technical expertise on the other. It is at this point 
that the top-down and bottom-up forces are in most obvious 
conflict. 
D. Implementation in the Policy Process 
We have attempted to demonstrate so far in this chapter how 
the policy-making process in our case-study was primarily a 
top-down process, and also both the strengths and limitations of 
government in implementing policy. Bottom-up forces appear to 
have considerable power in the implementation process, but what 
is the nature of their power? If the company busmen are so 
crucial to the success of implementation, why might it be so 
difficult for them to become more prominent in the policy-making 
process? Also, why do the implementers appear to rely on the 
policy-makers for the introduction of radical policy change? 
Although our case-study has been chiefly concerned with 
examining the NBC and implementation, in the later stages we 
also examined in detail the development of public transport 
co-ordination in the Shire Counties. Radical change within the 
NBC or in its relationship with the environment is not easily 
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detected. Change has undoubtedly occurred, most notably in the 
increasing acceptance of external financial aid, but it has come 
largely as a result of the force of circumstance. The 
introduction of the Commissioners was a radical policy change, 
but it was comfortably accommodated by the busmen. In certain 
cases we saw how the Co-ordinators also initiated radical change 
(with outcomes which can still not be easily predicted), while 
the NBC attempted to control the pace of change. The 
conservative nature of the NBC can be seen as forming part of 
the organizational culture, although even here there were 
internal tensions. The instigators of MAP saw it as a radical 
policy change, but nearer the operational level there was 
considerable resistance to these initiatives. In reality it 
appeared that all the radical initiatives made by Counties such 
as Cheshire and Oxfordshire, together with the development of 
NA. P, eventually arrived at a point where the originally hoped 
for pace of change was slowed down. 
Thus within the 'order of comprehension' of the implementers 
it was interaction leading to incremental change which was 
predominant. Lindblom terms interaction between autonomous 
participants in a policy process as partisan mutual adjustment 
and defends this form of activity as being more rational than 
comprehensive or synoptic planning. He considers that 
incrementalism is more likely to yield real knowledge than a 
search for some over-ambitious objective. In reply to the 
frequent criticism that incremental change gives too much power 
to vetoing interests, and that some of the interests may be 
under-represented, he concedes these as weaknesses of 
incrementalism, but considers that in the course of time greater 
knowledge may lead to improved incremental rationality: 
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"Hence, in a very distant future, bigger political steps may 
be possible - not large without constraint but perhaps 
significantly less incremental than at present. " 
21 
In our study we have seen that incrementalism and partisan 
mutual adjustment has been the predominant form of implementation, 
in marked contrast to the radical initiatives emanating from the 
centre. This dichotomy between policy-making and implementation 
indicates a considerable discontinuity, but perhaps more 
significantly also suggests that radical policy change at the 
centre needs to be implemented in an incremental fashion if it 
is to be successful. 
The discontinuities between 'orders of comprehension' 
appear to be of fundamental significance to the policy process. 
In our study it was technical expertise within the 'order of 
comprehension' which gave power to both policy-makers and 
implementers. Company busmen outside government could not 
significantly influence the policy-making process, only the THC 
could do that. At a later date, the NBC was successful in 
persuading the Conservative Government that it should remain in 
existence. Nevertheless, the MoT was the most powerful agent of 
change at this level, for it knew how to operate and control the 
network. During implementation, it was the NBC who took over 
this position. The NBC as an organization has been relatively 
successful in giving a strong sense of identification to its 
employees, in marked contrast to the inability of the 
policy-makers to inculcate their values into the policy process. 
Nevertheless, there are many 'orders of comprehension' within 
the NBC, and again a tendency towards discontinuity. The power 
of the Regional Director indicates the importance of an 
individual placed on the margins between two spheres of activity. 
540 
Central management sees the Regional Director as ultimately 
enforcing. company policy on subsidiaries, while concurrently 
gaining information on activity at the operational level. As 
well as being the Regional Director, he is also Chairman of the 
subsidiary, and must to some extent represent its interests. 
On some occasions this may place him in an invidious position, 
but the knowledge which he gains of both camps can give him 
real power. 
We also identified an 'order of comprehension' at Midland 
Red's Divisional level. In particular, the Divisional Manager 
based at Rugby had a high degree of autonomy, and his 
relationship with the Warwickshire Co-ordinator was a 
particularly notable feature in this area of activity. This 
local interaction also illustrated the importance of the 
individual to the implementation process, for where individuals 
possess indispensable expertise, their values and their 
relationships with others at the same level is of considerable 
importance in determing the nature of policy impact. 
The relationship between radical and incremental change was 
also indicated in the development of MAP, where the instigators 
of the programme were forced to realize that change could not be 
implemented without consultations with local busmen, County 
Councils and even the public! 
MAP itself had several objectives, some internal to the 
NBC and others concerned with adjusting to the environment. 
Internally, it was intended that MAP could raise the morale of 
employees, strengthen the sense of cohesion within the company, 
give a sense of organizational renewal, and improve the company's 
financial position. Externally, it was hoped by the NBC that it 
could demonstrate to government its ability to operate 
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efficiently, while also assisting in the development of relations 
with the Counties. We saw that in the event MAP itself altered 
in character by adapting itself to the NBC structure and the 
policies of the various Counties. Data collection and 
interpretation was refined, but at the same time it was realized 
that MAP could not be implemented on the basis of a radical cure 
for the NBC's problems, but had to be adapted to existing 
practices. 
Externally, events in Counties such as Oxfordshire and 
Cheshire demonstrated different purposes for MAP. Particularly 
in Cheshire, MAP itself became just one element in a developing 
relationship entailing a process of exchange. Throughout the 
study we have seen behaviour which might be construed as 
commensurate with self-interest. At the same time we have also 
seen that this behaviour may be interpreted in other ways, and 
in any case often becomes lost through change over the course 
of time. In this respect self-interest is of lesser analytical 
importance than the examination of social activity. 
The discontinuities between 'orders of comprehension' and 
the authority of expertise within them might be described as the 
prime strength of the implementers. The difficulty is that this 
same expertise which has such power in its own sphere is not 
easily communicable or transferable to another. March and Olsen 
outline the characteristics of incomplete learning cycles. They 
assume that individuals will learn and adapt their behaviour 
accordingly: "They are, however, operating under conditions in 
which (a) what happened is not immediately obvious, (b) why it 
happened is obscure, and (c) whether what happened is good is 
unclear. " 
22 Thus the participant will build up his 
understanding on what he sees, likes and trusts. This learning 
542 
under ambiguity is an endemic property of the policy process, 
for no individual can have 'perfect information'. 
The general implication of these cognitive gaps is that 
within the policy process as a whole, bottom-up forces are less 
powerful than top-down ones. A participant at the operational 
level may try to convey his understanding of events to someone 
at a higher (or different) level of the process, but the limits 
to understanding can be severe. In any case the official may 
be content with his lot and not wish to communicate with another 
level unless some sort of crisis appears. Even then, he will 
need to translate the instructions into terms which make them 
operationally feasible. Throughout our study, characteristics 
of the aggregative and 'Babel House' models have been observable. 
Values are not easily inculcated by the policy-maker, but he can 
institute radical organizational change and control the 
allocation of resources, even though it comes about as the 
result of learning under ambiguity. Nevertheless, control over 
implementation or the ability to 'fine tune' is often notable 
for its absence. Top-down activity can invade and institute 
change in 'orders of comprehension' although its power is 
limited. In contrast, bottom-up forces are less powerful as 
communicators between spheres of activity, but within their own 
sphere they reign supreme. This power of interaction dominates 
cross-sections of the policy process, but is circumscribed by 
endemic limits to understanding. 
E. Implementation and the Policy Process 
The chief modification arising from this study with regard 
to our initial conclusions about implementation and the policy 
process, is that we under-estimated the capacity for discontinuity 
between policy-making and implementation. Consequently, we 
543 
over-estimated the extent to which everyday interaction during 
implementation could influence the character of the policy 
process as a whole. Many of the points we made in Chapter One 
we have attempted to demonstrate in this concluding Chapter, 
and throughout the study as a whole, e. g., the validity of the 
aggregative model, the limits to "perfect implementation", the 
relationship between interaction and change, the trend towards 
consensus in implementation and resultant exchanges, the 
particular power of government and the tendency towards 
corporatism at both national and local levels. Although we 
examined the importance of discontinuities from the outset, the 
case-study primarily indicated the high degree to which various 
elements within the policy process may not be interdependent. 
Implementation itself cannot be divorced from preceding and 
succeeding stages of the policy process, e. g., even a failed 
policy holds the attention of implementers while policies also 
overlap, but the nature of the aggregative model places policy 
in a subordinate role when compared to complex real world 
activities. Thus we saw that the officiality of government and 
its capacity to institute radical change does not necessarily 
give it the ability to inculcate its values into the policy 
process as a whole. 
In the same way, policy change at the local level does not 
always seek the status of the official stamp of government. 
Indeed, radical policy change was principally the prerogative of 
central policy-makers. Although it would once again be unwise 
to generalize on this point, it does appear that those working 
at the operational level are likely to be highly suspicious of 
changes to the status quo. It was this innate conservatism 
which had an inhibiting effect on policy initiatives by both 
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central and local government. On the other hand, the officiality 
of government does give it the power to introduce radical 
structural change by the introduction of an agent at or near the 
operational level. Even then, this change is only likely to be 
successful if the agent can initiate some type of interaction 
and exchange process with the chief interests. 
The strength of the discontinuities also throws doubt on 
the hypothesis that a corporatist policy may contain within itself 
the seeds of a different approach. There was strong evidence of 
corporatism at all levels of the policy process, and as we have 
seen it was interrelationships at the implementation level which 
primarily determined the success of the policy. In other words, 
in our particular study none of the legislation under review was 
implemented in a manner that could be described as highly 
centralized or highly decentralized. At a particular moment in 
time the actions of central government appeared to be of greater 
significance to the process, but at other times it was activity 
nearer the operational level which was more relevant. The 
nature of the aggregative model tends to defy easy classification 
into centralized or decentralized policies, for the ability of 
any level of activity to strictly control another is limited. 
Similarly, our conclusion that top-down forces are more 
powerful than bottom-up forces suggests that Kaufman's image of 
a policy cycle may not be easy to identify in practice. In our 
study the chief evidence for some kind of policy cycle comes 
from the 1980 Transport Act. Deregulation of express services 
and excursions does not take the situation back to the 1920s, 
but it does represent a significant dismantling of the 
administrative system. We saw how the Conservatives wished to 
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"liberate" the bus operators, and in this sense we could say 
that, fifty years on, there was a move towards completion of the 
cycle. We should nevertheless also note that financial 
limitations have pushed governments of both Parties towards 
deregulation, and it is perhaps this economic reality which 
will push the policy cycle nearer to completion rather than 
dissatisfaction with the administrative system itself. 
This study has not been intendedly prescriptive, but if 
there is one particular lesson for the British policy process, 
it may be that change (either radical or incremental) is only 
likely to be successfully implemented as a result of significant 
interaction and exchange among the implementers. Discontinuities 
give severe limits to central control, but by employing the gaps 
rather than fighting them, government may attain some degree of 
success in fulfilling its objectives. At the same time, the 
autonomy of implementers does raise serious questions about 
political accountability. We have already referred to the 
increasing politicization of issues going hand in hand with 
increasing specialization, and at the local level the apparently 
natural trend towards a corporatist relationship may exclude 
many interests. In the case of bus transport the voice of the 
passenger traditionally has been weak, while transport and 
environmental groups have tended to concentrate their activity 
at national rather than local levels. If a more pluralistic 
system is to evolve, then these groups may need to develop 
expertise on activities nearer the operational level. The trend 
towards de licensing may also assist in this process. 
One further point to note is that, despite limits to 
understanding, both central and local government might find it 
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advisable to encourage the relatively weak bottom-up processes. 
In this way it would be more likely that at least the most 
obvious obstacles to successful policy implementation could be 
forseen. Examination of much legislation and of MAP suggests 
that policy-makers continue to initiate change with little or 
no understanding of its implications. If interaction is the 
essence of change within the implementation process, then at 
least the degree of learning under ambiguity should be minimized. 
547 
CHAPTER TEN: References. 
1. See J. J. Richardson: `Policy-making and Rationality in 
Sweden: The Case of Transport. 
British Journal of Political Science 9: 3 
2. Jack Hayward: (Change and Choice: the Agenda of Planning. 1 
Planning, Politics and Public Policy (J. Hayward and 
M. Watson Eds. ) Cambridge University Press 1975, P. 6. 
3. W. Plowden: The Motor Car and Politics in Britain 
Pelican 1973 P. 35. 
4. Richardson and Jordan: op. cit. P. 25. 
5. R. Rose: Do Parties Make a Difference? Macmillan 1980 P. 74. 
6. Ibid. P. 99. 
7. Ibid. P. 141. 
8. Ibid. P. 145. 
9. Richardson and Jordan op. cit. P. 27. 
10. Ibid. 
11. Ibid. P. 94. 
12. B. Smith: Policy-Making in British Government 
Martin Robertson 1976 P. 142. 
13. Richardson and Jordan: op. cit. P. 145. 
14. Ibid. 
15. Smith: op. cit. P. 25. 
16.1. Lundquist: (The Control Process: Steering and Review 
in Large Organizations. ' Scandinavian Political Studies 
Vol. 7 1972 P. 32. 
17. Ibid. P. 39. 
18. P. Self: (Planning: Rational or Political? i 
Policy Analysis and Policy Innovation (P. R. Baehr and 
B. Wittrock, Eds. ) Sage 1981 P. 221 
548 
CHAPTER TEN: References. (Continued) 
19. R. S. Montjoy and L. J. O'Toole: tToward a Theory of Policy 
Implementation: An Organizati onal Perspective. ' 
Public Administration Review September/October 1979 P. 468. 
20. Ibid. P. 473. 
21. E. Lindblom: 'Still Muddling, Not Yet Through. ' 
Public Administration Review November/December 1979 P. 522. 
22. J. G. March and J. P. Olsen: 'The Uncertainty of t he Past: 
Organizational Learning Under Ambiguity. ' 
European Journal of Political Research 3.1975 P. 161. 
